Mohan Lal Jain vs State Of Jharkhand
2025 Latest Caselaw 4148 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Mohan Lal Jain vs State Of Jharkhand on 23 June, 2025

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

                                                               2025:JHHC:16520




        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
                 C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
                                     ----

Mohan Lal Jain, aged about 59 years, S/o Late Shri Ram Jain Singh having his residence at C-38, City Centre, Sector - 4, PO and PS - Sector - 4, District - Bokaro, as the proprietor of M/s Mohan Timber having its principle place of business at Ukrid More, PO - Sector - 12, PS - Bokaro Steel City, District - Bokaro .... Petitioner

-- Versus --

1. State of Jharkhand

2. Bokaro Steel Limited, through its Director - In-charge, officiating from his office at Administrative Building, Bokaro Steel City, Sector - 4, PO and PS - Ram Mandir, District - Bokaro

3. The Executive Director (P & A), officiating from his office at Bokaro Steel City, Sector - 4, PO and PS - Ram Mandir, District - Bokaro

4. Chief General Manager, Town Services, Bokaro Steel Limited, officiating from his office at Administrative Building, Bokaro Steel City, Sector - 4, PO and PS - Ram Mandir, District - Bokaro

5. Sudesh Verma, aged about 59 years, S/o not known to the petitioner, Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Limited, an authority appointed under Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, officiating from his office at Ram Mandir Camp Office, PO and PS - Ram Mandir, District - Bokaro

6. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, aged about 50 years, S/o not know to the petitioner, Assistant Chief General Manager (Town Administration/Land & Estate), Town Services, Bokaro Steel Limited, officiating from his office at Administrative Building, Bokaro Steel City, Sector - 4, PO and PS - Ram Mandir, District - Bokaro

7. Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, officiating from his office at Collectorate Building, PO and PS - Bokaro, District - Bokaro

8. Sub-Divisional Officer, Bokaro, officiating from his office at Collectorate Building, PO and PS - Chas, District - Bokaro.

.... Opposite Parties

----

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

---

For the Petitioner :- Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate :- Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate For O.P. Nos.2 to 6 :- Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate :- Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate For O.P. Nos.7 & 8 :- Mr. Kumar Pawan, Advocate :- Ms. Rukmini Kumari, Advocate

----

05/23.06.2025 Heard Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for

the petitioner along with Mr. Parth Jalan, learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner, Mr. Indrajit Sinha along with Mr. Shresth Gautam,

learned counsel appearing for the opposite party Nos.2 to 6 and

learned counsel appearing for the State.

2. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 15.04.2025

passed in Civil Appeal No.13 of 2024 whereby the learned Principal

District Judge, Bokaro adjudicated the appeal and has been pleased

to dismiss the appeal preferred under Section 9 of Public Premises

(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.

3. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioner submits that the proprietorship firm operating in the

name and style of M/s Mohan Timber was started by the petitioner's

father in 1970 over the land situated within Mouza - Ukrid, Thana

No.37, in the area falling under North - Bokaro Steel Limited (here-

in-after referred to as BSL) Land, South BSL Land, East Road from

NH-23 bypass to Nayamore (Old NH-23) West BSL Land, Bokaro

Steel City allotted to him by respondent No.2 vide license contained

in TA/A/25/031/1106 dated March 14, 1977 contained in

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Annexure-1. He further submits that the respondent - company

accepted the license fee from the petitioner till 1988, however,

thereafter stopped accepting the fee and the petitioner continued to

operate the business of the proprietorship firm over the said

premises since past more than 45 years. He further submits that the

present proceeding was initiated on 8th August, 2014 wherein the

respondent - company issued notices to 4000 (four thousand)

persons for removing their unauthorized construction over the land

claimed by them under the said act which was challenged by some

of the aggrieved persons before this Court in W.P. (C.) Nos.7296 of

2023 as well as 7210 of 2023 which was allowed by a co-ordinate

bench of this Court setting aside the said notice and liberty was

provided to the respondent - company to proceed afresh strictly as

per the provisions of the said act. He then submits that thereafter a

new petition was filed by the respondent No.2 which was registered

as Case No. A/E 59 of 2004 and the respondent issued a fresh

notice dated 5th February, 2024 upon the petitioner and initiated

proceedings under Section 5A (1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of

Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. He submits that the ground of

issuing the said notice was that the petitioner has erected a timber

and plywood factory building over the land. He submits that the

petitioner herein filed a preliminary objection to the aforesaid

notice, wherein the petitioner stated that it was operating the firm

under the license granted by the respondent - company and in

absence of any determination of the said license, the petitioner

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could not be treated to be an unauthorized occupant. He submits,

however, by the order dated 16.04.2024 one of the witnesses was

discharged and for that the petitioner filed a petition for recalling

the witness which was rejected by order dated 23.04.2024. He

submits that the rejection order has been challenged before this

Court in W.P. (C.) No.2914 of 2024 which is still pending and

according to him, in the meantime, the present proceeding is

proceeded before the Estate Officer and the petitioner was held to

be an unauthorized occupant and the direction has been issued to

vacate the land. He further submits that the said order of the Estate

Officer was assailed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 before the

learned Court of Principal District Judge, Bokaro which was

registered as Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.13 of 2024. He submits

that the learned appellate court has dismissed the appeal and

affirmed the order of the Estate Officer. In this background, he

further submits that the occupied area has already been

demolished. He draws the attention of the Court to paragraph No.7

of the petition filed in the form of preliminary objection and submits

that the occupied area has already been demolished. He further

draws the attention of the Court to the notice of eviction by way of

referring to the rejoinder and submits that one witness has stated

that the license fee was not being paid and the license was not

further extended. By way of relying on this statement, he submits

that in light of this dispute, it is proved that the petitioner herein is

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in occupation of the land which has been licensed by the BSL to the

father of the petitioner. He refers to paragraph No.24, 37 and 39 of

the counter affidavit filed by the BSL and submits that a second

case has been tried to be made out by BSL to the effect that the

land in encroachment is another land and not the licensee land. He

draws the attention of the Court to definition of "unauthorized

occupation" that is sub-section (g) of Section 2 of the Act and

submits that even in the said definition the petitioner is not coming

under the said act. According to him, Section 5A is a section which

gives power to remove the unauthorized construction and in view of

that wrongly the order has been passed under Section 5A of the

Act. According to him, it is not clear from two orders of two Courts

that on which land the petitioner is having the occupation. He

submits that once a license is granted a right is accrued to the

person and without following the due process a person cannot be

evicted. To buttress this argument, he relied in the judgment of

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Express Newspapers Pvt.

Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others reported in

(1986) 1 SCC 133, wherein at paragraph No.86 it has been held

as under:

86. The Express Buildings constructed by Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. with the sanction of the lessor i.e. the Union of India, Ministry of Works & Housing on plots Nos. 9 and 10, Bahadurshah Zafar Marg demised on perpetual lease by registered lease-deed dated March 17, 1958 can, by no process of reasoning, be regarded as public premises belonging to the Central Government under Section 2(e).

That being so, there is no question of the lessor applying for

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eviction of the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. under section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 nor has the Estate Officer any authority or jurisdiction to direct their eviction under sub- s.(2) thereof by summary process. Due process of Law in a case like the present necessarily implies the filing of suit by the lessor i.e. the Union of India, Ministry of Works & Housing for the enforcement of the alleged right of re- entry, if any upon forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms of the lease.

4. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that remedy to

the BSL is elsewhere in spite of that the shorter root has been

chosen by the BSL by way of filing the petition under the Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. He also

refers to paragraph No.59 of the counter affidavit and submits that

on this ground the impugned order may kindly be set aside

5. Per contra, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for

the opposite party Nos.2 to 6 - BSL submits that it has been

recorded in the order dated 05.05.2025 of this Court that so far

prayer (a) is concerned that has not been pressed by the petitioner

herein and prayer (b) and (c) have only been pressed. He further

submits that the land which is said to be evicted is different and the

licensee land is another. He then submits that the license is not

heritable. He submits that even if the contention of the petitioner is

correct, he is utilizing the land in light of the license that is not

permissible as the license is not heritable. He refers to Annexure-1

which is the allotment letter in the name of father of the petitioner

and particularly submits that in light of Clause 1B only the allotee is

required to use the premises. By way of referring to Clause 12 (ii),

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he submits that the said license is not transferable either to any

person or agents of constituted authority. By way of referring to

Clause 15(ii), he submits that interest cannot be created in the said

plot or land. On the point of license, he relied in the judgment of

Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Y. Duraisamy Vs. The

Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, Ripon Buildings

Chennai and Ors. reported in 2002-2-L.W. 302, wherein at

paragraph No.5 it has been held as under :-

5. A licence is only a right to do or continue to do something which, in the absence of such right be unlawful.

In general, licence is only a personal privilege as such it is neither transferable nor heritable. A licence is not annexed to the property in respect of which it is enjoyed nor is it a transferable or heritable right but is a right purely personal between the grantor and licencee. Unless a different intention appears, it cannot even be exercised by the licencee, servants or agents. Such an intention must be gathered from the terms of the grant, be inferred from surrounding circumstances or be found as an incident of legal usage. In order to be irrevocable under Section 60 of the Easement Act, a licence is to be coupled with a transfer of property. In this case, the license held by the deceased Hasarathiah was annexed to the property in respect of which it is enjoyed is descendible and heritable.

6. He submits that this judgment of Hon'ble Madras High Court

has been further considered by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case

of Shashank Shekhar vs. Surinder Kumar Jain and Anr.

reported in 2016 DHC 4819.

7. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that in

paragraph No.13 Hon'ble Delhi High Court has further reiterated

that a license is only a right to do or continue to do something

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which in the absence of such right would be unlawful. A license is

only a personal privilege and it is neither transferable nor heritable.

8. Relying on the above two judgments, he submits that even

the case based by the petitioner on the point of license is not

helping the petitioner herein. He submits that if the license period is

over, the proceeding under the said act can be initiated and that is

well settled. To buttress this argument, he relied in the case of

Corporation of Calicut Versus K. Sreenivasan reported in

(2002) 5 SCC 361, wherein at paragraph No.16 it has been held

as under :-

16. It is true that a licensee does not acquire any interest in the property by virtue of grant of licence in his favour in relation to any immovable property, but once the authority to occupy and use the same is granted in his favour by way of licence, he continues to exercise that right so long the authority has not expired or has not been determined for any reason whatsoever, meaning thereby so long the period of licence has not expired or the same has not been determined on the grounds permissible under the contract or law. Occupation of licensee is permissive by virtue of the grant of licence in his favour, though he does not acquire any right in the property and the property remains in possession and control of the grantor, but by virtue of such a grant, he acquires a right to remain in occupation so long the licence is not revoked and/or he is not evicted from its occupation either in accordance with law or otherwise. Main thrust of Section 2(f) of the Act is upon the expression `occupation' with authority or without authority. If a person without any authority occupies any public building he would be a trespasser and his case would be covered by first part of Section 2(f) and would be liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Act instead of taking recourse to ordinary law by filing a properly constituted suit which is dragged on

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for years together. Second part of Section 2(f) deals with cases where a person is in occupation by virtue of an authority granted in his favour irrespective of the fact whether the authority is in the form of lease or licence or in any other form. So far as case of lease of a public building is concerned, upon expiry of the period limited thereby or its determination in accordance with law, the special procedure prescribed under the Act providing speedy remedy for eviction would apply even though some interest in the immovable property is created in favour of the lessee by virtue of creation of lease in his favour. But in a case of licence, no interest in the property is created by virtue of the grant, but a person acquires a right to continue his occupation by virtue of the authority granted in his favour under the licence unless the period of licence has expired or the same has been determined or licence has been revoked and/or the licensee is evicted by the grantor. If it is held that Section 2(f) would apply only in case of lease and not in the case of licence, the position will be very incongruous as in the case of lease, though a lessee acquires interest in the property which is a higher right, but he can be evicted under the special procedure prescribed under the law providing much speedy remedy whereas in case of licence, a licensee, who does not acquire any interest in the property and has only some sort of right of occupation by virtue of the nature of grant in his favour so long he is not evicted, can be evicted through long drawn ordinary procedure of filing a civil suit. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Apart from that, out of the expressions `whether by way of lease' or `any other mode of transfer', the expression `any other mode of transfer' is very wide and would not necessarily mean only that mode of transfer whereby a right has been created in immovable property.

The expression `transfer' under the Transfer of Property Act connotes creation of some interest in immovable property. But under Section 2(f) of the Act such a restricted meaning would defeat the purpose of legislation which is impermissible. The expression "any other mode of transfer"

would definitely bring within its sweep the case of a licensee

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where right of the grantor to occupy and continue to occupy immovable property is transferred though under law, the property remains in possession and control of the grantor. In view of the foregoing discussions, we hold that the expression `unauthorised occupation' within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act would embrace within its ambit the case of licensee as well after expiry of the period of licence or upon its determination for any reason whatsoever, as such the Estate Officer was quite justified in initiating proceeding under the Act and passing eviction order therein.

9. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that both the

orders, the Estate Officer as well as the First Appellate Court is a

well-reasoned order and there is no perversity. This Court, sitting

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, may not review and

re-appreciate the entire facts as there is no apparent error and

perversity in the orders of two courts. On the point of Article 227 of

the Constitution of India, he relied in the case of Celina Coelho

Pereira (Ms) and Others versus Ulhas Mahabaleshwar

Kholkar and Others reported in (2010) 1 SCC 217, wherein at

paragraph Nos. 30 to 33 it has been held as under :-

30. In Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta And Another11, this Court held :

"The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts."

31. In State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afshan Guru And Others12 this Court explained the power of the High Court under Article 227 thus :

"Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals

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throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such (1975) 1 SCC 858 (2003) 6 SCC 641 discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise"."

32. The aforesaid two decisions and few other decisions, namely, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram13 , State of Maharashtra v. Milind & Ors.14, Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash15, came to be considered by this Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad & Ors. v. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through LRs. And Others16 and this Court held :

"Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power

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is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The (1986) 4 SCC 447 (2001) 1 SCC 4 (2004) 3 SCC 682 (2008) 9 SCC 1 powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law."

33. In light of the aforesaid legal position concerning jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227, which the High Court failed to keep in mind, it must be held that in the facts and circumstances of the case and the findings recorded by the Additional Rent Controller as well as the Administrative Tribunal, High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent orders of eviction based on the ground of sub- letting in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

10. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that the High

Court is required to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India keeping in mind the concurrent orders of two

Courts and there is no perversity. He submits that so far judgment

relied by learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in the

case of Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) is

concerned the facts of that case are completely different. He

submits that in paragraph No.86 of the said judgment, it has been

clearly held that there was a perpetual registered lease deed in

favour of the Express Newspapers and in light of that the judgment

has been passed. He further submits that since 1988 not even a

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farthing has been paid, so far the license fee is concerned. On this

ground he submits that this petition may kindly be dismissed.

11. In view of above submission of learned counsel appearing

for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record

and has examined the relevant documents as has been placed by

learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is an admitted position

that by way of Annexure-1 dated 14.03.1977, the grant of license

was made in the name of the father of the petitioner on a license

basis. It was not denied by the petitioner that since 1988, the

license fee was not paid. Initially, a notice was issued for eviction

upon 4,000 (four thousand) persons which has been challenged in

two W.P. (Cs.) and this Court set aside the said notice on conceding

of the opposite parties herein and liberty was provided to the BSL to

start afresh proceeding. Pursuant thereto, BSL has instituted the

present proceeding before the Estate Officer of BSL. The petitioner

herein has appeared before the Estate Officer and after providing

opportunities the said authority has passed the order of eviction

against the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the same through

appeal under Section 9 of the Act before the Principal District Judge,

who has been further dismissed the appeal and the said appeal was

preferred by the petitioner none other than else. The petitioner

herein has not been able to show by way of leading any evidence or

document that on what lands construction have been made or

business is being done and the onus lies upon the petitioner to

show that the land of the BSL is not being used or occupied by the

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petitioner, however, it has been admitted by the petitioner that the

land granted on the basis license to his father is being utilized by

the petitioner herein and it is an admitted position that since 1988

the license fee has not been paid. Clause 1B of the allotment letter

speaks that allottee shall mean the person who is given the

permission to use the plot. Clause 12 (II) speaks as under :

12(ii). The permission given by the Bokaro Steel Limited to the allottee for use of the plot being personal the allottee shall not allow or permit any other persons as agents or constituted attorney or otherwise run or remain in- charge of the plot without obtaining prior permission in writing of Town Administrator nor shall the allottee sublet the plot or enter into partnership with anyone else for running the business on the plot or in any way assign or transfer the right to use conferred on him under these presents.

12. In light of the above clause, it is crystal clear that the

allottee was restricted not to allow or permit any other persons or

agents or constituted attorney or otherwise run or remain in-charge

of the plot without obtaining prior permission in writing of Town

Administrator of BSL. It has not been shown either before the

Estate Officer or before the Appellate Authority that the permission

in this regard has been taken by the petitioner herein and in light of

this clause as well as the two of judgments relied by the petitioner

herein in the case of Y. Duraisamy Vs. The Commissioner,

Corporation of Chennai, Ripon Buildings Chennai and Ors.

(supra) and Shashank Shekhar vs. Surinder Kumar Jain and

Anr. (supra) it is clear that a license is only a personal privilege

and it is neither transferrable nor heritable.

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13. Arguments have been advanced on behalf of petitioner that

on the wrong provision of law, the petition has been filed before the

Estate Officer, however, it is well settled that merely mentioning of a

wrong provision of any law is not sufficient to take away the

jurisdiction of the Court and the reference may be made to the case

of J. Kumaradasan Nair and Another Versus Iric Sohan and

Others reported in (2009) 12 SCC 175, wherein at paragraph

No.18 it has been held as under :-

18. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. While exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficient provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof.

14. Thus, the argument advanced on this point is not being

accepted by this Court. The Court finds that the Estate Officer is

having the jurisdiction under the said Act in light of definition of the

Act the premises in question is unauthorized. Petitioner herein has

not been able to show that on which land he is in occupation and

onus lies upon him to show about the use of a particular land and in

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view of that the contention of the petitioner herein that the BSL has

taken two stands so far the land in question is not being accepted

by the Court as the petitioner has not been able to show by way of

adducing any evidence or document that which land is being used

by the petitioner. In view of that the petitioner has not been able to

make out his case either on the point of license or occupation of

another land.

15. The petitioner herein has already surrendered to the

jurisdiction of the said authorities under the said act. The petitioner

himself has preferred the appeal under Section 9 of the said Act.

The procedure as prescribed under the Act is admittedly a summary

procedure. The question of title is not involved in the proceeding

before the Estate Officer but it is the issue to be decided as to

whether the petitioner is an unauthorized occupant of the public

premises. The burden is not to prove the title of either party but to

show that the petitioner is not an authorized occupant of the land in

question and he is not required to seek any license or permission

from the Estate Officer in order to possess the premises under his

occupation while doing so it cannot be inferred that the dispute of

title is relevant in the proceeding before the Estate Officer but it is

the burden to be discharged once the petitioner decides to contest

the finding of the Estate Officer and the burden is the principal

burden inasmuch as the petitioner is required to show that the land

under the possession of the petitioner is not within the ambit and

scope of definition of public premises or unauthorized occupation.

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The order passed by the Estate Officer has its finality including the

one passed by the prescribed appellate authority and there is a

specific provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court because

Section 10 of the Act speaks about the finality of the order and

Section 9 prescribes the remedial measures if the Estate Officer fails

to take any step before declaring him as an authorized occupant.

This Court is having the view that the act is sufficiently acute for

redressal of the grievances of the petitioner and there is adequate

remedy.

16. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India and it is well settled that under the said

jurisdiction the High Court cannot convert that proceeding into a

court of appeal, however, the power is discretionary power and that

can be exercised in facts and circumstances of each case and

apparent error and perversity in both the two orders have not been

shown before this Court. So far the judgment relied by Mr. Ajit

Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in the

case of Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Others vs. Union

of India and Others (supra) is concerned that is not in dispute

and in that case by way of perpetual registered lease deed, the

property in question was the subject matter. It is well settled that by

way of registered lease a right is accrued in favour of the persons in

whose favour lease has been executed and in this background the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has passed that judgment. Coming to the

facts of the present case, what has been discussed here-in-above,

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that case is not helping the petitioner.

17. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, this Court

comes to the conclusion that there is no perversity in the order of

either of the authorities and no interference of this Court is

required. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. However, keeping in

view that the petitioner herein is having a timber sawmill in that

plot, the opposite party herein shall not initiate any action for his

eviction within the next four months starting with effect from the

date of judgment.

18. Pending petition, if any, is also disposed of.

(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Sangam/ A.F.R.