Jharkhand High Court
Jaya Bharti @ Komal vs Rakesh Kumar on 16 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No.79 of 2025
-----
Jaya Bharti @ Komal ....... ... Appellant
Versus
Rakesh Kumar ... ... Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Rishi Pallav, Advocate
For the Respondent : None
------
th
Order No.05/Dated: 16 July, 2025
I.A No.3650 of 2025
1. The present interlocutory application has been filed under section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 485 days
in preferring First Appeal No.79 of 2025.
2. Today when the matter is called out, no one appears to represent
the respondent, however, the name of the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent is reflected in the daily cause list
who has put her appearance in the present proceeding as would be
evident from the order dated 09.07.2025.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted
that delay of 485 days has been caused in filing the appeal due to
having no knowledge about passing of ex-parte judgment and
decree by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro ( in
short, learned Family Judge) for dissolution of marriage in
Original Suit No.70 of 2023 which was granted in favour of the
petitioner-husband (respondent herein).
4. It is stated in the instant interlocutory application that the decree
of divorce, vide judgment dated 19.08.2023 and decree dated
26.08.2023, which is impugned in the present proceeding has been
passed ex-parte. Hence, the appellant-wife had been no knowledge
about the judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No.70 of
2023 for dissolution of their marriage and could not be able to file
an appeal within the period of limitation.
5. The ground has been taken as would appear from paragraph nos.5,
6 and 7 that notice said to be issued on 28.02.2023. It has been
stated that on the next date i.e. on 31.03.2023, no step was taken
by the petitioner (the respondent herein) and all of sudden on
19.04.2023 the case has been fixed for ex-parte hearing against the
respondent.
6. The appellant came to know about the judgment dated 19.08.2023
and decree dated 26.08.2023 only on 20.02.2025 and thereafter
she has applied for certified copy of the plaint, order sheet and
judgment along with decree on 21.02.2025 which were supplied to
her on 24.02.2025.
7. The ground, therefore, has been taken that due to having no
knowledge about the passing of the decree and judgment in
Original Suit No.70 of 2023, the delay of 485 days has been
caused in filing the appeal.
8. It has been contended that the reason which has been shown in the
instant interlocutory application to condone the delay of 485 days
is, therefore, sufficient for the purpose of condoning the aforesaid
delay.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone
through the pleadings made in the instant interlocutory
application.
10. This Court while hearing the learned counsel for the appellant on
18.06.2025 has called for the trial court records so that the issue
involved in the present appeal is to be decided on merit.
11. It needs to refer herein that the day when the trial court records
was called for there was no appearance on behalf of the
respondent-husband. However, this Court, based upon the office
report, since the notice has been received by his father, namely,
Ramji Prasad as also there is a report of jointness of the family,
accepted the service to be validly served. However, the
appearance has been made on behalf of the respondent-husband by
filing "vakalatnama' by Ms. Shristi Sinha, the learned counsel as
would appear from the order dated 09.07.2025.
12. The trial court record is available on record.
13. We have gone through the trial court record and found that the
Original Suit No.70 of 2023 was registered on 06.02.2023. The
Sheristedar was directed to report and the matter was posted on
13.02.2023 for hearing on the point of admission. On that day, no
step was taken by the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) in
the said original suit. Thereafter, the matter was posted on
24.02.2023 for hearing on admission point.
14. The matter was again posted on 24.02.2023. On that day, the
petitioner has filed attendance through his learned counsel and a
prayer was made on behalf of the petitioner for admission of the
case. The learned trial Court has heard the learned counsel and
perused the case record and after finding the petition in order, the
case was admitted vide order dated 24.02.2023. It appears that in
the right side of the order sheet dated 24.02.2023, there is a
handwritten script indicating "notice issued by both ways" and the
same is of dated 28.02.2023.
15. It needs to refer herein that when on 24.02.2023 the case was
posted for appearance on 31.03.2023 and it is evident from the
order that no step has been taken by the petitioner in compliance
of the order dated 24.02.2023 and, accordingly, the case was fixed
for 19.04.2023 then a question arises herein how the notice was
issued on 28.02.2023 even without any specific order for issuance
of notice upon the respondent-wife (appellant herein) which is not
understandable.
16. It is, thus, evident that the handwritten script, so far it relates to
issuance of notice by both ways are concerned, appears to be
issued not on the date when the case was posted for hearing before
the learned Family Judge, rather the same was in between
24.02.2023 and 31.03.2023 without having any specific order said
to be passed on 24.02.2023. it also appears that there is no
signature of the learned Family Judge just below the handwritten
script dated 28.02.2023. The matter was posted as was fixed vide
order 24.02.2023 on 31.03.2023, but no step was taken by the
petitioner. The matter, thus, was posted on 19.04.2023 for
appearance of the respondent-wife.
17.This Court is again not in a position to accept the fact that when
the learned Family Judge has drawn the order sheet dated
31.03.2023 indicating that no step was taken by the petitioner,
then where was the occasion available to him to post the matter
for 19.04.2023 for appearance of the respondent-wife, rather the
learned trial Court ought to have passed an order with a direction
upon the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-husband to
take steps for service of notice if the notice issued vide order dated
28.02.2023 had been passed by the learned Family Judge himself.
18. The learned Family Judge ought to have also conducted an
inquiry for the purpose of verifying as to whether the notice dated
28.02.2023 said to be issued on that date is actually is by him and
if he has not passed the order since there is no situation to pass an
order when the case was posted on 31.03.2023 for appearance of
the respondent-wife. The learned Family Judge ought to have
made an inquiry as to why in the midway between 24.02.2023 to
31.3.2023 how the notice was issued on 28.02.2023 and by whom.
19. The matter was posted on 19.04.2023. A reference has been made
therein that the petitioner-husband filed attendance through his
learned counsel. It further appears from the said order that the
respondent-wife has not appeared till that day and registered
notice sent to her returned with the endorsement "refused" that let
the learned Family Judge to post the matter for ex-parte hearing
against the respondent.
20. The learned Family Judge since has accepted the order by which
the notice was issued on 28.02.2023 which was by both ways but
as would appear from the order dated 19.04.2023 that there is no
reference with respect to the out come of the notice sent to the
respondent-wife through ordinary process and merely on the basis
of the endorsement of "refuse" to accept the notice sent through
the registered post, the case has been set as ex-parte hearing
against the respondent-wife.
21. This Court, therefore, is of the view that what has been stated in
the said interlocutory application appears to be in consonance with
the order dated 24.02.2023 to 31.03.2023 as available in the order
sheet of Original Suit No.70 of 2023.
22. Since we are dealing with the issue of limitation of 485 days in
filing the First Appeal No.79 of 2025 and there is no dispute in
position of law that irrespective of period of delay, the delay is to
be condoned in exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the
Limitation Act depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by
the party seeking condonation of delay.
23. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of
'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient
cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land
Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been
held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in
the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this
context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its
part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v.
Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v.
Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC
1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012
SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a
lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.
Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is
the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to
bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own
inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa
Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5
SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held
that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts
to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
24. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a
case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted
deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable
the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that
whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device
to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land
and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors.,
AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2
SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and
Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
25. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard
may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs.
Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-
12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause"
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of
the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would
constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of
each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or
rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking
steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed
with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the
other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose
sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed
a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be
lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the
matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when
stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are
involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury
to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or
inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the
decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to
strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to
pass upon the parties either way."
26. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held
that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts
of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay
condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of
a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If
sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its
bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is
shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court
may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the
party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or
due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14.
Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section
14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there
is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in
favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism
made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of
limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we
have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner
rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only
on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon
as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion,
is not a valid ground."
27. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient
cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant
as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the
period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side
and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the
litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
28. This Court adverting to the ground taken in the instant
interlocutory application as also to come to the consideration as to
whether the ground shown for condoning the delay of 485 days
can be said to be sufficient cause or not.
29. Expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means
that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has
"not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
30. It has been stated in paragraph nos.5,6,7,8 and 9 of the instant
interlocutory application that the appellant was having no
knowledge about the divorce suit and when she came to know the
judgment and decree passed in divorce suit being Original suit
No.70 of 2023, she applied for certified copy of the plaint, order
sheet and judgment along with decree on 21.02.2025 which were
supplied to her on 24.02.2025. Thereafter, she consulted her
lawyer for filing an appeal and thus, delay of 485 days occurred.
For ready reference, paragraph nos.5,6,7,8 and 9 are being quoted
hereinunder as:
"5. That order for issuance of notice to the appellant was
passed on 24.02.2023 and accordingly notice to the appellant
was issued on 28.02.2023. The notice returned undelivered
with noting "addressee was not in the house and family
member denied to accept".
6. That on the next date i.e on 31.03.2023 no step was taken
by the respondent and case was put up on 19.04.2023. On the
submission of the counsel of the respondent that the notice
was returned with endorsement "refused", order of ex-parte
against the appellant was passed on 19.04.2023.
7. That the suit proceeded, ex-parte without any further
attempt for appearance of the appellant either by way fresh
notice or by substituted service.
8. That the appellant has not received any notice of the suit
nor she has refused to accept the same nor any further attempt
for appearance of the appellant was made during trail, which
are apparent from the order-sheet and records of the case.
9. That recently, on 20.02.2025, the appellant came to know
about the judgment dated 19.08.2023 and decree dated
26.08.2023 and immediately applied for certified copy of the
plaint, order-sheet and judgment along with decree on
21.02.2025, which was supplied to the
appellant on 24.02.2025."
31. We are considering the issue of matrimonial dispute and as per
the law laid down for condoning the delay that the issue of
limitation is to be taken liberally and not to be taken in hyper
technically manner. The reason what has been stated in paragraph
nos.5, 6 and 7, therefore, cannot be said to be not having sufficient
reason being filing the appeal after delay of 485 days.
32. This Court, on the basis of the reference, as has been made
hereinabove by making reference of the order sheets setting the
Original Suit No.70 of 2023 ex-parte hearing against the
respondent-wife, is of the view that the cause which has been
shown by the appellant-wife in the instant interlocutory
application is sufficient one to condone the delay.
33. This Court, considering the reason assigned in paragraph nos. 5,
6, 7, 8 and 9 of the instant interlocutory application, is of the view
that the same is sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the
delay of 485 days in filing the appeal.
34. Accordingly, I.A. No. 3650 of 2025 is allowed.
35. Consequently, the delay of 485 days in filing the present appeal is
hereby condoned.
36. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant.
37. Admit.
38. Since the parties have already appeared in the present case and, as
such, there is no need to issue fresh notice to the respondent-
husband.
39. List this case on 06.08.2025.
40. In the proceeding of Original Suit No.70 of 2023, this Court
considered the conduct of the office of the learned Family Judge
to be not proper.
41.This Court is further of the view that if such practices are going on
in the respective Courts of the judgeship of the State of Jharkhand,
the same is to be taken care of seriously due to the reason that the
office-clerk cannot act as an Presiding Officer/Judge and if any
order has been passed without any signature of the Presiding
Officer/Judge, then the said order is said to be invalid in the eyes
of law.
42. Let this order be communicated to all the learned Principal
District & Sessions Judge/Principal Judicial Commissioner for its
onward communication to the learned Principal Judges/Additional
Principal Judges of different judgeship of the State of Jharkhand.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Sudhir
