Nisha Saw @ Nisha Gupta, aged about 37 years, w/o Ashish Kumar
Banka, D/O Vijay Sao, R/O Shiv Mandir Road, Jharia, P.O. + P.S.-
Jharia, District-Dhanbad.
1. Ashish Kumar Banka @ Anni, S/O Late Lal Banka, R/O Banka Bahvan,
Iryu Road, Near Kailesh Mandir, P.O. + P.S.-Sukhdeonagar, District-
Ranchi.
2. State of Jharkhand through S.S.P., Ranchi.
..... ..... Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
1. The present interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the
delay of 25 days which has occurred in filing the instant appeal.
2. The explanation has been furnished in the present interlocutory
application claiming the same to be sufficient cause.
3. It has been contended that the judgment impugned has been passed
ex-parte and as such, the appellant was having no knowledge/idea
about the pending proceeding rather the appellant has only come to
know about the pending proceeding in the matter of original
Maintenance Case No. 13 of 2023 and thereafter, the present appeal
has been filed after the delay of 25 days.
4. It has been submitted that the said ground may be considered to be
sufficient cause to condone the delay mainly for the reason that the
impugned judgment is ex-parte and further the appellant was having
no knowledge about the pending proceeding.
5. The notice had been issued upon the respondent-husband as per the
order dated 24.03.2025. The office note dated 31.07.2025 states that
the respondent-husband is not residing at the address given in the
notice.
6. This Court, thereafter, has passed an order on 04.08.2025 granting
liberty to the appellant to effect notice upon the respondent through
officer-in-charge of the concerned police station where the
respondent resides as per the address furnished in the memo of appeal
as also reflected in the impugned judgment. For ready reference, the
order dated 04.08.2025 is being referred as under:
7. The matter was posed on 16.10.2025. The Senior Superintendent of
Police, Ranchi since was impleaded as party for the purpose of
effective service of notice upon the respondent-husband on whose
behalf one affidavit was filed represented by Mr. Rahul Saboo,
learned counsel who has submitted by referring to paragraph-3 of the
said affidavit that the notice has been served upon the respondent-
husband through Sukhdeonagar Police Station and acknowledgment
of receipt of notice bears the signature of the concerned respondent.
8. We have perused the aforesaid acknowledgment but there was no
appearance by the respondent and as such, this Court has passed the
order to proceed to hear the matter on merit. For ready reference, the
order dated 16.10.2025 is being referred as under:
8. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the service is complete and
as such, proceeding to hear the matter on merit.
9. We have heard the delay condonation application being I.A.
No.1644 of 2025.
10. The sole ground has been taken that the judgment impugned is ex-
parte and, as such, the appellant-wife was not having any knowledge
about the proceeding or the decree of dissolution of marriage, as
impugned in the instant appeal.
11. This Court, in order to appreciate the aforesaid ground, is calling
upon the trial court record.
12. Let the trial court record be called for.
13. Post this matter on 11.11.2025."
9. We have also heard the present interlocutory application being I.A.
No. 1644 of 2025 wherein the ground has been taken that the
impugned judgment is ex-parte and as such, the appellant-wife was
having no knowledge about the proceeding or the decree of
dissolution of marriage. This Court, therefore, thought it proper to
call for the trial court record to appreciate the aforesaid ground for
consideration as to whether the same can be considered to be the
sufficient explanation to condone the delay of 25 days or not.
10. The record has been received. We have perused the record and found
from the order dated 13.09.2023 by which the notice was issued upon
the respondent. The notice was delivered from the office of the
concerned court on 20.09.2023.
The matter was listed on 30.11.2023 and on that date, the postal
receipt and the track report was filed on behalf of the respondent-
husband. It has been taken note by the concerned court that the
registered notice has returned without service. It has been referred in
the order dated 30.11.2023 that the steps have also been taken
through CIS and the matter was posted on 15.12.2023 awaiting
service report.
11. We have not found in the reference by putting note in the order-sheet
regarding the service report with respect to the service of notice upon
the appellant-wife. Further, when the matter was posted on
15.12.2023, the respondent-husband has filed a petition for
publication of notice which had been allowed. The respondent-
husband had filed copy of the publication of notice as would appear
from the order dated 30.01.2024.
12. It is apparent from the order dated 12.02.2024 that the notice on O.P.
is assumed sufficient. The case was fixed for ex-parte hearing and the
matter was posted on 22.02.2024 for ex-parte evidence. For ready
reference, all these orders of the trial court are being referred herein:
"13-09-2023:
Petitioner filed requisites of notice.
O/C to issue notice. Put up on date fixed.
30-11-2023:
Postal receipt and track report filed by petitioner. Registered notice
has returned without service O/C to ensure notice through CIS. Put up
on 15.12.2023 awaiting S/R.
15.12.2023:
Petitioner is in attendance and files a petition for publication of notice
which is allowed. Petitioner to take steps for publication of notice for
appearance of O.P. Put up on 30.01.2024 for filing of copy of
publication.
30.01.2024:
Petitioner files copy of publication of notice. Keep it on record. Put up
on 12.02.2024 for appearance.
12.02.2024:
Attendance filed on behalf of petitioner. Heard and perused the case
record. Notice on O.P. is assumed sufficient. Case is fixed for ex-parte
hearing. Put up on 22.02.2024 for ex-parte evidence.
22.02.2024:
Attendance filed on behalf of petitioner. Petitioner to adduce evidence.
Put up on 06.03.2024 for ex-parte evidence."
13. This Court is conscious of the fact that the limitation is to be
condoned irrespective of the period of delay depending upon the
sufficient cause if the litigant concerned is able to show. Reference in
this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs-9 to 15 which reads as under: -
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of
a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient
cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the
facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party
has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts
and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that
whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented
by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v.
Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan
[(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3
SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC
157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient
cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause
and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed
to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1
SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao
[(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201].
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is
not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being
to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts
of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from
lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own
inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh
[(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil
v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC
(Civ) 907].
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating
and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which
means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard
to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts
to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case
or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation
of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide
or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held
in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath
Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A.
Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti,
(2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
15. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression
'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure
that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party
concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu &
Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at
paragraph-12, it has been held which is being referred as under:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause"
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the
Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence
or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a
particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute
"sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case.
There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting
explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one
thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of
finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a
slipshod order in overjubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of
explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception,
more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be
imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while
considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact
that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right
has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated
by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a
pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or
arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing
enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the
lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable
right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between
resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either
way."
16. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal
Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given
case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At
paragraph-12, it has been held which is being referred as under:
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient
cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of
delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is
a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved
nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay
has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the
consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence
of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope
of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the
court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why
the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due
diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing
with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the
effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in
our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material
and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent
and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which
fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14.
In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion
should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the
general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during
the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it.
Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial
Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of
delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal
as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our
opinion, is not a valid ground."
17. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient
cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as
to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period
of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as
such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant
and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
18. Adverting to the explanation so furnished on behalf of the appellant-
wife. This Court has found from the order sheet as referred
hereinabove that the learned trial court has proceeded without
following the settled norms as provided under the Civil Procedure
Code for effective service of notice for the reason that even though
the learned Family Judge has taken note in the order particularly in
the order dated 30.11.2023 posting the case awaiting the service
report but there was no service report as is being referred in the office
note as available in the column no.4 of the format of the order-sheet
and on 15.12.2023, a petition was filed for notice through substituted
mode which had been allowed and based upon the paper publication,
the case has been posted for ex-parte hearing.
19. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the appellant-wife has been
able to show sufficient cause in filing the appeal after delay of 25
days.
20. Accordingly, the delay of 25 days occurred in filing the instant appeal
is hereby, condoned.
21. In the result, the present interlocutory application is allowed, as such,
disposed of.
F.A. No. 52 of 2025:
22. Let this matter be listed under the heading for 'Admission' on
26.11.2025.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
12th November, 2025
Saurabh/-
