1. Ram Singh Banara, aged about 47 years S/O Triban Banra
2. Mangu Banara, aged about 47 years S/o Porma Banara
Both are R/O-Forest Block Tola Dalmabera, P.S.+P.O.-Jadugora
Dist.-East Singhbhum .... .... Appellants
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ..... .... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of
passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-I, Ghatsila, in
connection with Jadugora P.S. Case No.49 of 2016 corresponding
to G.R. Case No.475 of 2016, whereby and whereunder, the
read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for
life along with fine of Rs.10,000/-. He has further been sentenced
to undergo R.I. for two years for the offence under Section 324
further been directed to undergo S.I. for three months.
2. It has been contended on behalf of appellant no.2 that although,
passed in I.A. No.2679 of 2024 but the prayer has been renewed
Bench of this Court, vide order dated 28.08.2024 passed in I.A.
3. Learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondent-State has
vehemently opposed the prayer for suspension of sentence.
4. It has been contended by him that the prayer for suspension of
I.A. No.2679 of 2024.
5. It has been contended that so far as the prayer for suspension of
28.08.2024 passed in I.A. No.7439 of 2024 will be taken into
6. It has also been contended that merely on the ground of period of
custody of nine years, the sentence is not fit to be suspended.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
order dated 20.03.2024 passed in I.A. No.2679 of 2024, wherein,
8. It is the admitted case that the order passed by this Court on
20.03.2024 in I.A. No.2679 of 2024 has not been challenged
9. Since, we have already taken a view on the issue on merit by
on merit. However, in addition thereto, further grounds have been
taken, i.e., the parity and the period of custody.
10. So far as the issue of parity is concerned, the ground has been
order dated 28.08.2024 in I.A. No.7439 of 2024, therefore, we
in I.A. No.7439 of 2024 by the Coordinate Bench, which is being
"08/28.08.2024:
This interlocutory application has been filed by the
appellant No.1, praying therein to suspend the
sentence and release him on bail during the
pendency of this appeal.
2. The appellant has been convicted for the
offence under Sections 302, 324 read with 34 of
IPC in connection with Sessions Trial No.164 of
2017. He has been sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of
Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Sections 302
read with Section 34 of IPC along with other
sentences.
3. Heard, learned counsel for the appellant and
learned A.P.P. for the State and have gone
through the impugned judgment, the evidence
and the Trial Court Records.
4. Opportunity was given to the State to oppose
the bail, which the State availed and opposed.
5. Appellant has remained in custody from
31.12.2016. From the statement of the eye
witness, P.W.-7 it is clear that this appellant has
not given any fatal blow on the head of the
deceased. Thus, this case can be distinguished
from the case of the co-appellant, whose bail has
been rejected.
6. Considering the statement of P.W.7 and the
fact this appellant has not given any fatal blow
and was not armed with the murder weapon, we
are inclined to allow this Interlocutory application.
Accordingly, upon suspending the sentence, the
appellant No.1, namely, Ram Singh Banara is
directed to be released on bail during the
pendency of this appeal, on furnishing bail bonds
of Rs.10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand) with two
sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction
of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I,
Ghatsila in connection with Session Trial No.164
of 2017 with a condition that the appellant No.1
shall appear and mark his attendance before the
Registrar, Civil Court, Ghatsila, once in every four
months till the disposal of this appeal.
7. Accordingly, I.A. No.7439 of 2024 stands
allowed."
11. It is evident from the said order, particularly, paragraph-5
thereof that the Coordinate Bench has taken into consideration
the period of custody, as also, the testimony of P.W.7, eye
witness, wherein, no attributability has been casted upon the
appellant no.1, namely, Ram Singh Banara, said to be giving any
fatal blow over the head of the deceased.
12. It has also been observed that the case of Ram Singh Banara,
appellant no.1 is distinguishable from the case of the present
appellant, whose appeal has already been rejected by this Court,
vide order dated 20.03.2024 passed in I.A. No.2679 of 2024, for
ready reference, the said order dated 20.03.2024 is being quoted
as under:-
"Order No.05/ Dated: 20.03.2024
The instant interlocutory application has
been filed under Section 389 (1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 on behalf of the
appellant Mangu Banra who is appellant No.2
prays for the suspension of sentence and to
release him on bail during the pendency of the
instant criminal appeal, whereby and whereunder
he has been convicted and sentenced under
Section 302 read with section 34 and Section 324
r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. It has been contended on behalf of the
appellants in the instant case where the
prosecution has failed to substantiate to prove all
shadow of reasonable doubt. It has been
contended that there is wide contradictions in the
testimony of the witnesses.
Further, ground has been taken that even
the weapon which has been used in commission
of crime i.e. Kattari having the blood stain has not
been sent for forensic test before the Forensic
Science Laboratory. Hence, it cannot be said that
the prosecution has been able to prove the said
charges beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt.
The submission has also been made that merely
on the basis of the testimony of P.W. 7 which has
not been corroborated by the other testimony.
Hence, it is a fit case where the sentence is fit to
be suspended.
3. While on the other hand Mr. Azeemuddin,
learned APP appearing for the State has opposed
the prayer for bail. The ground has been taken
that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant that
the prosecution has failed to substantiate the
charge. It appears that P.W. 7 who happens to be
wife of the deceased was in the house and she
had witness the commission of crime while
committing murder by these two appellants, one
of the appellant-Mangu Banara, is her own
relative.
4. It has been contended that it is a case of
prosecution that is based upon the testimony of
the eye witness and it is a settled proposition of
law that if the conviction is based upon the
testimony of eye witness, even if the weapon has
not been sent for the forensic examination that will
not be fatal to the prosecution. 5. The learned
APP appearing for the State based upon the
aforesaid ground has submitted that it is not a
case where the sentence is fit to be suspended.
6. This Court heard learned counsel for the
parties, gone across the finding given by the
learned trial court in the impugned judgment, the
testimony available in the trial court record along
with the other documents.
7. This Court after appreciating the rival
submissions has gone through the testimony of
P.W. 7 where it is evident that P.W. 7 has
consistently supported the prosecution version of
commission of murder of her husband while she
was inside the house and in front of her, both
these appellants have assaulted and killed her
husband.
8. This Court is of the view that since the
judgment is based upon the testimony of P.W.7
and she remained consistent even in the cross
examination, hence, this Court is of the view that
this is not a case for suspension of sentence.
9. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application
stands dismissed."
13. The Coordinate Bench has further considered the testimony of
P.W.7 to the effect that no such attributability has been casted
upon Ram Singh Banara, the appellant no.1 in giving the fatal
blow over the head of the deceased and even has not been
referred by the P.W.7 that the Ram Singh Banara, appellant no.1,
was armed with the murder weapon.
14. The case of the present appellant is distinguishable, which
would be evident from the testimony of P.W.7, wherein, specific
attributability has been casted upon the present appellant of
giving fatal blow over the head sustaining serious injury
succumbed into death. Therefore, the testimony of P.W.7, clarifies
the position of specific attributability in commission of murder of
the deceased by the present appellant.
15. The law is well settled so far as the issue to be considered for
the purpose of applying the principle of parity that while applying
the principle of parity, all surrounding facts are to be taken into
consideration, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of
Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein, it has held
as under:
"18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra
to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the
other co accused who were similarly situated as the
appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be
accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law.
While applying the principle of parity, the Court is
required to focus upon the role attached to the
accused whose application is under consideration."
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed in the aforesaid
judgment, i.e., Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate
of Enforcement (supra) that it is axiomatic that the principle of
parity is based on the guarantee of positive equality before law
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if any
illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any
individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong order has been
passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same
irregularity or illegality or for passing similar wrong order. Article
14 is not meant to perpetuate the illegality or irregularity. If there
has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of
people by any authority or by the court, without legal basis or
justification, other persons could not claim as a matter of right the
benefit on the basis of such wrong decision.
17. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot
exercise its power in a capricious manner and has to consider the
totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply
saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient
to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity
has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to
the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh
Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6
SCC 230, wherein, it has been held as under:
"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders
passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster
under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the
nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the
severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In
Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this
Court has held that while applying the principle of parity,
the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious
manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances
before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515,
para 17)
"17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a
stand was taken that the second respondent was a history
sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to
scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that
the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on
the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute
certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the
impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014
SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non-
application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has
been brought on record that the second respondent has
been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other
heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note
of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of
extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount
to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside."
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is
the manner in which the High Court has applied the
principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12-2020
[Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC
OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v.
State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High
Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat
Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh
Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on
22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of
Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as
the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar
role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to
Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a
wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A10), Kheta
(A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with
sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently
misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by
parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role
of the accused. Merely observing that another accused
who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is
not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of
bail on the basis of parity has been established. In
deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the
accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the
victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has
proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic
assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass
muster under the law."
18. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sagar Vs.
State of UP & Anr., 2025 INSC 1370 has categorically observed
that while utilizing parity as a ground for bail, the same must focus
on the role of the accused and cannot be utilized solely because
another accused person was granted bail in connection with the
same offence, and neither can this ground be claimed as a matter
of right, the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:
"12. The High Court appears, plainly, to have
erroneously granted bail to the accused-respondent on
the sole ground of parity which it has misunderstood as
a tool of direct application as opposed to parity being
focused on the role played by the accused and not the
thread of the same offence being the only common
factor between the accused persons. On this count
alone we can set aside the impugned judgment and
order. However, we propose not to do so and proceed
to delve further.
14. What flows from the above judgments, which have
been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated
above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that
parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be
granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in
law. The word 'parity' is defined by the Cambridge
Dictionary as "equality, especially of pay or position."
When weighing an application on parity, it is 'position'
that is the clincher. The requirement of 'position' is not
met only by involvement in the same offence. Position
means what the person whose application is being
weighed, his position in crime, i.e., his role etc. There
can be different roles played - someone part of a large
group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of violence;
someone who throws hands at the other side, instigated
by such words spoken by another, someone who fired a
weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people
will be with those who have performed similar acts, and
not with someone who was part of the group to
intimidate the other by the sheer size of the gathering,
with another who attempted to hack away at the
opposer's limbs with a weapon."
19. This Court, after going through the testimony of P.W.7, is of the
view that the attributability is quite distinguishable so far as the
present appellant and appellant no.1, namely, Ram Singh Banara
of the present appeal is concerned and by taking the aforesaid
ground, we have already rejected the prayer for suspension of
sentence of the present appellant.
20. So far as the ground of custody as has been made of about 9
years that merely on the ground of custody, the sentence is not to
be suspended, rather, the sentence can be a ground coupled with
the attributability as has been found and substantiated in course
of trial.
21. It is the settled position of law that the period of custody cannot
be the sole ground for suspension of sentence, rather, the nature
of crime as has been found to be proved against one or the other,
the appellant herein, is to be taken into consideration and even if
the convict has completed substantive sentence, that cannot be a
sole ground for suspension of sentence if the nature of offence
having been proved in course of trial is serious.
22. Further, it needs to refer herein that recently, the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Chhotelal Yadav versus State of
Jharkhand & Anr. (Criminal Appeal no.4804/2025) has
specifically observed that while considering the plea for
suspension of sentence of life imprisonment is that the convict
should be in a position to point out something very palpable or a
very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of
which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone,
his appeal deserves to be allowed.
23. Thus, it is settled connotation of law that even if the convict has
completed substantive sentence, that cannot be a sole ground for
suspension of sentence if the nature of offence having
been proved in course of trial is serious.
24. Herein, it is the specific attributability against the present
appellant as would be evident from testimony of P.W.7 having
been corroborated by the witnesses, this Court, therefore, is of the
view that merely on the ground of sentence having been
undergone by the present appellant of nine years, cannot be a
sole ground for suspending the sentence leaving aside the
attributability found to be substantiated in course of trial.
25. Therefore, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove, this
Court is of the view that it is not a fit case for suspension of
sentence of the present appellant.
26. Accordingly, I.A. No.17207 of 2025 stands dismissed.
27. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not
prejudice the issue on merit as the appeal is lying pending for its
consideration.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai J.)
29.01.2026
Rohit/-
