[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... vs Dr. Kala Nand Thakur on 3 February, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:2677- DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 313 of 2025
With
I.A. No. 4970 of 2025
---
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary,
Department of Higher, Technical Education and Skill
Development, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2. The Director, Higher Education, Department of Higher,
Technical Education and Skill Development, Government of
Jharkhand, Ranchi ... ... Appellants
Versus
1. Dr. Kala Nand Thakur, son of Late Parma Nand Thakur, resident
of Mohalla- Sonuwadangal, Resikpur, P.O., P.S. and District-
Dumka
2. Dr. Viveka Nand Singh, son of Sri Jai Krishna Prasad Singh,
resident of Mohalla Satya Nagar near Block Office, P.O.- Godda,
P.S.-Town Thana, District- Godda
3. Arvind Kumar Jha, son of Late Harish Chandra Jha, resident of
Village and P.O.- Sakri Gali, via- Deosangh, P.S. & District-
Deoghar
4. Kislai Sinha, son of Sri Shashibhushan Sinha, resident of
Ishaan Green Apartments, Flat No. 205, Shital Malik Road,
P.O., P.S. & District- Deoghar
5. Dr. Rahul Kumar Santosh, son of Late Jagdish Bhagat, C/o-
Lalit Narayan Bhagat at Barhait, P.O. & P.S.- Barhi, District-
Sahebganj
6. Siddhu Kanhu Murmu University, Dumka, through its Registrar
7. The Vice Chancellor, Siddhu Kanhu Murmu University, Dumka
8. Registrar, Siddhu Kanhu Murmu University, Dumka
.... ... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
---
For the Appellants : Mr. Abhijeet Anand, A.C. to Sr.S.C.-I
Mr. Aditya Kumar, A.C. to Sr.S.C.-I
For the Resp. Nos. 1 to 5 : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate
Mr. Sudhanshu Singh, Advocate
---
Reserved on 29.01.2026 Pronounced on 03.02.2026
Per : Rajesh Shankar, J. :
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order/judgment
dated 17.05.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.
4765 of 2018 whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners
(respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein) has been allowed by quashing and
2026:JHHC:2677- DB
setting aside the condition mentioned in Clause 1.3 of the Statute
dated 15.12.2022 and they have been held entitled for the monetary
benefits from their due date(s) of entitlement; be it by way of
promotion or otherwise, as per the UGC Regulations.
2. Since the present appeal is barred by limitation, it is appropriate to
first consider the application filed on behalf of the appellants seeking
condonation of delay.
3. The present interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the
appellants/applicants seeking condonation of delay of 303 days in
filing the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that after passing the
impugned judgment dated 17.05.2024, the file was put up
before the Deputy Director, Higher Education, Department of Higher
Technical Education and Skill Development, Government of
Jharkhand on 19.06.2024 for taking further steps in the matter, who
after making endorsement, forwarded the said file to the
Policy Section of the concerned department on 20.06.2024.
5. It is further submitted that the file pertaining to the present appeal
was returned to the Deputy Director, Higher Education, Department
of Higher Technical Education and Skill Development, Government
of Jharkhand on 25.06.2024 for taking further steps in the matter,
who then sent the said file to the Under Secretary for making
endorsement in order to forward the same to the departmental
retainer for preparing the grounds of appeal.
6. It is also submitted that the Under Secretary endorsed the said file
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to the legal retainer on 01.07.2024 who prepared the grounds of
appeal on 16.07.2024 and then the file was again forwarded to the
Deputy Director for getting opinion on the grounds of appeal.
Subsequently, the file was sent to the Under Secretary on
22.07.2024 for the said purpose, pursuant to which the said file was
forwarded to the Director, Higher Education, for making
endorsement, who thereafter sent the said file to the Principal
Secretary on 23.07.2024 in order to send the same to the office of
the Advocate General seeking legal opinion regarding filing of the
Letters Patent Appeal against the impugned judgment.
7. Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that the Principal
Secretary of the department thereafter forwarded the said file to the
office of the Advocate General who rendered his opinion through
the Law Officer on 25.07.2024 to prefer Letters Patent Appeal. The
concerned section of the said department then endorsed the file to
the Director, Higher Education, Government of Jharkhand on
20.11.2024 with a noting that the interlocutory applications seeking
stay and condonation of delay were being prepared and approval
for the same was required.
8. It is further submitted that on 21.11.2024, the Director, Higher
Education, Government of Jharkhand granted his approval for filing
interlocutory applications for the aforesaid purposes and thereafter
the file was forwarded to the concerned law officer for preparing
the draft of Letters Patent Appeal who prepared the same and
returned to the department for getting approval to file the appeal
and on getting approval, the same was filed on 17.04.2025.
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9. It is thus contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that
though some delay occurred in filing the present appeal, however
the same cannot be said to be inordinate as time was majorly
consumed at different levels in the concerned department. Since the
said delay in filing the present appeal is primarily attributed to the
procedural formalities, the same may be viewed leniently and the
present application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal
may be allowed.
10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondent
nos. 1 to 5 vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel
for the applicants by submitting that no cogent ground has been
made out in the present application seeking condonation of delay.
11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the content of
the present interlocutory application.
12. Though the impugned judgment was passed by the learned writ
court on 17.05.2024, the appellants filed the application for
obtaining the certified copy on 04.04.2025 i.e. about more than 10
months from the date of passing of the impugned judgment which
goes to suggest that the appellants were lethargic and casual in
filing the appeal in time. Moreover, the learned Advocate General
rendered his opinion to prefer appeal on 25.07.2024, however the
section office of the concerned department endorsed the file to the
Director on 20.11.2024 and the delay of about four months
occurring between the said period has not been explained in the
present interlocutory application.
13. The averment made in the present application clearly shows that
2026:JHHC:2677- DB
the file concerning the present case kept on moving in the
department from one desk to another which cannot be said to be
sufficient cause so as to condone the delay. The applicants, rather
on superficial and frivolous grounds, have sought the condonation
of delay in filing the instant appeal.
14. The applicants being the State and its officers were well aware of
the time period for filing the appeal challenging the order of the writ
court which is only 30 days, however the lethargy on their part is
apparent particularly as the reason for delay of about four months
occurring between 25.07.2024 and 20.11.2024 remains completely
absent.
15. So far as the issue of consideration of an application filed on behalf
of the State seeking condonation of delay is concerned, it seems
appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
rendered in the case of Postmaster General and others Vs.
Living Media India Limited and another reported in (2012) 3
SCC 563, wherein it has been held as under:
"25. We have already extracted the reasons as
mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr.
Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division,
New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said
affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is
aware of the date of the judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief
Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009.
Even according to the deponent, their counsel had
applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only
on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the
Department on the very same day. There is no
explanation for not applying for the certified copy of
the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least
within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the
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certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e.
after a period of nearly four months. In spite of
affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by
placing adequate material, neither the Department nor
the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not
applying the certified copy within the prescribed
period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit
which we have already extracted, clearly show that
there was delay at every stage and except mentioning
the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken,
there is no explanation as to why such delay had
occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department
that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances
and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day
one the Department or the person/persons concerned
have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter
to this Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have
a separate period of limitation when the Department
was possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the Government
is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government."
16. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme
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Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs
Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) (P) Ltd. reported
in (2022) 3 SCC 159, Union of India vs. Central Tibetan
Schools Administration & Others reported in (2021) 11 SCC
557, State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Sabha Narain &
Others reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266 and Union of India &
Others Vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited &
Another reported in (2022) 9 SCC 263.
17. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 489, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -
"25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and
say that no prejudice would be caused to either side
by the delay being condoned. This litigation between
the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his
decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned or
not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
2026:JHHC:2677- DB
and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to
be preferred as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation
is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been
said that delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants
have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent
in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case."
18. In a recent judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma (dead)
by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
thus:
"261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned
order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before
we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as
a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous
and superficial grounds, until a proper case of
sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-
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machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona
fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure
is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But
courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts,
ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating
State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or
its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a
State-authority. They should not become surrogates
for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts
ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a
private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of
their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at
later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this
everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice,
not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until
sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only
add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals
under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction
is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate
and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
because, say if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation
of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens
the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent
from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to
misuse the process of law."
19. Thus, it is well settled law that administrative lethargy and laxity can
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never be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Delay cannot
be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds unless proper and
sufficient cause is made out by the state authorities explaining that
they have acted in a bonafide manner and have remained vigilant
throughout. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone,
including the government and its instrumentalities. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of
the modern technologies being available and used.
20. The appellants/applicants have not been able to set out sufficient
cause so as to condone the considerable delay of 303 days in filing
the present Letters Patent Appeal, which in our view is otherwise
inordinate.
21. We are also conscious of the fact that vide impugned judgment
dated 17.05.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4765 of 2018, the
appellants/applicants have been directed to pay monetary benefits
to the writ petitioners/the respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein from their
due date(s) of entitlement and as such, they have certainly been
made to suffer on account of lethargic and casual attitude of the
appellants/applicants in filing the present appeal after inordinate
delay of 303 days.
22. The writ petitioners/respondent nos. 1 to 5 are not supposed to wait
for indefinite period to obtain the fruit of the order passed by the
writ court at the whims and fancies of the state authorities i.e., the
appellants/applicants herein, to file an appeal as per their own
convenience. If such an attitude of the state authorities is taken
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lightly, it will certainly cause serious prejudice to the writ petitioners
and will amount to granting undeserving latitude to the state
authorities in deliberately delaying filing of the appeal without
setting out any cogent explanation.
23. Under the aforesaid circumstance, we are of the view that the
explanation offered by the appellants/applicants in the present
application is not sufficient to condone an inordinate delay of 303
days in preferring the present appeal.
24. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application is dismissed.
25. Consequently, the L.P.A. is also dismissed.
26. pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
February 03, 2026
Ritesh/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 03.02.2026
