Jharkhand High Court
State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... vs Shahdeo Paswan on 22 July, 2025
Author: Rajesh Kumar
Bench: Rajesh Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A No.659 of 2023
With
I.A No.53 of 2024
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1. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand,
Project Building, Dhurwa, PO-Dhurwa, PS-Jagarnathpur, District-
Ranchi
2. The Secretary, Rural Development Department, Jharkhand at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O.- Dhurwa, P.S.-Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Giridih, P.O. & P.S. Giridih, District
Giridih.
4. The Deputy Development Commissioner, Giridih, P.O. & P.S. Giridih,
District Giridih.
5. District Rural Development Agency through its Chairman, Giridih,
P.O. & P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
6. The Additional Collector, Giridih, P.O. & P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
..........Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Shahdeo Paswan, son of Badhan Ram, resident of village
Choudharydih, P.O. Sabalpur, P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
2. Arjun Prasad Gupta, son of late Vyas Ram, resident of village Mahadeo
Talab Road, P.O. & P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
3. Tulsi Paswan, son of late Bakhauri Paswan, resident of village
Pandeydih, P.O. Sirsiya, P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
4. Ashok Ram, son of late Babulal Ram, resident of village Dhariyadih,
P.O. Dhariyadih, P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
5. Md. Riyaz Ansari, son of Md. Muslim, resident of village Bhagri, P.O.
Bhagri, P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
6. Santosh Kumar Thakur, son of Triloki Nath Thakur, resident of village
Shitalpur, P.O. Sirsiya, P.S. Giridih, District Giridih.
7. Smt. Anjani Devi, wife of late Govind Mistri, resident of village
Ruputola, Panchayat-Pandeydih, P.O. Dhanwanr, P.S. Giridih, District
Giridih.
8. Vikash Kumar Rana, son of late Govind Mistri, resident of village
Ruputola, Panchayat-Pandeydih, P.O. Dhanwanr, P.S. Giridih, District
Giridih.
9. Gautam Rana, son of late Govind Mistri @ Govind Ram, resident of
village Ruputola, Panchayat-Pandeydih, P.O. Dhanwanr, P.S. Giridih,
District Giridih.
...... Respondents/Petitioners
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CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellants : Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II
Mr. Ravi Prakash Mishra, AC to AAG-II
For the Respondents : Mr. R.N. Sahay, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Yashvardhan, Advocate
Mr. Kirtivardhan, Advocate
Mr. Ritesh Singh, Advocate
Mr. Aditya Aman, Advocate
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Order No.09 Dated: 22.07.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.
1. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent appeal
is directed against the order dated 08.06.2022 passed in W.P(S) No.2538
of 2017 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge by allowing
the writ petition has directed the State-authority (appellants herein) to
consider the case of the petitioners for regularization and pass a reasoned
order within eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of
the order.
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ
petition needs to refer herein which reads as under:
(i) It is pleaded that the writ petitioners were appointed since 1993,
1994 and 1996 respectively and working for more than ten years
in the office of the respondents concerned.
(ii) It is specific case of the petitioners that from the date of
appointments, they are working to the full satisfaction of their
controlling authorities, wherever they were posted. In the year
2011, a written examination was conducted on 31.7.2011 for
appointment of Grade-IV posts. The petitioners participated in
the examination and upon publication of results, all the
petitioners were called for interview, but the same stood
cancelled and thereafter no examination was held.
(iii) It is also pleaded that an approval for vacant and sanctioned
seats/posts was made by the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur
Division, Hazaribag to the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih,
stating the total number of seats. Since the petitioners are still
working on the said posts, their cases ought to have regularized,
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but no decision has yet been taken by the respondents, which
compelled them to approach this Court by filing W.P(S) No.2538
of 2017.
3. The learned Single Judge by allowing the writ petition has
directed the State-authority (appellants herein) to consider the case of the
petitioners for regularization and pass a reasoned order within eight weeks
from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the order.
4. Being aggrieved, the instant appeal has been preferred by the
State-Appellant.
Submission on behalf of the State-appellant:
5. In support of his contention, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned
AAG-II has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
(i) It has been contended that the present appeal has been filed after
delay of 575 days and for condonation of such delay, an
interlocutory application under section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 being I.A No.53 of 2024 has been filed by the State.
(ii) It has been contended by referring to paragraph nos.4 to 7 of the
application for condonation of delay that due to the reason
mentioned in those paragraphs, the delay has been caused and, as
such, a prayer has been made to condone the delay so as to hear the
matter on merit.
(iii) It has been contended that the learned Single Judge has failed to
appreciate that without giving any finding in the writ petition only
to direct to take decision upon the representation of the writ
petitioners/respondents which were taken by the respondents but
the learned Single Judge not satisfied with the reasoned order.
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(iv) It has further been contended that the writ petitioners have not been
appointed on the sanctioned vacant post which is mandatory
condition as laid down b the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
"State of Karnataka vrs. Uma Devi" reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1.
(v) It has further been contended that the learned Single Judge has
failed to appreciate that the writ petitioners having no requisite
qualification as well as they have also not appointed by the
competent authority.
(vi) It has further been contended that the writ petitioners have not
annexed any appointment letter along with the writ petition and
they are the employee of DRDA and as per the Memo No.2391
dated 30.07.2020 of the Department of Personnel, Administrative
Reforms and Rajbhasa, Govt. of Jharkhand they are not entitled for
any regularization because they are working with the DRDA.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the State-appellant based upon the
aforesaid ground, initially, has contested the case by showing the error in
the impugned order and has submitted that the impugned judgment needs
interference.
Submission on behalf of the Respondents-writ petitioners:
7. While on the other hand, Mr. R. N. Sahay, the learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioners assisted by Mr. Yash
Vardhan, the learned counsel has submitted that the reason which has been
assigned for condoning the 575 days, inordinate delay, in filing the appeal
cannot be said to be sufficient cause.
8. It has been contended that the delay is shown to be there due to
movement of file from one table to another. The said ground has been
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considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court not to be sufficient cause to
condone the delay.
9. The learned senior counsel, in addition thereto, has submitted
that even the appellant has no case on merit since, all the respondents-writ
petitioners are in service since long, i.e., from 1993, 1994 and 1996
regularly and still are discharging their service, but they have not been
regularized in service in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of "State of Karnataka & others Vrs. Uma Devi
& others", reported in (2006) 4 SCC 01, as also in the case of "Narendra
Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors." reported in (2018)
8 SCC 238.
10. The learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that the
reason for condoning the delay cannot be said to be sufficient, hence, the
application for condonation of delay being I.A No.53 of 2024 filed by the
State-appellant may be dismissed due to want of sufficient cause for
condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeal of 575 days.
11. The learned senior counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has
submitted that the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the
aforesaid aspect of the matter has passed the impugned judgment and, thus,
the same cannot be said to suffer from an error and, as such, the impugned
judgment needs no interference.
Analysis:
12. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
gone through the application for condonation of delay and the findings
recorded by the learned Single Judge.
13. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant
intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 575 days, deems
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it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before
going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.
14. Learned counsel for the State-appellant has submitted that delay
in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory
Application being I.A No. 53 of 2024 on the basis of grounds shown
therein treating the same to be sufficient.
15. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the instant
appeal, as has been mentioned in the said interlocutory application are
being referred herein as under:
"4. That, it is stated and submitted that after perusing the
judgement/order, the file was forwarded to the legal
Section for obtaining legal advice in the matter who after
perusing the same, advised for filing L.P. A.
5. That, it is stated and submitted that the appellants have
sent a letter to the office of the Advocate General, Hon'ble,
High Court of Jharkhand requesting therein to prepare
memo of appeal against the judgement/order dated 08-06-
2022 passed by Hon'ble Single Judge in W. P. (S) No.
2538/2017.
6. That, it is stated and submitted that the appellants have
requested their counsel to apply for Certified copy of
impugned order. On receipt of the same the present Letter
Patent Appeal has been filed.
7. That, it is stated and submitted that in the meantime due
to issue of contempt proceeding the delay occurred in
preferring the appeal which is not willful and malafide and
are on the account of circumstances beyond the control of
the appellants.
8.That, it is stated and submitted that by the impugned
order/judgement, the Respondents were directed to pass a
reasoned order. The reasoned order has been passed
however, since there are certain observations of the
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Hon'ble Court, it was decided to file the present appeal.
Hence, delay has occurred in filling the present appeal.
9. That, it is stated and submitted that the appellants have
raised good grounds in the appeal and have every chance
in succeeding therein and if the delay in
filing the appeal will not be condoned and appeal will not
be admitted, the appellants will suffer irreparable loss and
injustice."
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on delay
condonation application and before considering the same, this Court,
deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been
propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of
the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
17. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to
be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing
of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to
consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit
of the lis.
18. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined
in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every
legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as
has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
19. The Privy Council in "General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim", (1939-40) 67 IA
416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932,
wherein, it has been said that:
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"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate
harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law
provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk
of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on
equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law,
postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not
recognized by law."
20. In "P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala", (1997) 7 SCC 556,
the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565
days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory
explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6
as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds."
21. While considering the similar issue, this Court in "Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy", (2013) 12 SCC 649,
wherein, it has been held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot
be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to
be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal
approach.
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22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."
22. It is settled position of law that when a litigant does not act with
bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its
part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona
fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should
be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation
of delay.
23. In the case of "Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media
India Limited & Anr.", [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court that it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona
fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was
kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under
a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments. For ready reference
the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including
the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter
by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with competent persons
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familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before
us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice,
we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery
and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
24. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in "State of Madhya Pradesh
& Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade", [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to
the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Post Master
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General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr." (supra,) has
held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder:
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same
thing again and again and the conduct seems to be
incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after
a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such
inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of
Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order
dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and
we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again
except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the
delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that
the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the
judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and
the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the
impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department
took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP
had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary
of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of
revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the
Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable
period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of
excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no
more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1
SCC (L&S) 649]
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4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of
the cases are only "certificate cases" to obtain a certificate
of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the
issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be
in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation
where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these
files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in
which the application has been worded, the wastage of
judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner
State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and
Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited
within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the
files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also
filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have
put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any
successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up."
25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal
Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.", (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case,
there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12,
it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The
proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court
by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further
has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to
be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is
shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion
it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter
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naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts
and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona
fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts
as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the
time available to it. In this connection we may point out that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always
material and relevant when the court is dealing with
applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5
and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which
have been expressly made material and relevant by the
provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the
same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which
fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in
holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of
the appellant because apart from the general criticism made
against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of
limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed,
as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial
Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for
condonation of delay only on the ground that it was
appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within
the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid
ground."
26. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause
for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether
it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a
right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to
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look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part.
27. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of
'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has
been made in "Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer",
[(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court
at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than
that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances
of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted
diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the
reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has
to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the
court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation
is furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn.
Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC
1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC
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(Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC
157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993]
this Court explained the difference between a "good cause"
and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient
cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good
cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that
of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a
liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is
done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1
SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC
1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has
no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is
never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision
to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no
choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard
but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
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13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its
aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress
fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have
not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
(2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove
a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity
and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired
in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005)
7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC
705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4
SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly
in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC
225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
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within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature."
28. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for
the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously.
29. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is
bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been
held in "Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath
Banerjee & Ors.", AIR 1964 SC 1336; "Lala Matadin Vrs. A.
Narayanan", (1969) 2 SCC 770; "Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti", (2011)
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3 SCC 545 and "Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of
Brihan Mumbai", (2012) 5 SCC 157.
30. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to
ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference
in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao
& Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
"12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient
cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order
22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or
not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot
be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting
explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps.
But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the
rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence
or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the
matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not
taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has
accrued to the other party which should not be lightly
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defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of
the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected
when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law
are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis
terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.
While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon
the parties either way."
31. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein,
expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means that the
party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it
cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained
inactive".
32. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to condone the
inordinate delay of 575 days, is proceeding to examine as to whether the
explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for
condoning the delay.
33. As would appear from the explanation furnished, wherein, it has
been stated in the interlocutory application that after the impugned
order/judgment having been passed on 08.06.2022 to regularize the writ
petitioners in their service, being aggrieved by the said order it was decided
to file the present appeal. But due to pendency of the contempt case filed
by the writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge, the delay has been
caused.
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34. It appears from the stated grounds in the delay condonation
application that the cause has been tried to be shown firstly, after perusing
the impugned judgment, the file was forwarded to the legal section for
obtaining legal advice in the matter who after perusing the same, advised
for filing a Letters Patent Appeal and secondly, due to pendency of the
contempt proceeding filed by the respondent- writ petitioners before the
learned Single Judge the delay occurred.
35. This Court fails to understand that though the relief as sought for
by the respondent-writ petitioners was that they have been continuing in
their service in their respective Departments since long and they are still
working there and even no efforts will be taken by the State authority to
regularize them directly or through by conducting any examination/
interview and after passing the impugned order by the learned Single Judge
directing the State-authority to regularize them in their respective services
as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, but the State-
appellant instead of complying with the order of the learned Single Judge
has also faced the contempt proceeding and chosen to file the instant
appeal after inordinate delay of 575 days to save it from contempt
proceeding which is not justified at all.
36. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such circumstances
as per the reference made hereinabove about the conduct of the State-
appellant, the same cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the
inordinate delay of 575 days.
37. The reference of a case is required to be made herein of an order
passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019,
wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568 days was under
consideration.
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38. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the reason
furnished by the State of Jharkhand therein to be sufficient cause on the
aforesaid grounds by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex as referred hereinabove.
39. The State of Jharkhand has travelled to the Hon'ble Apex Court
by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has challenged the order
passed in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of 2022 has
been dismissed as would appear from the order dated 13.05.2022.
40. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed one Special Leave
to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th April, 2023 filed by the State
of Jharkhand which was filed against the order passed by this Court in
L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court
dismissed the said appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of the
appeal.
41. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed S.L.P.(C)
Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by the State of
Jharkhand against the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in
L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the delay of 259 days was not condoned.
42. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove as also the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application, is of the view
that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone inordinate delay of
575 days in filing the appeal.
43. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No.
53 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.
44. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal being L.P.A No.659
of 2023 also stands dismissed.
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45. In consequence of dismissal of appeal, pending interlocutory
application being I.A No.10737 of 2023 also stands dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C. J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Sudhir
AFR
