Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3316 Kant
Judgement Date : 25 February, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.G.S.KAMAL
R.S.A.NO.2513 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
1. SHRI U.G. SREENIVASA RAO
S/O SHRI GANAPATHI SHET,
MAJOR
OWNER OF MYSORE CAFE
SPM ROAD,
SAGAR TOWN - 577 401.
2. SHRI GANAPATHY S. NAYAK
S/O LATE SARVOTHAN NAYAK
MAJOR,
SRI. RAMANATHA NILAYA
S.N. NAGAR,
SAGAR - 577 401.
... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.B.N. SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, ASSTS.,)
AND:
SHRI. N. MALATHESH
S/O RUDRAPPA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
MERCHANT, MARKET ROAD
SAGAR - 577 401.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. VISHWANATH R. HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR C/R)
2
THE REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND
DECREE DATED 08.03.2006 PASSED IN R.A. NO. 74/1997 ON
THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN), SAGAR, ALLOWING
THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND
DECREE DATED 12.08.1997 PASSED IN O.S. NO. 85/1997 ON
THE FILE OF THE PRL. MUNSIFF, SAGAR.
THIS APPEAL BEING HEARD AND RESERVED, COMING
ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, THE
COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Present appeal is by the appellant/defendant
aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 08.03.2006
passed by The Civil Judge (Sr.Dn), Sagar in
R.A.No.74/1997 (hereinafter referred to as the 'first
appellate court'), in and by which, the first appellate
court while allowing the appeal of the plaintiff, has set
aside the Judgment and Decree dated 12.08.1997 passed
by the Principal Munsiff (Jn.Dn.), Sagar in
O.S.No.85/1997 (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial
court').
2. Parties are referred to by their original ranking
before trial Court.
3. The aforesaid suit in O.S.No.85/1997 was filed
by the plaintiff for relief of mandatory injunction and
possession on the premise that the suit schedule
properties are ancestral properties. That the plaint 'A'
schedule property being the property bearing
Assessment No.251, IDN Khatha No.228, SPM Road,
Sagara Town, measuring East to West 28.8 + 27 + 2 x
54.6 was sold by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant
No.1 in terms of deed of sale dated 17.11.1983, retaining
a lane measuring 4 and 1/2 feet on the western side of
the 'A' schedule property to be used by the plaintiff to
reach backyard of his residential house. That earlier
plaintiff had mortgaged the property in favour of the
defendant No.1 which was redeemed by selling the same
to the defendant in terms of the aforesaid deed of sale.
That there was a specific condition in the said deed of
sale to the effect that the defendant No.1 shall not put up
window or door on the wall facing the aforesaid lane
except a ventilation for the purpose of air and light at the
top of the wall. That the defendant No.1 in breach of the
said condition, constructed building on the Schedule 'A'
property. While constructing the building, the defendant
has encroached upon about 1 and 1/2 feet out of 4 and
1/2 feet of the lane by constructing a wall thereon and
has further put up of a cement window and ventilators
towards the said lane. The encroached portion of the
lane and the windows and ventilators are described as
plaint 'B' schedule property. The aforesaid illegal acts of
the defendant constrained the plaintiff to file the above
suit seeking relief of recovery of possession and
mandatory injunction.
4. The defendant filed written statement
contending interalia that he neither encroached any
portion of the 'B' schedule property of the plaintiff nor
has violated the terms and conditions imposed in the
deed of sale. That he has constructed the building after
obtaining the licence from the Town Municipal
Corporation and with a consent and knowledge of the
plaintiff. That the plaintiff had affixed his signature to the
mahazar. Without the consent of the plaintiff, he has only
put up sajja and the window. That during 1958, plaintiff
had leased the entire property in favour of the defendant
and thereafter, during 1972, mortgaged the same in his
favour. Thus, the defendant has been in possession of
the entire property and plaintiff has lost the right even to
redeem the mortgage. That having given consent for
construction, plaintiff remained silent until completion of
the building and only thereafter has filed the suit for
wrongful gain and to cause wrongful loss to the
defendant. If there was violation of the condition of the
licence, the Town Municipal Corporation would take
action and the suit of the plaintiff was thus not
maintainable. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.
5. The Trial Court based on the pleadings framed
the following issues;
"1. ªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ vÀ£Àß ªÁzÀ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è ºÉýzÀ zÁªÉzÀ '©' ±É, ¸ÉÆwÛ£À Nt HfðvÀzÀ°èvÀÄÛ, ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EzÀgÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀħzÀݪÁzÀ ¸Áé¢Ã£ÀªÀ£ÀÄß FvÀ zÁªÉ zÁR® vÁjÃT¤AzÁ ºÉÆA¢zÀÝ CAvÀ ªÁ¢ ¹zÀÝUÉÆ½¸ÀĪÀ£ÉÃ?
2. ªÁ¢ vÀ£Àß ªÁzÀ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è «ªÀj¹zÀAvÉ ¸ÀzÀj '©' ±É.
¸ÉÆwÛ£À NtÂAiÀÄ°è ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ CPÀæªÀĪÁV CwPÀæ«Ä¹ UÉÆÃqÉ PÀnÖgÀĪÀ£ÀÄ, ºÁUÀÆ F UÉÆÃqÉAiÀÄ ¥À²ÑªÀÄzÀ PÀqÉ '©' ¸ÉÆwÛ£À°è ZÁagÀĪÀ ¸ÀeÁÓ F NtÂAiÀÄ°è §gÀÄvÀÛzÉ CAvÀ ªÁ¢ ¹zÀÝUÉÆ½¸ÀĪÀ£ÉÃ?
3. ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ ¥À²ÑªÀÄzÀ UÉÆÃqÉAiÀİè AiÀiÁªÀÅzÀÆ QlQ ¨ÁV®ÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀÆræ¸ÀĪÀ ºÀPÀÄÌ ºÉÆA¢gÀ°®èªÉAzÀÄ ªÁzÀ ¹zÀÝUÉÆ½¸ÀĪÀ£ÉÃ?
4. ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ vÀ£Àß «ªÁzÀ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è «ªÀj¹zÀAvÉ vÁ£ÀÄ PÁAiÉÄݧzÀݪÁV ªÀÄÆgÀÄ CAvÀ¹Û£À ©°ØAUï PÀnÖzÀÄÝ EzÀgÀ ¸ÀeÁÓªÀ£ÀÄß Qý¸À®Ä PÉÆÃnð¤AzÀ ºÀÄPÀÄÌA ªÀiÁrzÉÝà CzÀgÀ°è vÀ£Àß PÀlÖqÀªÉà PÀĹzÀÄ vÀÄA§¯ÁgÀzÀ ºÁ¤ DUÀĪÀÅzÉAzÀÄ ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¹zÀÝUÉÆ½¸ÀĪÀ£ÉÃ?
5. ªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ vÀ£Àß ªÁzÀ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è ¨ÉÃrzÀAvÉ ªÀiÁåAqÉÃlj EAdPÀë£ï §UÉÎ rQæ ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄ®Ä CºÀð¤gÀĪÀ£ÉÃ?
6. AiÀiÁªÀ rQæ, E®èªÉà ºÀÄPÀÄA?"
and recorded evidence.
6. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and
exhibited 6 documents marked as Ex.P1 to Ex.P6.
Defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and exhibited 4
documents marked as Ex.D1 to Ex.D4.
7. On appreciation of evidence, the Trial Court
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the same,
the plaintiff preferred the regular appeal in
R.A.No.74/1997 before the First Appellate Court.
8. Considering the grounds urged in the appeal
memo, the First Appellate Court framed the following
points for its consideration.
"1. Whether the appellant proves that the judgment and Decree of the trial- court is not sustainable, perversive and needs to be interfered?
2. What order?"
and on re-appreciation of evidence and pleadings, the
First Appellate Court allowed the appeal setting aside the
judgment and decree passed in O.S. No.85/1997 and
decreed the suit of the plaintiff with specific directions as
follows:
" The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed with costs.
The judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.84/1997 is set aside.
The plaintiff is entitled the mandatory injunction in respect of removal of windows and sajja put up on 1st and 2nd floor and sajja, except ventilators on western wall constructed by the defendant.
The defendant is directed that he shall demolish within 6 months for cement sajja measuring 1 1/2' and 3 windows wherein no frame put on 1st floor as mentioned in para 10 of the Commissioner's report and also window measuring 7X4 feet and 4 inch and also 2 windows measuring 5 feet and 1 inch X 4 feet X 4 inch and also 1 feet 6 inches slab of 2nd upstair as mentioned in para 11 of Commissioner's report.
Further, the plaintiff is entitled, the recovery of possession of his property situated towards western side up to western wall of the defendant.
Further, the suit for the plaintiff is dismissed in respect of prayer for demolishing the ventilators and western wall of the defendant."
Aggrieved by the same, appellant/defendant filed
the present regular second appeal.
9. It is relevant to note at this juncture that the
original defendant has apparently sold the property in
favour of one Sri.Ganapathi S. Nayak, who has been
brought on record as appellant No.2 in terms of order
dated 03.06.2010 of this Court. This Court by its order
dated 10.12.2007 admitted the appeal for consideration
for the following substantial questions of law;
"1. Whether the learned appellate judge was justified in reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge ignoring the evidence on record?
2. Whether the judgment and decree of the appellate court is vitiated for granting a decree for mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff when the construction has come about two years prior to the institution of the suit, thereby acquiescing his right?"
10. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterating
the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal
submitted;
(a) that the First Appellate Court in the absence of
any evidence contrary to the finding of the Trial Court
ought not to have set aside the judgment and decree.
(b) that the First Appellate Court has not
appreciated the fact that the plaintiff having waited till
completion of construction by the defendant has
acquiesced himself and is estopped from raising the issue
of breach of the terms of the deed of sale. Thus, the
defendant is entitled for equitable consideration of this
case.
(c) that the projection of the sajja and installation
of window would not cause any inconvenience to the
plaintiff, which fact has not been taken to consideration
by the First Appellate Court. Hence, submits that the
substantial questions of law raised are required to be
answered in his favour.
11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondent/plaintiff submits;
(a) that the plaintiff has approached the Court
seeking the relief at the earliest point in time and there is
no acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff at any time in
any manner whatsoever. Therefore, the defendant is not
entitled for any equitable relief of estoppel on the said
ground.
(b) referring to the report of the Court
Commissioner dated 23.09.1989, wherein at paragraph
10 the Court Commissioner has reported that the
defendant had fixed three wooden frames measuring 7 ft.
X 4ft. and 4 inch tied with a chain without installation of
door and making of provisions for two windows and
ventilators without fixing any frame thereof, learned
counsel submits that even as on the date when the Court
Commissioner visited the site of the building the process
of construction was underway and the construction was
not completed. Thus, he submits that the defendant
despite having complete knowledge of the pendency of
the suit has proceeded to install the windows and
ventilator into the schedule 'B' property. As such, he is
not entitled for any equitable relief and he submits that
there is clear violation of terms of the deed of sale and
same has not been condoned by the plaintiff.
12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the records.
13. The Ex.P1 is the deed of sale in terms of
which the defendant had purchased the property from
the plaintiff and his family members. A specific condition
in the said deed of sale is imposed on the defendant to
the effect that;
"F UÉÆÃqÉAiÀÄ°è £ÀªÀÄä Nt ¢QÌUÉ QlQ CxÀªÁ ¨ÁV®Ä EqÀ®Ä CªÀPÁ±À EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. UÁ½ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨É¼ÀQ£À UÉÆÃqÉAiÀÄ ªÉÄïÁãUÀzÀ°è ªÉAn¯ÉÃlgï EqÀĪÀ ºÀQÌgÀÄvÀÛzÉ".
In terms of the aforesaid condition in the deed of sale,
defendant was entitled only for installation of ventilator
on the top of the wall facing the lane and was prohibited
from installing any window or the door. The said
condition in the aforesaid deed of sale is not disputed.
The lane referred to in the said deed of sale leads to
backyard of the plaintiff. The first appellate court has
taken note of the fact that even prior to executing the
mortgage infavour of the defendant by the plaintiff , the
plaintiff was using the said lane to reach to the said
backyard of the house of the plaintiff. The contention of
the defendant of he being in possession of the 'B'
schedule property has been considered and negated by
the first appellate court at paragraph 14 of its judgment.
Thus, the first appellate court has taken note of the fact
that the aforesaid condition imposed in the deed of sale
prohibiting the plaintiff from putting up any window or
door is justifiable as the plaintiff had retained the said
bye- lane to reach to his backyard from the main road.
Therefore, construction by the defendant by installing the
window on the southern side of the wall and sajjas facing
the bye lane described in 'B' schedule property amounts
to breach of aforesaid condition of the deed of sale, even
as rightly taken note of by the First Appellate Court.
14. Though the plaintiff by amending the plaint
had sought for relief of possession as an alternate relief
in view of specific contention taken by the defendant of
he being in possession of the entire property in terms of
the mortgage, the first appellate court as noted above in
paragraph 14 of its judgment has addressed the issue of
'B' schedule property being in possession of plaintiff and
has held plaintiff having proved his possession over the 4
1/2 feet of bye lane.
15. As regards the contention of the appellant of
plaintiff consenting for construction by affixing his
signature on the mahazar and thereby acquiescing
himself, the trial Court has taken note of the fact at
paragraphs 21 and 22 of its judgment that the said
mahazar as per Ex.D.2 drawn on 18.11.1987 though
mentioned about construction of building by the
defendant on the property measuring east to west 23 ft.
and north to south 45 ft., did not however contain any
information regarding plaintiff and his family members
giving consent to put up sajja or windows on the
western wall. Therefore, the first appellate court has
rightly concluding merely affixing signature on mahazar
as above would not dilute the condition imposed on the
defendant interms of the deed of sale prohibiting him
from installing doors and windows facing the 'B' schedule
property.
16. The Commissioner's report dated 23.09.1989
categorically points out the stage of construction of the
building by the defendant more particularly the
installation of three wooden frames measuring 7 ft.X4 ft.
+ 4 inch and position of windows in an unfinished
condition even during the pendency of the suit. The
defendant thus proceeded to construct during the
pendency of the suit. As noted above, the original
defendant has sold the property in favour of the second
appellant herein. The second appellant has been brought
on record in terms of the order dated 03.06.2010. The
first defendant himself having constructed the wall and
installed the windows during the pendency of the suit,
cannot claim any equity.
17. All factual and legal aspect of the matter
having been rightly considered by the first appellate
Court. No infirmity or illegality can be found with the
finding and conclusion arrived at by the First Appellate
Court. The substantial questions of law raised above are
answered accordingly infavour of the plaintiff. Appeal is
therefore dismissed and judgment and order dated
08.03.2006 passed by The Civil Judge (Sr.Dn), Sagar in
R.A.No.74/1997 is confirmed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
RU
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