Pradeep Kumar Roy vs The State Of Jharkhand
2026 Latest Caselaw 623 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Pradeep Kumar Roy vs The State Of Jharkhand on 3 February, 2026

Author: Deepak Roshan

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                           2026:JHHC:2844
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
              W.P.(L) No. 2852 of 2019
                         .........

1. Pradeep Kumar Roy, S/o Bhim Prasad Roy, aged about 39 years. Resident of village Baghmara, Harladangal, PO- Dumriya, PS- Palajori, Nawadih, District- Deoghar,

2. Nabam Kumar Roy, S/o Dhirendra Nath Roy, aged about 49 years, Resident of village- Sarath, PO &PS- Sarath, District- Deoghar.

3. Ishwar Pandit S/o Jay Narayan Pandit, aged about- 44 years, Resident of village- Domnatand, PO & PS- Domnatand, District- Deoghar.

4. TinkuRawani, S/o Mohan Rawani, aged about- 31 years, Resident of Ward No. 15, S.R. Dalmiya Road, Madhupur, PO & PS- Madhupur, District-Deoghar.

5. Sonalal Soren, S/o Chhota Soren, aged about- 48 years, Ward No. 10, G.P.Guriya, Po & PS- Madhupur, District- Deoghar.

6. Musho Pandit, S/o Bubhnewar Pandit, aged about 43 years, resident of village-Sarath, P.O. & P.S. Sarath; District-Deoghar. ..... Petitioner (s) Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand.

2. The Executive Engineer, P.H.E.D., Peyajal Swachhata Bibhag, Sub division-Madhupur,P.O. & P.S. Madhupur, District-Deoghar.

3. Superintending Engineer, P.H.E.D., Peyajal Swachhata Bibhag, Sub division-Madhupur,P.O. & P.S. Madhupur, District-Deoghar.

..... Respondent(s) with

.........

Dinesh Poddar, aged about 54 years, son of Dilip Poddar, resident of village Salona Tarh, P.O. & P.S. Deoghar, District-Deoghar. ..... Petitioner (s)

2026:JHHC:2844 Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand.

2. The Executive Engineer, Drinking Water and Sanitation Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Sub- Division Madhupur, P.O. and P.S. Madhupur, District Deoghar.

3. The Superintending Engineer, Drinking Water and Sanitation Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Sub- Division Madhupur, P.O. and P.S. Madhupur, District Deoghar. ..... Respondent(s) .........

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN .......

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Adv For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Divyam, A.C. to S.C.-IV (in W.P.(L) No. 2852 of 2019) Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, A.C. to Sr.S.C.-II (in W.P.(L) No. 3783 of 2019) .........

C.A.V. ON 02/12/2025 PRONOUNCED ON:03/02/2026

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. These writ petitions, W.P. (L) No. 2852 of 2019 filed by

Pradeep Kumar Ray and others, and W.P. (L) No. 3783 of

2019 filed by Dinesh Poddar, bring forth common questions

of law and have therefore, been considered together. The

petitioners in these cases were employed as casual

workmen by the Drinking Water and Sanitation

Department, Government of Jharkhand. Their roles

included nalkup-khalasi, hand pumpman, khalasi,

handpump mechanic, and jhadukash. Each petitioner

claims to have worked for various periods ranging between

1980 and 2017, completing more than 240 days of work

each year.

2026:JHHC:2844

3. The core grievance of the petitioners is that, after

submitting representations seeking regularization of their

services, their employment was terminated through oral

orders. They were informed that reinstatement would be

possible only if they agreed to contract employment.

Dissatisfied, the petitioners raised an industrial dispute

regarding their abrupt oral termination before the Executive

Engineer and the Superintendent Engineer of the Drinking

Water and Sanitation Department, Government of

Jharkhand.

4. All six petitioners in W.P. (L) 2852/2019 signed a

letter raising the industrial dispute dated March 24, 2017.

This letter, annexed as Annexure-1 of the writ petition, was

part of the record before the Labour Court, Deoghar, and it

was also sent to the Assistant Labour Commissioner,

Deoghar. Similarly, petitioner Dinesh Poddar sent a letter

dated October 10, 2017, to the respondents, with a copy to

the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Conciliation

Officer, Deoghar.

5. Despite the representations, the Conciliation Officer

took no action. As a result, the petitioners approached the

Labour Court at Deoghar under Section 2(A)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The claims of Pradeep

Kumar Roy and others were registered as ID Case No.

2026:JHHC:2844 01/2017, while Dinesh Poddar's case was registered as ID

Case No. 01/2018.

6. Before the Labour Court, the respondents did not

contest the claims of the petitioners. The petitioners

presented evidence, and the witnesses they produced were

not even cross-examined. Nevertheless, the Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Deoghar, dismissed both cases. The

primary reason for dismissal of the cases was the non-

compliance with statutory requirements prescribed in

Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Labour Court held that there was no documentary

proof that the petitioners had raised their claim before the

Conciliation Officer. Further, the Court found that, in the

absence of appointment letters, the petitioners' claims

lacked credibility, rendering them ineligible for relief.

7. The petitioners, Pradeep Kumar Ray and five others,

challenged the order/award dated March 2, 2019, passed

in ID Case No. 01/2017, while Dinesh Poddar challenged

the order/award of the same date in ID Case No. 01/2018.

As stated hereinabove, both awards rejected the petitioners'

cases for non-compliance with the statutory conditions

under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

8. The respondents submitted counter affidavits in these

cases denying the petitioners' claims for the first time. It is

2026:JHHC:2844 undisputed that they did not file a written statement/show

cause petition before the Labour Court, Deoghar.

9. At this stage itself, it is pertinent to note that the High

Court, when exercising its certiorari jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will neither act as a

court of first instance; nor consider the respondents'

defenses, since they failed to file written statement despite

ample opportunity in the Labour Court.

10. The fundamental question in these writ petitions is

whether a deemed reference under Section 2(A)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 existed, and whether the

claims should have been adjudicated on their merits.

Section 2(A) provides that the dismissal, discharge,

retrenchment, or termination of an individual workman is

to be deemed an "industrial dispute", even if no other

workman or union is party to the dispute. The section was

amended w.e.f. September 15, 2010, by inserting sub-

section (2), allowing a workman to directly approach the

Labour Court or Tribunal after 45 days have elapsed from

the date an application is made to the Conciliation Officer.

The provision of law reads as follows:-

2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.--

(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial

2026:JHHC:2844 dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section l0, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1)may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).

11. In the present cases, the petitioners raised grievance

against their oral termination before their employer, and

copies of relevant letters were sent to the Assistant Labour

Commissioner, Deoghar. The Assistant Labour

Commissioner, upon being aware of the petitioners'

grievances, should have initiated conciliation proceedings

by notifying both parties. Since no action was taken, the

petitioners directly approached the Labour Court at

Deoghar.

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Workmen of M/s.

Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v.

Management reported in [(1973) 1 SCC 813] has held that

the Labour Court is required to adjudicate the dispute on

merits, and procedural technicalities should not defeat

substantive rights.

In the instant matter, the Labour Court has dismissed

the cases, as in its opinion, no formal application was

2026:JHHC:2844 submitted before the Conciliation Officer. The petitioners'

however, had sent copies of the letters addressed to their

employer stating the dispute and demanding redressal of

their grievances. This is sufficient compliance with the

requirement of making application in Section 2A(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Labour Court should not have applied strict and

literal interpretation and was required to only ensure that

there is substantive compliance with the statutory

provisions. In this connection, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai,

reported in (1976) 3 SCC 832 has made following pertinent

observations: -

"7. Fairness to respondent's Counsel constrains us to consider in limine a flawsome plea forcibly urged that the union figured as the appellant before us but being no party to the dispute (which was between the workers on the one hand and the establishments on the other) had no locus standi. No right of the union qua union was involved and the real disputants were the workers. Surely, there is terminological lapse in the cause title because, in fact, the aggrieved appellants are the workers collectively, not the union. But a bare reading of the petition, the description of parties, the grounds urged and grievances aired, leave us in no doubt that the battle is between the workers and employers and the union represents, as a collective noun, as it were, the numerous humans whose presence is indubitable in the contest, though formally invisible on the party array. The substance of the matter is obvious and formal defects, in such circumstances, fade away. We are not dealing with a civil litigation governed by the Civil Procedure Code but with an industrial dispute where the process of conflict resolution is informal, rough-and-ready and invites a liberal approach. Procedural prescriptions are hand-maids, not mistresses, of justice and failure of fair play is the spirit in which courts must view processual deviances. Our adjectival branch of jurisprudence, by and large, deals not with sophisticated litigants but the rural poor, the urban lay and the weaker societal segments for whom law will be an added terror if technical misdescriptions and deficiencies in drafting pleadings and setting out the cause title create a secret weapon to non- suit a party. Where foul play is absent, and fairness is not faulted, latitude is a grace of processual justice. Test litigations, representative actions, pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to bypass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral, procedural shortcomings.

2026:JHHC:2844 Even Article 226, viewed in wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances, as distinguished from assertion of individual rights, although the traditional view, backed by precedents, has opted for the narrower alternative. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. Therefore, the decisions cited before us founded on the jurisdiction under Article 226 are inept and themselves somewhat out of tune with the modern requirements of jurisprudence calculated to benefit the community. Two rulings of this Court more or less endorse this general approach: Dabholkar [Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702 : (1976) 1 SCR 306] and Newabganj Sugar Mills [Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 1 SCC 120]."

(Emphasis Supplied)

13. Further, the relationship of employer and employee

can be established through oral evidence and

circumstances, not solely by appointment letters. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court has warned against defeating the

objectives of beneficial labour legislation on technical

grounds, underlining the need for substantive justice.

14. Having regards to the above, this Court is having no

hesitation in holding that the Presiding Officer of the

Labour Court, Deoghar, failed to consider the letters

(Annexure-1) that were on record in both writ petitions. The

finding that no application was made to the Conciliation

Officer contradicts the evidence and is patently perverse.

In other words, the Labour Court has adopted a hyper-

technical approach which is incorrect. Further, as soon as

the labour authorities became aware of the industrial

dispute it was their duty to initiate conciliation process. The

workmen waited for 45 days which is the condition

2026:JHHC:2844 precedent for approaching the Labour Court.

15. Moreover, the respondents did not challenge the order

of the Labour Court, Deoghar, that barred them from filing

their reply or written statement. They cannot now seek to

reopen the cases before the High Court examining the

legality of industrial awards in judicial review.

It would be highly improper to decide the merits as a

court of first instance when several disputed questions of

facts are involved.

16. The Labour Court, Deoghar, also committed a

significant error in examining uncontested evidence

regarding the petitioners' engagement and employment by

verbal orders. If the Labour Court found that the

prerequisite conditions for invoking its jurisdiction were not

fulfilled it should have confined the case to maintainability

only instead of examining the merits of the dispute.

It is inconceivable as to how the Labour Court could

first hold that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute

under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and

then examine the entire evidence and records. Therefore,

the findings in the awards are illegal and unsustainable and

liable to be set aside.

17. Given these circumstances, the cases before the

Labour Court require fresh examination. An order of

2026:JHHC:2844 remand would be best serve the ends of justice. The

respondents may avail themselves of the opportunity before

the Labour Court to file appropriate applications for

permission to submit their written statements and/or

adduce evidence etc., which shall be considered by the

Labour Court strictly in accordance with law. The Labour

Court should also decide the case expeditiously.

18. Consequently, these petitions stand disposed of.

Pending I.A.s, if any, also stands disposed of.

(Deepak Roshan, J.) Dated:03 /02/2026 Amardeep/ A.F.R

Uploaded 05.02.2026