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Managing Director vs Priya Ranjan Kumar
2026 Latest Caselaw 383 Jhar

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 383 Jhar
Judgement Date : 27 January, 2026

[Cites 3, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Managing Director vs Priya Ranjan Kumar on 27 January, 2026

Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
                                                            2026:JHHC:1983-DB




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                     L.P.A. No.513 of 2025
                               With
                      I.A No.5019 of 2025
                                -----
       1. Managing Director, Jharkhand State Housing Board, Harmu,
          Ranchi.
       2. Executive Engineer, Jharkhand State Housing Board, Harmu,
          Ranchi.
       3. Estate Officer, Jharkhand State Housing Board, Harmu,
          Ranchi.
                                                        .......... Appellants.
                              -Versus-
       1. Priya Ranjan Kumar, son of Sri Satish Ravidas, permanent
          resident of village Kadamatola, P.O. Mohanpur, P.S. Hiranpur,
          District Pakur, Jharkhand, at present resides at H-172, Harmu
          Housing Colony, Ranchi.
       2. The State of Jharkhand.
       3. Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department,
          State of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
                                                     .......... Respondents.
                                -----
       CORAM :           HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                                -----
       For the Appellants :        Mr. Gaurav Raj, Advocate
       For the State        :      Mr. R. K. Shahi, AC to SC (L&C)-I
                                -----
       Reserved on 19.01.2026             Pronounced on 27.01.2026
       Per: Rajesh Shankar, J.

I.A. No.5019 of 2025:

1. The present interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of

the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for

condonation of delay of 206 days in filing the instant letters

patent appeal, challenging the order/judgment dated 23.08.2024

passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.2854 of 2024.

2. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that after passing

of the impugned judgment dated 23.08.2024, the clerk of

the Jharkhand State Housing Board, Ranchi (in short 'the Board')

forwarded the file to the Law Officer of the Board adding notes

that the file could be sent to the Executive Engineer, Ranchi

2026:JHHC:1983-DB

Division of the Board for compliance of the judgment dated

23.08.2024. Thereafter, the Law officer forwarded the file along

with copy of the judgment dated 23.08.2024 to the Secretary of

the Board with similar noting for compliance of the said judgment.

3. It is further submitted that the file was again moved from the

level of clerk to the Managing Director of the Board for taking

decision in the matter i.e., either to comply the judgment of the

writ Court or to file letters patent appeal. Thereafter, the decision

was taken to file L.P.A. in the said matter and the file was sent to

the office of the Panel Advocate on 04.03.2025 for drafting the

memo of appeal.

4. It is also submitted that some time was consumed in arranging

requisite documents for drafting the memo of appeal, which were

obtained and provided to the Panel Advocate on 20.03.2025.

Subsequently, the memo of appeal was drafted by the Panel

Advocate on 27.03.2025, which was further sent to the Board for

its approval and finally the instant letters patent appeal was filed

on 17.04.2025.

5. According to learned counsel for the appellants/applicants, the

delay caused in filing the instant appeal is neither intentional nor

deliberate but due to the reasons beyond the control of the

appellants. The appeal has the merit which contains good

grounds for assailing the impugned judgment and, therefore, the

delay of 206 days caused in filing the instant appeal may be

condoned.

2026:JHHC:1983-DB

6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the

materials available on record.

7. On perusal of the record of the case, it appears that the judgment

was reserved by the learned writ Court on 12.08.2024 and was

pronounced on 23.08.2024. The counsel of the appellants was

not only present in course of argument but was also appropriately

heard in the matter. As such the appellants were supposed to

have the information of the said judgment. The appellants were

also well aware of the legal position that a Letters Patent Appeal

is to be filed within 30 days of passing of the judgment by the

learned Single Judge, however, they have filed the instant letters

patent appeal on 17.04.2025 after 206 days.

8. Laxity on the part of the appellants is also evident from the fact

that even the requisition for obtaining certified copy of the

impugned judgment was filed on 04.04.2025 i.e., after more than

seven months of passing of the impugned judgment dated

23.08.2024. This clearly suggests that the appellants were quite

causal and lethargic in filing the instant appeal.

9. In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living

Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3

SCC 563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the

2026:JHHC:1983-DB

certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government."

2026:JHHC:1983-DB

10. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji

Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 489, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring

2026:JHHC:1983-DB

into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case."

11. Thus, the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound

public policy and the principles of equity. The length of delay is a

relevant consideration for condonation of delay in filing appeal. If

it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has occasioned due

to own negligence and casual attitude of the party claiming

condonation of delay, the same may not be condoned on the

ground of doing substantial justice.

12. It is a trite law that a government department cannot claim a

separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly

binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for

condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and

inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes

cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being

available and used. If it is found from the record of a particular

case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not

2026:JHHC:1983-DB

diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking

appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is

liable to be rejected.

13. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, we are not

inclined to condone the inordinate delay of 206 days in filing the

present appeal in view of the fact that the appellants have been

negligent and casual in taking steps for filing the same and they

have not shown sufficient cause to condone the said delay.

14. For the aforesaid reasons, I.A. No.5019 of 2025 seeking

condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal is dismissed.

L.P.A. No.513 of 2025:

15. Resultantly, the present letters patent appeal is also dismissed.

16. Other pending I.A.(s), if any, are also dismissed.

(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Rajesh Shankar, J.) 27th January, 2026 Sanjay/ Uploaded on 27.01.2026

 
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