Jharkhand High Court
Shailesh Kumar Aged About 61 Years vs The Steel Authority Of Indian Limited ... on 14 July, 2025
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 4007 of 2020
Shailesh Kumar aged about 61 years, son of Late Jainandan Prasad,
resident of Plot No. GA-V, City Centre, Sector-4, Bokaro Steel City,
Bokaro-827004, P.O. and P.S.-Sector-IV, District Bokaro
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The Steel Authority of Indian Limited through its Chairman
having its office at ISPAT Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-
110002, P.O., P.S Lodhi Road.-and District- New Delhi.
2. The Managing Director, Steel Authority of India Limited,
Bokaro Steel Plant, having its office at Main Administrative
Building, Bokaro Steel City, P.O., P.S. Bokaro Steel City and
District- Bokaro.
3. The General Manager, Town Administration Department, Steel
Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant having its office
at Nagar Seva Bhawan, Bokaro Steel City, P.O., P.S. Bokaro
Steel City and District-Bokaro.
4. The Deputy General Manager (TA-LRA), Town Administration
Department, Steel Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel
Plant having its office at Nagar Seva Bhawan, Bokaro Steel
City, P.O., P.S.- Bokaro Steel City and District-Bokaro.
5. The Superintendent, Land and Estate, Twon Administration
Authority of India Department, Steel Limited, Bokaro Steel
Plant having its office at Nagar Seva Bhawan, Bokaro Steel
City, P.O., P.S. Bokaro Steel City and District-Bokaro.
6. The Manager (Land and Estate) Steel Authority of India
Limited, Land Estate, Town Administration Department,
Bokaro Steel Plant having its office at Nagar Seva Bhawan,
Bokaro Steel City, P.O., P.S.- Bokaro Steel City and District-
Bokaro.
7. The Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro Steel City, P.O.,
P.S.- Bokaro Steel City and District- Bokaro.
... Respondents
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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Senior Advocate
Mr. Sanjeev Thakur, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
: Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate
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17/14.07.2025 Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
"(a) For quashing and setting aside the letter with Ref.
No. TA/LRA/2020-1081dated 27.10.2020 (Annexure-13)
vide which the Respondent Steel Authority of India
Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant has terminated the indenture
of Lease dated 13.07.2000 issued in favour of the
petitioner with a prospective date i.e. 90th day from the
date of service of the said letter, arbitrarily and in
violation of the settled principles of law without issuing
any show cause notice or without giving any opportunity
of hearing.
(b) For showing cause the Respondent No. 4 as to
whether they can take the harass and disproportionate
action of termination of lease of the petitioner
considering that the lease pertained to only a piece of
barren and vacant land whereupon, as per the terms of
the lease and as per the sanctioned plan by the
Respondents, the petitioner has constructed commercial-
cum- residential buildings (G+2) by investing huge
amount of money which if taken away so abruptly and
unmindfully, cause immense personal loss to the
petitioner and may amount to profiteering so far
Respondents are concerned.
(c) For further directing the Respondents to take decision
and/or to pass appropriate orders for remedying the
alleged breach, if any, which has taken place in view of
the ambiguities in Clause 6 and 15 of the lease deed
which otherwise also is condonable on the basis of
permission of the Respondents, thus remediable in any
case and for direction upon the Respondents not to
disturb the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the
landed/constructed property in concern.
(d) During pendency of the instant writ petition, the letter
of termination dated 27.10.2020 (Annexure-14) issued by
Respondent No.4 may be stayed or status quo may be
granted by this Hon'ble Court.
(e) Further issuance of writ(s)/orders(s)/direction(s) for
quashing of letter no. TA/LRA/2022-1805 dated
25.04.2022 (Annexure-15) issued by Respondent
company and notice dated 20.05.2022 u/s 4(a)/7 (3) of
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act issued by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel City
(Annexure-16 & 16/1)."
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents at the
threshold raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability
of the writ petition and has submitted that the writ petition arises out
of indenture of lease entered into between the parties and neither the
terms and conditions of the lease can be interpreted by this Court
under writ jurisdiction at the first instance nor the disputed questions
of fact can be adjudicated. It is submitted that the agreement between
the parties is purely contractual in nature and hence the writ petition is
not maintainable . The petitioner has a remedy under the provisions of
Transfer of Property Act and may go to the civil Court for
adjudication of his right, title and interest in connection with the lease
hold property.
4. The learned counsel has also submitted that after the
termination of the lease by the impugned order, a proceeding under
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to Act of 1971) is also pending for consideration.
5. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1994) 3 SCC 552 (State of
Gujarat and Others versus Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust
and Others) paragraph 22 to submit that the principles of natural
justice have no applicability in the case of termination of contract. He
has further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in (2000) 6 SCC 293 (Kerela State Electricity Board
and Another Versus Kurien Em Kalathil and Others) para 11 to
submit that the dispute relating to interpretation of terms and
conditions of the contract cannot be agitated in writ jurisdiction. He
has then relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 (Banatwala and Company
versus Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another) para 52 to
submit that the proceedings have been rightly initiated under the Act
of 1971 which is a special procedure for recovery of premises in
connection with which the lease has been terminated and determined.
The learned counsel has then referred to the judgment reported in
(2013) 5 SCC 470 (Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corporation and Another versus Diamond and Gem
Development Corporation Limited and Another) para 19,20,21 and
22 to submit that the present case is not a case of statutory contract
and therefore the writ jurisdiction is not maintainable.
6. He has also submitted that the writ cannot be issued unless
there is an existing legal right with the petitioner and there is a
correspondent legal duty on the part of the respondents. He has
submitted that the respondent herein has acted in terms of the
agreement and therefore the writ jurisdiction has been wrongly
invoked by the petitioner. The learned counsel has relied upon the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1994
Supp. (3) 694 (Jiwan Dass versus Life Insurance Corporation of
India and Another) paragraph 4 to counter the argument of relating to
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and has submitted that the
respondent has the right to terminate the lease in terms of the Transfer
of Property Act. He has also relied upon the judgment reported in
(2007) 14 SCC 517 (Jagdish Mandal versus State of Orissa and
Others) para 22 to submit that the contract involved in this case is
primarily a commercial contract relating to letting out of property and
there is no arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the
respondents and therefore the judicial review of the impugned action
of the respondents is not attracted in the present case. He has further
submitted that the principles of natural justice and equity have no role
to play in the case of commercial transaction between the parties. He
has then relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in 2022 SCC Online 151 (R. Muthukumar and Others
versus Chairman and Managing Director TANGDEO and Others)
paragraph 28 and 29 to submit that though the petitioner has raised
certain point in the rejoinder with regard to other similarly situated
persons but negative equality has no role to play and the petitioner has
violated the terms and conditions of the lease. He has also submitted
the fact that the petitioner had sublet the property is not in dispute and
only when the CBI had ultimately concluded about illegality
committed by the petitioner, action was taken in the year 2020 by the
impugned order terminating the lease. He has submitted that merely
because any natural justice has not been followed prior to issuance of
letter of termination, the same will have no role to play on account of
the admitted fact of subletting.
Argument of the Petitioner
7. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner while responding
to the point regarding maintainability of the writ petition has relied
upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Express Newspaper Private Ltd. Reported in (1986) 1 SCC 133
and has in particular referred to paragraph 70,73, 75,76,85,86 and 87
to submit that in the said case also the matter was relating to
termination of lease and merely because there is commercial contract
between the parties, the same does not mean that the writ petition
would not lie in the circumstances where the provisions of part-III of
the Constitution are involved. He has referred to Article 14 19(1) (g)
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
8. He has also submitted that only the land was given to the
petitioner and at the cost of petitioner he has erected the building and
the building is being utilized for residential cum commercial purpose.
The learned counsel submits that it is not in dispute that while issuing
the impugned letter of termination as contained in Annexure-13, no
show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and by virtue of the
same letter allegation has been leveled against the petitioner and the
same is also a letter of termination.
9. He has also submitted that after the issuance of letter of
termination, the proceeding under the provisions of aforesaid Act of
1971 Act has been initiated by treating the petitioner as unauthorized
occupant.
10. The learned counsel submits that the impugned letter is fit to be
set aside on account of gross violation of principle of natural justice.
11. The learned counsel has further referred to the terms and
conditions of the lease and has submitted that the allegation was only
in connection with subletting a portion of the property. He submits
that the remaining portion of the property remained with the
petitioner. Since the entire property was not assigned or sub let to
anybody, the clauses of agreement for terminating the lease are not
attracted. He has in particular referred to clause 6,15 and 27(b) and
(c)of the lease agreement. The learned counsel submits that in the
allotment letter, it has been mentioned that the land can be utilized for
the business of electrical goods, but in clause 15 of the lease
agreement it has been mentioned that the building can be used for all
the purposes including residential and commercial. The learned
counsel has also submitted that even as per the records of this case,
there was subletting only for a period of six months way back in the
year 2012-13 and the letter of termination has been issued in the year
2020 and in the meantime, the petitioner continued to pay the rent
without any objection from the side of the respondents. The learned
counsel has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court reported in 1999(39) DRJ page 87 (B. Banerjee v.
Romesh Mahajan) and has submitted that merely because the portion
of the constructed building was sublet, the same does not amount to
violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement. He has in
particular referred to paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment.
12. The learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1989) 3 SCC 293 to
submit that merely because there is an agreement the same does not
exclude applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
13. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 (Dharampal
Satyapal Ltd. V. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Guahati
and Others) and has submitted that the principles of natural justice are
not excluded merely because there is a lease deed entered into
between the parties.
14. The learned counsel submits that the respondents are public
sector organization and their Acts are to be tested on the touchstone of
the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He has referred to
paragraph 19,20, 21,22,25,28 and 35 of the said judgment. He has also
referred to Section 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act.
15. Arguments concluded.
16. Post this case for judgment on 22.07.2025.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Binit
