Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Kumud Ranjan on 14 October, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2025:JHHC:31642-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.215 of 2024
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1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Project
Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
3. The Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police,
Doranda, Ranchi.
4. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed
Police, Doranda, Ranchi.
5. Commandant of Jharkhand Armed Police-7, Hazaribagh.
.......... Appellants.
-Versus-
Kumud Ranjan, son of Sri Vishnu Deo Raw, resident of village
Narayanpur, P.O. Rohini, P.S. Jasidih, District Deoghar.
.......... Respondent.
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Appellants : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C. II
For the Respondent: Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, Advocate
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Reserved on 06.10.2025 Pronounced on 14.10.2025
Per: Rajesh Shankar, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated
30.11.2023 passed in W.P. (S) No. 664 of 2014, whereby the said
writ petition filed by the petitioner/respondent has been allowed
by quashing and setting aside the order as contained in memo
No. 274 dated 06.07.2013 passed by the appellant no.5-
Commandant, JAP-7, Hazaribagh as well as the order as
contained in memo No.1789 dated 12.11.2013 passed by the
appellant no.4-Deputy Inspector General of Police, JAP, Doranda,
Ranchi.
2. The factual background of the case is that while the respondent
was posted at Kolkole Police Picket, he went on compensatory
leave for six days from 23.03.2013 (afternoon) to 29.03.2013,
however he failed to join the duty on 30.03.2013 after completion
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of the leave period. The respondent sent his application to the
appellant no.5 through fax as well as registered post for extension
of leave by granting him earned leave for 45 days, which was
rejected by the said authority vide letter as contained in memo
no.1011 dated 22.04.2013 and he was asked to resume the duty
instantly failing which, disciplinary proceeding would be initiated
against him.
3. The respondent joined the duty on 03.05.2013 and thereafter a
departmental proceeding was initiated against him under rule
828(C) of the Jharkhand Police Manual and a memo of charge
was served upon the respondent vide memo No.1146 dated
11.05.2013, alleging that he was unauthorizedly absent from duty
for a period of 34 days.
4. The Commander, C-Company, JAP-7, Hazaribagh was appointed
as Conducting Officer in the matter who submitted the enquiry
report by exonerating the respondent from the charges levelled
against him. However, the Commandant, JAP-7, Hazaribagh
(appellant no.5) disagreed with the finding given by the
Conducting Officer and imposed punishment against the
respondent vide order as contained in memo No. 274 dated
06.07.2013, withholding one increment for six months, equivalent
to one black mark. It was further ordered that the said
unauthorized absence of the respondent for a period of 34 days
would be adjusted against extraordinary leave by withholding his
salary for the said period.
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5. The respondent preferred appeal before the Deputy Inspector
General of Police, JAP, Ranchi, which was also dismissed vide
order as contained in memo No.1789 dated 12.11.2013.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed writ petition being
W.P.(S) No.664 of 2014, which was allowed vide order dated
30.11.2023 and the orders passed by the disciplinary as well as
the appellate authorities were quashed and set aside.
6. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
disciplinary authority had specifically recorded the reason for
differing with the finding of the Conducting Officer by clearly
stating that there was no evidence on record to show that the
respondent was continuously visiting the doctor during the period
of his unauthorized absence with respect to treatment of his
brother, who got injured in a so-called accident.
7. It is further submitted that the punishment awarded to the
respondent was proportionate to the charge levelled against him.
It is contended that the impugned order of punishment passed
against the respondent was in due compliance of the principles
of natural justice.
8. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have
at least remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority
for deciding it afresh if at all there was any violation of procedural
law during the disciplinary proceeding.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that
though the departmental proceeding was initiated against the
respondent under rule 828 (C) of the Jharkhand Police Manual
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which was a summary proceeding, he was awarded major
punishment without due compliance of the principles of natural
justice.
10. It is further submitted that the enquiry officer had submitted the
report exonerating the respondent from the alleged charges,
however, the disciplinary authority differed with the said finding
and imposed major punishment upon him without serving second
show cause notice. Such action of the disciplinary authority was,
therefore, against the settled legal principle.
11. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly quashed
and set aside the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary
authority as well as the order of the appellate authority which
needs no interference of this court.
12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
13. A departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent
under rule 828 (C) of the Jharkhand Police Manual for
unauthorized absence from duty for a period of 34 days and in
the said proceeding though the enquiry officer exonerated the
respondent from the charges levelled against him, the disciplinary
authority while disagreeing with the view of the enquiry officer,
imposed major punishment against the respondent without
serving second show cause notice to him.
14. We have perused the judgment of three judges' Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Punjab National
Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998)
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7 SCC 84. In the said case, their Lordships have specifically held
that whenever a disciplinary authority disagrees with the view
taken by the enquiry officer, it must record its tentative reason
for such disagreement and afford an opportunity to the
delinquent officer to represent against the disagreement before
recording its own findings. The report of the enquiry officer
containing its findings has to be conveyed so that the delinquent
officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary
authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the enquiry officer.
Their Lordships have further held that the principles of natural
justice require the disciplinary authority empowered to take a
final decision and to impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to
the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before
recording its findings on the charges framed against the officer.
After submission of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority
has an option either to agree with the findings recorded by the
enquiry officer or to disagree with those findings. If it does not
agree with the findings of the enquiry officer, it may record its
own findings based on record.
15. Moreover, there might be three situations before the disciplinary
authority. First is that, where the enquiry officer finds the
delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and
the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings. The second
is that, if the enquiry officer holds the charges proved, but the
disciplinary authority disagrees and records its own finding that
the charges are not established. The third is that, if the enquiry
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officer gives a positive finding that the charges are not
established and the delinquent officer is recommended to be
exonerated, however the disciplinary authority disagrees with
those finding and records its own finding that the charges levelled
against the delinquent officer are established for which he/she is
liable to be punished. In the first two situations, there would have
no difficulty with the disciplinary authority, however in the third
situation, even if the rules are silent in this regard, the disciplinary
authority is duty bound to afford an opportunity of hearing to the
delinquent officer before recording its own finding different to
that of the enquiry officer.
16. It would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a
delinquent officer who has already been held "not guilty" by the
enquiry officer is found "guilty" by the disciplinary authority on
the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding
of "not guilty" has already been recorded that too without
affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent
officer.
17. The purpose of giving the second show cause notice by the
disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the finding of the
enquiry officer is to give specific reason to the delinquent on the
basis of which the disciplinary authority wants to disagree with
the finding of the enquiry officer so as to enable the delinquent
to give response in support of the finding of the enquiry officer,
otherwise it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily
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persuade the disciplinary authority for accepting the conclusions
reached by the enquiry officer.
18. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to convince this
Court that sufficient reason has been assigned by the disciplinary
authority in its order of punishment for differing with the finding
recorded by the enquiry officer. However, as per our considered
view, mere fact that in the final order of punishment, certain
reasons have been assigned by the disciplinary authority in
disagreeing with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer,
the same cannot cure the defect. The disciplinary authority was
duty bound to serve second show cause notice to the respondent
explaining the reason for its disagreement with the finding of the
enquiry officer, however, he had failed to adhere to such
established legal principle.
19. Another argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that
while quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the
disciplinary as well as the appellate authorities, the learned Single
Judge ought to have at least remitted the matter to the
disciplinary authority for deciding it afresh, if a procedural error
was found in the disciplinary proceeding. We are not convinced
with the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellants
in view of the fact that more than 12 years have already been
elapsed from the date of passing of the order of punishment and
it will not be in the interest of justice to remand the matter at this
belated stage to the disciplinary authority.
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20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any reason to
interfere with the impugned order dated 30.11.2023 passed in
W.P.(S) No. 664 of 2014.
21. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
14 October, 2025
th
AFR
Sanjay/
