Shakib vs The State Of Karnataka
2022 Latest Caselaw 10541 Kant

                            1



        IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

            DATED THIS THE 08TH DAY OF JULY, 2022

                           BEFORE

          THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

           WRIT PETITION No.15266 OF 2021(GM-RES)


BETWEEN:

MR.SHAKIB
AGED 27 YEARS,
SON OF MR.SULAIMAN,
RESIDING NEAR IDGA
2ND BLOCK KATIPALLA VILLAGE,
MANGALURU TALUK,
DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT - 575 001.
                                               ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI VIKRAM RAJ, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
       THROUGH THE
       SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
       BARKE POLICE STATION,
       MANGALURU,
       DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT - 575 001.

2.     JAIL SUPERINTENDENT
       DISTRICT JAIL MANGALURU,
       DAKSHINA KANNADA - 575 001.

       BOTH ARE REPRESENTED BY
       THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
       HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
                                2



     BENGALURU - 560 001.
                                                  ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP)

     THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED FIR IN CRIME
NO.16/2021 OF BARKE POLICE LODGED ON THE COMPLAINT OF
R-2 FOR THE OFFENSES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 143, 147,
148, 353, 332, 324, 307 R/W SECTION 149 OF I.P.C. VIDE ANNX-
B, PENDING IN THE FILE OF JMFC (VI COURT), MANGALORE AND
ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THE SAID CASE IN SO FAR AS
PETITIONER HEREIN IS CONCERNED AND ETC.,

     THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 16.06.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-


                             ORDER

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question Crime

No.16/2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 143,

147, 148, 353, 332, 324, 307 r/w 149 of the IPC; Crime

No.17/2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 143,

147, 148, 353, 332, 324, 307 r/w 149 of the IPC; Crime

No.18/2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 143,

147, 148, 353, 332, 324 r/w 149 of the IPC and Crime

No.19/2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 143,

147, 148, 353, 332, 324, 504, 506, r/w 149 of the IPC, all

registered by the Barke Police Station, Mangalore, Dakshina

Kannada and seeks a consequent direction for taking these

crimes as additional crimes/charge sheets of crime No.15 of

2021 instead of multiple FIRs.

2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition, as

borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:

The petitioner - accused No.2 in Crime No.15 of 2021, is

an under-trial prisoner, housed at District Prison, Mangalore. He

is also under remand warrant in Crime No.20 of 2021 and under

body warrant in all other crimes that are called in question as

afore-mentioned. It is the allegation against the petitioner that

on 25-04-2021 in the morning hours between 6.50 a.m. and

7.00 a.m. i.e., 10 minutes, when five of the jail wardens were

opening lock of the jail, the petitioner and nine others who were

in Room No.3 of 'A' Barrack, pushed the wardens and entered

into Room No.5 and after entering Room No.5, they were

shouting as "Don't let Ansar live, kill him" and allegedly led

attack on one Mr. Jainuddin, assuming him to be Ansar with

steel vessels and later attacked Ansar, who was in the same

room. While doing so, they also led the attack on the Jail Warden

who came to the rescue of Jainuddin and Ansar. The victims

were then taken to the hospital. On the aforesaid incident, the

Jail Superintendent registered a crime at 10 a.m. on 25-04-2021

at Barke Police Station in Crime No.15 of 2021 for offences

punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 353, 332, 324, 307

r/w Section 149 of the IPC. Thereafter, it is alleged, that

between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m. the jail staff and the police

staff came into the barracks to convince under-trial prisoners not

to create problems. At that point in time, it is alleged that the

under-trial prisoners attacked the jail staff and the police

officers. This crime is registered at 11.00 a.m. on the same day

describing the incident took place between 6.50 a.m. and 7.00

a.m. and adding that the alleged attack was on Ansar. This

becomes crime in Crime No. 16 of 2021 for the same offence.

3. On an allegation that the petitioner along with others

had attacked several persons between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05

a.m., a crime came to be registered against the petitioner and

several others in Crime No.17 of 2021. Another crime came to

be registered by the very same complainant i.e., the Jail

Superintendent in Crime No.18 of 2021 for the very same

offence and for the same period i.e., 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m

- 5 minutes.

4. The Jail Superintendent again registers a complaint in

Crime No.19 of 2021 against the same accused for the same

offence on the same incident between 5.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m.

Therefore, there are 5 crimes registered for two incidents - three

of which are registered for the incident that happened between

5.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. and two of which are registered for the

incident that happened between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m. It is

the registration of multiple FIRs by the respondent that is called

in question in the subject petition.

5. Heard Sri Vikram Raj, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner and Smt. K.P.Yashodha, learned High Court

Government Pleader appearing for the State.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would

contend that the respondent/Jail Superintendent has deliberately

registered five FIRs for two different incidents that took place at

the same time for the same offence against the same accused

and submits that fundamental right of the petitioner would get

violated if multiple FIRs are registered for the same offence. He

would also submit that the investigation in every crime can

always become an additional charge sheet to be filed by the

Police at a later point in time and multiple crimes being

registered is only to take away the right of the petitioner to get

enlarged on statutory bail in the event the charge sheet is not

filed in a particular time. The learned counsel for the petitioner

would emphasise on the fact that registration of multiple FIRs

would be hit by the doctrine of sameness and cannot be

maintained.

7. On the other hand, the learned High Court Government

Pleader would refute the submission of the petitioner to contend

that the issue is not with regard to the doctrine of sameness, as

the doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of the case. Every time

when the petitioner went from one barrack to another attacking

people, the victims were different and it is based upon the

victims, multiple FIRs are registered and, therefore, would seek

to defend the action of registration of such multiple FIRs.

8. I have given my anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the respective learned counsel and

perused the material on record.

9. The afore-narrated fact of alleged attack by the

petitioner and others on the victims is not in dispute. The issue

is not concerning merit of the incidents. The issue in the case at

hand is with regard to registration of multiple crimes based upon

two incidents that allegedly took place at two different times -

one between 6.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. for a period of 10 minutes

and the other between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m. for a period of

five minutes. It is germane to notice the offences so alleged in

every crime. Crime No.15 of 2021 is the first one to be

registered for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 353,

332, 324, 307 and 149 of the IPC and the time of occurrence of

the incident is between 6.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. The relevant

portion of the FIR in Crime No.15 of 2021 is quoted hereunder

for the purpose of ready reference:

"WÀ£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ :6th JMFC Court, Mangalore City, Dakshin Kannada Dist.

1. f¯Éè: Mangaluru City ªÀÈvÀÛ/G¥À «¨sÁUÀ: Central Sub Division

¥Éưøï oÁuÉ:B Barle PS

C¥ÀgÁzsÀ ¸ÀASÉå: 0015/2021 ¥Àæ.ªÀ.ªÀ.¢£ÁAPÀ:25/04/2021

2. PÁAiÉÄÝ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®AUÀ¼ÀÄ: IPC 1860 (U/s - 143, 147,148, 353, 332, 324, 307,49)

3. (a) PÀÈvÀå £ÀqÉzÀ ¢£À: Sunday ¢£ÁAPÀ ¢AzÀ: 25/04/2021¢£ÁAPÀ

ªÀgÉUÉ:25/04/2021

ªÉüɬÄAzÀ: 06:50:00 ªÉüÉAiÀĪÀgÉUÉ: 07:00:00

(b) oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀvÀðªÀiÁ£À ¹éÃPÀj¹zÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ:25/04/2021 10:00:00

§gÀªÀtÂUÉAiÀÄ°è/ºÉýPÉ: Writeen."

The second crime that is registered by the very same

complainant on the very same incident and against the very

same accused is in Crime No.16/2021 and for the very same

offence. The said crime is also registered for the incident

between 6.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. The third crime is registered in

Crime No.19 of 2021 by the very same complainant and the time

now is between 5.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. which covers the earlier

crime between 6.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. The offences are same,

incident is the same and the accused are also same. Therefore,

there are three crimes registered for the very same offence

which has occurred between the very same time i.e., between

5.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. Some of the accused are common in all

these crimes and victims are different. The incident also

remains the same. This is the first chunk of crimes registered

against the petitioner and others which are three in number.

10. The second chunk FIRs registered are for an incident

that happened between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m. for 5

minutes. The allegation made herein is the same vis-à-vis the

three registered for the incident that happened between 5.50

a.m. and 7.00 a.m. Here the allegation is that the jail staff and

the police were sought to have been beaten in the squabble. The

first of the crime that is registered on this incident is Crime

No.17 of 2021 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147,

148, 353, 332, 324, 307 and 149 of the IPC. The complainant is

the same as is found in the other crimes as he is the Jail

Superintendent. A second complaint is registered in Crime

No.18 of 2021 by the different complainant-Police Officer

alleging the very same offences against the accused, accused

being the same and time of occurrence of the offence also being

the same.

11. What would emerge from the afore-narrated facts is

that there are three FIRs registered for an incident that

happened between 5.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m. and two FIRs

registered for the incident that happened between 10.00 a.m.

and 10.05 a.m. Petitioner is accused No.2 in all the five crimes.

The issue that requires to be considered is, whether registration

of three FIRs on one incident that happened between 5.50 a.m.

and 7.00 a.m. and registration of two FIRs for the incident that

happened between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m. is sustainable or

is hit by the doctrine of sameness.

12. Before consideration of the said issue, I deem it

appropriate to notice the judgments rendered by the Apex Court

from time to time concerning registration of multiple FIRs on the

very same incident against the same accused, in the cases of:

(i) T.T.ANTONY v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS -

(2001) 6 SCC 181;

(ii) UPKAR SINGH v. VED PRAKASH AND OTHERS -

(2004) 13 SCC 292;

(iii) BABUBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS -

(2010) 12 SCC 254;

(iv) SURENDER KAUSHIK AND OTHERS v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS - (2013) 5 SCC 148;

(v) ANJU CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF UTTARPRADESH AND ANOTHER - (2013) 6 SCC 384;

(vi) P.SREE KUMAR v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

- (2018) 4 SCC 579;

(vii) ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS - (2020) 14 SCC 12; and

(viii) KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P - (2021) 5 SCC 435.

13. The Apex Court right from the judgment in the case of T.T.

ANTONY (supra) has held as follows:

"15. On these contentions, four points arise for determination:

(i) whether registration of a fresh case, Crime No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station on the basis of the letter of the DGP dated 2-7-1997 which is in the nature of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC, is valid and it can form the basis of a fresh investigation;

(ii) whether the appellants in Appeals Nos. 689 and 4066 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1522 and 8840 of 2000] and the respondent in Appeals Nos. 690- 91 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 2724-25 of 2000] have otherwise made out a case for quashing of proceedings in Crime No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station;

(iii) what is the effect of the report of Shri K. Padmanabhan Commission of Inquiry; and

(iv) whether the facts and the circumstances of the case justify a fresh investigation by CBI.

... ... ... ...

18. An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as first information report (FIR) though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nickname suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station is the first information report -- FIR postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All other

informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H -- the real offender -- who can be arraigned in the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be. It is of course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the Magistrate concerned even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person suspected to be the accused.

27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322:

1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) CrPC before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A.

Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside."

(emphasis supplied)

Again, the Apex Court in the case of Babubhai (supra) holds as

follows:-

"23. If the two FIRs are read together, it becomes clear that the incident started in the morning as per both the FIRs CR No. I-154 of 2008, lodged by Mr M.N. Pandya, Sub-Inspector of Police, stated that he reached the place of occurrence after receiving the information from the police station and found that the mob had already dispersed. The case of the prosecution is that when the police reached the place of occurrence of the first incident, the mob had already dispersed, could not be correct for the reason that some of the witnesses have stated that the clash was going on when the police arrived and police resorted to force to disperse the mob. In fact, it was the police who summoned the ambulances which took the injured persons to hospitals."

(emphasis supplied)

In the case of SURENDER KAUSHIK (supra), the Apex Court holds

as follows:

"24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident.The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter-FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any

further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. As is further made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , the prohibition does not cover the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a different version of the same incident. Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two FIRs is permissible."

(emphasis supplied)

In the case of ANJU CHAUDHARY (supra), the Apex Court holds

as follows:

"14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in-charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate;

offences are similar or different, or even where the

subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police.

Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re- examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay

Tyagi v. Irshad Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.) (emphasis supplied)

In the case of P. SREEKUMAR (supra) the Apex Court holds as

follows:-

"30. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in mind when we examine the facts of the case at hand, we find that the second FIR filed by the appellant against Respondent 3 though related to the same incident for which the first FIR was filed by Respondent 2 against the appellant-Respondent 3 and three bank officials, yet the second FIR being in the nature of a counter-complaint against Respondent 3 was legally maintainable and could be entertained for being tried on its merits.

31. In other words, there is no prohibition in law to file the second FIR and once it is filed, such FIR is capable of being taken note of and tried on merits in accordance with law.

32. It is for the reasons that firstly, the second FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed the first FIR. Had it been so, then the situation would have been somewhat different. Such was not the case here; second, it was filed by the appellant as a counter-complaint against Respondent 3; third, the first FIR was against five persons based on one set of allegations whereas the second FIR was based on the allegations different from the allegations made in the first FIR; and lastly, the High Court while quashing the second FIR/charge-sheet did not examine the issue arising in the case in the light of law laid down by this Court in the two aforementioned decisions of this Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC

(Cri) 211] and Surender Kaushik [Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 953] and simply referred the three decisions of this Court mentioned above wherein this Court has laid down general principle of law relating to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code."

(emphasis supplied)

In the case of ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI (supra), the Apex

Court holds as follows:

"37. In the present case, all the FIRs or complaints which have been lodged in diverse jurisdictions arise out of one and the same incident

-- the broadcast by the petitioner on 21-4-2020 on R. Bharat. The broadcast is the foundation of the allegation that offences have been committed under the provisions of Sections 153, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 500, 504 and 506 IPC. During the course of the hearing, this Court has had the occasion, with the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel, to peruse the several complaints that were filed in relation to the incident dated 21-4-2020. They are worded in identical terms and leave no manner of doubt that an identity of cause of action underlies the allegations levelled against the petitioner on the basis of the programme which was broadcast on 21-4-2020. Moreover, the language, content and sequencing of paragraphs and their numbering is identical. It was in this backdrop that Mr Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted (in our view correctly) that this Court may proceed to quash all the other FIRs and complaints lodged in diverse jurisdictions in the States, leaving open, however, the investigation in respect of FIR No. 238 of 2020 dated 22-4-2020 transferred from Police Station Sadar, District Nagpur City to N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai.

... ... ... ...

39. A litany of our decisions -- to refer to them individually would be a parade of the familiar

-- has firmly established that any reasonable restriction on fundamental rights must comport with the proportionality standard, of which one component is that the measure adopted must be the least restrictive measure to effectively achieve the legitimate State aim. Subjecting an individual to numerous proceedings arising in different jurisdictions on the basis of the same cause of action cannot be accepted as the least restrictive and effective method of achieving the legitimate State aim in prosecuting crime. The manner in which the petitioner has been subjected to numerous FIRs in several States, besides the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of identical allegations arising out of the same television show would leave no manner of doubt that the intervention of this Court is necessary to protect the rights of the petitioner as a citizen and as a journalist to fair treatment (guaranteed by Article 14) and the liberty to conduct an independent portrayal of views. In such a situation to require the petitioner to approach the respective High Courts having jurisdiction for quashing would result into a multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary harassment to the petitioner, who is a journalist."

(emphasis supplied)

The law, in this regard, as laid down in the aforesaid cases is

followed in the latest judgment of the Apex Court in the case of

KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA (supra) wherein, it is held as follows:

"6. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] takes us to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the

question of material improvements made in a subsequent private complaint by the same complainant against the same accused with regard to the same incident, it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt from Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], which further clarifies the holding in T.T. Antony [T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048]: (Upkar Singh case [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], SCC pp. 297-98, para 17) "17. ... In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code."

(emphasis supplied in the original)

It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] that bears directly and strongly upon the present case.

(emphasis supplied)

If the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-

extracted judgments is considered qua the facts obtaining in the

case at hand, what would unmistakably emerge is, the

registration of multiple FIRs on the same incident would be hit

by the doctrine of sameness and would have to be obliterated,

as it would amount to violation of fundamental rights of a citizen.

14. As quoted hereinabove, the incidents have happened

at two different spells - first spell being 5.50 a.m. to 7.00 a.m.

and the second spell being 10.00 a.m. to 10.05 a.m. For the

incident that has happened in the first spell three FIRs are

registered and for the incident that happened in the second spell

two FIRs are registered. The incident that runs through the

stream of three FIRs in Crime Nos. 15 of 2021, 16 of 2021 and

19 of 2021 are the same having taken place between 5.50 a.m.

and 7.00 a.m. The incident that runs through Crime Nos. 17 of

2021 and 18 of 2021 have taken place between 10.00 a.m. and

10.05 a.m. Therefore, crime Nos. 16 of 2021 and 19 of 2021 are

a repetition of FIRs of the crime that is first registered in Crime

No.15 of 2021 and crime No.18 of 2021 is the second FIR

registered for the incident that has taken place between 10.00

a.m. and 10.05 a.m. The offences in crime Nos. 15 of 2021, 16

of 2021 and 19 of 2021 are the same and offences in crime Nos.

17 of 2021 and 18 of 2021 are the same. Therefore,

undoubtedly registration of multiple FIRs is hit by the doctrine of

sameness.

15. The issue before the Court is not concerning merits of

registration of complaints or FIRs. It is the registration of

multiple FIRs that is called in question. Therefore, the contention

of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner merits

acceptance on juxtaposition of FIRs and when it is tested on the

anvil of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-

quoted judgments. Therefore, crime in FIR Nos. 16 of 2021 and

19 of 2021 for the incident that took place between 5.50 a.m.

and 7.00 a.m. would stand obliterated as Crime No.15 of 2021 is

the same. Crime No.18 of 2021 would stand obliterated as

Crime No.17 of 2021 is the same. Therefore, for the two

incidents, registration of two FIRs are sustained - one in Crime

No.15 of 2021 and the other in crime No.17 of 2021. Rest of the

FIRs would be hit by the doctrine of sameness.

16. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.

(ii) FIRs in Crime Nos. 16 of 2021, 19 of 2021 and

18 of 2021 stand quashed, qua the petitioner.

(iii) The respondents are at liberty to take recourse to

such avenues in law against all the accused in all

these FIRs to be brought under the ambit of

Crime No.15 of 2021 and Crime No.17 of 2021.

Ordered accordingly.

Sd/-

JUDGE

bkp CT:MJ