Jharkhand High Court

The New India Assurance Company Limited vs Sanni Hansda on 5 February, 2025

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
                            M.A. No. 182 of 2024
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The New India Assurance Company Limited, having its Regional Office at Patna, and its local office i.e. the New India Assurance Company Limited, Kachchari Road, Deoghar, PO, PS and District

- Deoghar, through Manager, the New India Assurance Company Limited Office at Psethi Corporate, 2nd Floor, P.P. Compound, Main Road, Ranchi, PO - GPO, PS - Hindpiri, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand .... Appellant

-- Versus --

1. Sanni Hansda, wife of Late Madan Tudu

2. Naresh Tudu son of Late Madan Tudu (Minor)

3. Panmuni Tudu daughter of Late Madan Tudu Petitioner No.2 and 3 are minors, represented through her mother as a legal guardian. All resident of village and PO - Karijhank, PS - Mohanpur, Subdivision and District - Deoghar, Jharkhand ..... Petitioners/Respondents

4. Kanhai Chandra Mandal, son of Magram Mandal, resident of H. No.24, Raja Basti, Sindri, PO and PS - Sindri, District - Dhanbad, Jharkhand (Owner of Tracker Reg. No.BR 17P - 1887) ..... O.P. No.1/Respondent

5. Dhananjay Ray son of Hari Lal Ray, resident of village -

Hindolabaran, PO and PS - Mohanpur, Subdivision and District - Deoghar, Jharkhand .... O.P. No.2/ Respondent

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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          For the Appellant    :-   Mr. Amaresh Kumar, Advocate
                               :-   Ms. Arpita Sinha, Advocate
          For Respondents      :-

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04/05.02.2025 Heard learned counsels appearing for the appellant.

2. This appeal is barred by 462 days. There is delay in filing of

462 days in the present appeal and for that I.A. No.6560 of 2024 has

been filed for condonation of delay.

3. The appeal is preferred being aggrieved by the

judgment/award dated 02.11.2022 passed in Motor Vehicle Accident

Claim Case No.42 of 2014 by learned District Judge-II-cum-Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal-II at Deoghar.

4. Mr. Amaresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant submits that only on the ground of recovery right and

quantum the present appeal has been filed. He submits that the

permit of the vehicle was not there in spite of that the learned Court

has passed the order/judgment which is not in accordance with law.

He further submits that on the point of quantum also the said

judgment is required to be interfered. On this ground, he submits that

there is merit in the appeal and in view of that this appeal may kindly

be admitted.

5. It transpires from the judgment of learned Tribunal, the

compensation case was filed being Motor Vehicle Accident Claim No.42

of 2014 prayed for awarding compensation of Rs.13,50,000/- on death

of Madan Tudu, who died in a tragic road accident due to rash and

negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle No.BR 17P 1887 and for

that an FIR bearing Mohanpur P.S. Case No.229/2005 was registered

and charge-sheet was submitted against the driver.

6. So far the argument advance by learned counsel appearing for

the appellant with regard to the permit and violation of terms and

conditions, the learned Court has framed the issue No. D on the point

of violation of terms and conditions of the policy. While discussing the

said, the learned Tribunal has found that the insurance company has

not led any cogent evidence as to which clause or section of said

insurance policy was violated by the driver and owner of the truck and

in what manner and to what extent and in view of that it was

answered against the insurance company. In the pleadings also the

ground of permit has not been taken which is evident from the written

statement as discussed in the judgment of the learned Tribunal. Thus,

on merit also the appellant is not having a case and only a sum of

Rs.7,46,375/- with interest of 7.5% per annum has been allowed in a

death case.

7. The only ground taken in the limitation petition for condoning

the delay about movement of the file from one table to another table

and the delay is said to be 462 days. The appellant is a company and

having all the facilities like internet, e-mail, fax in spite of that such

delay has occurred and only ground is taken that in moving the file

from table to table such delay has occurred. The procedural red tape

was considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster

General and Others versus Living Media India Limited and

Another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, wherein at paragraph

Nos.25 to 30 it has been held as under :-

25) We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11.09.2009.

Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 08.01.2010 and the

same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11.09.2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied only on 08.01.2010, i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26) In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in 18 prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28) Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be 19 accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30) Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

8. Thus, the sufficient cause is not made out for condoning the

delay of 462 days.

9. It is settled position of law that when a litigant does not with

bona fide motive and on the same ground due to inaction and latches

on its part the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires such

lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital facts

which should be taking into consideration while considering the

question of condonation of delay.

10. What has been discussed here-in-above on merit also the

appellant has got no case and on limitation also not able to satisfy the

Court.

11. In view of the above, this appeal is dismissed.