Jharkhand High Court
Arvind Kumar vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... on 12 September, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:28103
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S). No. 6170 of 2019
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Arvind Kumar, aged about 59 years, son of late Baijnath Singh, resident
of Flat No. 501, Maa Laxmi Plaza, Basant Vihar, P.O. Harmu, P.S.
Argora, District Ranchi. .... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, having its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
3. The Joint Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, School Education
and Literacy Department, Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
4. The Deputy Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, School Education
and Literacy Department, Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
5. The Director, Secondary Education, Government of Jharkhand,
Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
6. The Deputy Commissioner, Jamtara, P.O. & P.S. Jamtara, District
Jamtara. .......... Respondents.
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Advocate
For the Resp.-State : Mr. Karan Shahdeo, AC to SC-II
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C.A.V. on 02/07/ 2025 Pronounced on 12/09/2025
Heard the parties.
2. The instant writ application the petitioner prays for issuance of
appropriate writ(s)/order(s) direction(s) for the following reliefs:
A. For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the
Notification contained in Memo No. 3223 dated 15.10.2019 passed by the
Respondent-Joint Secretary, whereby and whereunder the Appeal
preferred by the petitioner as against the order of Penalty dated
31.05.2018 has been dismissed by a vague and cryptic order.
B. For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the
Notification contained in Memo No. 442 dated 31.05.2018 issued under
the signature of Respondent-Joint Secretary, whereby and whereunder in
purported exercise of power under Rule-74 of the Jharkhand Service Code
the petitioner has been compulsorily superannuated w.e.f. 31.05.2018.
C. For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order
/ notification contained in memo no. 109 dated 09.02.2018 issued under
the signature of the Respondent Joint Secretary whereby under Rule-74 of
the Jharkhand Service Code and rule 14 of the Jharkhand Government
Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the petitioner has
been imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement as well as
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forfeiture of salary during the suspension period in the Departmental
Proceeding contemplated against him.
D. For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the
Notice as contained in Memo No. 147 dated 27.02.2018 whereby and
whereunder the delinquent has been served with three months' notice for
compulsory retirement.
E. Upon quashing of the impugned order/Notification of punishment the
petitioner prays for allowing him to be reinstated in service with full back
wages and continuity in service
3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings are that while the
Petitioner was posted as the District Education Officer, Jamtara, he
was holding the additional charge of Regional Deputy Director of
Education, Santhal Pargana, Dumka, and during the said period i.e. in
the year 2013-15, a scheme for construction of a number of school
buildings in Jamtara District was initiated and for checking the
misappropriation of public money, the District Education Officer was
empowered to hold enquiry and submit report.
During enquiry it was found that there was misappropriation of
Government money and the same was reported to the District
Programme Officer, Jamtara vide letter No. 248 dated 06.05.2014
issued under the signature of the petitioner. The Petitioner has also
directed for lodging F.I.R. against the persons concerned. The matter
of misappropriation was brought to the notice of various authorities
by the Petitioner and names of various para teachers who were
involved in the said misappropriation of funds was also pointed out;
however, no heed was paid by the authorities over the complaints and
report of the Petitioner.
4. It has been alleged by the Petitioner that only to vent out
personal vendetta against the Petitioner, one of such para teacher
namely Tarak Nath Mandal lodged a complaint before the Vigilance
Cell, Santhal Pargana, Division Dumka vide his letter dated
06.07.2015, in which, complaint was made that the Petitioner is
demanding Rs.50,000/- from him, in order to release the funds for the
work completed.
On this complaint, finally a raid was planned and the Petitioner
was allegedly caught in a trap, with an amount of Rs.30,000/-,
allegedly accepting the same as bribe from the complainant Tarak
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Nath Mandal. The Petitioner was taken to police custody and
vigilance P.S. Case No.48 of 2015 was registered. Thereafter, the
Petitioner was put under suspension, vide notification dated
13.08.2015 and corrigendum dated 07.09.2015., with effect from the
date of arrest i.e. 17.07.2015 and thereafter, a Departmental
Proceeding was initiated against him.
5. Further facts reveal that the Petitioner was released on bail on
22.11.2015, he gave joining on 23.11.2015, and thereafter he was
again put under suspension, under Rule 100 of the Jharkhand Service
Code, vide notification dated 22.12.2015, w.e.f. 22.11.2015. He
continued in suspension and after some time Departmental Proceeding
was initiated against him.
The Inquiry officer finally submitted his report on 11.11.2016,
in which, the first charge was found to be partially proved. As far as
second charge is concerned, it was found not proved; in relation to the
third charge, the Inquiry officer has given a finding that the matter
relates to a criminal prosecution and until the same is finally decided,
no fruitful enquiry could be done and hence, the charge was proposed
to be dropped, however, the Disciplinary authority, vide letter No. 547
dated 01.08.2017 differed from the report of the Inquiry officer and
issued a second show-cause with a stipulation that major punishment
may be inflicted upon the Petitioner.
The Petitioner filed reply to the second show cause; however,
he was inflicted with a major punishment of Compulsory retirement
vide order dated 09.02.2018. Thereafter, petitioner preferred the
appeal which was also rejected vide order dated 15.10.2019. Hence
this Writ application.
6. Mr. Saurabh Shekhar Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner submits
that the charges in the memo of charge are three (3) folds.
i) The first allegation charges that the petitioner had stayed the construction
of school building, and thereafter, for removing the stay, he had demanded
money/illegal gratification.
ii) The second allegation is in relation to demand of Rs.50,000/-, only then he
would release the funds for the construction of school building, and the
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petitioner had allegedly agreed to settle at Rs.30,000/-.
iii) The third allegation is connected with one F.I.R, being Vigilance P.S. Case
No.35 of 2015, dated 17.07.2015, in which, he was arrested in a trap case,
for allegedly accepting bribery of Rs.30,000/-.
7. He further submits that on the basis of second show-cause
notice, the Disciplinary authority differed with the findings of the
Inquiry officer and has concluded that charge nos.1 & 2 are proved,
but in order to find it proved, no clear evidence have been shown;
rather, only on presumption, the charges have been found to be proved
against the findings of the Inquiry officer. The reason given by the
Disciplinary authority lacks ipse dixit.
It is contended by him that from the reading of the Inquiry
report and the second show-cause notice, dealing with charge no. 1,
that the Petitioner had put a stay in the construction of school
buildings, vide his letter dated 06.05.2014, but no proof has been
found that the funds were ever released or that there was a direction to
start the construction work; rather, it has been found that some amount
were already released, prior to 06.05.2014, by the District
Superintending of Education in favour of the complainant namely
Tarak Nath Mandal.
He argued that as far as charge no.2 is concerned, the Inquiry
officer gave clean chit to the Petitioner to the extent that no demand of
any amount was made and the same was also found to be true in
relation to the charge no.1 as well, and in differing with such finding
the Disciplinary authority has given no reasoning, but only on the
presumption, he has concluded that the Petitioner must have
demanded amount of Rs.50,000/-, in order to remove the stay on
construction and release of funds, connected with the construction of
school building.
8. Ld. Counsel further submits that the decision reached by the
Inquiry officer coupled with the opinion of the Disciplinary authority
in the second show-cause notice was used to compulsorily retire the
Petitioner under the provisions of Rule-74(a) and (b)(ii) of Jharkhand
Service Code; but surprisingly, nothing was done to conclude the
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Departmental proceeding started under the provisions of Jharkhand
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016.
He strenuously contended that this amount to short - circuiting
of the entire Departmental proceeding; as such, impugned orders may
be set aside and Petitioner may be reinstated and deemed to be in
service with continuity and financial benefits may be extend to him.
9. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents submits that Departmental
proceeding was initiated against the Petitioner vide departmental
resolution no. 445 dated 13.06.2016 on the basis of charge sheet
submitted by Deputy Commissioner, Jamtara vide letter no. 89, dated
17.02.2016 and after full fledge enquiry and after issuance of second
show cause; the decision of petitioner's compulsory retirement from
service by giving 3 months' prior notice is given by departmental
notification no. 109 dated 09.02.2018.
He further submits that Departmental proceeding was conducted
against the Petitioner and due to his grave and serious allegations, the
State Government decided to award punishment of compulsory
retirement from the service vide departmental notification no. 442,
dated 31.05.2018 under rule 74(a) and 74(b)(ii) of Jharkhand Service
Code after compliance of natural justice.
He lastly submits that the appeal petitioner preferred against the
order of punishment also stood rejected; as such no relief should be
granted to the petitioner.
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going
through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits, the
issues that needs to be decided are as follows:-
i. Whether in the departmental proceeding, findings of the
Enquiry Officer that the charges of illegal gratification is not
proved against the petitioner, was differentiated by the
Disciplinary Authority, on the basis of presumption and opinion,
instead of any hard evidence and without disclosing any ipse dixit,
and therefore, the opinion recorded by the Disciplinary Authority
is perverse and cannot be relied upon?
ii. Whether the findings of an inconclusive departmental
proceeding can be converted and could it be formed as a basis of
decision of compulsory retirement, passed under the provisions of
Rule-74(a) & (b)(ii)?
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iii. Whether the respondents are legally permitted to convert the
departmental proceeding, initiated under the provisions of
Jharkhand Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 2016, to a decision taken under Rule-74(a) & (b)(ii) of the
Jharkhand Service Code and whether such decision would not
amount to short-circuiting of the entire departmental proceeding?
11. As far as 1st issue is concerned; from bare perusal of enquiry
report and the opinion of the Disciplinary authority in the second
show-cause notice, would clarify that there was no finding on behalf
of the Inquiry officer regarding the demand made by the Petitioner in
lieu of release of fund or start the construction work of the schools.
Further, the opinion of the Disciplinary authority that the
Petitioner must have demanded for illegal gratification, is not backed
by any evidence; oral or documentary. Further, the Disciplinary
authority has not been able to show any ipse dixit in order to reach the
conclusion that the demand may have been made by the Petitioner for
illegal gratification. Therefore, on the one hand, the Inquiry Officer
has not found any demand of illegal gratification; and on the other
hand, even the Disciplinary authority in his opinion, recorded in the
second show-cause notice, has not been able to produce any evidence
of any illegal gratification.
12. Under such circumstances, this charge leveled against the
Petitioner is not backed by any of the evidences and therefore, the
conclusion reached by the Disciplinary authority in his opinion
recorded in the second show-cause can safely be said to be perverse.
It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that any finding given
by any authority, that is not backed by evidence is a perverse finding.
In the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors.1, in
paras-9 & 10 it has been held as under:-
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with
the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding
of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and
would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the
decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is
arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable
(1999) 2 SCC 10
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and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be
perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable
and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be,
the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings
would not be interfered with."
13. Having regard to the aforesaid judgment, in the factual
background of this case since it is necessary that the opinion of the
Disciplinary authority differing with the findings of the Inquiry
officer, on the point of demand of illegal gratification, should not have
been merely on the basis of presumption and assumption, but should
have been backed by any firm evidence or ipse dixit, which is absent
in this case. Therefore, the opinion of the Disciplinary authority
differing with the findings of the Inquiry officer is a perverse finding,
as it is not supported by any evidence.
14. As far as 2nd issue is concerned, it is an admitted position that the
Departmental proceeding remained inconclusive and that the same
was converted into the proceeding of compulsory retirement, under
the provisions of Rules-74(a) & (b)(ii) of the Jharkhand Service Code.
It is to be seen that the Departmental proceeding was initiated in the
year 2016, and the order of compulsory retirement was passed on
31.05.2018; whereas, the petitioner reached age of retirement on
31.12.2019.
15. At this stage it is necessary to observe that in order to pass an
order of compulsory retirement as per the Rules-74(a) & (b)(ii) of
Jharkhand Service Code; such a decision is taken in public interest, or
that the employee is not good to the Institution, and would be declared
as a dead wood. Accordingly, in order to reach such a conclusion, a
case has to be made out that the continuance of employee will not be
in the public interest, or that he is not performing his duty good
enough to be allowed to continue to hold the post. For brevity, the
provision of Rule-74(a) & (b)(ii) are being reproduced as hereunder:
"74(a). The State Government may require any Government servant
who has completed twenty-one years of duty and twenty-five years of
total service calculated from the date of his first appointment to retire
from Government service, if it considers that his efficiency or conduct
is not such as to justify his retention in service. Where any
Government servant is so required to retire no claim to any special
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compensation shall be entertained.
(b)(ii). The appointing authority concerned may after giving a
Government servant at least three month's previous notice in writing,
or an amount equal to three months' pay and allowance in lieu of
such notice, require him in public interest, to retire from service on
the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years
of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date
thereafter to be specified in the notice."
16. Therefore, in the present case, it is clear that the issue is not
relatable to one under Rule-74(a) & (b)(ii); rather, this is a case where
imputation has been made by initiation of regular Departmental
proceeding and the same remained inconclusive. No final order of the
Disciplinary authority concluding the Disciplinary proceeding has
been passed.
Under such circumstances, when the allegations have travelled
the stage of service of Inquiry report through second show-cause
notice and an opinion of difference was made by the Desciplinary
authority to which the Petitioner has preferred reply also. Only,
thereafter, the matter was converted into a process under Rule-74(a)
and (b)(ii). This act of the Respondents appears to be mala-fide and
cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
17. In order to make out a case under Rule-74(a) & (b)(i), the
Respondents are required to visit the entire service tenure and ACRs
of the Petitioner. In the instant case, however, an inconclusive
Disciplinary proceeding has been looked into, that clearly is in
connection with the imputation. Hence, in this factual background,
this Court is of the view that the Departmental proceeding which was
initiated under the Jharkhand Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 2016 was subsequently converted into a process
under Rule-74(a) & (b)(ii) and the petitioner was compulsorily retired,
amounts to short circuit the entire Departmental proceeding and this is
not maintainable in the eyes of law.
18. Therefore, the issue stands answered that the Respondents are not
legally permitted to convert the Departmental proceeding, initiated
under the provisions of Jharkhand Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016, to a decision taken under Rule-
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74(a) & (b)(ii) of the Jharkhand Service Code without any finding on
Public Interest.
19. The issue no. 3 is answered, on the basis of the findings recorded
in relation to issue no.2 as it is already held that the Departmental
proceeding which was initiated under the Jharkhand Civil Services
(Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 cannot be converted
into one of compulsory retirement passed under Rule-74(a) & (b)(ii).
This has been clearly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj Vs. Union of India & Anr.2, para-26
& 42 of which are quoted herein below:
"26. In State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel [State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel,
(2001) 3 SCC 314 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 576], this Court has delineated the following
broad principles that ought to be followed in matters relating to compulsory retirement
: (SCC p. 320, para 11)
"11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallised into a
definite principle, which could be broadly summarised thus:
(i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful
to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily
retired for the sake of public interest.
(ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be
treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the
Constitution.
(iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead
wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after
having due regard to the entire service record of the officer.
(iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be
taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order.
(v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can
also be taken into consideration.
(vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a
short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more
desirable.
(vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries
made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the
officer.
(viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive
measure."
42. ............... If the appellant was worthy of being continued in service for little
short of a decade after he had attained the age of 50 years and of being granted an
overall grade of 9 on the scale of 1-10 on 31-7-2019 it has not been shown as to
what had transpired thereafter that made the respondents resort to FR 56(j) and
invoke the public interest doctrine to compulsorily retire him with just three months
of service left for his retirement, in routine. In such a case, this Court is inclined to
pierce the smokescreen and on doing so, we are of the firm view that the order of
compulsory retirement in the given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be
sustained. The said order is punitive in nature and was passed to short-circuit the
(2023) 11 SCC 466
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disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant and ensure his immediate
removal. The impugned order passed by the respondents does not pass muster as it
fails to satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of the public."
20. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the case of the
Petitioner stands the test of the three (3) issues, accordingly, it is held
that the action of Respondents is not sustainable in the eyes of law
and consequently, the impugned notification dated 09.02.2018,
communication dated 27.02.2018, notification dated 31.05 2018 and
appellate order dated 15.10.2019, are hereby, quashed and set-aside.
21. Consequently, the Petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential
benefits. The Respondents are directed to extend the same
accordingly.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
kunal/-
NAFR/AFR
