Karnataka High Court
Sri Dasharath S/O Datta Gadi vs State Of Karnataka on 23 February, 2022
Bench: R Natarajpresided Byrnj
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R. NATARAJ
W.P. NO.12029 OF 2007 (LR)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. DASHRATH
S/O DATTA GHADI
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS
1A. SMT. RENUKA, RAJARAM KUMBHAR
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE &
HOUSEHOLD WORK
1B. DATTU, S/O DASHRATH GHADI
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE
1C. PRIYA PRAKASH MADAWALKAR
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK
1D. SATOSH S/O DASHRATH GHADI
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE
1E. TUKARAM S/O DASHRATH GHADI
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE
1F. SAVITA D/O DASHRATH GHADI
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,
OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK
1G. SMT. NANDA W/O DASHRATH GHADI
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS,
OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK
2
ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF KARALAGA VILLAGE,
TQ: KHANAPUR, DIST: BELAGAVI.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. RAM P. SHOPADE AND SRI. RAJASHEKHAR BURJI,
ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
M.S.BUILDING,
BANGALORE.
2. THE LAND TRIBUNAL KHANAPUR
KHANAPUR TQ., BELGAUM DISTRICT
BY ITS CHAIRMAN
3. OMANNA
S/O KALLAPPA GHADI
AGE: MAJOR
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: KARALAGA, KHANAPUR TALUK,
BELGAUM DISTRICT.
4. MARUTI
S/O HANAMANTHA GHADI
AGE: MAJOR
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: KARALAGA, KHANAPUR TALUK,
BELGAUM DISTRICT.
5. NAGESH
S/O SADOBAD PATIL
AGE: MAJOR
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: JALAGI, KHANAPUR TALUK,
BELGAUM DISTRICT.
6. GOPAL
S/O RAGHUNATH DAMLE
AGE: MAJOR
3
R/O. MIRAJ
C/O: S.B.I. MIRAJ BRANCH, SANGALI DIST.
MAHARASHTRA
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. GIRIJA S. HIREMATH, H.C.G.P., FOR R-1 AND R-2;
SMT. R.M.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE FOR R-3 & R-4;
R-5 AND R-6 ARE SERVED)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 14.02.2007 PASSED IN KLR/OCP/SR/6+750+26/
KARLAGA BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT AS PER ANNEXURE-L AND
ETC.
THIS W.P. COMING ON FOR DICTATING ORDERS THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioner has sought for a writ in the nature of
certiorari to quash the Order dated 14.02.2007 passed in
No.KLR/OCP/SR-6+750+26/Karalaga by respondent No.2
granting occupancy rights to the extent of 1/3rd share in
the land bearing Sy. No.67/1 of Karalaga village, Khanapur
Taluk, Belagavi district.
2. During the course of this writ petition, the
petitioner died and his legal representatives were brought
on record.
3. The land in question is Sy.No.67/1 of Karalaga
village, Khanapur Taluk, Belagavi district measuring 10
acres 22 guntas. The petitioner claimed that this land was
cultivated by his father as a sole tenant. He filed a suit in
O.S. No.257 of 1964 on the file of First Additional Munsiff
at Belagavi for declaration that he was the exclusive
tenant and consequential relief of injunction against his
cousins Omanna Kallappa Ghadi and Hanamanth Ghadi.
The said suit was decreed in terms of the judgment and
decree dated 10.11.1964. Thereafter an appeal in R.A.
No.12 of 1965 was filed by defendants in the suit before
the Prl. Civil Judge, Belagavi, which also was dismissed in
terms of the judgment and decree in 21.08.1972. In the
decree passed by the Courts it was categorically held that
the father of the petitioner was the sole tenant of the
property in question. The petitioner claimed that the
record of rights from the year 1964-65 in respect of the
land in question stood in the name of his father and after
his death the name of the petitioner was entered. The
petitioner having inherited the tenancy filed Form No.7 for
grant of occupancy rights. Likewise, the respondents No.3
to 5 who claimed through Omanna Kallappa Ghadi and
Hanamanth Ghadi also filed Form No.7 in respect of the
land in question. The Land Tribunal, Khanapur after
considering the applications of all the parties, passed an
order dated 09.07.1976 granting 1/3rd share each in
respect of the land in question to the petitioner, Omanna
Kallappa Ghadi and Hanamanth Ghadi. This was
questioned by the petitioner in W.P. No.8311 of 1976.
This Court in terms of the order dated 16.03.1978 allowed
the writ petition and remitted the case back to the Land
Tribunal for fresh enquiry. After remand, the Tribunal took
up the case for enquiry and in terms of the order dated
17.03.1984 granted 5 acres 22 guntas to the petitioner, 2
acres 20 guntas to respondents No.3 and 4, 2 acres 20
guntas to respondent No.5. Again aggrieved by the said
order, the petitioner filed W.P. No.5903 of 1984 while the
respondents No.3 and 4 filed W.P. No.16686 of 1984. In
the meanwhile, Karnataka Land Reforms Amendment Act,
1986 came into force and the District Land Reforms
Appellate Authority was constituted. Consequently, the
cases were transferred to the Appellate Authority. The
Appellate Authority granted occupancy rights in favour of
the petitioner in respect of the entire 10 acres 22 guntas in
respect of Sy.No.67/1 and rejected the claim of the private
respondents herein. Aggrieved by the said order, the
respondents No.3, 4 and 5 filed LRRP No.1756 of 1989,
LRRP No.1901 of 1989 and LRRP No. 2305 of 1989 before
this Court. After hearing all the parties, this Court in
terms of order dated 22.01.2001 set aside the order
passed by the Appellate Tribunal and remanded the case
back to the respondent No.2 for fresh enquiry. After such
remand, the Tribunal took up the cases for enquiry, the
parties were granted liberty to lead their evidence. The
Tribunal after considering the evidence on record held that
the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No.257 of 1964
was inconsequential and that the petitioner had failed to
prove that he was the exclusive tenant in respect of the
property in question, and therefore, granted occupancy
rights to the extent of 1/3rd share to the petitioner and
1/3rd share each to respondents No.3 and 4, but rejected
the claim of respondent No.5.
4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
present writ petition is filed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the decree in O.S. No.257 of 1964 dealt with the issue
whether the father of the plaintiff was the exclusive tenant
of the suit property and was in exclusive possession. The
learned counsel submitted that the Trial Court after
considering the oral and documentary evidence, held that
the father of the petitioner was the exclusive tenant and
was in exclusive possession. This finding of fact was
confirmed by the Appellate Court in R.A. No.12 of 1965.
Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that as on
01.03.1974 it was the petitioner alone who was cultivating
the land in question as tenant, and therefore, the Tribunal
ought to have granted occupancy rights to the entire
extent rather than 1/3rd.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents, on
the other hand, contended that the decree passed in O.S.
No.257 of 1964 cannot be considered as a piece of
evidence to determine the tenancy, as the proof of tenancy
had to be established before the Tribunal in accordance
with law. The learned counsel contended that this Court in
LRRP No.1756 of 1989 after considering the efficacy of the
judgment and decree in O.S. No.257 of 1964 held as
follows :
"Therefore, I am of the view that the
decision rendered by the Civil Court on the
question of tenancy is a nullity; and the Tribunal is
not under obligation to rely upon the said decision
and it is required to examine the claim of the
parties independently. In the instant case, it is not
in dispute that the Appellate Authority held that the
contesting respondent was a tenant in respect of
the land in question on the basis of two materials
viz., the judgment and decree made by the Civil
Court; and the entries in the Record of Rights and
Pahani for the year 1964-65 and onwards.
Therefore, the order passed by the Appellate
Authority relying upon the decision of the Civil
Court, is totally erroneous in law."
7. The learned counsel submitted that the
petitioner is bound by the order passed by this Court and
he had accepted it by participating in the proceedings
before the Land Tribunal subsequent to the remand. She,
therefore, submitted that the petitioner cannot now
embark upon relying on the very same decree to contend
that he was in exclusive possession of the property in
question and that the Tribunal was bound to grant
occupancy rights in respect of the entire extent.
8. At this stage, the learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that the order passed by this Court in
LRRP No.1756 of 1989 in so far as it related to the finding
that the decree passed in O.S. No.257 of 1964 is not piece
of evidence to prove tenancy is per incuriam since Section
133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 came into
effect from 16.12.1975 by which time the decree in O.S.
No.257 of 1964 was passed and confirmed in R.A. No.12 of
1965. He, therefore, submitted that this Court may
declare that portion of the order to be per incuriam as it
lays down a wrong proposition of law.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited
attention of the Court to a judgment of the Full Bench of
this Court in the case of K. RAMIAH, DECEASED BY
NAGAPPA vs. BASAPPA K.G. [ILR 1979 KAR 1024] to
contend that a decree passed prior to 1975 can still be
relied upon as Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act operated prospectively.
10. In reply, the learned counsel for respondents
submitted that a proposition of law, even if it is wrongly
decided would bind the parties unless the same is set aside
in appeal. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment in
S.NAGARAJ (DEAD) BY LRS AND OTHERS vs.
B.R.VASUDEVA MURTHY AND OTHERS [2010(3) SCC
353].
11. I have considered the submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties.
12. It is seen from the decree passed in O.S.
No.257 of 1964 that the predecessors of the respondents
herein were parties in the said suit. The father of the
petitioner herein claimed that the land in question was
leased to him by the original owner and that he was in
actual possession as an exclusive tenant. He claimed that
the predecessor of respondents herein were separated,
and therefore, they were never in possession of the land in
question. He also claimed that he was paying rent to the
landlord and was obtaining receipts from him. The
predecessors of the respondents submitted a wardi to the
Revenue Inspector stating that they were jointly cultivating
the land as tenants in question along with the father of the
petitioner and that their names should be entered in the
record of rights. This was objected by the father of
petitioner and thereafter he brought a suit for declaration
that he was an exclusive tenant of the land in question and
for consequential injunction. The defendants in the suit
who are the predecessors of the private respondents
herein, claimed that the land in question was taken on
lease on behalf of the family in the name of the father of
the petitioner as he was a mortgagee. It was claimed that
after the death of the grandfather of the petitioner, it was
the father of the petitioner who managed the family as
well as its properties including the land in question. They
claimed that later the properties were divided into three
equal shares between the father of the petitioner, Omanna
Kallappa Ghadi and Hanamanth Ghadi.
13. Based on these rival contentions, the following
issues were framed :
i. Does plaintiff prove that he is the exclusive
tenant of the suit land?
ii. Does plaintiff further prove his exclusive
possession of the suit land?
iii. Do defendants prove that there was a partition in
have been in possession of 2/3rd portion of the
suit land?
14. The Trial Court answered the aforesaid issues
No.1 and 2 in the affirmative and issue No.3 in the
negative. This was upheld by the First Appellate Court in
R.A. No.12 of 1965 on 21.08.1972.
15. The application filed by petitioner in Form No.7
carried a reference as follows :
"The land is in the cultivation of the applicant
family as far as 30 years. It is in the cultivation of
the applicants since last 30 years. "
16. The respondent No.3 also filed Form No.7,
wherein he declared as follows:
"The land is cultivated by us as sub-tenants
since about last 50 years i.e., from their
grandfather's time they are protected tenants and
tenant of the land, so respondents' names should
be registered as occupants of the land."
17. The respondent No.4 filed Form No.7 where he
declared as follows :
"I have been cultivating the land as tenant
for 50 years, I am interested in getting registered
as an occupant of the land on the terms and
conditions laid down in the KLR Act, 1961."
18. Likewise, the respondent No.5 also filed Form
No.7 where he claimed that he was cultivating three acres
of land along with his brother by name Venkat Patil and
declared as follows:
"I enclose an affidavit made by Dashar Dathi
Ghali of Karalga stating that the applicant along
with his cousin brother is cultivating 3 acres of land
out of Sy.No.67/1 of Karalga."
19. All these applications were clubbed and the
Tribunal in terms of the order dated 09.07.1976 granted
occupancy rights to the petitioner to an extent of 1/3rd
share. This was questioned by the petitioner in W.P.
No.8311 of 1976 and the same was allowed and the case
was remanded for fresh enquiry in terms of the order
dated 16.03.1978. After remand, the Tribunal took up the
matter for enquiry and in terms of the order dated
17.02.1984 granted 5 acres 22 guntas to the petitioner
and 2 acres 20 guntas to respondents No.3 and 4; and 2
acres 22 guntas to respondent No.5.
20. Again the petitioners challenged the said order
before this Court in W.P. No.5903 of 1984, while
respondents No.3 and 4 also filed W.P. No.16687 of 1984
before this Court. These cases were transferred to the
Appellate Authority which after hearing the parties granted
occupancy rights to the petitioner in respect of the entire
extent of 10 acres 22 guntas in Sy.No.67/1 and rejected
the application of the other claimants.
21. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents No.3, 4
and 5 filed Revision Petition before this Court. This Court
while considering the claim of the parties held that the
decree passed in O.S. No.257 of 1964 as well as R.A.
No.12 of 1965 were inconsequential in view of Section 133
of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. Hence,
remitted the case back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after
considering the aforesaid and since the decree in O.S.
No.257 of 1964 and R.A. No.12 of 1965 were invalidated,
and as there was no other material placed before the
Tribunal to establish the tenancy of the petitioner, it
construed the petitioner and respondents as joint tenants
and passed the impugned order granting occupancy rights
to the extent of 1/3rd to the petitioner and respondents.
22. Therefore, the moot question is Whether the
order passed by this Court in L.R.R.P. No.1756 of 1989 laid
down a correct proposition of law. If not, Whether it could
be reviewed at the instance of the petitioner who did not
challenge it in the manner known to law and who accepted
it by participating in the proceedings before the Tribunal.
23. Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act, 1961 was introduced with effect from 16.12.1975 so
as to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide
questions under the Act of 1961. The same is extracted
below:
"133. Suits, proceedings, etc., involving
questions required to be decided by the
Tribunal.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law
for the time being in force,--
(i) no Civil or Criminal Court or officer
or Authority shall, in any suit, case or
proceedings concerning a land, decide the question
whether such land is or is not agricultural land and
whether the person claiming to be in possession is
or is not a tenant of the said land from prior
to 1st March 1974;
(ii) such Court or officer or Authority
shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far
as such question is concerned and refer the same
to the Tribunal for decision;
(iii) all interim orders issued or made by
such Court, officer or Authority, whether in the
nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a
Receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall
stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be;
(iv) the Tribunal shall decide the question
referred to it under clause (i) and communicate
its decision to such Court, officer or Authority.
The decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude
the Civil or Criminal Court or the officer or
authority from proceeding with the suit, case or
proceedings in respect of any matter other than
that referred to in that sub-section.
24. A Division Bench of this Court in CRP
No.730/1975 (K. RAMAIAH, SINCE DECEASED BY LRS
K.NAGAPPA AND OTHERS VS. K.G.BASAPPA.) felt that
the issue of tenancy which was determined and concluded
by March 1974, need not again be dealt with and
determined by the Land Tribunal. However, it felt that
some of the observations of this Court in BANDU
HAMASINGA DANAWADE VS. SASHIKUMAR AND
OTHERS [(1975) 1 Kant LJ 241] were of sweeping nature
and require reconsideration and accordingly, the following
two questions were referred for the opinion of the Full
Bench:
"(1) Where the issue regarding the tenancy
framed in a suit has been referred to and answered
by the Munsiff - Tribunal prior to the coming into
force of Act 1 of 1974 and the decision has been
affirmed by the appellate authority, namely, the
District Judge also prior to the coming into force of
Act 1 of 1974 and has become final, whether such
an issue should again be referred to the Tribunal
consequent on the amendment of the provisions of
Section 91 of the Act 1 of 1974?"
" Is the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge in this
case to dispose of the suit in accordance with the
decision of the District Judge given under Section
118 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act on the
question of tenancy affected by Act 31 of 1974?"
25. The Full Bench answering the above questions
held, "if an issue regarding tenancy framed in a suit has
been referred to an Officer or Munsiff - Tribunal prior to
the coming into force of Act 1 of 1974, and the decision
has also been affirmed by the appellate authority, namely,
District Judge, prior to coming into force of Act 1 of 1974,
and if that decision had become final, then, it will not be
necessary again to refer the said issue to the Tribunal
consequent on the amendment to Section 133 of the Act
and by virtue of Section 91 of Act 1 of 1974.
26. This Court in L.R.R.P. No.1756 of 1989 did not
consider the law declared by the Full Bench in the
aforesaid decision and wrongly decided the issue whether
the decree is obtained prior to 16.12.1975 when Section
133 was introduced into the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
1961, could be invalidated on the ground that the Civil
Court had no jurisdiction to decide upon the issues that
had to be decided by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decree
obtained by the petitioner was really not affected by
Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. However,
what needs to be considered is that this was a substantial
finding recorded by this Court, and therefore, the
petitioner ought to have got it corrected by filing necessary
appeal before the competent authority. However, the
petitioner has accepted the judgment of this Court in LRRP
No.1756 of 1989 and has thereafter participated in the
proceedings before the Tribunal.
27. The Apex Court in the case of A.R. ANTULAY
vs. R.S. NAYAK AND ANOTHER [AIR 1988 SC 1531],
while considering the finality of judicial orders qua the
parties and its reviewability for application to other cases,
held "in this case what was actually decided cannot be
undone, we are told repeatedly. It will produce an
intolerable state of affairs. This Court sought to recognise
the distinction between finality of judicial orders qua the
parties and the reviewability for application to other cases.
Between the parties even a wrong decision can operate as
res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is applicable
even to criminal trials, it was urged. A judgment of a High
Court is binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same
case; more so, a judgment which was unsuccessfully
challenged before this Court".
28. This Court while disposing off LRRP No.1756 of
1989 did not take into consideration the law declared by
the Full Bench of this Court consequently resulting in an
erroneous finding that the decree in O.S. No.257 of 1964
and R.A. No.12 of 1965 stood invalidated by virtue of
Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
Therefore, it can safely be held that the decision of this
Court in LRRP No.1756 of 1989 insofar as invalidating the
decree in O.S. No.257 of 1964 and R.A. No.12 of 1965 laid
down a wrong proposition of law.
29. The next question would be whether the
finding in LRRP No.1756 of 1989 can be revisited/reviewed
at the instance of the petitioner who did not challenge it
but accepted it by participating in the proceedings before
the Tribunal. In the case of A.R.Antulay (supra) it has
been held as follows :
"We are of the opinion that this Court is not
powerless to correct its error which has the effect
of depriving a citizen of his fundamental rights and
more so, a right to life and liberty. It can do so in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any
proceeding pending before it without insisting on
the formalities of a review application. Powers of
review can be exercised in a petition filed under
Article 136 or Article 32 or under any other
provision of the Constitution if the Court is satisfied
that its directions have resulted in the deprivation
of the fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal
right of petitioner".
30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering
the ambit of the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit"
in the case of SOUTH EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. vs.
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS [(2003)8 SCC 648] held
as follows :
"That no one shall suffer by an act of the
court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of
the court; the 'act of the court' embraces within its
sweep all such acts as to which the court may form
an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court
would not have so acted had it been correctly
apprised of the facts and the law. The factor
attracting applicability of restitution is not the act
of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error
committed by the Court; the test is whether on
account of an act of the party persuading the Court
to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable,
has resulted in one party gaining an advantage
which it would not have otherwise earned, or the
other party has suffered an impoverishment which
it would not have suffered but for the order of the
Court and the act of such party. The quantum of
restitution, depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case, may take into
consideration not only what the party excluded
would have made but also what the party under
obligation has or might reasonably have made.
There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding
being placed in the same position in which they
would have been had the court not intervened by
its interim order when at the end of the
proceedings the court pronounces its judicial
verdict which does not match with and
countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever
called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in
conjunction with what is the real and substantial
justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the
court shall be undone and the gain which the party
would have earned unless it was interdicted by the
order of the court would be restored to or
conferred on the party by suitably commanding the
party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary
would lead to unjust if not disastrous
consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful
industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet
there is an element of chance in every litigation.
Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to
approach the Courts, persuading the court to pass
interlocutory orders favourable to them by making
out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to
be heard and determined on merits and if the
concept of restitution is excluded from application
to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to
gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the
interim order even though the battle has been lost
at the end. This cannot be countenanced, we are,
therefore, or the opinion that the successful party
finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms
of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to
be compensated by award of interest at a suitable
reasonable rate for the period for which the interim
order of the court withholding the release of money
had remained in operation."
31. When a wrong proposition of law is laid down
affecting the rights of the parties, this Court is not
deprived of the power to correct its mistake, lest such
mistake would be perpetuated eternally. Therefore, in
deference to the maxim Act of the Court should prejudice
none, this Court holds that the finding recorded by this
Court in LRRP No.1756/1989 in so far as it relates to the
validity of the decree in O.S.No.257/1964 is a wrong
proposition of law and is therefore set at naught.
32. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner had marked
the revenue records in respect of the land in question from
the year 1964-65 and onwards which indicated that it was
the petitioner alone who was in possession of the land in
question. It is also found that the revenue entries till the
year 1975-76 stood in the name of the petitioner.
33. On the contrary, there is no material placed on
record to establish the tenancy of the respondents herein.
The entries in the revenue records together with the
judgment and decree passed in O.S. No.257 of 1964 and
R.A. No.12 of 1965 make it beyond a pale of doubt that it
was the petitioner alone who was a tenant in respect of the
property in question, while the private respondents were
not cultivating the same. There is no document to
establish their cultivation and the documentary evidence
produced by the petitioner before the Tribunal establish
beyond doubt that it was the petitioner alone who was the
tenant in respect of the property in question.
34. In that view of the matter, the impugned order
passed by the Tribunal based on a mere statement by the
private respondents that this land was held jointly by the
petitioner and themselves as tenants, deserves to be
interfered with. Hence, the following :
ORDER
i. The petition is allowed.
ii. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set
aside.
iii. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal with a
direction to confer occupancy rights in respect of
the entire land bearing Sy.No.67/1 of Karalaga
village, Khanapur taluk, Belagavi district measuring
10 acres 22 guntas in favour of the petitioner.
iv. This shall be complied by the Tribunal within a
period of six months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order.
Sd/-
JUDGE
hnm
