Jharkhand High Court

Most. Manjeet Kaur vs Dhanjeet Kaur on 5 March, 2025

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                     M.A. No. 69 of 2017

     Most. Manjeet Kaur, wife of late Ajit Singh, resident of Jawahar Nagar,
     Bhurkunda, P.O. Bhurkunda, P.S. Patratu and District-Ramgarh
                                      ......................Appellant


                        ... Versus....

      Dhanjeet Kaur, resident of Barrack No. 22, CCL Colony, Barkakana, P.O.
      Barkakana, P.S. Patratu and District-Ramgarh....... Respondent

       CORAM:     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

For the Petitioner              : Mr. Chanchal Jain, Advocate
For the Respondent                :
                 ..........

09/Dated: 05/03/2025 Notice upon the sole respondent has been validly served.

However, the sole respondent has not appeared and with a view to provide one

more opportunity to the sole respondent the matter was adjourned on

02.03.2023 and again on 12.02.2025 inspite of that nobody appeared on behalf

of the sole respondent. Today, on repeated calls, nobody appeared on behalf of

the respondent in view of this appeal is being heard in absence of sole

respondent.

2. Heard Mr. Chanchal Jain, learned counsel for the appellant.

3. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order

dated 30.11.2016 passed by learned District Judge-I, Ramgarh in Succession

Certificate Case No. 31/2004.

4. Mr. Chanchal Jain, learned counsel for the appellant submits

that the appellant herein filed Succession Case under section 372 of Indian

Succession Act, 1925 with prayer to grant succession certificate in her favour

for collection of gratuity amount and other emoluments pertaining to the office

of Chief General Manager, Central Coal Fields Limited with interest thereon as

mentioned in Schedule 'A' of the petition. He further submits that the learned

District Judge has been pleased to grant succession certificate in favour of the

appellant and sole respondent. He then submits that the appellant is the first

wife of the deceased and the sole respondent is the second wife of the

deceased. He submits that in existence of first marriage, the second marriage

has been solemnized in view of that second marriage is itself void and in view

of that the learned court has erred in passing the said order in favour of the

sole respondent also. He further submits that the application was not preferred

by the sole respondent in view of also the said order is bad in in law. He

submits that one O.P. witness has stated that the appellant herein is entitled

for the succession certificate. He further submits that second wife is not legal

heir and successor in view of that also the learned court has erred in passing

the said order. On these grounds, he submits that the impugned order may

kindly be set aside.

5. The learned court has considered two witnesses examined on behalf

of the appellant being Manjeet Kaur, the appellant herself and Kartar Singh,

Witness No, 2. Ext. 1 was the original Death Certificate of Ajit Singh Ext. 1/1

was the original Death of Hanse Kaur, who is mother-in-law. Ext. 2 was the

Marriage Certificate dated 15/10/99 issued by Sri Gur Singh Sabha Gurudawara,

Bhurkunda Bazar of the first wife who is appellant. Ext. 3 was the family

Ajit Singh. Ext. 5 was the Marriage Certificate dated 15/10/91 issued by

Mukhiya Gram Panchayat Dewariya, Bargawna in favour of the appellant. Ext. 6

was the saving bank pass book in the name of Ajit Singh and Hanse Kaur of

Punjab National Bank. On the other hand the sole responent has produced

eight witnesses. Besides the witnesses, Ext. A was the Marriage Certificate

issued from Maa Chhinmastika Religious Trust. Ext.B was the signature of Dilip

Chaterjee on a photocopy of the register relating to Maa Chhinmastika Mandir

Trust Committee. Ext. C and C/1 were the signatures and endorsement on a

petition dated 12-06-2001. Ext. D was the signature of Dy. Personnel Manager,

Barkakana. Ext. E, E/1 & E/2 were the signatures of the Dy. Karmik Manager on

the Service Book of Ajit Singh. Ext. F was the endorsement and signature of

personnel Manager on the first page of Service Book of Ajit Singh. Ext. G was

the voter list of 22 Barkagaon Assembly Constituencies. Ext. H & I were the

Voter card and Aadhar Card of Dhanjeet Kaur. Ext. J & K were the registration

slip and certificate of Jharkhand Academic Council of Sapna Kumari and Khusbu

Kumari respectively.

6. O.P Witness No. 5. Jan V. R. Kujur was Senior Personal Officer at

CCL, Naya Nagar Ghutuwa. He has stated that Ajit Singh has filed a petition on

08/06/2001 before him which was submitted in his office on 12/06/2001. He

has proved the endorsement on the application of Ajit Singh and the same has

been marked Ext. C. He has further proved an endorsement of the then Karmik

Personal Manager Sri A. K. Singh and the same has been marked Ext. C/1. He

has also proved Ext. C/2 and D. He has been fully cross-examined by the other

side. He has stated that service books of each employee is maintained which

bears photograph, date of birth and death of the employee including name of

the nominee. He has further stated that the addition and deletion of the name

of the employee is made on the basis of the order of the Senior Officers.

7. O.P Witness No. 7, Kewal Ram who has brought the service 'book of

Ajit Singh. He has stated before the learned court that in the service book, the

name of the wife of Ajit Singh has been mentioned as Dhanjeet Kaur and the

Dhanjeet Kaur is the sole respondent. This witness has also proved the

signatures on the service book and the same has been marked as Exhibit- E,

E/1 & E/2. He has also proved Exhibit- E i.e. the endorsement on the first page

of the service book.

8. O.P Witness No.8, Baleshwar Ram was an employee at CCL. He was

also co-employee. He has stated that Ajit Singh was married with Dhanjeet

Kaur at Rajrappa Temple.

9. Learned court has found that both claimed that both are legally

wedded wife of late Ajit Singh and in view of that the learned court has relied

judgment of the Gujrat High Court and allowed the succession certificate in

favour of both the sides i.e. appellant and sole respondent.

10. In the case of "Vidhyadhari and others Vs. Sukhrana Bai and

others" reported in (2008) 2 SCC 238 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held

in paras 13 and 14 as under:-

"13. This Court in Rameshwari Devi case has held that even if a government servant had contracted second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage, children born out of such second marriage would still be legitimate though the second marriage itself would be void. The Court, therefore, went on to hold that such children would be entitled to the pension but not the second wife. It was, therefore, bound to be considered by the High Court as to whether Vidhyadhari being the nominee of Sheetaldeen could legitimately file an application for succession certificate and could be granted the same. The law is clear on this issue that a nominee like Vidhyadhari who was claiming the death benefits arising out of the employment can always file an application under Section 372 of the Succession Act as there is nothing in that section to prevent such a nominee from claiming the certificate on the basis of nomination. The High Court should have realised that Vidhyadhari was not only a nominee but also was the mother of four children of Sheetaldeen who were the legal heirs of Sheetaldeen and whose names were also found in Form A which was the declaration of Sheetaldeen during his lifetime. In her application Vidhyadhari candidly pointed out the names of the four children as the legal heirs of Sheetaldeen. No doubt that she herself has claimed to be a legal heir which status she could not claim but besides that she had the status of a nominee of Sheetaldeen. She continued to stay with Sheetaldeen as his wife for long time and was a person of confidence for Sheetaldeen who had nominated her for his provident fund, Life Cover Scheme, pension and amount of life insurance and amount of other dues. Under such circumstances she was always preferable even to the legally wedded wife like Sukhrana Bai who had never stayed with Sheetaldeen as his wife and who had gone to the extent of claiming the succession certificate to the exclusion of legal heirs of Sheetaldeen. In the grant of succession certificate the court has to use its discretion where the rival claims, as in this case, are made for the succession certificate for the properties of the deceased. The High Court should have taken into consideration these crucial circumstances. Merely because Sukhrana Bai was the legally wedded wife that by itself did not entitle her to a succession certificate in comparison to Vidhyadhari who all through had stayed as the wife of Sheetaldeen, had borne his four children and had claimed a succession certificate on behalf of children also. In our opinion, the High Court was not only of the nominee of Sheetaldeen but also to the exclusion of his legitimate legal heirs."

14. Therefore, though we agree with the High Court that Sukhrana Bai was the only legitimate wife yet, we would chose to grant the certificate in favour of

Vidhyadhari who was his nominee and the mother of his four children. However, we must balance the equities as Sukhrana Bai is also one of the legal heirs and besides the four children she would have the equal share in Sheetaldeens estate which would be 1/5th. To balance the equities we would, therefore, chose to grant Succession Certificate to Vidhyadhari but with a rider that she would protect the 1/5th share of Sukhrana Bai in Sheetaldeen s properties and would hand over the same to her. As the nominee she would hold the 1/5th share of Sukhrana Bai in trust and would be responsible to pay the same to Sukhrana Bai. We direct that for this purpose she would give a security in the Trial Court to the satisfaction of the trial court.

11. In the above judgment it has been held that legally wedded wife not

automatically entitled to succession certificate to the exclusion of second de

facto wife and her children when the deceased had made nomination in favour

of the second wife to receive terminal benefits of his employment.

12. Admittedly, in the present case second wife is sole respondent

herein was made nominee and in view of that the said judgment is helping the

sole respondent.

13. Further reference may be made to the case of "Smt. Sarabati

Devi and Another Vs. Smt. Usha Devi" reported in (1984) 1 SCC 424

wherein paragraph nos. 5, 8 and 10 it has been held as under:-

"5. We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy-holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy-holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bona fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under Section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to sub-section (7) of Section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy-holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy- holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy-holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in paragraph 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36: ILR (1981) 2 Del 315]. If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides

for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.

8. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36: ILR (1981) 2 Del 315]. In this case the High Court of Delhi clearly came to the conclusion that the nominee had no right in the lifetime of the assured to the amount payable under the policy and that his rights would spring up only on the death of the assured. The Delhi High Court having reached that conclusion did not proceed to examine the possibility of an existence of a conflict between the law of succession and the right of the nominee under Section 39 of the Act arising on the death of the assured and in that event which would prevail. We are of the view that the language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law. The second error committed by the Delhi High Court in this case is the reliance placed by it on the effect of the amendment of Section 60(1)(kb) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 providing that all moneys payable under a policy of insurance on the life of the judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment by his creditors. The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs and legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded to the estate with all 'plus and minus points'. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The exemption of the moneys payable under a life insurance policy under the amended Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of 'devaluing' the earlier decisions which upheld the right of a creditor of the estate of the assured to attach the amount payable under the life insurance policy recognises such a right in such creditor which he could have exercised but for the amendment. It is because it was attached the Code of Civil Procedure exempted it from attachment in furtherance of the policy of Parliament in making the amendment. The Delhi High Court has committed another error in appreciating the two decisions of the Madras High Court in Karuppa Gounder v. Palaniammal [AIR

196... nominee under Section 44 will receive the money not as owner but as an agent on behalf of someone else, vide B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation [AIR 1977 Mad 72: 47 Com Cas 19: (1977) 1 MLJ 59: ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336]. Thus, the nominee excludes the legal heirs.

10. It is obvious from the above passage that the above case has no bearing on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act. The fact of nomination was treated in that case as a piece of evidence in support of the finding that the policy was not a joint family asset but the separate property of the coparcener concerned. No right based on the ground that one party was entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased in preference to the other or along with the other under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act was asserted in that case. The next error committed by the Delhi High Court is in drawing an analogy between Section 39 and Section 44(2) of the Act thinking that the Madras High Court had done so in B.M. Mundkur case [AIR 1977 Mad 72: 47 Com Cas 19: (1977) 1 MLJ 59: ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336]. In B.M. Mundkur case [AIR 1977 Mad 72: 47 Com Cas 19: (1977) 1 MLJ 59 : ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336] the High Court of Madras instead of drawing an analogy between Section 39 and Section 44(2) of the Act actually contrasts them as can be seen from the following passage:

"...There are vital differences between the nomination contemplated under Section 39 of the Act and nomination contemplated under the proviso to Section 44(2) of the Act. In the first place, the sum assured, with which alone Section 39 was concerned, was to be paid in the event of the death of the assured under the terms of the contract entered into between the insurer and the assured and consequently it was the contractual right which remained vested in the insured with reference to which the nomination happened to be made. It should be pointed out that the nomination as well as the liability on the part of the insurer to pay the sum assured become

effective simultaneously, namely, at the moment of the death of the assured. So long as he was alive, the money was not payable to him, in the case of a whole life policy, and equally, having regard to the language of Section 39(1) of the Act, the nominee's right to receive the money arose only on the death of the assured. Section 39 itself did not deal with the title to the money assured, which was to be paid by the insurer to the nominee who was bound to give discharge to the insurer. It was in this context that the Court took the view that the title remained with the estate of the deceased and, therefore, with the heirs of the deceased, that the nomination did not in any way affect the title and that it merely clothed the nominee with the right to receive the amount from the insurer. (AIR 1977 Mad 77, para 10- A) "

14. In view of above judgment, just because of facility of nomination

is made that does not defeat the rights of the legal heirs to claim their right in

respect of estate of deceased, as the right of the other legal heirs is as per law

of succession. Only because the nomination is made in favour of the second

wife who is the sole respondent that does not mean that the legal heirs of

the deceased as per governing law of inheritance will not be entitled for

benefits.

15. In view of above, this Court finds that considering all these

aspects the learned trial court has rightly passed the order providing succession

to both the wives. As such there is no illegality in the impugned order.

Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Pending I.A, if any, stands dismissed.

16. Let Trial Court Record be sent to the concerned court