[Cites 20, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Ravi Kumar Gupta vs Prity Gupta @ Prity Kumari on 16 February, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:4381-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.166 of 2025
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Ravi Kumar Gupta, aged about 35 years, son of Lalan Prasad Gupta, resident
of Aambagan, near Kali Mandir, Ranguni, PO and PS Bhuli, District Dhanbad,
Jharkhand. ... ... Appellant
Versus
Prity Gupta @ Prity Kumari, aged about 31 years, wife of Ravi Kumar Gupta,
Daughter of Sri Rakesh Kumar, permanent address: Aambagan, near Kali
Mandir, Ranguni, PO and PS Bhuli, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand. At present :
C/o Sri Rakesh Kumar, Quarters No. 36 Nichitpur Township, PO Bansjora and
PS Tetulmari (East Basuria), District Dhanbad, Jharkhand. .. Respondent
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Shekhar Prasad Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Pradyot Chatterjee, Advocate
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th
Order No.05/Dated 16 February, 2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. The instant first appeal, under Section 19(1) of Family Courts Act,
1984, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2024 and
06.11.2024 respectively passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Dhanbad in Original Suit No.398 of 2021, whereby and whereunder, the
suit filed by the respondent-Prity Gupta under Sections 13(i-a)and(i-b) of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been decreed in favour of the petitioner-
respondent and the marriage between the petitioner and respondent has been
dissolved and further the respondent-appellant was directed to pay Rs.
10,00,000/- as full and final alimony to the petitioner- Prity Gupta.
2. At the outset, Mr. Shekhar Prasad Sinha, the learned counsel for the
appellant-husband has submitted that in terms of order dated 09.12.2025 an
amount of Rs.10,000/- has already been transferred in the account of the
respondent-wife.
3. The aforesaid fact has been admitted by Mr. Pradyot Chatterjee, the
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learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-wife.
4. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is
delay of 168 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being
I.A. No. 12624 of 2025 has been filed for condoning such delay.
5. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant
appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 168 days, deems it fit and
proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into
the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that delay
in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory
Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be
sufficient.
7. The ground for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has
been mentioned at paragraph 3 of the interlocutory application is that the
appellant was under a misconception of the statutory period of limitation to
be of 90 days to file First Appeal, but after completion of 70 days when the
appellant consulted with the learned counsel who conducted his case before
the learned Trial Court, he told the appellant that the First Appeal had to be
filed within 30 days and then only the same has been filed along with a
limitation petition. For the ready reference paragraph no.3 of the present
interlocutory application is quoted herein under which reads as follows:
"3. That there is neither deliberate intention nor willful negligence
on the part of the appellant in not filing this first appeal within the
statutory period of limitation but as a matter of fact the appellant
were under a misconception of the statutory period of limitation to
be of 90 days to file First Appeal, but after completion of 70 days
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when the appellant consulted with the learned counsel who
conducted his case before the learned trial court told the appellant
that the First Appeal had to be filed within 30 days only and now
the same may be filed before the Hon'ble High Court along with a
limitation petition."
8. Further, at paragraph - 5 of the interlocutory application it has been
mentioned that the appellant had fallen on the ground after getting slipped
in the mud while riding on the bicycle and there had been several scratches
on his leg and as such the appellant had to get treatment by way of village
therapy and then only he could be able to get recovered and move to this
Court.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay
condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems
it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by
the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in
condoning the inordinate delay.
10. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be
rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of
appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to
consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit
of the lis.
11. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the
legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant
to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held
in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar &
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Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
12. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied
upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it
has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate
harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides
for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship
to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds,
enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or
introduce exceptions not recognized by law."
13. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the
Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days,
wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation
for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds."
14. While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee
v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been
held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
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22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."
15. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with
bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its
part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona
fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be
taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of
delay.
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs.
Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no
right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been
held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof
of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of
the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If
sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay.
This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the
party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope
of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after
sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such
facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time
available to it. In this connection we may point out that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material
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and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the
combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our
opinion, considerations which have been expressly made
material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to
the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing
with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5
without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no
difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in
favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism
made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period
of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed,
as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial
Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for
condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's
duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period
prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground."
17. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for
condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is
bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is
accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into
the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and
laches on its part.
18. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient
cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in
Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81],
wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15
hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
"sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be
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necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a
case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard
of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has
"not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts
and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he
was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The
court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was
merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra
Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964
SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770],
Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545] and Maniben Devraj Shah
v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it
can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with
on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot
be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient
cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
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its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is
hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim,
and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue
them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity
and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own
inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17
SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
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where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
19. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is
bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been
held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath
Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan,
(1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and
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Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157.
20. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression
'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,
(2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause"
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of
the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would
constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts
of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused
in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not
proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown
and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of
disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be
the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence
or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter
the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking
steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to
the other party which should not be lightly defeated by
condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a
pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or
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arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing
enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom
the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.
While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the
parties either way."
21. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to condone the
inordinate delay of 168 days, is proceeding to examine as to whether the
explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning
the delay.
22. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein,
expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
23. This Court, in order to assess as to whether the grounds as has been
referred in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the instant interlocutory application can be
considered to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 168 days in
filing the appeal, has scrutinized the record and found therefrom that the
order was passed on 28.10.2024 in presence of the learned counsel for the
appellant.
24. The reason has been shown that the appellant was under a
misconception of the statutory period of limitation to be of 90 days to file
First Appeal and after completion of 70 days when he consulted with his
advocate he told him that the First Appeal had to be filed within 30 days
and, thereafter, the appellant had fallen on the ground after getting slipped
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in the mud while riding on the bicycle and there had been several scratches
on his leg and, as such, the appellant had to get treatment by way of village
therapy and after getting recovered, he had filed the present First Appeal
and, as such, delay of about 168 days occurred in filing the instant appeal.
25. The aforesaid grounds which have been taken in the interlocutory
application to the effect that the appellant had no knowledge about the
statutory period of limitation to be of 30 days to file First Appeal, does not
seem to be a cogent explanation.
26. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the explanation which has
been furnished by the appellant in the delay condonation application, cannot
be said to be a sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay.
27. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove as also the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application, is of the view
that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone inordinate delay of 168
days in filing the appeal.
28. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed S.L.P.(C) Diary
No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by the State of Jharkhand
against the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.401 of
2022, wherein, the delay of 259 days was not condoned.
29. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court as also considering the fact that the delay of 168 days has not
sufficiently been explained and as such, the instant interlocutory application
deserves to be dismissed.
30. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 12624
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of 2025 is hereby dismissed.
31. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands dismissed.
32. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Dated:16.2.2026
KNR/A.F.R.
Uploaded On: 19/02/2026
