Jharkhand High Court

The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... vs Kishore Chandra on 8 July, 2025

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                                2025:JHHC:18224-DB




       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                        I.A. No. 1637 of 2025
                                 In/And
                        L.P.A. No. 252 of 2025
     1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of Home, Jail
        and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S.
        Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
     2. The Principal Secretary, Planning -cum-Finance Department,
        Government Jharkhand, at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District
        Ranchi.
     3. The Director General of Police, Government of Jharkhand, having its
        office at Police Headquarter, P.O.& P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
     4. The I.G. (Provision), Jharkhand Police, Government of Jharkhand, having
        its office at Police Headquarter, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
     5. The D.I.G. (Personnel), Jharkhand Police, Government of Jharkhand,
         having its office at Police Headquarter, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District
         Ranchi.                                      ....   ..... Applicants
                                         Versus
     1. Kishore Chandra, aged about 68 years, son of Late Rajendra Prasad
        Singh, resident of behind Ratan Residency Apartment, Harmu Housing
        Colony, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Argora, District Ranchi.
     2. The Accountant General (A & E), A.G. Office Complex, Doranda, P.O.
        & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand., ...             Respondents
                                 ---------

     CORAM:           HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                             ---------
     For the Appellants:     Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, AC to SC IV
     For the Resp. No. 2:    Mrs. Richa Sanchita, Advocate
                             Mr. Suman Roy, Advocate
                             --------
     Reserved on: 02.07.2025           Pronounced on: 08 / 07 /2025
     M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral)

1) The instant interlocutory application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 266 days in filing the Letters Patent

Appeal, challenging the judgment dt. 17.2.2024 of the learned Single Judge

in W.P.(S) No. 623 of 2020.

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2) In the application filed seeking condonation of delay it is stated that the

respondents had filed a representation dt. 28.3.2024 before the applicants

enclosing copy of the impugned order; that the Legal cell of the Police

Headquarter, Ranchi on 3.4.2024 mooted a proposal for taking appropriate

decision with regard the order of the learned Single Judge; that on 4.4.2024

the Dy. S.P. (Legal) forwarded the same to the IG ( Provision), Jharkhand;

that on 5.6.2024 IG (Provision) directed to obtain opinion of the Advocate

General in the matter; and the file was sent to the office of the Advocate

General on 13.6.2024; on 14.6.2024 he gave opinion to file LPA.

3) Thereafter file was returned on 24.6.2024 to the Legal Section through

proper channel and then statement of facts, grounds of appeal were prepared

and the same was sent to the office of the Standing Counsel-IV. It is

contended that on 6.8.2024 draft memo was received from the office of SC-

IV and was sent to the Home Department on 13.8.2024 for taking approval

of the Departmental Secretary which was returned to the Police Headquarter

on 28.10.2024; on 11.11.2024 Dy. S.P. Headquarter, forwarded it to the

higher authority; and then on 9.12.2024 the Letters Patent Appeal was filed

with a delay of 266 days.

4) Though the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on

17.2.2024, application for certified copy of the same was made on

22.11.2024, 9 months after the judgment was pronounced, and after it was

issued on 2.12.2024, the appeal was filed on 9.12.2024. No reason has been

assigned for the delay in applying for certified copy of the judgment of the

learned Single Judge.

5) A reading of the application for condonation of delay shows that the file

relating to the judgment of the learned Single Judge was moved from table to

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table on the pretext that there are several layers of decision making process

and time was thus wasted.

6) At every stage of the process the applicants had acted in lethargic manner as

if there is no limitation to file the Letters Patent Appeal and probably

believing that the appeal can be filed whenever they feel like it. It cannot be

said that they were unaware that limitation period for filing the LPA against

the judgment of the learned single Judge is only 30 days.

7) This conduct has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in several cases.

8) In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited

and another1, the Supreme Court held:

"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the

(2012) 3 SCC 563

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prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government." (emphasis supplied)

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9) These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants

have acted in a similar manner as in the said case

10) The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases

such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect

(India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 vs. Design

Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools

Administration & Others4, Union of India & Others vs. Vishnu Aroma

Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar Pradesh &

Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6.

11) In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his

LR 7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the merits of the

matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out

for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a

litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to

condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant

matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering

whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach

of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of

limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a

period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the

matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be

presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be

heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against

(2022) 3 SCC 159

(2022) 2 SCC 327

(2021) 11 SCC 557

(2022) 9 SCC 263

(2022) 9 SCC 266

2024 INSC 262: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489

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the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for

condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case

and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation

offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be

excused as a matter of generosity.

12) This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar

Choudhary8.

13) In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the applicants

have been negligent in taking steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal and they

have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the said period of delay.