Karnataka High Court
Mr Vijayendra Singh vs State Of Karnataka on 17 August, 2022
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7060 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
1. MR VIJAYENDRA SINGH
S/O LATE HEERA SINGH CHUPHAL
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/A HOUSE NO.49,
KURIYA GAON
LAMACHAUR, HALDWANI NAINITAL
UTTARKHAND-263139
ALSO AT NO.A806
BREN CHAMPIONS SQUARE
APARTMENT
OPP DECATHLON
SARJAPUR ROAD
BENGALURU-560035
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SIDDHARTH B MUCHANDI., ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
PADMAVATHI B K
Location: HIGH AND:
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY VIVEKNAGAR POLICE STATION
BANGALORE
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560001
-2-
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
2. MS GAURI SUBHAS
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
D/O SUBHAS MOGALISHETTAR
R/AT NO.S4, 2ND FLOOR,
PUSHPA ENCLAVE, 27TH MAIN
EJIPURA
BANGALORE-560047
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K.S. ABHIJITH, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI. SIDDHARTH SUMAN, ADV. FOR R2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH
THE FIR REGISTERED IN CR.NO.75/2022 ON THE FILE OF THE
XXIX A.C.M.M., AT BENGALURU, FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE
P/U/S 376, 504, 418 AND 420 OF IPC.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question the
registration of crime in Crime No.75/2022 for offences
punishable under Sections 376, 504, 418 and 420 of IPC.
2. Heard the learned counsel Sri.Siddharth B.
Muchandi, appearing for the petitioner, Sri.K.S.Abhijith, learned
HCGP for respondent No.1 and Sri.Siddharth Suman, learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
3. Brief facts that leads the petitioner to this Court, as
borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:
The second respondent is the complainant. The second
respondent and the petitioner get acquainted to each other
through a mobile application called "Truly Madly" and later on,
the acquaintance develops into a relationship. The allegation is
that the petitioner projected himself to be single in the profile
of the said App and from 28.12.2019 till the date of registration
of the complaint, the petitioner and the complainant were in
relationship which was physical as well. It transpires, later, the
complainant gets to know that the petitioner was already
married and had projected to the complainant that he is single.
The complainant therefore retaliates and registers a complaint
for offences punishable under Sections 376, 504, 418 and 420
of IPC. A complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.75/2022 for
the afore-quoted offences. It is the registration of the crime
that is what drives the petitioner to this Court in the subject
petition. During the pendency of the petition, the police after
investigation, have filed a charge sheet and the petitioner has
by way of an amendment sought to amend the prayer seeking
quashment of the entire proceedings in C.C.No.55301/2022.
The said amendment having gone un-apposed was allowed and
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
the challenge to the proceedings in C.C.No.55301/2022 was
accepted.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the App itself is designed with primary focus of
match making of compatible singles all over the Country. The
petitioner though projected himself to be single, the physical
relationship that they had for over two years was purely
consensual and had talks of divorce with the existing wife and
marrying the complainant. He would submit such consensual
relationship cannot amount to an offence of rape to become
punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. He would submit that
the petitioner is in custody on the aforesaid registration of
crime for the last three months.
5. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2
though would seek to refute the submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that
complainant herself has now come forward to settle the dispute
and has also filed affidavit of settlement before this Court. In
the light of the said affidavit so filed, he would not wish to
make any submissions on the merit of the matter, but admits
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
that the relationship between the petitioner and the
complainant was for more than two years.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
contentions of respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The
offences are the ones punishable under Sections 376, 418 and
420 of IPC. The crime so registered on offence punishable
under Section 376 of the IPC cannot in the normal
circumstances be closed on account of a settlement between
the parties at a later point in time. But the same would not be
applicable to every case, particularly in cases where the acts of
the parties to the lis were consensual even on the merit of the
matter, the offence under Section 376 of the IPC cannot be
made out. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner and the
complainant had sexual relationship after having met on an
online application "Truly Madly" and the relationship having
gone on for more than two years as the complaint comes to be
registered on 25.05.2022 i.e., between 28.12.2019 till the date
of registration of the complaint. The Whatsapp chat that are
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
appended to the petition would also demonstrate that the talks
of divorcing the wife and remarrying the complainant was also
between the parties.
8. A complaint comes to be registered on the ground that
the complainant out of serendipity found that the petitioner
was already married and it was breach of promise of marriage
and the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC was
what was sought to be alleged against the petitioner. The
police, after investigation, have filed a charge sheet. Column
No.17 of the charge sheet reads as follows:
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
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A perusal at the summary of the charge sheet (supra) would
clearly indicate consensual relation between the petitioner and
the complainant. Therefore, on both the counts that the acts of
the petitioner and the complainant having sexual relations was
consensual, as also, the fact that the complainant herself has
now come forward to settle the dispute amongst themselves,
the unmistakable inference that could be drawn on the merit of
the matter is, that permitting further proceedings would run
foul of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the cases
of: 1) PRAMOD SURYABHAN PAWAR v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA reported in (2019)9 SCC 608; and
2) DHRUVARAM MURALIDHAR SONAR v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA reported in (2019)18 SCC 191.
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
9. The Apex Court, while delineating inter-play between
promise of marriage and allegation of rape, in the case of
PRAMOD SURYABHAN PAWAR (supra), has held as follows:
"14. In the present case, the "misconception of
fact" alleged by the complainant is the appellant's
promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a
promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a
distinction between a false promise given on the
understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and
the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but
subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of
Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh,
(2019) 13 SCC 1: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509], this Court
held:
"12. The sum and substance of the
aforesaid decisions would be that if it is
established and proved that from the inception
the accused who gave the promise to the
prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention
to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for
sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the
accused that he would marry her, such a consent
can be said to be a consent obtained on a
misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and,
in such a case, such a consent would not excuse
the offender and such an offender can be said to
have committed the rape as defined under
Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the
offence under Section 376 IPC."
CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013)7 SCC 675: (2013) 3
SCC (Cri) 660] (Deepak Gulati):
"21. ... There is a distinction between the
mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a
false promise. Thus, the court must examine
whether there was made, at an early stage a false
promise of marriage by the accused;"
15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P.
(2006)11 SCC 615:(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 557] the accused
forcibly established sexual relations with the
complainant. When she asked the accused why he
had spoiled her life, he promised to marry her. On
this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with the complainant. When the
complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to
marry her. When the matter was brought to the
panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual
intercourse with the complainant but subsequently
absconded. Given this factual background, the Court
observed:
"10. It appears that the intention of the
accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right
from the beginning, not honest and he kept on
promising that he will marry her, till she became
pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the
accused cannot be said to be any consent because
she was under a misconception of fact that the
accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had
submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact
is also admitted by the accused that he had
committed sexual intercourse which is apparent
from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more
than clear that the accused made a false promise
that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention
of the accused right from the beginning was not
bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of
the accused, completely being misled by the
accused who held out the promise for marriage.
This kind of consent taken by the accused with
clear intention not to fulfil the promise and
persuading the girl to believe that he is going to
marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual
intercourse under total misconception, cannot be
treated to be a consent."
16. Where the promise to marry is false and
the intention of the maker at the time of making the
promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive
the woman to convince her to engage in sexual
relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that
vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand,
a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false
promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of
the promise should have had no intention of
upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
"consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated
on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where
such misconception was the basis for her choosing
to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675:(2013) 3
SCC (Cri) 660] this Court observed: (SCC pp. 682-84,
paras 21 & 24)
"21. ... There is a distinction between the
mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of
sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently.
***
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of
fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance".
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety,
and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless
the court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended
to marry her."
(emphasis supplied)
17. In Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4
SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] the complainant was a
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
college-going student when the accused promised
to marry her. In the complainant's statement, she
admitted that she was aware that there would be
significant opposition from both the complainant's
and accused's families to the proposed marriage.
She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused
but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from
her family. The Court observed that in these
circumstances the accused's promise to marry the
complainant was not of immediate relevance to the
comp l ain an t' s d ecis ion to en g a ge in s ex u al
intercourse with the accused, which was motivated
by other factors: (SCCp.58, para 25)
"25. There is yet another difficulty
which faces the prosecution in this case. In a
case of this nature two conditions must be
fulfilled for the application of Section 90
IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the
consent was given under a misconception of
fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the
person who obtained the consent knew, or
had reason to believe that the consent was
given in consequence of such misconception.
We have serious doubts that the promise to
marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to
having sexual intercourse with the appellant.
She knew, as we have observed earlier, that
her marriage with the appellant was difficult
on account of caste considerations. The
proposal was bound to meet with stiff
opposition from members of both families.
There was therefore a distinct possibility, of
which she was clearly conscious, that the
marriage may not take place at all despite the
promise of the appellant. The question still
remains whether even if it were so, the
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
appellant knew, or had reason to believe,
that the prosecutrix had consented to having
sexual intercourse with him only as a
consequence of her belief, based on his
promise, that they will get married in due
course. There is hardly any evidence to prove
this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances
of the case tend to support the conclusion
that the appellant had reason to believe that
the consent given by the prosecutrix was the
result of their deep love for each other. It is
not disputed that they were deeply in
love. They met often, and it does appear that
the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which,
if at all, are permitted only to a person with
whom one is in deep love. It is also not
without significance that the prosecutrix
stealthily went out with the appellant to a
lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It
usually happens in such cases, when two
young persons are madly in love, that they
promise to each other several times that
come what may, they will get married."
(emphasis supplied)
18. To summarise the legal position that
emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a
woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an
active and reasoned deliberation towards the
proposed act. To establish whether the "consent"
was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising
out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be
established. The promise of marriage must have
been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no
intention of being adhered to at the time it was
given. The false promise itself must be of
immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
10. The Apex Court, a little later in the case of
DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR (supra), while following
the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the case of UDAY v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2003)4 SCC 46 and DEELIP
SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR reported in (2005)1 SCC 88, has
held as follows:
"18. In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC
46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775, this Court was considering a
case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19 years, had
given consent to sexual intercourse with the accused with
whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would
marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to
meet the accused and often had sexual intercourse and
became pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of
the accused to marry her. It was held that consent cannot
be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It was
held thus: (SCC pp. 56-57, paras 21 & 23)
"21. It therefore appears that the consensus
of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the
consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual
intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply
in love on a promise that he would marry her on a
later date, cannot be said to be given under a
misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact
within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to
agree with this view, but we must add that there is
no straitjacket formula for determining whether
consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual
intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given
under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate
analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide
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CRL.P No. 7060 of 2022
at best guidance to the judicial mind while
considering a question of consent, but the court
must, in each case, consider the evidence before it
and the surrounding circumstances, before
reaching a conclusion, because each case has its
own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on
the question whether the consent was voluntary,
or was given under a misconception of fact. It
must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the
fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove
each and every ingredient of the offence, absence
of consent being one of them.
***
23. Keeping in view the approach that the
court must adopt in such cases, we shall now
proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the
instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl
studying in a college. She was deeply in love with
the appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact
that since they belonged to different castes,
marriage was not possible. In any event the
proposal for their marriage was bound to be
seriously opposed by their family members. She
admits having told so to the appellant when he
proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient
intelligence to understand the significance and
moral quality of the act she was consenting to.
That is why she kept it a secret as long as she
could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures
of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to them.
She thus freely exercised a choice between
resistance and assent. She must have known the
consequences of the act, particularly when she
was conscious of the fact that their marriage may
not take place at all on account of caste
considerations. All these circumstances lead us to
the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and
consciously consented to having sexual intercourse
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with the appellant, and her consent was not in
consequence of any misconception of fact."
19. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005)1 SCC
88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , the Court framed the following
two questions relating to consent : (SCC p. 104, para 30)
(1) Is it a case of passive submission in
the face of psychological pressure exerted or
allurements made by the accused or was it a
conscious decision on the part of the
prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and
consequences of the act she was asked to
indulge in?
(2) Whether the tacit consent given by
the prosecutrix was the result of a
misconception created in her mind as to the
intention of the accused to marry her?
In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with
the police stating that she and the accused were
neighbours and they fell in love with each other.
One day in February 1988, the accused forcibly
raped her and later consoled her by saying that he
would marry her. She succumbed to the entreaties
of the accused to have sexual relations with him, on
account of the promise made by him to marry her,
and therefore continued to have sex on several
occasions. After she became pregnant, she revealed
the matter to her parents. Even thereafter, the
intimacy continued to the knowledge of the parents
and other relations who were under the impression
that the accused would marry the girl, but the
accused avoided marrying her and his father took
him out of the village to thwart the bid to marry.
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The efforts made by the father of the girl to
establish the marital tie failed. Therefore, she was
constrained to file the complaint after waiting for
some time.
20. With this factual background, the Court
held that the girl had taken a conscious decision,
after active application of mind to the events that
had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is
a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a
case of false promise to marry, for which the
accused is prima facie accountable for damages
under civil law. It was held thus : (Deelip Singh v. State
of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p.
106, para 35)
"35. The remaining question is whether on
the basis of the evidence on record, it is
reasonably possible to hold that the accused with
the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual
intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We
have no doubt that the accused did hold out the
promise to marry her and that was the
predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to
the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too
keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But
we find no evidence which gives rise to an
inference beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused had no intention to marry her at all from
the inception and that the promise he made was
false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging
from the prosecution evidence establish this fact.
On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that
"later on", the accused became ready to marry her
but his father and others took him away from the
village would indicate that the accused might have
been prompted by a genuine intention to marry
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which did not materialise on account of the
pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to
be a case of breach of promise to marry rather
than a case of false promise to marry. On this
aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday
case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC
46: 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24 come to the
aid of the appellant."
21. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013)7
SCC 675:(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], the Court has drawn a
distinction between rape and consensual sex. This is a
case of a prosecutrix aged 19 years at the time of the
incident. She had an inclination towards the accused. The
accused had been giving her assurances of the fact that
he would get married to her. The prosecutrix, therefore,
left her home voluntarily and of her own free will to go
with the accused to get married to him. She called the
accused on a phone number given to her by him, to ask
him why he had not met her at the place that had been
pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long
time, and when he finally arrived, she went with him to a
place called Karna Lake where they indulged in sexual
intercourse. She did not raise any objection at that stage
and made no complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she went
to Kurukshetra with the accused, where she lived with his
relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became
intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason,
went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University
illegally, and once again came into contact with the
accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she even
proceeded with the accused to the old bus-stand in
Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them
could get married at the court in Ambala. At the bus
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station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court
held that the physical relationship between the parties
had clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix
as there was neither a case of any resistance nor had she
raised any complaint anywhere at any time, despite the
fact that she had been living with the accused for several
days and had travelled with him from one place to
another. The Court further held that it is not possible to
apprehend the circumstances in which a charge of
deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused.
****
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases,
must very carefully examine whether the
complainant had actually wanted to marry the
victim or had mala fide motives and had made a
false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust,
as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false
promise. If the accused has not made the promise
with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to
indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not
amount to rape. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused and
not solely on account of the misconception created
by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or
which were beyond his control, was unable to
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marry her despite having every intention to do.
Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant
had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine
motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged
consensual physical relationship between the parties
would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC.
24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position
that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the
Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working
as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that
she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant
informed her that he is a married man and that he has
differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to
different communities. It is also alleged that the
accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their
marriage registered. The complainant further states that
she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she
needed a companion as she was a widow. She has
specifically stated that "as I was also a widow and I
was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his
proposal and since then we were having love affair
and accordingly we started residing together. We
used to reside sometimes at my home whereas
sometimes at his home". Thus, they were living
together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at
the residence of the appellant. They were in a
relationship with each other for quite some time
and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear
that they had been living as such for quite some
time together. When she came to know that the
appellant had married some other woman, she
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lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the
complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a
conscious decision after active application of mind
to the things that had happened. It is not a case of
a passive submission in the face of any
psychological pressure exerted and there was a
tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was
not the result of a misconception created in her
mind. We are of the view that, even if the
allegations made in the complaint are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, they do
not make out a case against the appellant. We are
also of the view that since the complainant has
failed to prima facie show the commission of rape,
the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b)
cannot be sustained."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. On the bedrock principles laid down by the Apex
Court, if the case at hand is considered, the unmistakable
inference would be that proceedings against the petitioner for
offences punishable under Section 376 of the IPC cannot be
sustained for the reason that the petitioner and the
respondent/complainant, as observed hereinabove, had a
consensual relationship for more than 2 years and 5 months.
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12. The remainder of the offences are the ones
punishable under Sections 418 and 420 of IPC. The allegation
for those offences are breach of promise of marriage. A Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in its judgment VENKATESH AND
OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA - Criminal Petition
No.5865 of 2021 has held that breach of promise of marriage
cannot be made an offence under Sections 417 or 420 of IPC.
Therefore, the offences so alleged against the petitioner are
being covered in favour of the obliteration of the offences
against the petitioner.
13. It is germane, at this juncture, to notice the petition
for compromise filed between the petitioner and the
complainant.
"1. Based upon the complaint dated 24/05/2022 filed
by the second respondent before the first respondent
police station, the FIR in Crime No.75/2020 by the first
respondent police against the petitioner for the offences
punishable Sections 376, 504, 418 and 420 of IPC and
after investigation the final report u/s. 173 Cr.PC has
been filed which is now pending in C.C No.55301/2022
before the Ho'ble 29th Addl. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Mayo Hall, Bangalore for the aforesaid
offences. The petitioner was arrested by the first
respondent police on 26/05/2022 and has been in
judicial custody.
2. Thereafter upon the intervention and counselling by
the well-wishers, an amicable settlement is arrived at
between the parties and in terms thereof, the second
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respondent has agreed to withdraw all the allegations
made against the petitioner and thereby the second
respondent has no objection for this Criminal Petition to
be allowed and for the entire criminal proceedings
against this petitioner pending in C.C.No.55301/2022
before the Hon'ble 29th Addl. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Mayo Hall, Bangalore for the offences
punishable Sections 376, 504, 418 and 420 of IPC, be
quashed.
3. The petitioner and second respondent withdraw all
other allegations made against each other before any
forum or court and they further undertake that either of
them will not file any case against the each other or
their family or relatives.
4. The petitioner and second respondent state that
there are no claims either present, past or future
against each other.
5. The petitioner and second respondent undertake to
delete and destroy all the photographs, videos,
WhatsApp conversations, other conversations, display
pictures, profile pictures, status, SMS's, emails, in
respect of each other, which are stored either in the
mobile phones, computers, pen-drives, storage devices,
social media websites or any other electronic media,
they undertake not to use data for any purpose
whatsoever and further undertake that the same will not
be leaked, published or circulated by any means be it
electronic or otherwise and they indemnify each other
against such use or publication or circulation of such
sensitive information and data.
6. The petitioner and second respondent undertake and
will ensure that they, their family members, their
relatives, their friends and all the persons will not
interfere with the each other's lives or contact each
other and will not circulate or publish any information
relating to the each other in any manner, in the future.
7. This compromise has been filed without any force,
fraud or undue influence of any person and on the own
will and volition of the parties and that there is no
collusion in presenting the petition.
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Wherefore, the petitioner and second respondent
humbly pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:
a. allow this joint compromise petition and
consequently allow the criminal petition and quash the
criminal proceedings against this petitioner in C.C
No.55301/2022 before the Hon'ble 29th Addl. Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall. Bangalore for the
offences punishable Sections 376, 504, 418 and 420 of
IPC, in the terms and conditions agreed by the parties,
hereinabove, and
b. issue direction for the release the petitioner from
judicial custody, in the interest of justice."
14. In the light of the aforesaid undisputed facts, the
law as laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of 1) PRAMOD
SURYABHAN PAWAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported
in (2019)9 SCC 608; and 2) DHRUVARAM MURALIDHAR
SONAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in (2019)18
SCC 191, as also, the compromise arrived at between the
parties, I deem it appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and terminate the
proceedings qua the petitioner, failing which, the process would
become an abuse of the process of law and would result in
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, I.A.No.4/2022 filed for
compromise is allowed.
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15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
i. Criminal Petition is allowed.
ii. Impugned proceedings in C.C.No.55301/2022 on
the file of the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru, stand quashed.
iii. In the light of the quashment of the entire
proceedings, a communication be sent to the jail
authorities for consequent action of release of the
petitioner.
In view of the disposal of the main petition,
I.A.No.3/2022 stands disposed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
KG
