Jharkhand High Court

The State Of Jharkhand vs Sidharth Shankar Chaudhary on 5 June, 2025

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                            2025:JHHC:14479-DB




       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                      I.A. No. 1026 of 2025
                              In/And
                       L.P.A. No. 54 of 2025
     1. The State of Jharkhand
     2. The Principal Secretary, the Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
        Rajbhasha Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building,
        P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi
     3. The Joint Secretary, the Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
        Rajbhasha Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building,
        P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi
     4. The Deputy Secretary, the Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
        Rajbhasha Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building,
        P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi .. ...     ...   Appellants
                              Versus
     1. Sidharth Shankar Chaudhary, son of Late Arbind Chaudhary,
        resident of Gautam Green City, Anuj-31, P.O. Getalhatu, P.S. BIT
        Mesra ( OP), District Ranchi-835217 ( Jharkhand)
     2. The Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government of
        Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi
     3. The Divisional Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka,
        P.O. & P.S. Dumka, District Dumka
     4. The Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, P.O. & P.S. Dumka, District-
        Dumka                             ...      ...  Respondents
                              ---------

     CORAM:          HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                            ---------
     For the Appellants : Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to SC-IV
     For the Respondents:
                            --------
     Reserved on: 29.04.2025          Pronounced on: 5/06/2025
     Per M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.

1) The instant interlocutory application is filed under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 by the applicants to condone the delay of 231 days

in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt.

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22.3.2024 of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.(S) No. 6891 of

2017.

2) In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that

through a letter dt. 4.4.2024 received from the office of the learned

Advocate General, it was informed that the writ petition was allowed by

the learned Single Judge on 22.3.2024; till then order of the learned

Single Judge was not uploaded on the website of the High Court; on

9.4.2024, proposal was mooted for taking appropriate decision and

after going through various departmental channels, on 30.4.2024 the

Departmental Secretary sent the file to the office of the Advocate

General for obtaining necessary opinion.

3) It is then stated that on 3.5.2024, the Advocate General opined that the

L.P.A. in the present case be preferred and returned the file. Thereafter

the file was sent to the departmental retainer for preparing statement of

facts and also grounds of appeal and then it was placed before the

Departmental Secretary for approval on 12.8.2024. After such approval

was granted, memo of appeal was also drafted and the Letters Patent

Appeal was filed on 4.10.2024.

4) Thus, the Letters Patent Appeal was filed on 4.10.2024 challenging the

judgment of the learned Single Judge pronounced on 22.3.2024 with a

delay of 231 days.

5) Application for certified copy of the judgment of learned Single Judge

was made on 21.11.2024 and it was furnished on 29.11.2024, but it was

filed much later.

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6) Though the applicants were aware that the limitation for filing the

Letters Patent Appeal is only 30 days from the date of the judgment of

the learned Single Judge, no sense of urgency or diligence was shown to

ensure that the appeal is filed within the period of limitation prescribed

for the same. The file appears to have been moved from table to table

through various departmental channels without any sense of urgency

and after a period of 231 days, the appeal came to be filed.

7) In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and

another1, the Supreme Court held:

"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except

(2012) 3 SCC 563

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mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government." (emphasis supplied)

8) These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants

have acted in a similar manner as in the said case.

9) The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several

cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex

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Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise

Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs.

Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India &

Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and

State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6.

10) In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)

through his LR7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the

merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause

has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it

hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of

India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years;

length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into

consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned

or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that

they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the

proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it

is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on

merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-

deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead

that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the

technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for

condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main

(2022) 3 SCC 159