Jharkhand High Court
M/S. Bharat Coking Coal Limited vs Smt. Angura Sahis @ Angura Devi on 29 January, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
M.A. No. 107 of 2022
1. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, a Company incorporated under the
Companies Act, having its Head Office at Koyla Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. - Koyla
Nagar, District - Dhanbad (Jharkhand) through its General Manager of
Govindpur Area-III of M/s. BCCL, PO & PS - Sonardih, District - Dhanbad
(Jharkhand) and also through its Chief Manager (Personnel)/H.O.D. (Legal)
Sri Ved Prakash, aged about 56 years, son of Late Radha Krishna Prasad,
residing near Koyla Bhawan, PO BCCL Township, PS Saraidhela, District
Dhanbad (Jharkhand) who is also representing the other appellant herein..
2. The Project Officer, New Akashkinari Colliery, Govindpur Area-III of M/s.
BCCL, P.O. + P.S.- Katras, District - Dhanbad (Jharkhand)
............. Opposite Parties/Appellants
Versus
Smt. Angura Sahis @ Angura Devi, W/o. Late Yudhisthir Sahis, resident of
Village Dudhiya, P.O. & P.S.- Baliapur,, District Dhanbad, PIN 828201
(Jharkhand) ...........Applicant/Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Ms. Swati Shalini, Advocate
Ms. Aprajita Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Pratiush Lala, Advocate
.........
07/Dated: 29/01/2025
Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Das, assisted by Ms. Swati Shalini, learned
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Pratiush Lala, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. The present appeal has been filed against the Judgment/Award dated
14.03.2020 passed by learned Presiding Officer-cum- Employees Compensation
Commissioner, Labour Court, Dhanbad in W.C. Case No. 11 of 2018 whereby the claim
filed by the respondent under sections, 3, 4 and 22 of the Employee's Compensation
Act, 19223 has been allowed and the appellants were directed to make payment of
compensation to the tune of Rs. 6,65,160/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of death i.e. 11.09.2016 till the date of actual payment. .
3. The learned counsel for the appellants at the outset submits that for
maintaining the appeal, the awarded amount along with interest to the tune of Rs.
8,87,989/- after deduction of T.D.S. has already been deposited before the Employee
Compensation Commissioner, Dhanbad. She submits that the sole respondent had
filed claim application under sections 3, 4 and 22 of the Employee's Compensation
Act, 1923 claiming compensation on account of death of one Yudhisthir Sahis @
Judhisthir Sahis stating therein that he was a permanent employee of New Akashkinari
Colliery, Govindpur Area-III of M/s BCCL. He was designated as General Mazdoor. On
10.09.2016, Yudhisthir Sahis was working in underground mines in the night shift at
Akashkinari Colliery. He fell down into the mines and became unconscious while he
was performing his duty and with the help of co-workers and management personnel
he was provided first aid at Colliery Hospital. Thereafter he was admitted in Central
Hospital, Dhanbad and died during treatment on 11.09.2016. The applicant is said to
be the wife of the deceased and the monthly wages of the deceased -workman was
Rs. 25,000/- per month and he was aged about 46 years at the time of his death. She
submits that was the case of the respondent before the learned Presiding Officer-cum-
Employees Compensation Commissioner, Labour Court, Dhanbad.
4. Ms. Swati Shalini, learned counsel for the appellants submits that after
notice the appellants appeared before the learned Commissioner and thereafter Award
has been passed. She submits that there is no injury etc on the body of the deceased
and in absence of that the learned Tribunal has wrongly passed the said Award. She
submits that the deceased fell down and became unconscious and death has
occurred in view of that the case made under Sections 3 and 4 of the Employee's
Compensation Act, 1923 is not made out. She further submits that there is no clear-
cut finding how the death has occurred inspite of that the learned Tribunal has passed
the said Award. Learned counsel for the appellants relied in the case of "Leela Devi
and Another Vs. Ram Lal and Another" reported in ILLN 995. She submits
that the said Award may kindly be quashed.
5. Mr. Pratiush Lala, learned counsel for the respondent draws the
attention of the Court to the evidences of O.P.W.-I and in para 13 he has stated that
the deceased met with an accident while he was on duty and O.P.W-2 has also stated
in para 15 that the deceased became unconscious at his working place. He submits
that the learned Tribunal has given a clear-cut finding on the basis of statement of
the witnesses of the appellants itself. He submits that there is no illegality in the
Award.
6. In view of above argument of the learned counsel for the parties
only law point involved is as to whether accident has taken place on working place or
not ?
7. It is an admitted position that the deceased was working with the
New Akashkinari Colliery, Govindpur Area-III of M/s BCCL and he was employed there
and he was working in underground mines. In the light of statement of O.P.W.-1 which
has been recorded in the Award of the learned Tribunal, the Court finds that in para
13 he has stated that the deceased met with an accident while he was on duty and
identically O.P.W-2 has also stated in para 15 that the deceased became unconscious
at his working place. Thus, the employment and working place is proved. It is also
admitted by the O.P.Ws that he became unconscious while he was on duty. Based on
this, the learned Tribunal has passed the Award and he has come to the conclusion
that in different types of poisonous gases and percentage of oxygen varies in the
under ground mines cannot be ruled out. The nature of employment of the deceased
was full of stress and strain as such the deceased fell down while performing his duty.
It was not proved before the learned Commissioner by the BCCL that the deceased
was suffering from any disease or that he was not fit for performing duty in the
underground mines. Further, the BCCL has not examined the doctor before the
learned Commissioner and in this background the learned Commissioner has held
that the deceased met with an accident and has awarded the said amount.
8. The only argument has been made by the learned counsel for the
appellants that there is no injury and in view of that it cannot be said that it was an
accident.
9. The word "accident" has already been defined long ago in Fenton V. J.
Thorley and Co., (1903) A.C. 443 and it has been considered in the case of " Som
Dutt Builders Ltd. Vs. Phool Kumari, wife of late Manbirender Singh " 2004
(74) DRJ 626 wherein para 9 it has been held as under;
"9. What the word "accident" means was settled long ago in Fenton v. J. Thorley
and Co., [1903] A.C. 443. After reviewing the case law, the title of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1897 and its preliminary sections, Lord Macnaghten concluded
on page 448 of the Report that:
"... the expression "accident" is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word
as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or
designed." On page 453 of the Report, Lord Lindley said: "The word "accident" is
not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but
with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and
unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often use to denote
any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause; and if the cause
is not known the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident. The word
"accident" is also often used to denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt
being made to discriminate between them. The great majority of what are called
accidents are occasioned by carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often
important to distinguish careless from other unintended and unexpected events."
10. In view of above and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself
would certainly be called an accident.
11. "Accident" during the course of employment in the workman
compensation Act was also subject matter in the case of "Mackinnon Machenzie
and Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak" 1969 (2) SCC 607, para 5 is
quoted hereunder:-
"5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the
course of employment. The words "in the course of the employment" mean "in the
course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to
it." The words "arising out of employment" are understood to mean that "during
the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the
duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is
reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered." In other
words there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the
employment. The expression "arising out of employment" is again not confined to
the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as
such -- to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of
any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the
injury would be one which arises 'out of employment'. To put it differently if the
accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment,
the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has
exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. In Lancashire and
Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley [(1917) AC 352] Lord Sumner laid down the
following test for determining whether an accident "arose out of the employment":
"There is, however, in my opinion, one test which is always at any rate
applicable, because it arises upon the very words of the statute, and it is
generally of some real assistance. It is this: Was it part of the injured person's
employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If yes,
the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it
was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be
the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. To ask if the cause of
the workman was within the sphere of the employment, or was one of the
ordinary risks of the employment, or reasonably incidental to the employment,
or conversely, was an added peril and outside the sphere of the employment,
are all different ways of asking whether it was a part of his employment, that
the workman should have acted as he was acting, or should have been in the
position in which he was, whereby in the course of that employment he
sustained injury."
12. In view of above judgment, the expression applies to employment as such --
to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those
factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be
one which arises 'out of employment'. In other words, if the accident had occurred on
account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation
must succeed.
13. Notional extension was subject matter in the case of " Leela Bai and
Another V. Seema Chouhan and Another" (2019) 4 SCC 325 wherein para 7 the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"7. In the facts of the case, and the evidence available, it is evident that the
deceased was present at the bus terminal and remained with the bus even after
arrival from Indore not by choice, but by compulsion and necessity, because of the
nature of his duties. The route timings of the bus required the deceased to be
readily available with the bus so that the passenger service being provided by
Respondent 1 remained efficient and was not affected. If the deceased would have
gone home everyday after parking the bus and returned the next morning, the
efficiency of the timing of the bus service facility to the travelling public would
definitely have been affected, dependant on the arrival of the deceased at the bus-
stand from his house. Naturally that would bring an element of uncertainty in the
departure schedule of the bus and efficiency of the service to the travelling public
could be compromised. Adherence to schedule by the deceased would naturally
enure to the benefit of Respondent 1 by enhancement of income because of timely
service. It is not without reason that the deceased would not go home for weeks
as deposed by the appellant. Merely because the deceased was coming down the
roof of the bus after having his meal, cannot be considered in isolation and
interpreted so myopically to hold that he was off duty and therefore would not be
entitled to compensation."
14. In view of above it cannot be said that the accident has not taken place
while the deceased was discharging his duty. The finding based on the basis of
admission of appellants' own witnesses O.P.W-1 and O.P.W-2.
15. So far the judgement relied by the learned counsel for the appellants
in concerned, in that case the Himachal Pradesh High Court has come to the conclusion
that the burden is upon the workman to prove about the employment accident in the
course of employment. In the present appeal, on the admission of O.P.Ws itself it has
been proved that the death has occurred while he was discharging duty and in view of
that the said judgment is not helping the appellants.
16. In view of above reasons and analysis the law point is answered
accordingly. This appeal is dismissed. Pending I.A, if any, stands dismissed. It has been
informed by the learned counsel for the appellants that awarded amount has already
been received by the claimants.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Satyarthi/A.F.R
