Jharkhand High Court
Lagni Mundain vs The State Of Jharkhand & Others on 6 March, 2025
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 668 of 2015
Lagni Mundain ... ... Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Others ... ... Respondents
With
W.P. (C) No. 124 of 2017
Bimla Devi & Others ... ... Petitioners
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Others ... ... Respondents
With
W.P. (C) No. 220 of 2017
Babita Singh ... ... Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Others ... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
---
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manjul Prasad, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Akhouri Prakhar Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Aniket Rohan, Advocate
[in WPC No. 220 of 2017]
: Mr. K. K. Ambastha, Advocate
Mr. Suraj Verma, Advocate
Mr. Shashank Shekhar, Advocate
[in WPC No. 668 of 2015]
: Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, Advocate
Mr. Sanjay Kr. Tiwary, Advocate
Ms. Swati Singh, Advocate
For the Resp. No. 7 : Mr. Manjul Prasad, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Akhouri Prakhar Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Aniket Rohan, Advocate
[in WPC No. 668 of 2015]
For the Resp. No. 5 : Mr. K. K. Ambastha, Advocate
Mr. Suraj Verma, Advocate
Mr. Shashank Shekhar, Advocate
[WPC No. 124 of 2017 & 220/2017]
For the State : Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, Advocate
[WPC No. 124 of 2017]
---
th
23/6 March 2025
1. Learned counsel for the parties are present.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 668 of 2015 has
submitted that this writ petition has been filed in view of the fact that in
spite of order of restoration passed under Section 71-A of the Chhota
Nagpur Tenancy Act in favour of the petitioner, the Special Officer,
Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi himself has stayed the execution
without there being any stay order from the competent court of law. The
learned counsel submits that such a course was absolutely impermissible
in the eyes of law and therefore the conduct of the Special Officer is under
cloud. The learned counsel has further submitted that the application for
restoration was allowed by the SAR Court and the appeal against the SAR
Court's order was dismissed and the revision was also dismissed. The
learned counsel has submitted that only the revisional order is under
challenge in W.P. (C) No. 124 of 2017 and W.P. (C) No. 220 of 2017
which has been filed by the persons who are in possession of the property
and there is no specific challenge to the order of restoration nor there is
any specific challenge to the order of the appellate authority.
3. During the course of hearing and as per the records produced from
the SAR Court, it transpired that in the application for restoration filed by
Arjun Munda dated 25.01.2008 pursuant to which the concerned
proceedings are arising, under the column 'the date of dispossession', it
has been written 'he does not know' and under the column 'as to whether
the transfer has taken place through registered deed, mortgaged, lease etc.'
he has again written 'he does not know'. The application for restoration
has been perused by all the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties. The original copy of the application for restoration has been
produced by the learned counsel for the State.
4. Learned counsel for the State is directed to submit the records
before this Court for further scrutiny and perusal. However, the aforesaid
facts which have been mentioned herein is not in dispute.
5. The learned counsel for the parties have been specifically asked as
to whether there is any material to show the date of dispossession or the
manner in which Arjun Munda has been dispossessed from the property
apart from the application filed by the Arjun Munda, they have submitted
that there is no other material. However, it has been submitted that there
was a compromise way back in the year 1963 wherein the title suit ended
into a compromise.
6. The learned counsel for Smt. Lagni Tuti who is respondent No. 5 in
W.P. (C) No. 124 of 2017 and also in W.P. (C) No. 220 of 2017 has
submitted that the entire property involved in this case has been
transferred to third party so far as W.P. (C) No. 220 of 2017 is concerned,
but the petitioner has not disclosed this fact in the writ petition and that
amounts to material suppression before this Court. He submits that once
third party rights have already been created by the petitioner, the
petitioner does not have any locus to file the present case and therefore the
writ petition should be dismissed by imposing heavy cost on account of
suppression of material facts.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in W.P. (C)
No. 124 of 2017 and also in W.P. (C) No. 220 of 2017 has submitted that
the applicant or his predecessor in interest remained dispossessed from the
property for a pretty long period of time and the applicant has rightly not
disclosed the date of dispossession as he was not aware of it. The learned
counsel has also submitted that Bhuglu Oraon had instituted a case for
restoration under Section 71-A of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act as
back as in the year 1985-86 being S.A.R. Case No. 14/1985-86 against
Shri H. N. Singh and the same was allowed vide order dated 23.09.1986,
but he never instituted any execution case and the execution stood barred
by virtue of Section 181 of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act which
provides a limitation of three years for filing an application for restoration.
It has also been stated that Bhuglu Oraon again filed SAR Case No. 03 of
1999, but no positive order of restoration was passed in the said case in
view of the fact that there was already an order of restoration way back on
23.09.1986. Arjun Munda purchased the property from Bhuglu Oraon
after taking due permission under Section 46 of the Chhota Nagpur
Tenancy Act from the Deputy Commissioner and after purchasing the
property, Arjun Munda filed the application for restoration which is
subject matter of consideration in the present case.
8. The facts of the case revealed that Arjun Munda though purchased
the property but neither he nor his predecessor in interest remained in
possession of the property and consequently the date of dispossession
with respect to the property dates back to the period much prior to the
compromise decree and even if the date of compromise is taken as date of
dispossession, then also application for restoration filed by Arjun Munda
was filed much after expiry of more than 34 years. The learned counsel
has submitted that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under
Section 71-A of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act and the term 'at any
time' has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and 'any time'
does not mean that at the sweet will of the concerned raiyat. For this, the
learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Situ Sahu & Others vs. State of Jharkhand
& Others reported in 2004 (4) JCR 211 (SC) and Pandey Oraon vs. Ram
Chander Sahu & others reported in AIR 1992 SC 195.
9. The learned counsel has also submitted that merely because the
property has been transferred the same does not take away the locus of the
petitioners to challenge the orders which have been passed against the
petitioners as the petitioners could not have passed better title than what
the petitioners were having. He has relied upon the judgment passed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2001) 6 SCC 534 (Dhurandhar
Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University & others) and he submits that
merely because the property has been transferred to the third party, at best
the third party could have joined the proceedings but the same cannot be
said to be a reason to deny the locus of the petitioner to pursue the
litigation. He submits that the order of restoration of land was passed
while the petitioners were in possession of the property. It is submitted
that the vendor is under a duty to protect the interest with respect to the
property which he has transferred as the vendor cannot transfer a better
title than what he has.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 668 of 2015
has also referred to the Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 Appendix
IX Section 3 to submit that the compromise is by itself a fraud on the
statute.
11. In response, the learned counsel for the petitioners in other cases
has submitted that in absence of any allegation of fraud, there cannot be
any presumption of fraud merely because there was a compromise decree.
He has submitted that Section 3 of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation,
1969 simply provides that even in case of admission or any act of the
schedule tribe, the same cannot be taken as a gospel truth and mere
admission is not sufficient and the Deputy Commissioner can certainly
call upon the parties to prove the material facts although it might have
been admitted. The learned counsel has also submitted that since Arjun
Munda never came in possession, therefore there was no question of his
dispossession.
12. Arguments concluded.
13. Judgment is reserved.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Mukul
