Jharkhand High Court

The State Of Jharkhand vs Ashok Kumar on 11 July, 2025

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                                      2025:JHHC:18742-DB



       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

                       L.P.A. No. 727 of 2023
                             With
                       I.A No. 1152 of 2025

                                     ---

       1. The State of Jharkhand
       2. The Secretary, Water Resources Development Department,
       Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
       3. The Special Secretary, Water Resources Development
       Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
       4. The Under Secretary, Water Resources Development
       Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
       5. The Joint Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
                                       ...     ...     Appellants
                                  Versus
       Ashok Kumar, son of D. Sahu, resident of Fulkumari Bhawan,
       Hanuman Nagar, near Mustafabad, P.O. & P.S.- Gaya, District-
       Gaya (Bihar)                    ....    ...     Respondent
       CORAM:              HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                                     ---
       For the Appellants              : Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr.S.C.-I
       For the Respondent              : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Advocate
                                         Mr. Anurag Kumar, Advocate
                                     ---
Reserved on 07.07.2025                      Pronounced on 11.07.2025
Per : Rajesh Shankar, J. :

The present interlocutory application has been filed under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 193

days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the

order/judgment dated 24.04.2023 passed by the learned Single

Judge in W.P.(S) No. 6874 of 2019.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that after passing

of the impugned order dated 24.04.2023 in the said writ petition,

the concerned department was immediately informed regarding

the outcome of the said order and thereafter the original file along

with entire documents was placed before the competent authority

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i.e., the Under Secretary, Water Resources Development Department,

Government of Jharkhand (the appellant no. 4) to take appropriate

steps with respect to filing of appeal against the order dated

24.04.2023.

3. It is also submitted that an opinion was sought from the

Advocate General, Jharkhand and thereafter the original file along

with entire documents was placed before the Secretary, Water

Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand (the appellant

no. 2) on 06.07.2023 to take appropriate steps in the matter.

4. It is further argued that the appellant no. 2 also sought

opinion from the Advocate General, Jharkhand who advised to prefer

appeal against the order dated 24.04.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.

6874 of 2019 and on 11.07.2023, a decision was taken to file appeal

against the said order. Thereafter, draft memo of appeal was

prepared by the office of the Senior Standing Counsel-I and the same

was sent to the appellant department for final approval.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants also contends that several

rounds of discussions were held and the grounds of appeal were

finally approved for filing Letters Patent Appeal against the order

dated 24.04.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6874 of 2019 and thereafter

the present appeal was filed on 22.12.2023.

6. It is further argued by the counsel for the appellants that the

delay in filing of appeal has occasioned due to reasons beyond the

control of the appellants. There are good grounds involved in the

instant appeal and therefore, if the delay of 193 days in filing of the

same is not condoned, the appellants will suffer irreparable loss and

injury.

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7. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent submits

that there is an inordinate delay of 193 days in filing the instant

appeal and the present interlocutory application has been filed

without assigning any reasonable explanation for committing such

delay.

8. It is further submitted that the respondent was dismissed

from service merely relying on a preliminary enquiry without taking

into consideration his reply and as such, the learned Single Judge has

rightly passed the impugned order dated 24.04.2023.

9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

materials available on record.

10. On bare perusal of the record, it appears that the

order/judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on

24.04.2023 and the counsel of the appellants was present on the said

date. As such, the appellants had knowledge of the said judgment.

They were also well aware of the legal position that a Letters Patent

Appeal was to be filed within 30 days from the date of passing of the

order/judgment of the learned Single Judge, however the appellants

filed the present Letters Patent Appeal on 22.12.2023 i.e., after the

delay of 193 days. Even the application for obtaining the certified

copy was filed on 24.11.2023 i.e., after seven months of passing the

impugned order dated 24.04.2023. Thus, the appellants adopted

negligent/lethargic approach in filing the appeal.

11. In the case of Postmaster General and others Vs. Living

Media India Limited and another reported in (2012) 3 SCC

563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr.

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Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a

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liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government."

12. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir

Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 489, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -

"25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not

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start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case."

13. Thus, it is no more res integra that a government department

cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The claim on account of

impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of

making several notes cannot be accepted in view of modern

technologies being used and available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody, including the government.

14. We are not inclined to condone the delay of 193 days in filing

the present Letters Patent Appeal in view of the fact that the

appellants have been negligent in taking steps in filing the same and

they have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

15. Otherwise also, it appears from the record that no document

was produced before the enquiry officer to prove the charges levelled

against the respondent and the inquiry officer submitted the inquiry

report finding the respondent guilty of the charges merely on the

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basis of preliminary inquiry.

16. In the case of Satyendra Singh Versus State of Uttar

Pradesh and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3325,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -

"16. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301, this Court held that evidence recorded in a preliminary inquiry cannot be used for a regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it and the opportunity to cross-examine persons examined in preliminary inquiry is not given. Relevant extract thereof reads as under:--

"42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [AIR 1960 SC 992], held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held.

43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1854], a Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry should not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to whether a regular inquiry must be held. The Court further held as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12)

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"12. ..... There must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that article, nor prior to that."

44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1997) 1 SCC 299], this Court dealt with the issue and held as under:

"... a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and, whether preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by observing principles of natural justice of (sic) nor, remains of no consequence."

45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross- examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice."

(emphasis supplied)

17. We are of the view that the evidence recorded in a

preliminary inquiry cannot substitute a regular inquiry as the

delinquent is not associated with preliminary inquiry and no

opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in preliminary

inquiry is given to him. Using such evidence would be violative of the

principles of natural justice. The purpose of holding a preliminary

inquiry is only to prima facie know as to whether the alleged

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misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings

recorded in preliminary inquiry, a departmental proceeding is to be

initiated against the delinquent. Thus, otherwise also the appellants'