[Cites 5, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

M/S. Nayan Enterprises vs Commissioner Of State Tax on 16 March, 2026

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                              2026:JHHC:6994-DB




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

                    W.P.(T) No. 4197 of 2023

     M/s. Nayan Enterprises, having its office at Kothan, P.O.- Kothan,
     P.S.- Kothan, District- Godda, through one of its partners Raju
     Kumar Mandal, son of Late Mahesh Prasad Mandal, resident of
     Kothan, P.O. & P.S.- Kothan, District- Godda
                                            ...  ...  Petitioner
                                    Versus
     1. Commissioner of State Tax, State of Jharkhand, Jharkhand
         Goods and Service Tax, Ranchi
     2. Deputy Commissioner of State Tax, Jharkhand Goods and
         Service Tax, Godda and Dumka, having his office at P.O. &
         P.S.- Godda, District- Godda
     3. State Tax Officer, Jharkhand Goods and Service Tax, Godda
         and Dumka, having his office at P.O. & P.S.- Godda, District-
         Godda
                                            ...  ...    Respondents

        CORAM:          HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
     For the Petitioner        : Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, Advocate
                                 Mr. Deepak Sinha, Advocate
     For the Respondents       : Mr. Aditya Kumar, A.C. to Sr.S.C.-I

                                           -----

     Order No. 06                                   Dated: 16.03.2026

1.   Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2.   The   petitioner     challenges       the     adjudication   order   dated

07.04.2022, summary of which was issued in Form GST DRC-07

dated 07.04.2022. The impugned order concerns the period

April 2020 to March 2021.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that by order dated

29.05.2022, the petitioner's GST registration was cancelled. The

same was restored only on 04.07.2023. Therefore, during the

period 29.05.2022 and 04.07.2023, the petitioner was precluded

from appealing the adjudication order dated 07.04.2022. She,

therefore, submits that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not

2026:JHHC:6994-DB

instituting an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation of

three months, extendable by one month.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even the

adjudication order dated 07.04.2022 was in violation of the

principles of natural justice because no notice of hearing was

given to the petitioner.

5. Mr Aditya Kumar, learned A.C. to Sr.S.C.-I appearing on behalf of

the respondents, submits that this petition was instituted only on

26.07.2023. He submitted that show cause notices were issued to

the petitioner, which it did not respond to. Therefore, the claim of

failure of natural justice is bereft of any merit.

6. Mr Aditya Kumar submits that a petitioner cannot allow the

limitation period to lapse and, after that, invoke this Court's

extraordinary jurisdiction on the specious plea that the petitioner

had a sufficient cause for not instituting the appeal within the

period of limitation. He submitted that this is a case of fraud and

therefore, no leniency must be extended to the petitioner.

7. We have considered the rival contentions, and we are satisfied

that there is no merit in this petition. Brief reasons for this

conclusion follow.

8. Firstly, we are not satisfied that any sufficient cause has been

shown by the petitioner for not availing of the alternate remedy

of appeal to question the adjudication order dated 07.04.2022.

9. Admittedly, the petitioner's registration was cancelled only on

29.05.2022, though, w.e.f. 31.03.2022. For the period between

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07.04.2022 and 29.05.2022, nothing prevented the petitioner

from instituting an appeal. The argument that the petitioner was

unaware of the order dated 07.04.2022 is not made good and is,

in fact, contrary to the record.

10. Secondly, nothing is shown to us to indicate that the petitioner's

appeal would not have been entertained because registration was

cancelled by order dated 29.05.2022. Admittedly, the

adjudication order dated 07.04.2022 relates to the period April

2020 to March 2021, during which the petitioner had a

registration.

11. Thirdly, this petition was instituted only on 26.07.2023. Surely,

the cancellation of registration did not preclude the petitioner

from instituting a petition before this Court well within the

limitation period prescribed under the statute for instituting

appeals. Though no limitation period as such is prescribed for

invoking this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution, still, it is expected that the petitioner

institutes a writ petition with utmost dispatch, assuming that

there was any real difficulty in instituting an appeal before the

appellate authority.

12. Fourthly, nothing whatsoever was submitted on the merits of the

matter or the probable defence to resist the demand. Only

ground urged was that the impugned order was ex parte and

allegedly not served on the Petitioner. If, despite the service of a

show cause and the grant of opportunities, the Petitioner does

2026:JHHC:6994-DB

not avail of the same, the resulting order cannot be attacked as

ex parte.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant

Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada & Ors. Vs. GLAXO

SMITH KLINE Consumer Health Care Limited, reported in

2020(19) SCC 681, has held that the extraordinary jurisdiction

of this Court must not be exercised to help parties to defeat the

statutory regime, which includes the limitation period prescribed

under the statute. This is precisely what the petitioner seeks to

achieve by belatedly instituting this petition.

14. In the case of Rikhab Chand Jain Vs. Union of India and

Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6719 of 2012 decided on November 12,

2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to the

Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal Vs.

A. Majid, Superintendent of Taxes, reported in AIR 1964

SC 1419, has held that ordinarily the Court will not entertain a

petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an

alternate remedy, which, without being unduly onerous, provides

an equally efficacious remedy. Therefore, where it is open to the

aggrieved petitioner to move another Tribunal, or even itself in

another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided

by the statute, the high court normally will not permit, by

entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the

machinery created by the statute to be bypassed, and will leave

the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.

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15. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Rikhab

Chand Jain (supra), by referring to the majority view in a

previous Constitution Bench in the case of A.V.

Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs.

Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, reported in AIR 1961 SC

1506, has held that if a petitioner has disabled himself from

availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not

doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be

permitted to urge that as a ground for the court dealing with his

petition under Article 226 to exercise its discretion in his favour.

In essence, the Court believed that once a petitioner has, due to

his own fault, disabled himself from availing a statutory remedy,

the discretionary remedy under Article 226 may not be available.

16. In paragraph-13 of Rikhab Chand Jain (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has held that although there is no period of

limitation for invoking the writ jurisdiction of a High Court under

Article 226, all that the courts insist is the invocation of its

jurisdiction with utmost expedition and, at any rate, within a

"reasonable period". What would constitute "reasonable period"

cannot be put in a straitjacket, and it must invariably depend on

the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Nonetheless,

the period of limitation prescribed by an enactment for availing

the alternate remedy provided thereunder in certain cases thus

provides an indication as to what should be the reasonable

period within which the writ jurisdiction has to be invoked.