Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... vs Rajendra Prasad on 7 March, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.606 of 2024
(with I.A. No. 10362 of 2024)
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, Officiating at Project Building, H.E.C. Town Ship, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
2. The Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Officiating at Project Building, H.E.C. Town
Ship, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
3. The Special Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government
of Jharkhand, Officiating at Project Building, H.E.C. Town Ship, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
4. The Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government
of Jharkhand, Officiating at Project Building, H.E.C. Town Ship, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
5. The Under Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government
of Jharkhand, Officiating at Project Building, H.E.C. Town Ship, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
6. The Joint Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of
Jharkhand, Officiating at Project Building, H.E.C. Town Ship, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. ... ... Appellants
Versus
Rajendra Prasad, son of Late Lakhan Rajak, C/o Sri Sunil Kumar
Gupta, resident of Naya Road, Block Colony, P.O. & P.S. Phusro,
District Bokaro. ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Appellants : Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to S.C.-IV
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C.A.V. On: 13.02.2025 Pronounced On: 7.3.2025
M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral)
I.A. No. 10362 of 2024 in/and L.P.A. No. 606 of 2024
This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
to condone delay of 260 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal
challenging the judgment dt. 04.12.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5022 of
2016 passed by the learned Single Judge.
2. In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that
the respondent had submitted his appeal through Governor Secretariat
enclosing copy of the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
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3. Thereafter, the file was placed before competent authority, who
directed to proceed with Letters Patent Appeal.
4. According to the application, the grounds of appeal were drafted by
the department and the file was placed before competent authority for
approval on 22.07.2024. Thereafter, Advocate General's opinion was
secured on 25.07.2024, approval on appeal was granted on 02.08.2024 and
the appeal was filed on 19.09.2024.
5. We have noticed that the appeal has been preferred enclosing a
certified copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge pronounced on
04.12.2023 but the application for certified copy of the same had been filed
on 30.08.2024 and it was made ready on 12.09.2024. No explanation is
offered for this delay in applying for certified copy of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge.
6. The plea of the applicant that they are Government functionaries
having several layers of decision making, which consumed much time,
cannot be accepted. When the judgment was pronounced on 4.12.2023,
and the time for filing of the LPA is 30 days, the applicants cannot act
leisurely, wait till 19.9.2024 and then file the LPA.
7. In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited
and another1, the Supreme Court held:
"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the
"better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air
Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the
said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of
the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in
(2012) 3 SCC 563
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Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-
2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for
the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the
same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is
no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the
impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable
time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on
8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by
placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-
in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified
copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the
affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there
was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt
of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why
such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department
that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine
difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the
person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting
the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware
or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage
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of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government." (emphasis supplied)
8. These observations equally apply to the instant case where the
applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case.
9. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in
several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex
Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1
vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs. Central Tibetan
Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India &Others vs. Vishnu
Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar
Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6.
10. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his LR7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the
merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly
matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of
delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their
(2022) 3 SCC 159
(2022) 2 SCC 327
(2021) 11 SCC 557
(2022) 9 SCC 263
(2022) 9 SCC 266
2024 INSC 262: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
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own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances,
he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while
considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the
merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona
fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It
declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
11. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Ramkumar Choudhary8.
12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the
above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are satisfied that sufficient cause
has not been shown by the applicants for condonation of delay of 272 days
in filing the appeal.
13. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters
Patent Appeal is also dismissed.
14. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(M. S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
APK
Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt. 29.11.2024
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