Jharkhand High Court

Sanjay Kumar Dalmia vs The State Of Jharkhand Through A.C.B. ... on 9 May, 2025

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

                                                                2025:JHHC:14145




       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                       Criminal Revision No. 1030 of 2024
                                      ---------

Sanjay Kumar Dalmia, aged about 40 years, son of Late Gopi Krishna Dalmia, R/o. Ward No.6, Pattnaik Tola, Seraikella, P.O. & P.S.- Seraikella, District-Seraikella-Kharsawan (Jharkhand).

... ... Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand through A.C.B. ... ... Opp. Party

---------

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

----------

For the Petitioner : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Vineet Sinha, Advocate For the Opp. Party : Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III

----------

th C.A.V. on 25 April, 2025 Pronounced on 09/05/2025

1. The instant petition filed under Section 438 and 442 of Bhartiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is directed against the order dated

03.06.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, A.C.B. at Chaibasa in

Misc. Criminal Application No. 1536 of 2023 in connection with

Vigilance Case No. 08 of 2020 whereby and whereunder, the

application filed by the petitioner seeking discharge has been rejected.

Factual Matrix:

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant

petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under:

The petitioner had been made accused in Seraikella P.S. Case

No. 118 of 2019 which was instituted for an offence under Sections

419, 420, 406, 409, 467, 468, 471, 472, 120-B/34 of the Indian Penal

Code on the basis of a typed report as contained in Letter No.95 dated

21.08.2019 written by Pradeep Kumar Samal, Branch Manager,

Jharkhand State Co-operative Bank Limited, Seraikella wherein he has

2025:JHHC:14145

stated that former Branch Manager Sunil Kumar Satpathy in collusion

with the petitioner has defalcated a huge amount of bank money

through irregular loans in violation of provision of loan manual as

reported by the Bank's Internal Committee.

It is further alleged by the informant that earlier an inquiry report

no.179/SA-Ka was submitted by one Bishal Singh, the Member

Cooperative Study Circle before the Secretary of Govt. Agriculture,

Animal Husbandry and Co-operative Department stating defalcation of

bank fund above 50 crores and in the light of such report, further

inquiries were held by combined teams including the Registrar of Co-

operative Societies, who conducted inquiry from 07.07.2018 to

10.07.2018 and submitted the report about irregular distribution of loan

granted to the petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Dalmia for providing him fiscal

gain the manner as follows:-

(i) Cash Credit Loan: On 09.08.2012 the petitioner was granted

one crore cash credit limit by the bank's administrator on

mortgage of 100% collateral securities and the inquiry team was

not provided with relevant documents. In the fiscal year 2013-14

the cash credit limit of the petitioner was enhanced from 1 crore

to 4.5 crore against the collateral securities, but relevant

documents were never presented before the inquiry committee.

In the fiscal year 2016-17, cash credit limit of the petitioner

renewed by the then Regional Manager, Singhbhum Regional

Office, Chaibasa and against the cash credit limit, the following

documents were presented by the petitioner as collateral security.

2025:JHHC:14145

a) Deed No. 2334/2370, dated 19.06.2015, for an area 1.29

acres, Deed worth Rs.11,50,000, Government value

Rs.16,86,030/- was valued by the valuer at Rs.96,75,000/-.

b) Deed No. 3489/3474, dated 27.08.2012, for an area of 25

decimals, Deed worth Rs. 7,50,000/- Govt. Value

Rs.26,00,000/- was valued by the valuer Prem Prakash

Tiwary at Rs.68,75,000/.

c) Deed No. 5113/5095, dated 21.07.2011, for an area of 1.02

Acres, Deed worth Rs.1,51,000/- Govt. Value Rs.2,15,000/-

was valued by the valuer Prem Prakash Tiwary at

Rs.10,70,000/-.

d) Deed No3489/3474, dated 27.08.2012, for an area of 25

decimals, deed worth Rs.7,50,000/- Govt. Value

Rs.26,00,000/- was valued by the valuer Prem Prakash

Tiwary at Rs.68,75,000/.

e) Deed No. 3863/37-87, dated 16.12.2014, for an area of 38.5

decimals, deed worth Rs, 12,00,000/- Govt. Value

Rs.46,35,500/- was valued by the valuer Prem Prakash

Tiwary at Rs.1,05,87,500/-.

f) Deed No. 3900/3724, dated 15.12.2014 for an area of 31.5

decimals, deed worth Rs.12,86,000/- Govt. Value

Rs.37,92,000 was valued by the valuer Prem Prakash Tiwary

at Rs.86,92,500/-.

2025:JHHC:14145

It is further alleged that the valuation of the land furnished

in the above deeds are suspicious. The total valuation of lands

assessed at Rs.4,70,00,000/- against which Rs, 4,50,00,000/- cash

credit loan was sanctioned in favour of the petitioner without

support of any legal opinion.

(ii) Loan Against Deposit: The petitioner Sanjay Kumar Dalmia

was sanctioned loan against deposit in addition to irregular, loans

on seven bank account to the tune of Rs.12,07,56,343/- as on

10.07.2018. On 29.06.2017 the petitioner was sanctioned

Rs.90,00,000/- LAD COM (Loan against deposit) against the

FDR A/C No. 40418902 for Rs.1,04,00,000/- but the said FDR

was in the name of SKM Infraventure Pvt. Ltd, which is a third-

party deposit and according to the bank's manual an undertaking

was required from the third party, but no such undertaking was

taken from. On 04.07.2017 the petitioner was sanctioned a sum

of Rs.3,95,00,000/- as LAD COM (Loan Against Deposit)

against a LIC Policy No. 55937448, the said LIC Policy is in the

name of petitioner. The sum assured of such policy is

Rs.1,10,00,000/-. The policy commences from 28.12.2015 on

payment of Rs, 4,01,665/- as annual premium. So, the tentative

deposit of the said policy comes at Rs.8,03,330/- in last two

years against with such huge amount was sanctioned in violation

of the rule, which says that in LIC policy maximum loans are

granted up to the extent of 90% of the premium deposited

amount. On 27.06.2018, the petitioner availed a loan of

2025:JHHC:14145

Rs.3,97,91,000/- as LAD COM (Loan Against Deposit) against

an annual deposited premium of Rs.22,35,100/- in his LIC Policy

No.828044510. The policy commences from 27.03.2018 with a

sum assured amount Rs.5,00,00,000/-. Such sanction of loan is

said to be beyond the rule. On 06.07.2018, the petitioner took a

sum of Rs.1,26,25,000/ as LAD COM against his own LIC

Policy No. 557825465. The said policy commenced on

30.05.213 with deposit of Rs.1,72,450/-, such sanction of loan is

beyond the rule. On 06.07.2018, there is another LAD COM in

favour of the petitioner amounting to Rs, 88,50,000/- against his

own LIC Policy No.557976983 of which sum assured amount is

Rs.4,80,10,190. This policy commences from 28.03.2016 with

deposit of Rs.45,27,519/- as annual premium. If three

consecutive premium is deposited, the deposited amount would

be Rs.1,35,82,557. So, this loan is also beyond the rule. The

petitioner availed a sum of Rs.69,75,000/- as LAD COM against

FDR No. 40419105 of Rs.77,70,000/-. The FDR is in the name

of SKM Infraventrue Pvt. Ltd. As no undertaking was taken from

third party in this regard, this is a violation of rule. Moreover,

such document was not presented before the enquiry team. So, in

the manner stated above, the petitioner took a total sum of

Rs.11,67,41,000/- as LAD COM (Loan against Deposit) by way

of cheating the bank and therefore, this is a case of

misappropriation of bank's fund. The total outstanding as on

10.07.2018 stood at Rs.12,07,56,343/- in addition to cash credit

2025:JHHC:14145

loan of Rs.4,50,00,000/-. This figure is based upon the enquiry of

core banking system and therefore, it may increase by way of

adding interest. It is further stated that huge amount of loan

granted to the petitioner squarely intended to get him financially

benefited by flaunting banking rules.

(iii) Cheque Purchased Loan: It is further alleged that the enquiry

team found debit balance against the petitioner amounting

Rs.15,44,18369/- through cheque purchase account product Code

No. 58105 dated 10.07.2018. The aforementioned amount

transferred to the bank account of the petitioner's firm namely

Pintu Engineering Construction Pvt. Ltd and SKM Infraventure

Pvt. Ltd by way of cheque purchase loans. Such agreement was

made upon mere request of the petitioner. The cheques were not

available in the bank in the relevant time on account of which on

05.12.2018, the cheques did not clear, so the cheque Pamount

were debited in the aforementioned entry. Therefore, the

petitioner misappropriated the sum of Rs.32,01,74,712/0 and the

Branch Manager Sunil Kumar Satpathy misappropriated a sum

of Rs.33,24,000/- of the bank's fund. On the basis of aforesaid

premises, the instant case has been instituted against the accused

petitioner Sanjay Kumar Dalmia and the Branch Manager Sunil

Kumar Satpathy, JSCB Ltd, Seraikella Branch for the offence

punishable under sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, 472,

120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

2025:JHHC:14145

3. After investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner

for the offence under Sections 120-B, 420 of IPC and 13(2) read with

13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

4. The petitioner filed an application for discharge being Misc. Criminal

Application No. 1536 of 2023 before the trial court (special Judge) on

the ground that there are no materials against him to suggest that he

conspired and had taken active part in the conspiracy, thus, no case is

made out against him and he needs to be discharged.

5. The learned special Judge vide order dated 03.06.2024 had dismissed

the aforesaid application for discharge.

6. The present petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 03.06.2024

has preferred the present revision petition.

Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner:

7. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the

following grounds in assailing the impugned order:

(i) The ground has been taken that no case is being made out under

Sections 120-B. 420 of IPC and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 if the entire material, as has

been collected in course of investigation by the prosecuting

agency, will be taken to be consideration.

(ii) The ground has been taken that the amount alleged to have been

defalcated in the FIR amount to Rs.3,20,174,712/- was in fact

given by the Bank through various loan facilities and are secured

by collateral securities by way of properties value much more

2025:JHHC:14145

than the loan amount and also through FDRs and the petitioner

had been regularly making payment of interest on the same, as

such, availment of loan cannot attract any criminal prosecution.

(iii) The ground has been taken that though the FIR was instituted

under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 of IPC but during

investigation, no document was found to be forged, therefore, no

charge-sheet under the said sections was submitted.

(iv) The ground has also been taken that the enhancement of cash

credit loan was sanctioned by the Bank itself against 100%

collateral security and the bank having taken the collateral

security documents approved the loan and if such documents

were not produced before the enquiry committee, the petitioner

cannot be held liable because the petitioner was never called

upon to explain his point over the said issue.

(v) The ground has also been taken regarding the valuation done of

the properties, that the valuation was done by the authorized

valuer Mr. Prem Prakash Tiwari, after proper verification.

(vi) So far as the allegation regarding loan against deposit is

concerned, the loan stood under serial no.6 and 7 have already

been closed and so far as loan under serial nos. 1 to 5 are

concerned, the petitioner is paying interest for the same and have

not been declared NPA till filing of the instant case.

(vii) It has also been submitted that third party security is not in

violation of the loan procedure as the petitioner was never asked

2025:JHHC:14145

to furnish consent letter from the third party, i.e., SKM

Infraventure Pvt.

(viii) It has been submitted, therefore, that the Bank after proper

verification and going through all the documents for sanction of

the loan has granted loan facilities in favour of the petitioner,

therefore, no offence has been committed by the petitioner, as

such, there is sufficient grounds for discharge on the principle

that no person can be allowed to face the rigour of trial in

absence of any material.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has

submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned order

needs to be interfered with.

Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State:

9. Mr. Ashutosh Anand, learned AAG-III assisted by Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar,

learned AC to AAG-III, has taken the following grounds in defending

the order impugned:

(i) It has been contended that sufficient material has been surfaced

in course of investigation to the effect that the involvement of the

petitioner is there in syphoning the public money at the time of

taking loan from the Bank as would be evident from both the

case diary and in the charge-sheet.

(ii) There is enough material on record to frame charge against the

petitioner and accordingly the petition for discharge has been

rightly rejected. Further, there is no illegality or perversity or

2025:JHHC:14145

material irregularity in the impugned orders calling for any

interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The learned

court below has passed a well-reasoned order refusing to

discharge the petitioner.

(iii) On perusal of case record it is apparent that Investigating Officer

has submitted supplementary charge sheet No.181/2020 dated

04.11.2020 against the present petitioner under Section 120-B/

420 of I.P.C. and under Section 13(1)(d)/13(2) of Prevention of

Corruption Act 2018 for committing in crime cheque / bill

purchased loan and loan against deposit.

(iv) It has come in the investigation that Branch Manager Sunil

Kumar Sathpathy, in collusion with present petitioner has

defalcated a huge amount of bank money through irregular loans

in violation of provisions of loan manual as reported by the

Bank's internal committee.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the aforesaid grounds, has

submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned order

to be interfered with.

Analysis:

11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also

gone through the finding recorded by the learned court in the impugned

order as also the case diary.

12. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues

which require consideration are--

2025:JHHC:14145

(i) Whether the order dated 03.06.2024 by which the application for

discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, can be said

to suffer from an error?

(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in

course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is

made out or not?

13. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together.

14. At this juncture it would be appropriate to consider the ambit and scope

of the powers of the Court at the time of considering the discharge

application.

15. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous

examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be

sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that

a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the

case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for

the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on

record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding

that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.

16. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge,

the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the

materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made

in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the

witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which

the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the

2025:JHHC:14145

prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested

at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the

stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be

made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed.

17. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the

charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and

marshal the material available on record as to whether there is

sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in

conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there

is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of

the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is

sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused

has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence

is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at

the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake

an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the

material.

18. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of

Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014)

11 SCC 709, wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon'ble

Apex Court has been observed as under:--

"29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the

2025:JHHC:14145

prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification.

33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear

2025:JHHC:14145

before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously.

34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.

19. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National

Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected

by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record

at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of

the said judgment as under:--

"18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record."

20. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be

considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be

a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok

Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference Paragraph

no. 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:--

2025:JHHC:14145

"11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to.

11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) "25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled

2025:JHHC:14145

principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) '29. ... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence.

The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.'"

21. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for

framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of

Delhi) wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:--

"11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which

2025:JHHC:14145

leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.

12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised.

14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7) "7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused."

22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder

Singh, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges

can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and

appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that

point of time.

23. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an

accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by

the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to

be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been

entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and

experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel

2025:JHHC:14145

for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides

before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him.

If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also

makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its

own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the

rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face.

The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who

views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there

are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It

would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed.

Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi

Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.

24. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court

should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9

SCC 460, in the following words:--

"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of

2025:JHHC:14145

law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression "there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence". This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word "presume" while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean "to believe or accept upon probable evidence"; "to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming". In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.

25. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by

the court while considering an application for discharge of the accused

person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of

the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there

2025:JHHC:14145

is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However,

while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite

opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth

of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once

the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume

that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge

accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution.

26. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case

of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228

CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of

in para 21 as under:

"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the

2025:JHHC:14145

pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."

27. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case

of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768,

the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31

and the Hon'ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters

of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs of

the report are quoted as under:

"17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier

2025:JHHC:14145

decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles:

17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, "cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial".

17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, "the record of the case", used in Section 227 CrPC,

2025:JHHC:14145

is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).

28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused.

29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.

30. However, what is the meaning of the expression "materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's", which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage?

31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him."

28. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (2019) 7 SCC 148, it has been

held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the words 'not sufficient ground

for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not

2025:JHHC:14145

a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution,

but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to

determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the

prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to

enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and

balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function

after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to

sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground

would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the

police or the documents produced before the court which ex

facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the

accused so as to frame a charge against him.

29. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case

of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC

657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has

held in paragraph 27 which reads as under:

"27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial

court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the

time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a

mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet

presented by the police as it is without applying its

mind and without recording brief reasons in support of

its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the

material which is required to be evaluated by the court

2025:JHHC:14145

at the time of framing charge should be the material

which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution.

The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous

as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the

guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at

this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the

evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to

presume that the accused has committed an offence.

Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly,

apart from the material that is placed before the court

by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms

of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any

other evidence or material which is of sterling quality

and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by

the prosecution."

30. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if,

upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents

submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused

and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he

shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if,

after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the

opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has

committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore,

the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once

2025:JHHC:14145

the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for

framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to

sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other

words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature

of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced

before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious

circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him

and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient

ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he

will discharge the accused.

31. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to

determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the

prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and

cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and

probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial

starts.

32. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was

only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out

or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not

because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering

the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

33. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this

Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the

conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in

2025:JHHC:14145

course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be

available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner

is made out or not?

34. It is evident from record that after completion of investigation police

has submitted charge sheet and on the basis of material available on

record, vide order dated 24.11.2020 cognizance of the offence has been

taken by the learned court for the offence under section 120 (B), 420 of

Indian Penal Code and Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of

Corruption Act against the present petitioner namely Sanjay Kumar

Dalmiya.

35. It has been alleged in the written report basis upon which FIR was

instituted that the former Branch Manager Sunil Kumar Sathpathy, in

collusion with present petitioner has defalcated a huge amount of bank

money through irregular loans in violation of provisions of loan manual

as reported by the Bank's internal committee. It is further alleged by the

informant that earlier an inquiry report no. was submitted by one of the

member, the member, Co- Operative Study Circle before the Secretary

of Govt. Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Co-Operative department

stating defalcation of bank Fund above 50 Crores and in the light of

such report, further inquiries were held by combined teams including

the Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, who conducted inquiry from

07.07.2018 to 03-12-2020 and submitted the report about irregular

distribution of loans granted to the petitioner .

36. It is evident from the record that charge-sheet has been submitted under

Section 120 (B), 420 of Indian Penal Code and Section 13 (2) r/w

2025:JHHC:14145

13(1)(d). The learned counsel has contended that no offence under the

Section 120 B of the IPC has been made out reason being that

petitioner has never conspired with any Bank officials and he had just

follow the all the documentation process as had been stated by the Bank

officials.

37. In this context, it is pertinent to reiterate the settled legal proposition

that in cases of conspiracy to commit a crime, usually it is very difficult

for the prosecution to adduce direct evidence since conspiracy is not an

open affair, therefore, the prosecution has to rely upon evidence

pertaining to the acts of various parties to prove such an agreement of

conspiracy on the basis of circumstantial evidence which can be

inferred by necessary implication.

38. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions has observed that

for an offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC, the

prosecution need not necessarily prove that the propagators expressly

agree to do or carried to be done an illegal act and such agreement may

be proved by necessary implication to be determined from the

circumstantial evidence brought on record.

39. Further, Offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there

is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be

accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the gravamen of

the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a

conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and

inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and

conduct of the conspirators. Reference in this regard may be taken from

2025:JHHC:14145

the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State

of T.N. through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT Petitioner v.

Nalini and others; (1999) 5 SCC 253.

40. In Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra (AIR

1965 SC 682) a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the

offence of conspiracy can be established either by direct evidence or by

circumstantial evidence and the section will come into play only when

the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two

or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an actionable

wrong, that is to say, there should be prima facie evidence that a person

was a party to that conspiracy.

41. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Sheetla

Sahai (2009) 8 SCC 617 has held as follows:--

"Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence. It is punishable separately. Prosecution, therefore, for the purpose of bringing the charge of criminal conspiracy read with the aforementioned provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act was required to establish the offence by applying the same legal principles which are otherwise applicable for the purpose of bringing a criminal misconduct on the part of an accused."

42. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position this Court is now

adverting to fact as well as merit of the case.

43. In the instant case it has come in the investigation that the petitioner in

connivance with the Bank officials has defalcated a huge amount of

bank money through irregular loans which is clear violation of

provisions of loan manual. Further the violation of loan manual has also

been reported by the Bank's internal committee.

2025:JHHC:14145

44. It has further come in investigation that earlier an inquiry report no.

179/Sa-Ka was submitted by one Bishal Singh, the member, Co-

Operative Study Circle before the Secretary of Govt. Agriculture,

Animal Husbandry and Co-Operative department stating defalcation of

bank Fund above 50 Crores and in the light of such report, further

inquiries were held by combined teams including the Registrar of Co-

Operative Societies, who conducted inquiry from 07.07.2018 to 03-12-

2020 and submitted the report about irregular distribution of loans

granted to the present petitioner for providing him fiscal gain in the

manner on the head of (1) (Cash Credit Loan), (ii) Loan Against

Deposit, (iii) Cheque Purchased Loan, (iv) Deposit Mobilization

Expenses.

45. It has been alleged that petitioner Sanjay Kumar Dalmiya

misappropriated the sum of Rs. 32,01,74,712/- and the co accused Sunil

Kumar Satpathy misappropriated a sum of Rs.33,24,000/- of the bank

fund.

46. Thus, on perusal of the case diary as well as document available on

record, it appears that the present petitioner along with the then Bank

Officials has connived and he obtained illegally Rs.15,44,18,369/-

under loan cheque/bill purchased loan scheme on the basis of three bills

issued by Manoharpur Road Division in favour of S.K.M. Infra Venture

Pvt. Ltd.

47. During course of investigation, it reveals that only a bill of amount Rs.

5,24,43,369/- was issued by Manoharpur Road Division, which was

already en-cashed by the petitioner on 30.04.2018 at Chakradharpur

2025:JHHC:14145

treasury, and record further reveals that remaining two bills of amount

Rs.3,55,50,000/- and Rs. 5,25,50,000/- dated 27.06.2018 were not

issued by Manoharpur Road Division, which prima facie shows that

petitioner on the basis of bills in which one bill was already en-cashed

and two forged & fabricated bills were obtained huge amount of loan

with connivance of bank officials.

48. Case-diary also reveals that petitioner obtained Rs. 1,38,75,000/- loan

under cheque/bill purchased scheme on the basis of Cheque No.

009808 but the said cheque was not deposited by the petitioner at the

time of taking loan.

49. As per the case-diary the present petitioner also obtained rupees twelve

crore ninety lakh and five hundred loan in the head of loan against

deposit scheme (L.A.D.) violating the provisions of loan manual with

connivance of bank officials.

50. On the basis of material available on record prima facie it appears that

case against present petitioner is made out for the offence u/s 120-B,

420 of I.P.C. and u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act.

51. It needs to refer herein the settled proposition of law that at the initial

stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that

there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an

offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused.

2025:JHHC:14145

52. The law on the aforesaid point is succinctly stated by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (supra) wherein after referring to Union

of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) and Dilawar Balu

Kurane v. State of Maharashtra 2002) 2 SCC 135 the Hon'ble Apex

has Court observed in para 19 which reads as under:

"19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial."

53. For the foregoing reasons, having regard to facts and circumstances, as

has been analysed hereinabove, the petitioner failed to make out a

special case for exercise of power for discharge as such no interference

is required to interfere with the order dated 03.06.2024 by which

application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the

trial court.

54. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis and considering the

principles of discharge which have been discussed hereinabove in the

preceding paragraphs and also taking note of the alleged culpability of

the petitioner, this Court is of the view that there is no infirmity in the

impugned order dated 03.06.2024 to warrant interference by this Court,

accordingly the instant petition is hereby dismissed.