Jharkhand High Court

Bibhuti Bhushan Prasad Amar Aged About ... vs Union Of India Through Cbi .... .... Opp. ... on 9 May, 2025

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

                                                        2025:JHHC:14078




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
               Cr. Revision No.1312 of 2023
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Bibhuti Bhushan Prasad Amar aged about 56 years Son of Late Vishwanath Prasad Amar Resident of Flat No.4D, Bageshwari Apartment, P.O. Ratu Road & P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, Dist. Ranchi .... .... Petitioner Versus Union of India through CBI .... .... Opp. Party

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Siddhartha Ranjan, Advocate Ms. Shipra Shalini, Advocate For the CBI : Mr. Deepak Kr. Bharati, Advocate

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03/Dated: 09.05.2025

1. The instant application filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the

Cr.P.C. assailing the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the

learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder,

the prayer for discharge from criminal prosecution in connection

with R.C.03(A)/2011-R, has been rejected.

2. Since the instant case is barred by limitation of 1234 days and as

such, the delay condonation application being I.A. No.9880 of

2023 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to

condone the delay of 1234 days in filing the instant petition.

3. The reason has been explained at paragraph-4 of the instant

application showing therein that the cause has been said to be

sufficient in not approaching the Court by challenging the order

impugned dated 05.03.2018 and since, it was pending for its

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consideration in interlocutory application being I.A. No.3913 of

2018 which had been filed in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012.

4. It has been submitted that the said W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012 was

dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 05.05.2023

without passing any order on I.A. No.3913 of 2018.

5. The present revision petition has been filed after passing of the

order dated 05.05.2023 and as such, the delay has been caused

of 1234 days.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that

by applying the principle as provided under Section 14 of the

Limitation Act, the explanation, so furnished at paragraph-4, is

treated to be sufficient cause to condone the delay.

7. Mr. Deepak Kr. Bharati, learned counsel for the Opp. Party-CBI

has opposed the ground shown for the purpose of condoning the

delay.

8. The affidavit in opposition has also been filed.

9. It has been contended that the delay is in the nature of inordinate

delay of 1234 days and as such, the same may not be condoned.

10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties.

11. This Court is conscious with the issue of consideration of delay

condonation while exercising the power conferred under Section

5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 wherein, the underlying principle is

that the parties concerned are aggrieved with the order, which is

to be questioned, if has been able to show the sufficient cause

and certainly the delay is to be condoned so as to enter into the

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merit of the issue. Contrary to that if the sufficient cause has not

been shown by the party concerned, then, certainly the delay is

not to be condoned.

12. This Court, before appreciating the reason which has been

shown in the instant interlocutory application, needs to refer the

definition of "sufficient cause".

13. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of

'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient

cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land

Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been

held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"

means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"

from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the

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mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

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13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court

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could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

14. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party

should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want

of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a

case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted

deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and

circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to

enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason

that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be

exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he

was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his

case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the

Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or

was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been

held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.

Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin

Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @

Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs.

Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

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15. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the

expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal

interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only

so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be

imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause

has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular

case and no straitjacket formula is possible.

16. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation

application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient

cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the

litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry

of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other

side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive

of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on

its part.

17. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position, this Court

has considered the explanation furnished at paragraph-4 and in

order to assess as to whether the reason shown at aforesaid

paragraph-4, is fit to be considered as sufficient cause to

condone the delay. The ground has been taken of pending

proceeding before this Court in the interlocutory application being

I.A. No.3913 of 2018 which has been filed in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of

2012 wherein, the order rejecting the prayer to discharge from the

criminal prosecution, was the subject matter.

18. The said W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012 has been dismissed, vide

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order dated 05.05.2023, on dismissal of the prayer made therein.

19. This Court, taking the liberal approach and considering the said

reason of pending proceeding before this Court, is of the view

that the limitation petition is to be condoned so that the main

issue be taken up.

20. Accordingly, the delay of 1234 days in filing the present revision

application is hereby, condoned.

21. In view thereof, I.A. No.9880 of 2023 stands allowed.

22. The instant revision application filed under Sections 397 and 401

of the Cr.P.C. assailing the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the

learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in connection with

R.C.03(A)/2011-R, registered for the offence under Sections

120B, 420, 468 & 471 of the IPC read with Section 13(2) read

with Section 13(1)d of the P.C. Act, Section 52 of the J.R.D.A. Act

and Section 82 of the Registration Act, whereby and whereunder,

the prayer for discharge from criminal prosecution, has been

rejected.

23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order

refusing discharge is a mechanical order without taking into

consideration the factual material, which has been collected in

course of investigation and as such, even though, the petitioner is

not fit to be tried and without taking into consideration the

aforesaid fact, the prayer for discharge has been rejected.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the prayer

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although has been made earlier to filing of the present petition by

filing W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012, wherein, the order taking

cognizance was under challenge by which cognizance was taken

by the concerned court, vide order dated 25.10.2011.

25. Interlocutory Application being 3913 of 2018 had been filed in

W.P.(Cr.) No. 211 of 2012 whereby an amendment was sought in

the prayer portion of the said application consequent upon the

order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned trial court whereby

the prayer to discharge the petitioner from the prosecution was

rejected.

26. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another Interlocutory application

being I.A. No. 10551 of 2022 on 18.11.2022 in W.P.(Cr.) 211 of

2012 for amendment of the prayer challenging the order dated

18.04.2018 whereby the learned trial court framed the charge

against the petitioner.

27. It has been submitted that both the Interlocutory applications (I.A.

No. 3913 of 2018 and I.A. No. 10551 of 2022) remained pending

till the disposal of the said writ petition on 05.05.2023.

28. It has further been submitted that since no orders on the merit of

the said Interlocutory applications were passed in W.P.(Cr.) No.

211 of 2012 that was disposed of on 05.05.2023, hence, a

separate application has been filed challenging the impugned

order dated 05.03.2018 by way of instant revision application.

29. Learned counsel appearing for the O.P.-CBI, at this juncture, has

intervened and submitted that the present petition is not

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maintainable under the power, which is to be exercised under the

revisional jurisdiction conferred to this Court, since, the prayer is

now being questioned by filing the present revision petition, has

already been dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court

while passing the order dated 05.05.2023.

30. Submission has been made by referring to order dated

05.05.2023 passed in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012, appended as

Annexure-6 to the paper book as also para-4 of the delay

condonation application being I.A. No.9880 of 2023, wherefrom, it

will be evident that the prayer was made to quash the order by

which the prayer to discharge the petitioner from the criminal

prosecution has been sought to be challenged.

31. It has been submitted that the interlocutory application being I.A.

No.3913 of 2018 has been disposed of vide order dated

05.05.2023 passed by the another Coordinate Bench of this

Court in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012.

32. The submission therefore has been made that when the prayer

made in the instant revision petition which was also challenged in

the said petition (W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012) has been dismissed

by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated

05.05.2023, hence, the prayer made herein questioning the order

dated 05.05.2023 has already been dealt with by the Coordinate

Bench of this Court, hence, the present petition is not fit to be

entertained.

33. It has been submitted that the issue of discharge which has been

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agitated by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No.3913 of

2018 has been disposed of while dismissing W.P.(Cr) No.211 of

2012. It has been contended that since the said interlocutory

application had been disposed of and as such, it is not available

for the writ petitioner without challenging the order passed by the

Coordinate Bench of this Court as referred, to challenge the

refusal of prayer of discharge from the criminal prosecution by

invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Sections 397 and 401 of

the Cr.P.C.

34. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in response, is not in a

position to dispute the aforesaid fact particularly with respect to

the issue of challenging the order dated 05.03.2018 by which the

prayer for discharge has been rejected, which was disposed of by

the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012.

35. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and

gone through the rival submissions made on their behalf.

36. This Court, while hearing the matter and taking note of serious

objection on behalf of learned counsel for the CBI by raising the

issue of consideration which has already made and dealt with by

the Coordinate Bench with respect to the issue, as raised in the

present revision petition, therefore, this Court is thought it proper

to first consider the said issue.

37. Before adverting to the submission made by the learned

counsel for the parties, it will be relevant to refer the provisions

contained in Section 397 of the Code, which reads as under:

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"397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding. Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.

Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.

(2) The powers of revision conferred by Subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."

38. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction of the Court u/s 397 CrPC can

be exercised where there is palpable error, non-compliance

with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous

or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. Further,

in view of the provisions u/s 397(3) CrPC, a second revision

against the same order with the same prayer is not

maintainable. If the revision preferred against the order of the

Magistrate is dismissed by the Sessions Judge, second

revision before the High Court is not maintainable u/s 397, 399,

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401 CrPC.

39. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of

the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised

in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it

should not be exercised against an interim or interlocutory

order.

40. The purpose behind conferring the revisional power under

Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to

invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent

miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure

or to meet out justice. However, remedies under writ

jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction cannot be availed

simultaneously or one after the other in the High Court for the

same cause. Party filing a petition under Section 397 before

High Court cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Code at the same time for the same cause.

41. It is evident from the interlocutory application being I.A. No.3913

of 2018 that the said application has been filed to challenge the

order rejecting discharge dated 05.03.2018 in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of

2012.

42. It is admitted case of the petitioner that the said interlocutory

application being I.A. No.3913 of 2018 was filed seeking leave of

this Court to challenge the order dated 05.03.2018 by which the

prayer to discharge the petitioner from criminal prosecution has

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been refused by learned trial court.

43. The said interlocutory application has been disposed of by the

Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.05.2023, the

relevant part of the said order is being referred as under:-

".... ..... ..... I.A. No. 10477 of 2022, I.A. No.11064 of 2019 in Cr. M.P. No.1149 of 2012, and I.A. No. 7367 of 2017, I.A. No.3913 of 2018 and I.A. No.10551 of 2022 in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012 also stand disposed of."

44. The prayer so made in the interlocutory application being I.A.

No.3913 of 2018 since has been disposed of and as such, the

issue of order by which the prayer for discharge has been

rejected by the concerned court has become the part and parcel

of W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012.

45. The said W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012 as per the copy appended

therein as Annexure-6 has been dismissed by the Coordinate

Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.05.2023, as would

appear from paragraph-20 of the said order, the relevant part of

the order is being referred as under:-

"...... ....... Thus, I am not inclined to interfere with the order taking cognizance and issuing summons so far as these two petitioners are concerned.