Smt. Rubi Rai Tirkey vs State Of Jharkhand
2025 Latest Caselaw 5946 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Smt. Rubi Rai Tirkey vs State Of Jharkhand on 18 September, 2025

Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary

Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary

                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

                                   S.A. No. 241 of 2018

            Smt. Rubi Rai Tirkey, Aged about 48 years, D/o late Joseph Tirkey,
            Resident of Gitilipi, Kulkumdungri, P.O. - Azadnagar, P.S. Mango,
            District- East Singhbhum
                                      ...      ...     Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant
                                      Versus
            1. State of Jharkhand
            2. The Secretary, Department of Forest, P.O. and P.S. Doranda,
               District Ranchi.
                   ...        ...      Defendants/Respondents/Respondents
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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

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For the Appellant : Mr. Rahul Kr. Gupta, Advocate : Mr. S.B. Gupta, Advocate : Mr. Navnit Prakash, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Sanjay Kr. Tiwari, SC-I : Mr. Krishna Kr. Bhatt, AC to SC-I

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15/18.09.2025 The arguments of the appellant have been recorded in order dated 15.09.2025. However, when the case is taken up today, he has submitted that the period of limitation for the State to file any suit for recovery of possession would be 30 years and has referred to Article 112 of the Limitation Act. He submits that Articles 65 and 112 are to be read together. In the previous order dated 15.09.2025, there was no reference of Article 112 of the Limitation Act.

Submission on behalf of the respondents.

2. The learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that there are concurrent findings recorded by both the courts. He has submitted that the suit was filed for declaration of title and also challenging the settlement entry of 1979 stating it to be wrong. The plaintiff claimed the property on the basis of registered sale deed dated 08.08.1956 [exhibit 1] in favour of the mother of the plaintiff and simultaneously claimed adverse possession without disclosing the foundational pleading which are required to be pleaded and established for claiming adverse possession. He submits that otherwise also, the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of registered title deed and on the basis of adverse possession are simultaneous and conflicting to each other.

3. He has referred to the submissions as recorded by the learned trial court that notice under Section 80 CPC was given primarily for settlement of land and not for filing of suit, but the State had refused the settlement. He has further stated that a specific plea was taken that the suit was barred by Section 80 CPC and also barred by limitation.

4. The learned counsel has read the entire summary of the written statement from the judgement passed by the learned trial court. He has specifically submitted that a plea was raised before the learned trial court in the written statement that the suit was barred by Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act as well as under Bihar Land Reforms Act and further in paragraph 9, the various provisions of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act i.e. Sections 83, 86, 89 and 96 have been referred to. He submits that since a plea was raised that the suit was barred by Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, therefore the learned courts have rightly entered into the point that no prior permission of the Deputy Commissioner was taken before entering into the registered sale deed of the year 1956 [exhibit 1].

5. Learned counsel for the respondents has read the entire finding of the learned Trial Court on issue nos. (iv) and (v) and also on issue no. (iii). He has submitted that the plaintiff had claimed title over the suit property by virtue of registered sale deed no. 3518 dated 08.08.1956 and ultimately the court found that the registered sale deed was hit by the provisions of Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. This finding was recorded as on the face of Exhibit-1 it revealed that the vendor of the mother of the plaintiff Ladura Ho belonged to Schedule Tribe and the mother of the plaintiff belonged to Christian Community. The court has also recorded that in the sale deed, there is no mention that due permission from the Deputy Commissioner was taken before transfer of the property and these facts regarding taking due permission from the Deputy Commissioner to transfer the property has also not been stated by the plaintiff in the plaint or in the documentary or oral evidence.

6. The learned counsel has also submitted that on account of the aforesaid defect in connection with the registered sale deed, the learned Trial court has rightly held that the sale deed executed by Ladura Ho in favour of mother of the plaintiff was void ab initio and title of the land cannot pass to the mother of the plaintiff through the sale deed.

7. The learned counsel submits that the point regarding violation of Section 46 of the Chotangapur Tenancy Act is a pure question of law which can be raised irrespective of any pleading or proof to that effect. He has submitted that it was for the plaintiff to prove her case and she has failed to prove her title on the basis of the registered sale deed Exhibit-1.

8. The learned counsel has further submitted that the court has recorded that there is a presumption in connection with the entries made in record of rights and the plaintiff has failed to bring any substantive material to rebut the legal presumption. This has been recorded after having held that the sale deed exhibit-1 was null and void.

9. The learned court thereafter held that the plaintiff was claiming title on the basis of registered sale deed and simultaneously claiming adverse possession without any foundational pleading and the two pleas are inconsistent to each other. For this, he has relied upon the judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2022) 10 SCC 217 (Kesar Bai versus Genda Lal and Another) paragraph 7. The learned counsel has further submitted that the plea of the plaintiff claiming title and also adverse possession has been rightly rejected by the learned trial court and the finding has been upheld by the learned 1st appellate court.

10. So far as the point regarding limitation is concerned, he has submitted that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the wrong entry on and from 09.07.1973 and the record of right was finally published on 10.08.1979. The learned court has recorded that the plea of plaintiff that she had no knowledge did not inspire confidence. This was recorded by referring to exhibit-5, which is a certified copy of the

order passed in the Case number 2268 of 1972-73 related to the suit land in which the mother of the plaintiff was a party and therefore the court recorded that the plaintiff had full knowledge about the wrong entry of the record of right from very beginning. The record of rights was finally published in the year 1979. Therefore, the court rejected the plea that the plaintiff came to know for the first time about the wrong entry only on 15.04.2005. However, during the course of hearing it transpired that the order was finally passed in exhibit-5 on 24.08.1973 which was much prior to the final publication of the record of right.

11. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2010)5 SCC 203 (R. Hanumaiah and another versus Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and Others) paragraphs 19 and 20 to submit that the courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that the public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements and has also submitted that it has been held whether Government contests a suit or not, before suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish either his title by producing title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the Government or a statutory development authority) or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than 30 years. In such suits, courts cannot ignore the presumption which were in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted.

12. While referring to the substantial questions of law, the learned counsel has submitted that the submissions which have been recorded as aforesaid covers all the substantial questions of law. Rejoinder argument of the Appellant

13. In response, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1995) 6 SCC 309 [R. Chandevarappa & Others vs. State of Karnataka & Others] paragraph 11.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to paragraph 7 and 8 of the plaint to submit that the foundational pleading for adverse possession has been laid down and it has been asserted that the plaintiff has remained in possession of the property since 08.08.1956. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are quoted as under:

"7. That thereafter the plaintiff searched and inspected the records of right in respect of suit property in the office of the record room and could know that the suit property is wrongly recorded in the name of "Ban Bibhag Bihar Sarkar" and the same is also shown in the remarks column illegal possession of Masih dhani Tirkey, wife of Joseph Tirkey since the year 1971.

8. That the suit property is in actual physical possession of the plaintiff since long more than 48 hears from the time of her mother since 8.8.1956 without any interference from any corner whatsoever and thereby the plaintiff has acquired her indefeasing right, title and interest thereon by virtue of adverse possession well within the knowledge of all concerns whatsoever. The plaintiff has and is performing all her acts of possession of the suit property since more than 48 years without any hindrance from any corner and thereby her possession and title over the suit property has been duly confirmed under the provision of law"

15. He submits that even if the sale deed is taken as null and void, the possession since 08.08.1956 can be relied. He submits that the State never filed any counter claim nor any separate suit for recovery has been filed till date.

16. Learned counsel has also submitted that the findings of the learned trial court that the sale deed of 1956 [exhibit 1] was void ab- initio is referable to substantial question of law No.1 as the sale deed has been held to be null and void on account of alleged violation of Section 46 of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, but no such foundational

pleading was laid by the State in the written statement and the parties did not join issues on this point.

17. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that once the Settlement Officer had rejected the objection of the State with regard to possession of the plaintiff, then the order ought to have reflected in the final publication of the records of right showing the possession of the plaintiffs since 1956.

18. Arguments concluded.

19. Judgment is reserved.

20. Post this case on 31st October 2025 for judgment or any other date as may be notified by this Court, whichever is earlier.

(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) 18.09.2025.

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