[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Khalid Ahmed vs The Punjab National Bank on 17 February, 2026
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
2026:JHHC:4429
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 175 of 2022
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Khalid Ahmed, aged about 37 years, son of Abdul Hafiz, resident of House
No. 69, Khan Road, Khirgaon, Hazaribagh, P.O. Hazaribagh Sadar, P.S.
Sadar Thana, District-Hazaribagh.
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The Punjab National Bank, through its Chairman, Office situated at- 7
Bhikajikama Place, Africa Avenue, New Delhi, P.O, P.S & Dist- New
Delhi
2. The General Manager, Personnel, Punjab National Bank, through its
Chairman, Office situated at-7 Bhikajikama Place, Africa Avenue, New
Delhi, P.O, P.S & Dist- New Delhi.
3. The Deputy General Manager-cum- Disciplinary Authority, Punjab
National Bank, Zonal Office, Office situated at- PNB House, Ground
Floor, 18A, Brabourne Road, Kolkata, P.O, P.S & Dist- Kolkata.
... ... Respondents
----
CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
----
For the Petitioner: Mr. Binod Singh, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Pratyush Kumar, Advocate
Mr. V. Chaturvedi, Advocate
----
ORDER
RESERVED On: 10.02.2026 Pronounced On 17.02.2026
This case was taken up on 10.02.2026.
2. A preliminary objection has been raised regarding the
maintainability of this writ petition before this Court on the ground of territorial
jurisdiction. Counsel for both the parties argued at length on the point of
maintainability. Upon conclusion of this arguments, Order was reserved.
3. The brief facts of the case are that while the petitioner was posted
as Circle Officer at Burdwan, West Bengal, he was served a departmental
chargesheet on 19.04.2018.The charges were related to alleged misconduct,
concerning loan sanctions based on allegedly forged documents. These overt
acts were committed in West Bengal. Departmental enquiry was conducted
between August to November 2018 in West Bengal. The Disciplinary Authority
at PNB Zonal Office, Kolkata issued an order of termination from service on
12.02.2019. He filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority through speed
post from Hazaribagh. The appeal was rejected by the Appellate Authority on
26.11.2019. The petitioner has come to this Court challenging the aforesaid
orders.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary
objection regarding maintainability of this writ petition on the ground of
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territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He submitted that no part of the cause of
action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The overtact of
misconduct was at West Bengal. The disciplinary proceedings, including the
issuance of chargesheet, the enquiry was conducted outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court, i.e., West Bengal. Further, the Disciplinary Authority
and Appellate Authorities who have passed the impugned orders are stationed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, he submitted that the writ
petition is not maintainable on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner is a local resident of Hazaribagh, which falls within the Territorial
Jurisdiction of this Court. He further submitted that the petitioner has filed the
appeal through a speed post against the order of termination of his services
from Hazaribagh to Punjab National Bank, Head Office, Delhi which was
rejected by the Appellate Authority on 26.11.2019 and communication was
sent at Hazaribagh. He admits that the act, which constitute the misconduct,
was committed in West Bengal, Departmental Proceeding was initiated in
West Bengal, dismissal order was also passed in West Bengal. Even the
appellate order was passed at New Delhi, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
this Court, but since the memo of appeal was sent by Speed Post from
Hazaribagh, part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this
Court. Thus, he argued that the present writ petition is maintainable before
this Court.
6. I find that only on the basis of communication from Hazaribagh
the petitioner is invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226(2) of
the constitution of India. Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as
under:-
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. - (1)
Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court
shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or
any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority
or person may also be exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories.
2026:JHHC:4429
(3) Where any party against whom an interim
order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any
other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating
to, a petition under clause (1), without-
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition
and all documents in support of the plea for such interim
order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being
heard,
makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of
such order and furnishes a copy of such application to
the party in whose favour such order has been made or
the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of
the application within a period of two weeks from the date
on which it is received or from the date on which the
copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is
later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of
that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards
on which the High Court is open; and if the application is
not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry
of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the
said next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this
article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred
on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 has held
that the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply
thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action.
In paragraph No.8 of the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
as under:-
"8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear
that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had
arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to
NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be
given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which
appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response
thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta
office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt
that it was considered ineligible it sent representations,
including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi,
demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering
Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and
awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-
1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a
part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the
advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender
from Calcutta and made representations demanding
justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its
offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders
should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those
would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final
decision whether or not to award the contract to the
2026:JHHC:4429
tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the
execution of the contract work was to be carried out at
Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the
advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from
Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would
not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral
part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it
sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply
thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part
of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-
1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the
offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the
writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part
of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court."
8. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v.
Swaika Properties reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217 held that mere service of
notice would not give rise to any cause of action within the territory unless the
service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. Paragraph 8
of the judgment reads as under: -
"8. The expression "cause of action" is tersely defined
in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure:
"The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to support his right to a judgment of the court."
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the
law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief
against the defendant. The mere service of notice under
Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their
registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e.
within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal,
could not give rise to a cause of action within that
territory unless the service of such notice was an integral
part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section
52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e.
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High
Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question
whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause
of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution must depend upon the nature of the
impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The
notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became
effective the moment it was published in the Official
Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in
the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was
not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of
notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning
Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of
the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by
the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If
the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their
lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the
validity of the notification issued by the State
Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act
2026:JHHC:4429
by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief
had to be sought by filing such a petition before the
Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of
action wholly or in part arose."
9. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after noticing several
judgments including judgments of Oil and Natural Gas Commission and
Swaika Properties in the Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India
reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 has held as under:
"27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or
tribunal or an executive authority whether under
provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of
action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the
original authority is constituted at one place and the
appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ
petition would be maintainable at both the places.In other
words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a
part of cause of action, a writ petition would be
maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction
it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the
appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as
the order of the original authority merges with that of the
appellate authority."
10. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. v. State
Bank of Sikkim reported in (2007) 11 SCC 335 has observed as under:
"37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view
the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court,
it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts
averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not
constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider
whether such fact constitutes a material, essential,
or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true
that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises
within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition.
Nevertheless it must be a "part of cause of action",
nothing less than that."
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. A. Shainamol
reported in (2021) 20 SCC 267 has observed as under:
"50. The Full Bench of the jurisdictional High Court in a
judgment in Nakul Deo Singh v. Commandant was
considering an original petition filed before the Kerala
High Court by a Head Constable working in the Central
Industrial Security Force Unit at Bokkaro Steel Plant. In
the said case, the disciplinary authority and the appellate
authority were situated outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the High Court. The applicant claimed that since the
order of appellate authority was received within the
jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court, therefore, it will
have the jurisdiction to entertain the original petition. The
Court held as under : (SCC OnLine Ker para 29)
"29. It appears to us that the decisions in Swaika
Properties case and the decision of the Supreme Court
2026:JHHC:4429
and that of the High Court subsequent thereto clearly
establish that the receipt of communication by itself does
not constitute a fact in the bundle of facts constituting
the cause of action. At best receipt of the order or
communication only gives the party a right of action
based on the cause of action arising out of the action
complained of. When that action complained of takes
place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court
and an appeal therefore is dismissed by an authority
located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court cause
of action wholly arises outside the jurisdiction of the High
Court and Article 226(2) of the Constitution cannot be
invoked to sustain a writ petition in this High Court on the
basis that a part of the cause of action has arisen within
the jurisdiction of this court, merely because the
appellate order communicated from the seat of the
appellate authority was received while the petitioner was
residing or working within the jurisdiction of this court
Acceptance of the argument that the situs of the receipt
of the order will determine the jurisdiction can lead to a
position where a litigant would be in a position to choose
his own court for the purpose of redressal of his
grievance. All that he need do is to move over to a
particular place for receiving the communication from the
appellate authority and then approach the High Court of
that place with a plea that that court had jurisdiction
because the order of the appellate authority was served
on him while he was residing within the jurisdiction of
that High Court. No litigant can have a right to choose the
court for seeking relief and the mere introduction of
Clause 2 of Article 226 does not alter that position."
51. It may be noticed that the Union had not raised
objection about the entertainment of an original
application filed by the applicant before the Ernakulam
Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal. It appears
that the applicant filed an application before the
Ernakulam Bench for the reason that she was permanent
resident in the State or may be for the reason, the order
of allocation was received by her in the State of Kerala.
Both of these reasons do not give rise to part of cause of
action arising within the jurisdiction of the Ernakulam
Bench of Tribunal. At this stage, the applicant is not
being non-suited on the ground that the Ernakulam
Bench of the Tribunal had no jurisdiction."
12. In this case, admittedly the misconduct had taken place in
Burdwan, West Bengal. The Departmental Proceeding was held at West
Bengal. Disciplinary Authority was not stationed at any part of Jharkhand,
rather was at Kolkata, West Bengal. The punishment order was passed by the
Disciplinary Authority at PNB Zonal Office, Kolkata. The Appellate Authority
was also not stationed at Jharkhand as the appellate order was passed from
the Office of the respondent Bank at New Delhi. All these are integral part of
cause of action. Mere sending a letter from Hazaribagh, which is a
communication cannot be said to be a part of cause of action for the purpose
of this writ petition, when the Departmental Proceeding, the orders passed by
the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority were all conducted/passed
2026:JHHC:4429
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and none of these integral part
of cause of action occurred at a place over which this Court has territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, I am of the opinion that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction
to entertain this writ petition.
13. In view of the aforesaid, the preliminary objection raised by the
respondents is upheld. This writ petition is dismissed due to lack of territorial
jurisdiction. It will be open to the petitioner to approach an appropriate Court
having territorial jurisdiction. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed of.
(Ananda Sen, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
th
Dated 17 February, 2026
Kumar/Cp-02
AFR
Uploaded on 17.02.2026
