Jharkhand High Court
Sushil Kumar Jain vs State Of Jharkhand Through Chief ... on 4 September, 2025
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
2025:JHHC:26863
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
WP(S) No.4767 of 2025
-----
Sushil Kumar Jain, son of late Suresh Kumar Jain, resident of
Paras Villa, Swami Sahjanand Nagar, opposite Ashish Kiran
Apartment, Malipatti, PO and PS Dhanbad, District Dhanbad
... Petitioner(s).
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, Ranchi, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi
2. The Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government
of Jharkhand, having its office at F.F.P. Building, P.O. Dhurwa,
P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. Special Secretary, Rural Development Department,
Government of Jharkhand, having its office at F.F.P. Building,
P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi
4. Deputy Secretary, Rural Development Department,
Government of Jharkhand, having its office at F.F.P. Building,
P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi
5. Executive Engineer, Road Development, Special Division,
Dhanbad, P.O. Dhanbad, P.S. Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad.
6. Accountant General (A&E), Jharkhand having its office at A.G
Building, Doranda, P.O Doranda, P.S Doranda, District Ranchi
... Respondent(s).
CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
------
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suraj Singh, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Varun Prabhakar, AC to GP-III
For Accountant General: Ms. Richa Sanchita, Advocate
Ms. Suman Roy, Advocate
.........
02 /04.09.2025: Heard the parties.
2. The petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer in Rural
Development, Special Division, Dhanbad. On 23.08.2009 an
inspection was carried out in an under construction bridge in village
Barbandiya, Nirsa Block and some irregularities were found for
which he was suspended vide Memo No. 6318 dated 29.08.2009
and a departmental proceeding was initiated vide order no. 2502
dated 14.05.2010. The inquiry report was submitted on 26.08.2009.
Vide letter dated 18.06.2010 the petitioner was directed to appear
before the inquiry officer thereafter on several occasions the
2025:JHHC:26863
petitioner appeared before the inquiry officer. After due inquiry
finding the charge to be proved against the petitioner he was
inflicted punishment on 08.11.2012. He was punished with
stoppage of six pay increments with cumulative effect with further
punishment that he will not be entitled for any promotion during his
service career. Further it was ordered that the petitioner will not be
paid anything except his subsistence allowance during the period of
suspension.
The petitioner was also implicated in a criminal case being
Vigilance PS Case No. 27 of 2010 registered under sections 406,
409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 109 IPC and under section 13(2) read with
13(1) (D) of Prevention of Corruption Act. After imposition of
punishment in the departmental proceeding on 08.11.2012 the Anti-
Corruption Bureau after investigation submitted Final Form being
Final Form No. 56 of 2014 dated 31.12.2014 in the criminal case.
Thereafter vide order dated 17.08.2017 the Special Judge, ACB,
Ranchi accepted the Final Form.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that for the
same set of allegation both the departmental proceeding and the
criminal proceeding was initiated. In the departmental proceeding
he was found guilty whereas in the criminal proceeding there is
submission of Final Form stating therein mistake of fact. The
petitioner has relied on paragraph nos. 12 and 30 of the judgment
passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Ram Lal vs. State of
Rajasthan and Others" reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175, which held
as under:
"12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and
the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence,
witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the
matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court in judicial
review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding
was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and
that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the
Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain
circumstances. The Court will be entitled to exercise its
discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the
findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust,
unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts.
2025:JHHC:26863
(See G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [G.M. Tank v. State of
Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] , State
Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [State Bank of
Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 : (2009) 2 SCC
(L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S.
Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 :
(2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] .)
30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding
of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the
orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The
charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence,
witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a
case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders
of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as
allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive.
This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M.
Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 1121] ."
4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
petitioner was punished by the department on 08.11.2012 and after
much delay only on 2025 he has challenged the same, thus, no
relief could be granted to the petitioner.
5. First Information Report and the departmental proceeding
is absolutely on a different premises and standard of proof is also
different. Both are different in terms of nature and the standard of
proof. While criminal proceedings require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, departmental proceedings are governed by the
preponderance of probabilities.
6. The petitioner has never challenged the continuation of the
departmental proceeding nor the punishment at any point of time
though criminal proceeding was pending against the petitioner, so
exoneration of the petitioner in the criminal case will have no effect.
The petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case has no bearing on the
departmental proceedings or the punishment imposed therein.
Further the departmental proceeding culminated in a punishment
much prior to the criminal case.
7. The petitioner has challenged the Memo No. 8614 dated
08.11.2012 when the petitioner was in service thereafter the
petitioner superannuated on 31.03.2022 and much thereafter only
in 2025 he had challenged the order of punishment dated
2025:JHHC:26863
08.11.2012 which is at a much belated stage i.e. after 13 years.
More than thirteen years after the punishment order was passed,
the petitioner has now chosen to file the present writ petition,
challenging the very same order. Such an unexplained delay
renders the petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross
laches and delay.
8. Further, I find that it is the negligence of the petitioner
which is being put in question in the departmental proceeding.
Negligence was not and cannot be the subject matter of the
criminal case. The petitioner did not supervise the work properly
which may be a charge under the departmental proceeding but the
same cannot be a criminal charge, so the judgment which the
petitioner is relying upon does not fit in the facts of this case.
9. In view of the unexplained delay and latches of the
petitioner and considering the difference in the criminal and
departmental charge, this writ petition is dismissed.
(ANANDA SEN, J.)
Tanuj/
