Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3189 Kant
Judgement Date : 24 February, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU
R
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
WRIT PETITION NO.15356 OF 2020(GM-FC)
BETWEEN:
MR. MICHAEL GRAHAM PRINCE,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
S/O TERRY GRAHAM PRINCE,
R/AT A017, SOBHA CORAL,
JAKKUR, BANGALORE - 560 064.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.KIRAN SEBASTIAN ROZARIO, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MRS. NISHA MISRA,
AGED 51 YEARS,
W/O MR.MICHAEL GRAHAM PRINCE,
R/AT GA REGENCY ALANDON,
2 WARE ROAD, FRAZER TOWN,
BANGALORE - 560 005.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SMT. JAYNA KOTHARI, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. ROHAN KOTHARI, ADVOCATE FOR C/R
(CP NO.10716/2020)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDER ON IA NO.4 DATED 25.9.2020 IN MC
NO.1761/2018 PASSED BY THE HONBLE 1ST ADDL. PRINCIPAL
JUDGE FAMILY COURT AT BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE-A
AND ALLOWING THE PRAYER OF THE PETITIONER IN IA NO.4
IN M.C.NO.1761/2018 AND ETC.,
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDER, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
2
ORDER
What Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his book 'The
Common Law' (1881) at the very first page had said, should
prelude this judgment:
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow- men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become..."
2. The estranged spouses are fighting this legal battle.
Respondent - wife has filed MC No.1761/2018 u/s. 27(1)(a) &
(d) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 r/w Sec.18 of the
Foreign Marriages Act, 1969 seeking a decree for dissolution
of marriage and for the retention of child custody. Petitioner
- husband had filed application in I.A.No.4 u/s. 151 of CPC,
1908 "to dismiss/reject the divorce petition"; learned 1st Addl.
Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore, dismissed the same
vide order dated 25.09.2020 holding that the native court has
jurisdiction to try the subject matrimonial cause. Aggrieved
thereby, petitioner is knocking at the doors of Writ Court.
3. After service of notice, respondent - wife having
entered appearance through her counsel has filed the
Statement of Objections on 09.03.2021 resisting the Writ
Petition. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
respondent makes submission in justification of the impugned
order and the reasons on which it has been constructed.
Having argued additional reasons, she seeks dismissal of the
petition as being devoid of merits.
4. FACTS IN BRIEF:
(a) Petitioner - husband, is a 'Christian by faith' and
Respondent - wife is a 'Hindu by faith'; both they are British
nationals; their marriage was solemnized on 20.02.2000
according to 'Hindu Arya Samaj rites & customs', in the
presence of family members & friends at Mumbai;
subsequently, a civil marriage ceremony was undertaken on
18.03.2000 in United Kingdoms; a Certificate of Registration
evenly dated has been obtained by them.
(b) For a few years, their married life went well and
the couple begot a girl child namely Tiya on 21.04.2006 in
UK; this child too happens to be a British national; after this
new arrival to the family, the couple has been residing in
India, is not in dispute. Both they are employed too; the
respondent obtained 'Overseas Citizens of India Card'
(hereafter OCI Card) on 27.06.2006 u/s. 7B of the Citizenship
Act, 1955; similarly, petitioner also obtained OCI Card on
13.07.2017; the temperamental and other differences having
cropped up between the couple, the respondent filed
M.C.No.1761/2018 seeking a decree for dissolution of
marriage on 03.04.2018. Petitioner had filed the subject
application seeking dismissal of the M.C. on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction contending that it is only the English
Courts that have it; the same has been rejected vide
impugned order.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and having perused the petition papers, this Court declines
indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:
(a) What the Apex Court observed as under in
JOSEPH SHINE vs. UNION OF INDIA, (2019) 3 SCC
39 at page 76 has been profitably reproduced:
"...the essentiality of the rights of women gets the real requisite space in the living room of individual dignity rather than the space in an annexe to the main building. Individual dignity has a sanctified realm in a civilised society. Any system treating a woman with indignity, inequity and inequality or discrimination invites the wrath of the Constitution. A woman cannot be asked to think as a man or as how the society desires. Such a thought is abominable, for it slaughters her core identity. And, it is time to say that a husband is not the master. Equality is the governing parameter...It is advisable to remember what John Stuart Mill had observed: "The legal subordination
of one sex to another -- is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a system of perfect equality, admitting no power and privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other." [John Stuart Mill, On Subjection of Women, Chapter 1 (1869).]""
Our constitution provides for equal protection of the laws
under Article 14, this also includes gender - equality,
elimination of a gender-based differentiation in the pursuit of
legal remedies, the right of non-discrimination on the basis of
gender under Article 15 and the right to life under Article 21
that includes the right to live with dignity. Race, caste, sex,
place of birth etc., manifest as organizing categories of an
individual's life, the aim for egalitarianism as emanating from
our constitutional paradigm places as an imperative 'the equal
worth of liberty' and 'truly fair equality of opportunity'. In
bringing about this conducive and egalitarian atmosphere for
its citizenry, there exists a positive duty upon the State as
readily apparent in the context of welfare entitlements
wherein the State must adopt affirmative steps to alleviate
poverty and the major sources of economic and social non -
freedom vide K.S PUTTASWAMY vs. UNION OF INDIA
(2017) 10 SCC 1.
(b) As a necessary corollary of the above, in
matrimonial causes the precept of 'spousal-equality' as a
necessary facet of gender-equality enshrined u/a 14 of the
Constitution must be given due recognition i.e., 'truly fair
equality of opportunity' for both persons in the marriage in
terms of opting into marriage & opting out, i.e., dissolution of
marriage. Allowing the husband to curtail the 'exit' option of
the wife, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or such other
factors militates against our constitutional philosophy. It is
also pertinent to state that the principle of 'spousal-equality'
is premised on the provision of effective freedom to both
parties to determine the nature of their lives, different styles
and ways of living. At this juncture it would be profitable to
recall what Martha C Nussbaum in her book "Woman and
Human Development: The Capabilities Approach" Cambridge
University Press (2000) at page 69 states:
"...a theory of justice must be cognizant of the different situations of distinct lives, in order to distribute not only liberty, but also equal worth; not only formal equality of opportunity, but also truly fair equality of opportunity...We want an approach that is respectful of each person's struggle for flourishing, that treats each person as an end and as a source of agency and worth in her own right. Part of this respect will mean not being dictatorial about the good, at least for adults and at least in some core areas of choice, leaving individuals a wide space for important types of choice and meaningful affiliation. But this very respect means taking a stand on the conditions that permit them to follow their own lights free from tyranny ..."
(c) The first contention of the Petitioner that both the
parties being foreign nationals, native Courts do not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter, is bit difficult to
countenance; foreign nationals they are, is not in dispute;
however, admittedly the Government of India has issued OCI
Cards to both of them; thus, they are not strangers to this
country. Under the Notifications dated 11.04.2005,
05.11.2007 & 05.01.2009 issued by the Central Government
u/s. 7B of the Citizenship Act, 1955, in many aspects the OCI
Cardholders are treated on par with Non- Resident Indians
(NRI); these notifications are superseded on 04.03.2021, is
beside the point since it is prospective in operation; sub-
section 2 of section 7B excludes certain rights from being
granted to the OCI Cardholders. However, this exclusion
does not cover the right to seek matrimonial reliefs at the
hands of the native Courts; the subject statutory notifications
do not in so many words vest in them such a right to litigate
may be true; but, that per se does not divest them of such a
right which otherwise avails even to the OCI Cardholders.
(d) After all, ubi jus ibi remedium is the operational
principle of our system; once lawfully admitted to a territory
even the foreigners are entitled to certain essential rights that
are necessary for a meaningful life vide SARBANANDA
SANOWLA vs. UNION OF INDIA, 2005 (5) SCC 665. The
constitutional guarantee under Articles 14 & 21 ordinarily
extends to foreigners too vide HANS MULLER OF
NURENBURG vs. SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,
CALCUTTA, AIR 1955 SC 367; if aliens can have certain
fundamental rights almost on par with the natives, it sounds
abhorrent to the rule of law and notions of justice if ordinary
legal rights are not conceded to them; an argument to the
contrary would justify perpetuation of legal injury sans any
remedy to an aggrieved foreigner residing on Indian soil.
(e) It is admitted in the pleadings that the parties
have undergone marriage ceremony in accordance with the
rites & rituals of Hindu Arya Samaj; thus, they acquired
marital status in India and in accordance with lex loci i.e., the
Arya Marriage Validation Act, 1937; Section 2 of this Act
saves the marriage of the kind subsequently, they got
registration of civil marriage in U.K. does not alter their
spousal status; far from that it strengthens the same; a
subsequent official ceremony of marriage that took place in
their country would not replace the existing marital status in
rem and create a new one; if marriage has taken place in
India in which parties are ordinarily residing, the native
Courts have substantive jurisdiction to adjudge matrimonial
disputes; parties cannot be asked to go to some other
country to have redressal to their grievances; it is more so
when the grieving party is the wife; this view gains support
from several International Conventions. Articles 15(2) &
16(1)(c) of The Convention on the Elimination of All Form of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) read as under:
"15 (2): States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in Courts and tribunals.
16 (1) (c): The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and its dissolution."
(f) It is relevant to state here that this Convention has
been referred to by the Apex Court in SHAYARA BANO vs.
UNION OF INDIA, (2017) 9 SCC 1; ordinarily, the
International Conventions of the kind are treated as a source
of law even in the domestic sphere if they are not inconsistent
with existing corpus juris of our country, vide JOLLY
GEORGE VERGHESE vs. BANK OF COCHIN, AIR 1980 SC
470; at least, while construing the provisions of domestic law,
they need to be adverted to; keeping this in mind, the word
'citizen' occurring in Sections 4 & 18 of the Foreign Marriage
Act, 1969, needs to be liberally construed to include a
foreigner who holds OCI Card and resides in India. It is not
prudent to insist that what the provisions of the statutes
meant to the vision of its makers then, must mean to the
vision of our time. They should be interpreted to meet and
cover changing conditions of social and economic life. The law
states not rules for the passing hour but the principles for an
expanding future. Otherwise, it will not be living law of the
people but would remain as a black letter on a white paper.
Such a purposive construction serves the Parliamentary object
of this Act which vide Section 18 refers to certain provisions of
the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The march of law and more
particularly family law from April to May and to the June of its
life, as of necessity happens in the judicial process in all
civilized jurisdictions where boundaries of nations are loosing
significance in a shrinking globe.
(g) The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner,
that domicile being a pre-condition for the institution of
matrimonial cases, the Court below could not have entertained
the divorce petition of the wife, does not much come to his
aid. Section 18 of the 1969 Act and Section 31 of the 1954
Act prescribe "residence" for invoking the jurisdiction of Family
Court. The word 'residence' is not prefixed by the word
'ordinarily' and thus these provisions are a bit in variance with
usual drafting. The absence of prefix gives an indication that
the word 'residence' needs to be given an expansive meaning;
after all, law is not the slave of dictionaries; words employed
in a statute do not have a fixed meaning; the contours of their
meaning vary with the run of time. Statutes do not suffer
from rigor mortis. Admittedly, the respondent-wife has been
residing within the jurisdictional limits of the Court. Thus,
these provisions are 'citizenship neutral' but 'domicile
centric'; it hardly needs to be stated the domicile involves the
factum of residence and the intent to reside indefinitely; these
ingredients galore in this case. It is profitable to advert to
'Halsbury's Laws of England' (3rd Edn.) Vol. VII at
paragraph 26: "A person's domicile is that country in which he
either has or is deemed by law to have his permanent home".
(h) It is said tritely that the soundness of a proposition
can be adjudged by contemplating consequences of the
opposite; the contention of the husband that the wife should
go to Courts in England to seek dissolution of the marriage
that has been solemnized in India and in accordance with
Indian Law, if countenanced, virtually amounts to denying
matrimonial relief to her and thus compelling her to remain in
the wedlock, which otherwise she could have worked out her
remedy against; it has long been settled that the contention
as to exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts is seen with jealousy
and that a heavy onus lies on the asserter.
In the above circumstances, this Writ Petition being
devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it
is, costs having been made easy.
Nothing observed hereinabove shall influence the trial of
& decision making in the case.
Learned judge of the Court below is requested to try &
dispose off the subject matrimonial case as expeditiously as
possible.
This court places on record its deep appreciation for the
able assistance rendered by the Law Clerk cum Research
Assistant, Mr.Faiz Afsar Sait.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Snb/
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