Jyoti Devi vs Rajeshwar Prasad @ Rinku
2026 Latest Caselaw 1323 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Jyoti Devi vs Rajeshwar Prasad @ Rinku on 19 February, 2026

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
              F.A. No. 124 of 2025
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Jyoti Devi                                ...   ...     Appellant
                                 Versus
Rajeshwar Prasad @ Rinku                  ...   ...     Respondent
                         -------

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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For the Appellant : Mr. Pran Pranay, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. D. K. Malityar, Advocate

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Order No. 08/Dated 19 February, 2026 th

I.A. No.15747 of 2025

1. This Court since has proceeded and has also called

upon the parties in person but before proceeding further

thought it proper to first hear the issue of condonation of

delay.

2. The appeal since has been filed after delay of 1504

days and, as such, to condone the delay, instant

interlocutory application being I.A. No.15747 of 2025, has

been filed.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-wife

has submitted by referring paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the

delay condonation application, particularly, by raising the

ground that the impugned judgment is ex parte and has

made a prayer to condone the delay.

4. It has been submitted that the wife is living with 14

years old female child and if the appeal will not be heard on

merit then the appellant-wife will suffer irreparable loss

and injury which will be irreparable for all time to come.

5. Serious opposition has been made by Mr.

D.K.Malityar, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-husband, by referring the stand inter alia taken

in the counter affidavit.

6. It has been submitted in the affidavit that it is

incorrect on the part of the appellant wife to take the

ground that the proceeding pending before the learned

Family Judge, which has been culminated into the order

impugned, was not within her knowledge, rather, the wife

was fully conscious with the order. Therefore, the impugned

judgment cannot be said to be ex parte. Hence, the delay in

filing the appeal since is inordinate, as such, not fit to be

condoned.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and

gone through the pleadings filed on behalf of the respective

parties on the issue of condonation of delay of 1504 days.

8. This Court is conscious that the period of delay is

immaterial in condoning, rather, the sufficient cause is the

material one and if the litigant concerned is in a position to

substantiate the delay base upon the sufficient cause, then

irrespective of the period of delay, it is to be condoned.

9. It also requires to refer herein that what is the

meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning

of 'sufficient cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr.

Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81],

wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at

paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC

545] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157].)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.

(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.

"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a

decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

10. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means

that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner

or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the

facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged

that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained

inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each

case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court

concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that

whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be

exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court

that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from

prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation

is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for

condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether

the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the

ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and

Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee &

Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A.

Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @

Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah

Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5

SCC 157.

11. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments

that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a

liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is

done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of

bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,

whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be

decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket

formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to

the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram

Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan

Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12,

it has been held as hereunder:-

"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over- jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."

12. This Court, applying the proposition laid down by

Hon'ble Apex Court referred hereinabove, and adverting the

factual aspect raised on behalf of the parties in the delay

condonation application and the objection as has been filed

by way of counter affidavit making opposition to condone

the delay as also after going through the trial court record

which contains the order-sheets wherein it has been found

that on the basis of the paper publication, the proceeding

has been posted as ex parte.

13. The question of adjudication is the primary concern

of the adjudicator/court of law and while considering the

same, it is the primary duty of the adjudicator/court of law

to call upon the party (s) who is/are to be adversely affected

from the decision which is to be taken on the basis of the

issue agitated before the concerned adjudicator/court of

law.

14. The process has been defined in the C.P.C. for

calling upon the party so that adequate and sufficient

opportunity is given to the party concerned to put his/her

defence so that there may not be any prejudice said to be

caused to the other side.

15. This Court has found from the order-sheet that the

notice has been issued, as would be evident from the order

dated 05.12.2017 and steps have been taken but

subsequent thereto, the postal receipt without any service

report was placed before the court and not only that, an

application was filed for paper publication also.

16. The moment the court has proceeded by allowing

the prayer made to go for substituted service of notice

which itself suggests and clarifies that the court itself was

not satisfied with respect to the notion of the deeming

fiction of service of notice merely on the basis of postal

receipt.

17. The court of law, i.e., the learned trial court herein,

ought to have taken further steps for service of notice but

instead of doing that, on the basis of the paper publication

the notice has been deemed to be served and thereafter, the

matter has been posted for ex parte hearing which

ultimately culminated into conclusion of the proceeding

and resulted into passing of the impugned judgment.

18. The objection which has been raised on behalf of

the respondent-husband that in the maintenance case copy

of reply was received by the counsel for the appellant-wife

on 08.06.2021 which the learned counsel for the

respondent-husband is taking as a ground that the

proceeding was within the knowledge of the appellant-wife.

But, what is being said on behalf of the respondent-

husband cannot be accepted because the judgment

impugned in the instant case is of the year 2018 whereas

copy of reply was served upon the learned counsel for the

appellant-wife in the year 2021, i.e., after lapse of about

three years.

19. We are only concerned with the bounden duty

which is to be exercised by the court of law in the judicial

proceeding. It is the satisfaction of the concerned court as

to whether it is a case to proceed for ex parte hearing on the

basis of evading the notice by the noticee.

20. We are not concerned with respect to the conduct of

the appellant-wife that even in spite of knowing about the

notice which is being said to be communicated in another

proceeding can be taken as a ground not to condone the

delay. This Court is to consider on the basis of the record of

the present case.

21. This court, considering the aforesaid fact, is of the

view that the learned trial court has become too mechanical

in posting the matter for ex parte hearing without taking

care of the prejudice and the irreparable loss which will

cause to the other side.

22. This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussions and

applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, is

of the view that the appellant-wife has been able to satisfy

the sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1504 days.

23. Accordingly, the delay in filing the instant appeal is

hereby condoned.

24. I.A. No.15747 of 2025 stands allowed.

25. Reference be made to the order dated 12.02.2026 by

which the following order was passed :-

"05/Dated: 12.02.2026

1. Mr. Pran Pranay, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that although, the appeal is against the ex-parte judgment and the same is also barred by limitation of 1504 days, for which, delay condonation application has been filed, but as per the instruction, the respondent-husband has already solemnized second marriage, hence, the only solution of dispute is in terms of alimony.

2. He, on instruction, has also submitted that the appellant-wife is now sustaining her life along with 15 years child who is working as maid. He has further submitted that the respondent-husband is working in Tata Steel as a senior electrician under the Contractor.

3. Mr. D.K. Maltiyar, learned counsel for the respondent-husband has submitted that he will come with the instruction on the issue of alimony.

4. As prayed for by Mr. D.K. Maltiyar, learned counsel for the respondent-husband, list this matter on 19th February, 2026."

26. It has been referred in the said order that the

respondent-husband is working in Tata Steel as a senior

electrician under the Contractor.

27. The husband, namely, Rajeshwar Prasad, has

appeared along with the appellant-wife and daughter aged

about 14 years.

28. When the Court has started interacting with

respondent-husband, he has responded with arrogance by

saying that he will not comply with the order of

maintenance which has been passed by the learned Family

Court, Jamshedpur dated 11.06.2024 in Original Misc.

Case No.307 of 2019.

29. This Court has posed a question to the learned

counsel representing the husband that as to whether the

order passed in the maintenance case has been assailed by

the respondent-husband before the higher forum. The

answer has been given in affirmative.

30. This Court has further posed a question that as to

whether the ad interim stay has been granted against the

order passed by the learned Family Court. It has been

submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant as also

learned counsel for the respondent that no ad interim stay

has been given.

31. The appellant-wife is present in the Court along

with the daughter aged about 14 years. She has submitted

that she is in great financial hardship and not in a position

to sustain her life and more particularly, the upbringing of

the minor female child aged about 14 years.

32. If an order is passed by the court of law, the party is

having liberty/statutory right to challenge the said order

before the higher forum as also to make a prayer for

passing of ad interim stay of the operation of the order.

But, merely filing an application before the higher forum

will not amount to keeping the effect of the order in

abeyance, particularly, in a case where the order pertains

to the issue of sustenance of the life, herein, of the wife and

the daughter taken birth from the wedlock.

33. This Court is fully conscious with the very object

and intent of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The underlying

object is that the Court is to act as a guardian.

34. This Court has once again asked the respondent-

husband as to whether he is willing to make part payment

of the amount by way of installment, he has flatly refused

showing arrogance and has submitted that he is ready to

die.

35. Such wordings of the respondent-husband is

contemptuous and he is having no authority to say this

once the order has been passed by the court of law.

36. It seems that these words have been used for the

purpose of putting pressure upon the Court which the

respondent-husband has done in the open Court.

37. The arrogance shown by the respondent-husband is

very serious. The conduct of a litigant or even the counsel

is to be submissive in the court proceeding when the court

is putting a question, the response is to be given either in

positive or negative but not in arrogance and such

behaviour may amount to contempt of Court.

38. Contempt of court in general means, "To offend the

dignity of the court and lower the prestige of the court".

Oswald defines, contempt to be constituted by any conduct

that tends to bring the authority and administration of Law

into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice

parties or their witnesses during litigation. Thus, Contempt

of court is disobedience to court by acting in opposition to

the authority, justice and dignity thereof. It signifies a

willful disregard or disobedience of courts order. It also

signifies such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the

court and the administration of law into disrespect.

39. Contempt of Courts Act provides that "Criminal

Contempt" means the publication whether by words,

spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations,

or otherwise of any matter of the doing of any act

whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize or

lower or tends to lower the authority of any court, or

prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due

course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to

interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the

administration of justice in any other manner.

40. In the case of Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka

Tanga Mazdoor Union, AIR 1979 SC 1767, the Hon'ble

Apex Court has specifically held that every person is

entitled to the redress of his grievances through the

assistance of the Court and it is the main function of the

Court to decide the disputes between the parties.

Consequently, any conduct which prevents or tends to

prevent a party to obtain the remedy through the Court

amounts to contempt of Court as it interferes with the

course of justice.

41. Further, in Delhi Judicial Services Association v.

State of Gujarat & others, (1991) 4 SCC 406, the

Hon'ble Apex Court held that the definition of criminal

contempt is wide enough to include any act of a person

which would tend to interfere with the administration of

justice or which would lower the authority of the Court. The

scope of the criminal contempt has been made very wide so

as to empower the Court to preserve the majesty of law

which is an indispensable condition, for the rule of law.

42. In the backdrop of the aforesaid, this Court is of the

prima facie view that a criminal contempt has been

committed by the respondent-husband.

43. In view thereof, the notice is being issued under

Rule 393 of the Jharkhand High Court Rules.

44. The respondent-husband since is present in the

Court, as such, the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-husband has undertaken before this Court to

serve notice of the contempt and file explanation as to why

he be not held guilty of proceeding of contempt.

45. List this case on 27.02.2026.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) 19th February, 2026

Birendra/