Jharkhand High Court
Rakesh Vishwakarma Aged About 24 Years ... vs The State Of Jharkhand on 10 September, 2025
Author: Sanjay Prasad
Bench: Sanjay Prasad
2025:JHHC:27649
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 178 of 2025
....
Rakesh Vishwakarma aged about 24 years son of Rajeswar
Mistri, resident of Village- Chaupariya, PO- Nawadih, PS-
Chainpur, District- Palamau ...... Appellant
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Informant (name not disclosed) ..... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, Advocate
Mr. Randhir Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Sumitra Kumari, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Saket Kumar, A. P. P.
For the Resp. No. 2 : Mr. Jai Prakash Pandey, Advocate
......
ORAL ORDER IN COURT
......
07/10.09.2025 The Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 178 of 2025 has been filed on
behalf of the appellant under Section 14 (A) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015
by challenging the order dated 21.12.2024 passed by learned
Special Judge, Palamau in Misc. Cri. Application No. 2159 of
2024 arising out of Ramgarh P. S. Case No. 43 of 2024 registered
for the offences under Section 323/376/504/506/34 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 3 (1)(r)(s) of the SC/ST Act by which the
prayer for Anticipatory Bail of the appellant has been rejected.
2. As per the FIR, the appellant is alleged to have
established physical relationship with the victim lady on the
pretext of marriage since the year 2019 and he has raped her on
different places in Gujarat, Ranchi, Kolkata, Ramgarh and
Daltanganj from 2019 till the institution of FIR i.e. on 12.09.2024.
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It is alleged that the parents and brother of the appellant had
abused the Informant in the name of her caste.
3. Heard Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, learned counsel for
the appellant, Mr. Saket Kumar, learned counsel for the State and
Mr. Jay Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
impugned order passed by the learned Court below is illegal and
not sustainable in eye of law. It is submitted that the appellant has
been falsely implicated by the victim lady and he is innocent and
has committed no offence. It is submitted that the victim is major
lady aged around 26 years on the date of lodging the FIR and she
has established physical relationship with the appellant on her
own for around five (5) years and she had raised no grievance for
last five (5) years. It is further submitted that Informant is a
married lady and she has also filed one maintenance case being
O. M. No. 121 of 2023 against her husband Ajay Ram before the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Garhwa. It is also
submitted that the Informant has also instituted Complainant Case
No. 1046 of 2021 against her husband in which cognizance has
been taken against her husband by the learned Court below on
05.11.2022 and summon has been issued against her husband
Ajay Ram under Sections 498-A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code
and hence, the appellant may be enlarged on Anticipatory Bail.
5. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer
for Anticipatory Bail. It is submitted that there is direct allegation
against the appellant for committing rape and for having sexually
established physical relationship with the victim lady and hence,
the prayer for Anticipatory Bail of the appellant may be rejected.
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6. Learned counsel for the Respondent no. 2 has also
opposed the prayer for Anticipatory Bail and has submitted that
the appellant has allured the victim lady and established physical
relationship on the pretext of marriage and she was in touch with
the appellant from the year 2019 till 2024. It is submitted that the
family members of the appellant have also abused the Informant
in the name of her caste. It is submitted that the appellant has not
performed marriage with the victim lady, despite giving assurance
on several times in Palamau, Nagpur, Gujrat, Daltonganj, Ranchi
and hence prayer for Anticipatory Bail of the appellant may be
rejected.
7. Perused the FIR and the case diary and considered the
submissions of learned counsels for both the sides.
8. It reveals from the FIR that the appellant is alleged to
have established physical relationship with the victim lady on the
pretext of marriage from the year 2019 till 2024 i.e. for around
four (4) to five (5) years. It has been stated in the FIR that she
has lived with appellant at several places like Palamau, Nagpur,
Gujarat, Daltonganj, Ramgarh, Ranchi and finally the appellant
had left her at Gujrat and switched his mobile phone. It is also
alleged in the FIR that the parents and brother of the appellants
have abused the victim lady in the name of her caste. However,
there is no specific allegation against the appellant for abusing her
in the name of her caste.
9. It appears that there was consensual relationship
between the appellant and the Informant for last five (5) years and
the Informant had established physical relationship with the
appellant though she is a married and major lady.
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10. It has been held in the case of Manish Yadav Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh & Another reported in 2025 INSC 151 at
paragraphs nos. 15 to 18 as follows:-
"Para-15:- The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of 'consent'
in case s where sexual intercourse took place on the promise of
marriage has been well established through a catena of
judgments by this Court. In Uday v. State of Karnataka, this
Court acquitted the accused based on the reasoning that the
prosecutrix, a mature college student, consented to sexual
intercourse with the accused of her own free will. The Court
found that she was fully aware of the consequences of her
actions and held that her consent was not based on any
misconception of fact. In Uday(supra), the Court noted that:
"21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial
opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given
by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person
with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he
would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be
given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is
not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are
inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that
there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether
consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is
voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of
fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the
courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind
while considering a question of consent, but the court
must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and
the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a
conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar
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facts which may have a bearing on the question
whether the consent was voluntary, or was given
under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the
evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the
prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the
offence, absence of consent being one of them."
"Para-16:- This Court, in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State
of Haryana, while discussing the nature of the 'consent' in
cases where sexual intercourse occurs on the promise of
marriage, distinguished between a mere 'breach of promise'
and 'not fulfilling a false promise'. The Court held as follows:
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether
the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim,
or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the
latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception.
There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of
sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused, and
not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her
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by the accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases
must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted
for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the
intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had
clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the
victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when
a person having the best of intentions is unable to
marry the victim owing to various unavoidable
circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with
respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are
not very clear from the evidence available, does not
always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact",
the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90
IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to
pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal
liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the
fact that from the very beginning, the accused had
never really intended to marry her."
Para-17:- Moreover, in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, 10 the
Court acquitted and set aside the conviction of the accused
while holding that while there was a breach of promise to
marry, it was not a case of false promise to marry. The relevant
extract is produced hereinunder:
"35. The remaining question is whether on the basis of
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the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to
hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of
inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false
promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused
did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the
predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the
sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to
marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no
evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to
marry her at all from the inception and that the
promise he made was false to his knowledge. No
circumstances emerging from the prosecution
evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the
statement of PW 12 that "later on", the accused
became ready to marry her but his father and others
took him away from the village would indicate that the
accused might have been prompted by a genuine
intention to marry which did not materialise on
account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It
seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry
rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this
aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday
case[(2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 : (2003) 2
Scale 329] at Para 24 come to the aid of the appellant."
Para-18:- Applying the above principle to the case at hand, it is
clearly discernible that in the present case, the complainant had
agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the
accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false
promise of marriage made by the appellant. Therefore, while
the present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not
constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry. Based
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on the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the appellant
obtained the complainant's consent to engage in a physical
relationship under the pretext of a false promise of marriage."
11. It appears from the supplementary affidavit dated
12.08.2025 filed on behalf of the appellant that the victim lady
i.e. the Informant is claimed to be the wife of one Ajay Ram and
the Informant is also having one son (name not disclosed) and she
has filed one maintenance case being O. M. No. 121 of 2023
against her husband Ajay Ram before the learned Principal Judge,
Family Court, Garhwa for grant of maintenance of Rs. 45,000/-
per month from the said Ajay Ram, which has been enclosed as
Annexure-1 to the Supplementary Affidavit dated 12.08.2025.
12. It further reveals from Annexure-2 of the
Supplementary Affidavit dated 12.08.2025 that the Informant has
also filed one Complaint Case bearing Complaint Case No. 1046
of 2021 against the said Ajay Ram, who is said to be her husband
and also against six others family members i.e. her father in-law,
brother in-law and married Nanad and in the said Complaint Case
No. 1046 of 2021, the learned Court below has taken cognizance
against the said Ajay Ram vide order dated 05.11.2022 and
summon has been issued against the said Ajay Ram under
Sections 498-A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.
13. Thus, it is evident that the relationship between the
parties is consensual. From perusal of Annexure-1 and
Annexure-2 of the Supplementary Affidavit dated 12.08.2025, it
would appear that the Informant is also married lady as the
Informant has claimed that one Ajay Ram is her husband.
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14. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties
and in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, the appellant- Rakesh Vishwakarma is directed to surrender
before the learned Court below within six weeks from today and
in the event of his arrest or surrender, the appellant-Rakesh
Vishwakarma is directed to be released on bail, on furnishing bail
bond of Rs. 15,000/- (Fifteen thousand only) with two sureties of
the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge,
Palamau/ or his Successor Court in connection with Ramgarh P.S.
Case No. 43 of 2024 subject to condition that one of the bailors
must be the own relative of the appellant and the appellant will
not leave the jurisdiction of Civil Court, Palamau without prior
permission to the learned Court below and also subject to the
condition that he will not commit such type of offence in future
again and the appellant shall make himself available for
interrogation by the police officer as and when required and the
appellant shall not directly or indirectly or make any inducement
or threat to the Informant and also subject to the conditions laid
down under Section 482 of the BNSS, 2023.
15. Accordingly, the Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 178 of 2025 is
allowed and the impugned order dated 21.12.2024 passed by
learned Special Judge, Palamau in Misc. Cri. Application No.
2159 of 2024 arising out of Ramgarh P. S. Case No. 43 of 2024 is,
hereby, set aside.
16. Thus, the Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 178 of 2025 is allowed
and stands disposed of.
Dated 10.09.2025 (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Kamlesh/
