[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Ajay Sagar @ Ajay Prem Sagar vs The State Of Jharkhand on 6 April, 2026
Author: Anil Kumar Choudhary
Bench: Anil Kumar Choudhary
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.2626 of 2025
------
Ajay Sagar @ Ajay Prem Sagar, aged about 63 years, son of Late
Prem Sagar, resident of 22/1022, Sea Wood Estate, NRI Complex,
Near Palm Beach Road, Near Delhi Public School, Sector 53/56/58
Nerul, 400706, Thane, P.O. + P.S.+District-Thane, State-Maharashtra,
also a resident of Neel Sidhi Enclave, Commercial Complex Plot
No.48/9, Sector 14, Vashi, P.O. + P.S.-Vashi, District Mumbai, State-
Maharashtra.
... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Rajiv Kumar Agarwal, son of Ramesh Kumar Agarwal, Resident
of 9th Floor, Carnation Building, Ashiana Garden, Sonari, P.O. & P.S.-
Sonari, Town-Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum.
... Opposite Parties
------
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sourav Kumar, Advocate
: Mr. Pratik Sen, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Fahad Allam, Addl.P.P.
For the O.P. No.2 : Mr. D.K. Karmakar, Advocate
------
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
Heard the parties.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this interlocutory
application has been filed with the prayer for early hearing of the instant
Cr.M.P.
Since, the hearing of instant Cr.M.P. is taken up today, hence, this
interlocutory application stands disposed of being infructuous.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
By the Court:- Heard the parties.
2. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 with the
prayer to quash and set aside the entire criminal proceeding arising out of
Complaint Case No.2238 of 2020 including the order dated 25.11.2020
passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur at East
Singhbhum whereby and where under the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st
Class, Jamshedpur at East Singhbhum has taken cognizance for the
offence punishable under Sections 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
against the petitioner and after taking cognizance of the offence passed
summoning order.
3. The brief fact of the case is that the petitioner is the Director of J.K.
Surface Coatings Private Limited which is a company incorporated under
the provisions of the Company Act. The company issued eight different
cheques of different amounts in favour of the complainant, the cheques
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
were dishonoured. The cheques were signed by the co-accused namely
Sanjay Kumar Singh & Prashant Singh. After dishonour of the cheques,
demand notice was issued by the complainant to the company and all its
Directors including the petitioner and after receipt of the said demand
notice on behalf of the company, the petitioner replied to the Advocate of
the complainant on behalf of the said company, mentioning therein that
due to financial crisis, the company could not release the payment to the
complainant and assured that from November, 2020 onwards, the
company will start releasing the payments of the complainant; which
period was of course beyond the period of 15 days from the date of
receipt of the said demand notice.
4. On the basis of the complaint, the affidavits filed by the
complainant and other documents and materials available in the record,
the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur at East Singhbhum
found prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the concerned company
and its Directors including the petitioner and summoning order was
passed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sunita Palita & Others vs.
Panchami Stone Quarry reported in (2022) 10 SCC 152, paragraph-35 of
which reads as under:-
"35. The High Court rightly held that when a
complaint was filed against the Director of a company, a
specific averment that such person was in charge of and
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
responsible for the conduct of business of the company was an
essential requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act. The High
Court also rightly held that merely being a Director of the
company is not sufficient to make the person liable under
Section 141 of the NI Act. The requirement of Section 141 of
the NI Act was that the person sought to be made liable
should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company. This has to be averred as a fact."
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hitesh Verma vs.
Health Care at Home India Private Limited & Others reported in (2025)
7 SCC 623, paragraph-4 of which reads as under:-
"4. There are twin requirements under sub-section
(1) of Section 141 of the 1881 Act. In the complaint, it must
be alleged that the person, who is sought to be held liable by
virtue of vicarious liability, at the time when the offence was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company. A
Director who is in charge of the company and a Director who
was responsible to the company for the conduct of the
business, are two different aspects. The requirement of law is
that both the ingredients of sub-section (1) of Section 141 of
the 1881 Act must be incorporated in the complaint.
Admittedly, there is no assertion in the complaints that the
appellant, at the time of commission of the offence, was in
charge of the business of the company. Therefore, on a plain
reading of the complaints, the appellant cannot be prosecuted
with the aid of sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the 1881 Act."
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that since in the
complaint, it has not been alleged that the petitioner, at the time, when the
offence committed, was in-charge and was responsible for the conduct of
the business of the company, hence, the cognizance taken against the
petitioner is bad in law. It is lastly submitted that the prayer as prayed for
by the petitioner in this Cr.M.P., be allowed.
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
8. Learned Addl.P.P. appearing for the State and the learned counsel
for the opposite party No.2 on the other hand vehemently oppose the
prayer of the petitioner made in the instant Cr.M.P and drawing attention
of this Court to para-8 of the complaint wherein it has categorically been
mentioned that the accused person of the case including the petitioner
replied to the legal notice sent to the company concerned and on behalf of
the company, the petitioner admitted the payment and promised to start
releasing the payment in the month of November, 2020 which was a
period beyond 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, hence, this
conduct of the petitioner replying to the notice demanding the payment of
the cheque amount, itself goes to show that the petitioner was in-charge
and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company or
else, the petitioner had no business to respond to the legal notice
demanding payment of cheque amount, on behalf of the said company,
hence, the sole contention of the petitioner to quash the entire criminal
proceeding is not sustainable in law. It is further submitted by the learned
counsel for the opposite party no.2 that in the meanwhile, non-bailable
warrant of arrest has been issued against the petitioner. It is lastly
submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed.
9. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after
carefully going through the materials available in the record, this court
has no hesitation in holding that it must be alleged in the complaint that
the person who is sought to be held liable by virtue of vicarious liability at
the time when the offence was committed, was in-charge and was
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, but it is
pertinent to mention here that no particular 'word' or 'verbatim' has been
prescribed by the statute to be pleaded to the effect, that the persons
sought to be held liable by virtue of vicarious liability was in-charge or
was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
10. Now coming to the facts of the case, since the undisputed facts
remains that the petitioner on behalf of the company responded to the
notice demanding the amount of the dishonoured cheques and even
assured on behalf of the company to the complainant, through his
Advocate, who sent the notice demanding the said cheque amount to pay
the amount of the cheques, albeit after the period of 15 days from the date
of receipt of the said demand notice; by the said company. In the
considered opinion of this Court in this undisputed fact regarding this
conduct of the petitioner is indicative of the fact that the petitioner was in-
charge and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company or else, there was no business for the petitioner, solely
representing the company, to reply to the demand notice issued to the
company and the concerned Directors including the petitioner.
11. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that
this is not a case where the entire criminal proceeding is to be quashed
and set aside on the ground agitated by the petitioner in this criminal
miscellaneous petition in exercise of the power under Section 528 of the
BNSS, 2023.
( 2026:JHHC:9693 )
12. Accordingly, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, being without
any merit, is dismissed.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated the 06th of April, 2026
AFR/ Abhiraj
Uploaded on 09/04/2026
