Kiran Kumari vs The State Of Jharkhand Through ... on 27 January, 2026

Author: Ananda Sen

Bench: Ananda Sen

                                                                        2026:JHHC:1987



              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

                                   W.P.(S) No.182 of 2026
                                         -----
        Kiran Kumari, W/o Dr. Prashant Kumar Suman, R/o 8L/20 Housing Colony, Sector
        8, P.O. & P.S- Bahadurpur, District Patna, Bihar
                                                                  .... Petitioner(s).
                                         Versus
        1.The State of Jharkhand through Principal Secretary, Road Construction
        Department, Government of Jharkhand having its office at- Jharkhand Mantralaya,
        Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
        2.Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand having its
        office at- Jharkhand Mantralaya, Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District
        Ranchi
        3.Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand
        having its office at- Jharkhand Mantralaya, Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa,
        District Ranchi
        4.Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand
        having its office at- Jharkhand Mantralaya, Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa,
        District Ranchi
                                                                 ... Respondent(s)
                                         ------
               CORAM         :     SRI ANANDA SEN, J.

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For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rohit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Vijay Shankar, Advocate Md. Imran Hassan, Advocate For the Resp.-State : Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, AC to Sr. S.C.-II .........

03/ 27.01.2026: Heard, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State.

2. Charge against the petitioner mainly is of unauthorized absence.

3. A departmental proceeding was initiated. The defence of the petitioner is that, having been appointed on compassionate grounds, she was under an obligation to look after her mother, which was a condition mentioned in the appointment letter itself. As her mother was ill, she had to take care of her, but the respondents in an unsympathetical manner rejected her prayer for leave.

4. Thereafter, a chargesheet was submitted against the petitioner and the enquiry report was prepared. After considering the same, the Disciplinary Authority inflicted punishment of dismissal from service.

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Challenging the dismissal order, she filed an appeal, but the said appeal was also rejected.

5. The scope of interference in departmental proceedings by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954 at paragraph 21.1, has held that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer. By referring to judgment in State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the High Court to review the findings and arrive at a different finding. In a departmental proceeding, scope of interference is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere only where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice, or where the findings are based on no evidence, or are in violation of the statutory rules. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:-

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

6. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has a limited scope of interference with the quantum of punishment. The determination of punishment lies within the domain of the departmental authorities. Unless the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, the High Court can not

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interfere.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 while dealing with the issue of quantum of punishment, at paragraph 19 of the said judgment formulated the following guidelines:-

19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.

19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-

delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.

8. In a Departmental Enquiry, the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function. It is true that in a Departmental Proceeding, the provision of Evidence Act are not strictly applicable. However, if a charge is sought to be proved, it must be established either by oral evidence or by documentary evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 at paragraph 28 has held as under:-

28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the

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evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.

Thus, the charge has to be proved in the inquiry proceeding before the Enquiry Officer. In a quasi-judicial proceeding before the Enquiry Officer, there must be evidence, either oral or documentary or both, to prove the charge. If a charge is sought to be proved solely based on documentary evidence, not only must those documents be supplied to the delinquent employee, but such documents along with their contents must also be duly proved before the Enquiry Officer during the proceeding.

In the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an officer conducting an enquiry must arrive at findings only after considering the materials brought on record by the parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 14 as follows:-

14.Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.

9. In the present case, I find that no witnesses have been examined to prove the charge against this petitioner. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid judgments, it can be said that, without any evidence, the Enquiry Officer arrived at the conclusion that the charge stood proved, which is absolutely contrary to law.

10. Further, this Court in Girish Mahto vs. Union of India [W.P.(S) No.1717 of 2021] while relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble

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Supreme Court has held that absence must be willful, and if the absence is not willful, it will not amount to misconduct. It is necessary to quote paragraph 12, which reads as under:-

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar vs Union of India & Anr., reported in 2012 (3) SCC 178. Paragraph 17 has held that if the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to perform the duty, such absence cannot be held to be willful. Further in paragraph 18 it has been held that in a departmental proceeding it is on the department to prove that the absence was willful and if the absence is not willful the same will not amount to misconduct. It is necessary to quote paragraphs 17 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment:-

17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant.

18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct

11. In the present case, the petitioner has produced sufficient materials in support of her contention that her absence was not willful, as she was attending to her mother, who was ill and subsequently expired. The Enquiry Officer was required to consider whether the absence was willful or not, however, this crucial aspect is missing from the enquiry.

12. Considering the observations made above, I find that the impugned order is unsustainable in law and, accordingly, the same is set aside.

13. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service.

14. With regard to back wages, considering the facts of this case and circumstance that the petitioner has not been in service for a considerable period, the respondents are directed to pay back wages

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at the rate of 30%. However, the said period shall be considered as a period in service for all consequential benefits.

15. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant writ petition stands allowed.

(ANANDA SEN, J.) 27th January, 2026 R.S./ Uploaded on 05 /02/2026