[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Niraj Kumar Pandey vs The State Of Jharkhand on 15 April, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:10656-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 202 of 2026
1. Niraj Kumar Pandey, S/o Yogeshwar Pandey, R/o Village-Kemo,
P.O. & P.S.-Keredari, District-Hazaribagh
2. Amit Kumar, S/o Arun Kumar, R/o 513 D Art House Chowk,
Makatpur, P.O.-Giridih, P.S.-Giridih (T), District-Giridih
3. Ramavtar Mahto, S/o Birbal Mahto, R/o Dhanhara, Sandi, P.O.-
Bharech Nagar, P.S.-Mandu, District-Ramgarh
4. Pankaj Kumar Singh, S/o Rajendra Singh, R/o Village-
Tetariyadih, P.O.-Domchanch Bazar, P.S.-Domchanch, District-
Koderma
5. Arti Singh, W/o Pankaj Kumar, R/o near Gopal Mandir, Kumhar
Toli, P.O.-G.P.O. Ranchi, P.S.-Sukhdeo Nagar, District-Ranchi
6. Avinandan Kumar, S/o Chandra Shekhar Thakur, R/o Ward No.
29, Dhariyadih, behind Town Thana, near Bajrangbali Mandir,
P.O. & P.S.-Giridih, District-Giridih ..... Appellants
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Ranchi
2. Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. Jharkhand Public Service Commission, through its Secretary,
Ranchi
4. Examination Controller, Jharkhand Public Service Commission,
Ranchi
5. Madhu Sudan Sharma, S/o Shreestidhar Sharma, R/o Village &
P.O.-Chiksia, P.S.-Chas MU, District-Bokaro
6. Arun Kumar, S/o Bikarama Singh, R/o at Saket Nagar, Lower
Hinoo, P.O.-Doranda, P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi
7. Deepak Kumar, S/o Chanderadeo Sahu, R/o Pahra, P.O.-Hewai,
P.S.-Keredari, District-Hazaribagh
8. Manazir Ahsan, S/o Shamim Ahmad, R/o 96 Jama Masjid Road,
P.O. & P.S.-Hazaribagh, District-Hazaribagh ..... Respondents
With
L.P.A. No. 204 of 2026
1. Ranjeet Kumar, S/o Satyanarayan Singh, R/o HEC Colony, P.O. &
P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi
2. Priyabrat Kumar, S/o Ramesh Prasad Singh, R/o DT 1791, Sector
09, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi ..... Appellants
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Ranchi
2. Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. Jharkhand Public Service Commission, through its Secretary,
Ranchi
4. Examination Controller, Jharkhand Public Service Commission,
Ranchi
1
2026:JHHC:10656-DB
5. Owais Karni, S/o Mohamad Aslam, R/o Village-Loknathpur Ganj
Ward 11, Dalsinghsarai, P.O. & P.S.-Dalsinghsarai, District-
Samastipur (Bihar)
6. Ranjeet Kumar, S/o Santosh Kumar, R/o Annapurna Hotel,
Mangal Bazar, P.O., P.S. & District-Hazaribagh ..... Respondents
With
L.P.A. No. 146 of 2026
Neelam Kumari, D/o Chandrika Prasad, R/o Buchaa Mahadev,
near Sunday Market, P.O.-Hatia, P.S.-Jagannathpur, District-
Ranchi ..... Appellant
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Ranchi
2. Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. Jharkhand Public Service Commission, through its Secretary,
Ranchi
4. Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Public Service Commission,
Ranchi ..... Respondents
-----
CORAM
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
-----
For the Appellants: Mr. Amritansh Vats, Advocate
Mr. A.K. Sahani, Advocate
For the Res.-State: Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, A.G.
Mr. Piyush Chitresh, A.C. to A.G.
For the Res.-JPSC Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate
-----
02/15.04.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Learned counsel for the parties submits that these three appeals
can be disposed of by a common order as the issues raised
therein are the same.
3. The challenge in these appeals is to the judgments and orders
passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the appellants'
writ petitions seeking age relaxation of almost seven years in the
context of Advertisement No. 01/2026 for the Jharkhand
Combined Civil Services Examination-2025.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in terms of Rule
4(i) of the Jharkhand Combined Civil Services Examination Rules,
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2021 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rule, 2021'), the Jharkhand
Public Service Commission (JPSC) was bound to announce
vacancies in accordance with the requisitions received from the
concerned cadre controlling departments each year in such
manner as it may deem fit to be filled by direct recruitment and
shall invite applications from the eligible candidates. They submit
that the proviso, under which the examinations for two or more
years, would be held by clubbing the vacancies applied only in
case of some unforeseen reasons. They submit that the normal
rule was to hold the examination each year and a proviso was in
the nature of an exception to this normal rule.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants point out that from 2017 to
2020, no examination was held. Ultimately, vide Advertisement
No. 01/2021, the examinations were to be held for the years
2017, 2018, 2019 & 2020. This time, the respondents, by
exercising the powers under Rule 6(i) of the Rules, 2021,
granted age relaxation by fixing a cut-off date for the purpose of
determining the age requirement as 01.08.2016. The resolution
granting the age relaxation specifically referred to failure in
holding examinations each year as being the reason for grant of
relaxation.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants point out that similarly, vide
Advertisement No. 01/2024, the Civil Services Examination, 2023
was announced for filling up the vacancies of the years 2021-
2022. Even this time, five years age relaxation was granted by
providing that the cut-off date shall be 01.08.2018. Again, this
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was on account of failure to hold the Civil Service Examinations
each year.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants point out that the impugned
Advertisement No. 01/2026 concerns the filling up of the
vacancies for the years 2023 and 2024. This time, however, age
relaxation of only four years has been granted by fixing the cut-
off date as 01.08.2022, even in fact going-bye the past practice,
this cut-off date should have been 01.08.2018.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that there is
arbitrariness in fixing the cut-off date as 01.08.2022 instead of
01.08.2018. They submit that in fixing this cut-off date, the past
practices as evident from Advertisement Nos. 01/2021 and
01/2024 have been completely ignored. They submit that such
action is unfair and defiance of the doctrine of legitimate
expectations. They rely on a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sivanandan C.T. and Others vs.
High Court of Kerala and Others reported in (2024) 3 SCC
799 in support of their argument.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants also rely on the judgments
rendered in the cases of Bhola Nath Rajak & Others vs.
State of Jharkhand & Others [W.P. (S) 7526 of 2013] as
well as Dharmendra Kumar Barnwal & Others vs. The
State of Jharkhand & Others [W.P. (S) No. 4852 of 2023]
and other connected matters decided by the co-ordinate
Benches of this Court on 16.01.2014 & 13.12.2023 respectively
to submit that under similar circumstances, the power of judicial
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review was exercised and cut-off date was modified as
suggested by the petitioners in the said matters.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that the impugned
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge fails to
appreciate that the rules provide a mandate for conducting the
Combined Civil Service Examinations each year, however, this
mandate was not complied by the respondents. They submit
that under such circumstances, the appellants should not be
made to suffer and were consequently entitled to get age
relaxation by modifying the cut-off date from 01.08.2022 to
01.08.2018 going-bye the past practices and also the principle of
fairness, which ought to inhere in recruitment process in such
matters.
11. For all the above reasons, learned counsel for the appellants
submit that these appeals ought to be allowed and suitable
directions may be issued to the respondents to modify the cut-
off date from 01.08.2022 to 01.08.2018 so that all the appellants
may be held eligible to apply and appear in the Civil Services
Examination in pursuance of Advertisement No. 01/2026.
12. Learned Advocate General resists grant of any relief in these
appeals. At the outset, he points out that the decisions of this
Court relied upon by the appellants have been held to be per-
incurium in the case of Krishna Kumar Mishra vs. State of
Jharkhand & Another [W.P. (S) No. 6302 of 2017 and
other analogous cases].
13. Learned AG submits that Krishna Kumar Mishra (supra),
which has been relied upon by the learned Single Judge, affords
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the complete answer to the arguments now raised on behalf of
the appellants. He submits that by following the ratio laid down
in the case of Krishna Kumar Mishra (supra), these appeals
should be dismissed.
14. Without prejudice, learned Advocate General submits that the
relaxation of five years was indeed granted in the context of
Advertisement No. 01/2021 because, if for unforeseen reasons,
there was a delay in conducting the Civil Service Examination to
fill up the vacancies for the years 2017 to 2020. Similarly, the
relaxation of five years was granted in the context of
Advertisement No. 01/2024, even though the delay in holding
the examinations was due to unforeseen reasons and concerned
only the vacancies of 2021 & 2022, i.e., two years. He thus
submits that the appellants had already availed the benefit of
age relaxation for a substantial period totalling to almost ten
years in respect of the vacancies up to the year 2022.
15. Learned Advocate General submits that even this time, under
Advertisement No. 01/2026, a further four years' relaxation has
been granted, considering the relaxation already granted to the
candidates like the appellants on earlier two occasions. He
submits that failure to hold examinations was for unforeseen
reasons and consistent with the proviso to Rule 4 of the Rules,
2021. He points out that no mala fide as such was alleged,
claiming that this delay was intentional or for any extraneous
purpose.
16. Learned AG submits that more than ample compensation was
provided to the candidates as a result of this delay. He further
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submits that even now, more than ample compensation has
been provided by way of age relaxation and the appellants
cannot insist on further age relaxation of seven years either on
the ground of legitimate expectation or otherwise. He submits
that fixing a cut-off date is a matter of executive policy and in
this case, such policy has been exercised reasonably, having
regard to all relevant factors. Hence, he submits that these
appeals may be dismissed.
17. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
18. The conduct of the Jharkhand Combined Civil Services
Examination is governed by the Jharkhand Combined Civil
Services Examination Rules, 2021 (Hereinafter Referred to as the
Said rules).
19. Rule 4(i) indeed provides that the Commission shall conduct
Combined Service Examinations to fill the posts in the civil
services each year. However, the proviso to this Rule provides
that, in case, for any unforeseen reason, the Jharkhand
Combined Civil Services Examination is not held in a particular
year(s), the Commission will hold the examinations for two (or
more) years together by clubbing the vacancies.
20. Thus, though the normal rule is to hold the examination each
year, the proviso permits the Commission to hold the
examination for two or more years together by clubbing the
vacancies in case, due to unforeseen reasons, the examination is
not held in a particular year.
21. Rule 6 of the Rules, 2021 provides that a candidate should have
completed a minimum age of 21 years and must not have
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attained the age of 35 years on the first date of the following
month from the date of the publication of the advertisement for
the examinations under the said Rules. This Rule was later
amended in 2023 to provide that a candidate should have a
minimum age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of
35 years on the first date of the month of August in the year of
publication of the advertisement of the examination under these
Rules.
22. Rule 6(ii) provides that the upper age limit as prescribed under
Rule 6(i) will be relaxable as below or as amended by the
government from time to time. From this, it is argued that the
government has a blanket power to grant age relaxation, that, in
the present case, such power ought to have been exercised, or
that the non-exercise of such power in providing the cut-off date
on 01.08.2018 amounts to arbitrariness and violates the doctrine
of legitimate expectation.
23. In this matter, we do not propose to go into the larger
contention about the power of blanket relaxation, if any,
possessed by the government in such matters, which are
governed by the statutory rules. However, by proceeding on the
premise that such powers are indeed vested with the
government, we propose to examine whether there is any
arbitrariness or breach of the doctrine of legitimate expectation
in the matter of the exercise of such powers.
24. The record shows that under Advertisement No. 01/2021, an
examination was held to fill vacancies for the years 2017, 2018,
2019 & 2020. This time, the government, considering inability to
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hold the examination each year for unforeseen reasons, granted
a five-year relaxation by providing a cut-off date on 01.08.2016
instead of 01.08.2021 as specified in the advertisement.
25. Under Advertisement No. 01/2024, which was announced to fill
vacancies in 2021 & 2022, a five-year age relaxation was again
granted, with a cut-off date of 01.08.2017 instead of 01.08.2022
as specified in the advertisement. Again, the relaxation order
was based on the same reason.
26. Under Advertisement No. 01/2026, with which we are concerned
in these appeals, it is not as if no age relaxation has been
granted. Age relaxation of four years has been granted by
modifying the cut-off date to 01.08.2022 instead of 01.08.2026
as specified in the advertisement.
27. Learned Advocate General has explained that since the
candidates, like the appellants, who were beneficiaries of not
less than two age relaxations covering a cumulative period of
almost ten years, there was nothing unreasonable this time with
the government providing age relaxation of four years and not
seven years as has been claimed by the appellants. He submits
that in such circumstances, there is no question of any
arbitrariness or defiance of the doctrine of legitimate expectation
involved.
28. Upon considering the record and the decisions on the subject,
we are satisfied that the appellants cannot claim any vested
right to age relaxation, and that too for a particular number of
years. The record clearly shows that the appellants are
beneficiaries of age relaxation of a cumulative period of almost
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ten years in respect of the previous two advertisements.
Therefore, assuming that the appellants were prejudiced on the
earlier two occasions, this prejudice was more than amply
compensated by the grant of age relaxation of five years on
each of the occasions.
29. So far as Advertisement No. 01/2026 is concerned, the same
relates to the examination to fill up the vacancies of only two
years, i.e., 2023 & 2024. By the logic applied earlier, it cannot be
assumed that an age relaxation on this occasion was mandatory,
or, in any event, that such an age relaxation would have
extended beyond two years. However, as a matter of executive
policy, this time the government has granted the age relaxation
for a period covering almost four years.
30. The relaxation was granted after considering that the candidates
had earlier benefited from two age relaxations, cumulatively
covering almost 10 years. The appellants cannot insist upon
recompensation or double compensation on every occasion.
Such insistence, besides not being backed by any legal provision,
cannot be styled as reasonable or legitimate. There is a
difference between a mere expectation or an aspiration and a
legitimate expectation, which alone can be considered when
judicially reviewing the government's executive action.
31. The decision rendered in the case of Dharmendra Kumar
Barnwal (supra) is distinguishable because in that case, the
co-ordinate Bench was concerned with the direction issued by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Malik Mazhar Sultan
that examinations for filling up the judicial posts must be held
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each year. In that matter, the Court was not concerned with the
provisions akin to a proviso under Rule 4(i) of the said rules.
This proviso makes a provision for holding examinations for
more than one year by clubbing the vacancies, if, due to
unforeseen reasons, the examinations could not be held each
year.
32. The decision in Bhola Nath Rajak (supra) has expressly been
held to be "per incuriam" in Krishna Kumar Mishra (supra).
Even otherwise, the decision in Bhola Nath Rajak (supra)
does not lay down any universal proposition that age relaxation
must be granted when the Commission fails to hold
examinations each year, nor does it require that the age
relaxation mathematically correspond to the number of years for
which the examination was not held. In Bhola Nath Rajak
(supra), the co-ordinate Bench found that the fixing of the cut-
off date was arbitrary. In the present case, we detect no
arbitrariness in the fixing of the cut-off date. In fact, the
government has been substantially liberal in granting age
relaxation.
33. In Sivanandan C.T. (supra), the facts and circumstances were
entirely different and bore no comparison to those of the present
case. In this case, there was nothing unfair or unpredictable in
the State's action. Apart from the fact that no promises were
made to any of the candidates, this is also not a case of
deviation from past practices. In any event, proper reasons have
been furnished as to why, on this occasion, an age relaxation of
four years, and not seven years as claimed by the appellants,
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was granted. Therefore, based upon the law laid down in the
case of Sivanandan C.T. (supra), no relief can be granted to
the appellants in the present case.
34. In Krishna Kumar Mishra (supra), a coordinate Bench, after
referring to several decisions of the High Courts and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, has culled out a summary in paragraph
No. XXVIII, which reads as follows:
"XXVIII. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions
rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the law can be
summarized as under :-
(i) The choice of date as a basis for classification
fixed by the legislature or its delegate cannot always be
dubbed as arbitrary, even if, no particular reason is
forthcoming for the choice unless, it is shown to be
capricious or whimsical in the circumstances,
(ii) The cut-off date, to attain the minimum or
maximum age, must be specific and determinate on a
particular date and it cannot be allowed to depend upon
any fluctuating or uncertain date, because it may lead to
consequences, anomalies and uncertainties.
(iii) Mere errors of government in fixing of cutoff
date, which may be unjust and oppressive are not subject
to judicial review, it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise
which can be declared void.
(iv) It is the discretion of the rule-making authority
or employer, to fix a cut-off date for determining the
maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post and it
cannot be, per se arbitrary, unless the cut-off date, is as
wide off the mark, as to make it wholly unreasonable.
(v) A cut-off date cannot be fixed with any
mathematical precision. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed
there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the
cut-off date and some persons fall on the wrong side of
the cut-off date and the persons falling on the wrong side
cannot challenge the same, unless, it is as capricious or
whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable.
(vi) There cannot be any "wholesale relaxation"
on the ground that the advertisement is delayed unless,
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there is an allegation of any mala fides in connection with
delay in issuing an advertisement. This wholesale
relaxation would make total uncertainty in determining the
maximum age of a candidate and it might be unfair for
large number of similarly situated candidates who may not
apply, thinking that they are age-barred.
(vii) A cut-off date can be provided in terms of the
provisions of statute or executive order and if any hardship
is caused to some persons or a section of society that may
by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off
date so fixed is ultra vires to Article 14 of the constitution.
(viii) The fixing of cut-off dates is within the
domain of the executive authority. There may be various
considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due
to which a particular cut-off date is fixed. These
considerations can be financial, administrative or other
considerations. Therefore, the court should not normally
interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive
authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it
blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary."
35. Applying the principles summarised above to the facts in this
case, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the
impugned judgments and orders passed by the learned Single
Judge in these matters. In fact, the learned Single Judge has
relied on the judgment rendered in the case of Krishna Kumar
Mishra (supra) in concluding that the appellants had not made
out any case for the grant of reliefs in the petitions that they had
instituted.
36. The present appeals are accordingly dismissed without any order
for costs.
(M. S. SONAK, C.J.)
(RAJESH SHANKAR, J.)
15.04.2026
Satish/Vikas/
Uploaded on 17.04.2026
