[Cites 35, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Ajeet Rana vs Pooja Kumari on 2 December, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 147 of 2025
Ajeet Rana, aged 35 years, S/o of Shri Ram Pravesh Rana,
resident of Village-Latbedhwa, P.O.-Sarmapand, P.S.
Jainagar, District-Koderma.
...Respondent/Appellant
Versus
Pooja Kumari, aged about 25 years, W/o Ajeet Rana,
resident of village-Lathedhwa, P.O.- Jainagar, District-
Koderma, At present resident of village-Kanti Basti, P.O.
Telaiya Dam, P.S. Jainagar, District-Koderma.
... ... Petitioner/Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. Amritanshu Singh, Advocate
----------------------------
CAV/Reserved on 25.11.2025 Pronounced on 02/12/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal, under Section 19(1) of the Family Court
Act, 1984, is directed against the order/judgment dated
23.04.2025, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Koderma in Original Suit No. 118 of 2023, whereby
and whereunder the petition filed by the respondent under
Section 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 for custody
of minor children has been partly decreed and it has been
ordered that the custody of minor son, Aditya Rana shall
remain with his father- Ajeet Rana [appellant] while the
custody of daughter Aditi Kumari shall go to her mother-
petitioner, Pooja Kumari [respondent].
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Brief facts of the case:
2. The brief facts of the case, as per plaint and written
statement filed in the trial court, as taken note in the
impugned order, needs to be referred herein as under:
3. The suit being Original Suit No. 118 of 2023 was filed by
respondent-mother stating therein that two children were
born out of wedlock with the respondent-father who during
the course of time developed illicit relationship elsewhere. It
is further stated that on 12.06.2023 she came to know that
her in-laws were admitted in Sadar Hospital, Koderma
having met with an accident and while she was rushing to
the said hospital one Chandan Rana overpowered and
kidnapped her. The police on 16.06.2023 instituted Jainagar
PS Case No. 119 of 2023 against the said Chandan Rana
while respondent since then has severed the marital ties
with her forcibly keeping the children.
4. Pursuant to notice being served, the respondent-father
[appellant herein] appeared and filed his written statement
denying the allegations stating inter alia that the suit is not
maintainable as the same is without any valid cause of
action. It is further alleged that petitioner-mother was
having extra-marital affair with said Chandan Rana. On
12.06.2023 while his parents had gone to Jhumri Telaiya
the petitioner, namely, Pooja Kumari left home with
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Chandan Kumar Rana leaving behind her two children for
which Jainagar PS Case No. 119/2023 was instituted.
Pursuant thereto, the respondent herein and Chandan
Kumar Rana were recovered and brought back after 15 days.
Therefore, ground has been taken that the petitioner-wife
[respondent herein] has neither any love nor affection for her
children nor is capable to look after them.
5. The petitioner-respondent herein, Pooja Kumari, in support
of her case examined herself as PW-1 and other three
witnesses being her mother-Munwa Devi as PW-2, her sister
Usha Devi as PW-3, and her brother-in-law Tarkeshwar
Rana as PW-4, were examined on her behalf.
6. While the respondent, Ajeet Rana [appellant herein] on the
other hand has examined his mother Devanti Devi as RW-1,
his father Ram Pravesh Rana as RW-2, and himself as RW-3.
7. Two documents, being the judgments in Original Suit
79/2023 and Original Maintenance 105/2023, have been
marked as Exhibits A and B respectively on his behalf.
8. The learned family court, on the basis of pleading available
on record, framed the issues, and evidences were led on
behalf of parties.
9. The learned family court, based upon consideration of
principle of handing over the children, and the evidence led
on behalf of parties, allowed the suit in part, against which,
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the instant appeal has been preferred by the respondent-
father [appellant herein].
Submission of learned counsel for the appellant:
10. The learned counsel for the appellant-father has taken the
following ground in assailing the impugned order passed by
the learned family court.
11. Submission has been made that learned family court
misconstrued the pleadings and evidences adduced by the
parties resulting into perverse findings, which vitiates the
impugned judgment.
12. Further submission has been made that in view of the facts
admitted by the respondent that respondent-wife left both
the minor children uncared for and she fled away with said
Chandan Kumar Rana from her matrimonial home in
absence of appellant and his family members, itself goes to
suggest that she does not have love and affection towards
her children but this aspect of the matter has not been
taken into consideration by learned family court.
13. It has been submitted that if a mother leaves her minor
children and elopes with another person, in such a situation
it is not fit to hand over the guardianship of minor daughter
to such lady. Further in view of dissolution of marriage by
decree of divorce there was no justified reason to allow the
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custody of one of the children to the respondent who has
developed extra-marital relation.
14. Further ground has been taken that the respondent has fled
away with another person, namely, Chandan Kumar Rana,
who later on was recovered by the police, as such in that
pretext it is quite impossible for the respondent to take care
of the child [daughter]. But the learned family court has
failed to appreciate the fact that such act of her mother can
create a psychological and mental effect on the child.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
finding recorded by the learned family court while granting
the custody of minor daughter to the respondent-mother is
based upon presumption and assumption which is contrary
to the pleadings available on record, as such the impugned
judgment is perverse and requires interference by this Court.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant based upon the
aforesaid ground has submitted that since there is no
consideration of these facts by learned trial court, as such
the impugned judgment requires interference by this Court.
Submission of learned counsel for the respondent:
17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has taken the
following ground in defending the order passed by the
learned family court.
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18. Submission has been made that admittedly out of the
wedlock of appellant and respondent one son namely Aditya
Rana and daughter Aditi Kumari were born. However, when
on 12.6.2023, she rushed to Koderma Sadar Hospital to
attend her parents-in-law who reportedly had met with an
accident, leaving her children with her neighbours but she
was overpowered by one Chandan Rana, for which, an FIR
was lodged and pursuant thereto the police recovered and
produced her before SDJM, Koderma, But her husband and
in-laws refused to take her back from the Court. Under this
peculiar situation, her children are residing with her
husband [appellant] and in-laws but being infants they
require their mother.
19. Further submission has been made that she with the aid of
her parents is financially well and capable to take care of
them. In her deposition, she has claimed to be earning
Rs.14,000/- per month at Ranchi where she lives with her
mother.
20. It has been submitted that the learned family court has
taken into consideration the fact that the minor girl is of very
tender age and not even school going, as such she is
oblivious to the nature of litigation or even of the dispute
between her parents. Therefore, the minor daughter is in
requirement of her mother as she appeared ragged, uncared,
and neglected. Furthermore as the children are under the
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care of their grand-mother as such the welfare of the
daughter would be best served by giving her custody to her
mother.
21. The learned family court based upon the aforesaid ground
and on consideration of the aforesaid fact has passed the
impugned judgment which requires no interference by this
court.
Analysis
22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through pleading available on record as also the finding
recorded by learned family court.
23. This Court, before going to examine as to whether the
finding recorded by learned family court denying the custody
of the minor daughter to the father, the appellant herein,
requires interference needs to refer herein the provision of
law as provided under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act, 1956 and as also the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
24. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
deals with natural guardian of a Hindu minor, Section 9
thereof deals with the testamentary guardians and their
powers and Section 13 deals with the provision of welfare of
the minor to be paramount consideration. For ready
reference, these provisions are quoted as under:
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"6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.--The natural
guardians of a Hindu minor; in respect of the minor's person
as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or
her undivided interest in joint family property), are-- (a) in the
case of a boy or an unmarried girl--the father, and after him,
the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not
completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the
mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate
unmarried girl--the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the
case of a married girl--the husband: Provided that no person
shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor
under the provisions of this section-- (a) if he has ceased to be
a Hindu, or (b) if he has completely and finally renounced the
world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati
or sanyasi). Explanation.--In this section, the expressions
"father" and "mother" do not include a step-father and a step-
mother.
9. Testamentary guardians and their powers.--(1) A
Hindu father entitled to act as the natural guardian of his
minor legitimate children may, by will appoint a guardian for
any of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of
the minor's property (other than the undivided interest
referred to in section 12) or in respect of both. (2) An
appointment made under sub-section (1) shall have no effect if
the father predeceases the mother, but shall revive if the
mother dies without appointing, by will, any person as
guardian. (3) A Hindu widow entitled to act as the natural
guardian of her minor legitimate children, and a Hindu mother
entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor legitimate
children by reason of the fact that the father has become
disentitled to act as such, may, by will, appoint a guardian for
any of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of
the minor's property (other than the undivided interest
referred to in section 12) or in respect of both. (4) A Hindu
mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor
illegitimate children may; by will, appoint a guardian for any
of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of the
minor's property or in respect of both. (5) The guardian so
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appointed by will has the right to act as the minor's guardian
after the death of the minor's father or mother, as the case
may be, and to exercise all the rights of a natural guardian
under this Act to such extent and subject to such restrictions,
if any, as are specified in this Act and in the will. (6) The right
of the guardian so appointed by will shall, where the minor is
a girl, cease on her marriage.
13. Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration.--
(1) In the appointment of declaration of any person as
guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor
shall be the paramount consideration. (2) No person shall be
entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this
Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage among
Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship
will not be for the welfare of the minor."
25. It needs to refer herein that the word „after‟ as used in
Section 6(a) can be construed so as to save it from being
unconstitutional the presumption being that the legislature
acted in accordance with the constitution. Moreover, when
Sections 4 and 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act are construed harmoniously the word „after‟ can be
understood to mean „in the absence of‟, thereby referring to
father's absence from the care of the minor's property or
person for any reason whatever. Hence, in such situations
mother can act as natural guardian of the minor during the
lifetime of the father, who would be deemed to be „absent‟
reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment
rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Githa
Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1999) 2 SCC 228.
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26. It is evident from Section 13 that while appointing any
person as guardian of a Hindu minor the paramount
consideration is the welfare of the minor and no person shall
be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of
this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage
among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her
guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor.
27. The matter to be considered by the Court in appointing
guardian has been made under the provisions of Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890. For ready reference, the relevant
provision of the Act, 1890 is quoted as under:
"4. (1) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of
the Indian Majority Act, 1875, (9 of 1875) is to be deemed not
to have attained his majority:
(2) "guardian" mean's a person having the care of the person
of a minor or of his property, or of both is person and property:
7. Power of the Court to make order as to guardianship.--(1)
where the Court is satisfied that it is for the welfare of a minor
that an order should be made-- (a) appointing a guardian of
his person or property, or both, or (b) declaring a person to be
such a guardian, the Court may make an order accordingly.
(2) An order under this section shall imply the removal of any
guardian who has not been appointed by will or other
instrument or appointed or declared by the Court. (3) Where a
guardian has been appointed by will or other instrument or
appointed or declared by the Court, an order under this
section appointing or declaring another person to be guardian
in his stead shall not be made until the powers of the
guardian appointed or declared as aforesaid have ceased
under the provisions of this Act.
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17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing
guardian.--(1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of a
minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section,
be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the
minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the
welfare of the minor. (2) In considering what will be for the
welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to the age,
sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the
proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the
wishes, if any, of a deceased parent, and any existing or
previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or
his property. (3) If the minor is old enough to form an
intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference.
1 * * * * * (5) The Court shall not appoint or declare any person
to be a guardian against his will."
28. The law, therefore, is well settled that even though the father
is the natural guardian as stipulated in the statute but the
paramount consideration in the matter of handing over the
custody of the child is welfare of the child.
29. The law relating to custody of minors has received an
exhaustive consideration by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in a
series of pronouncements. In the case of Gaurav
Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42 the
principles of English and American law in this regard were
considered by Hon‟ble Apex Court to hold that the legal
position in India is not in any way different. Noticing the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in Saraswatibai
Shripad Ved v. Shripad Vasanji Ved [AIR 1941 Bom 103]
, Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (1973) 1 SCC
840 and Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka v. Hoshiam Shavaksha
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Dolikuka (1982) 2 SCC 544, the Hon‟ble Apex eventually
concluded in paras 50 and 51 which reads as under:
"50. [T]hat when the court is confronted with conflicting
demands made by the parents, each time it has to justify the
demands. The court has not only to look at the issue on
legalistic basis, in such matters human angles are relevant for
deciding those issues. The court then does not give emphasis
on what the parties say, it has to exercise a jurisdiction which
is aimed at the welfare of the minor. As observed recently
in Mausami Moitra Ganguli case [Mausami Moitra
Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli, (2008) 7 SCC 673] , the court has
to give due weightage to the child's ordinary contentment,
health, education, intellectual development and favourable
surroundings but over and above physical comforts, the moral
and ethical values have also to be noted. They are equal if not
more important than the others.
51. The word „welfare‟ used in Section 13 of the Act has to be
construed literally and must be taken in its widest sense. The
moral and ethical welfare of the child must also weigh with the
court as well as its physical well-being. Though the provisions
of the special statutes which govern the rights of the parents
and guardians may be taken into consideration, there is
nothing which can stand in the way of the court exercising its
parens patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases."
30. Thus, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has categorically held that
while considering the issue of custody of the minor child the
court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis, in
such matters human angles are relevant for deciding those
issues. Further it has been held that the Court should not
emphasis only on what the parties say rather the welfare of
the minor should be paramount consideration. Further the
Hon‟ble Apex Court has opined that the Court has to give
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due weightage to the child's ordinary contentment, health,
education, intellectual development and favourable
surroundings but over and above physical comforts, the
moral and ethical values have also to be noted.
31. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the aforesaid Judgment
interpreted the word „welfare‟ used in Section 13 of the Act
and has observed that it must be taken in its widest sense,
though the provisions of the special statutes which govern
the rights of the parents and guardians may be taken into
consideration, there is nothing which can stand in the way
of the court exercising its "parens patriae jurisdiction" arising
in such cases.
32. It needs to refer herein that in child custody matters, the
court's "parens patriae" jurisdiction empowers the Court to
act as a guardian for the child, prioritizing their best
interests above all else. This principle, allows the court to
intervene and make decisions that protect the child's
welfare, even if it means overriding the wishes of the parents
or guardians.
33. In the case of Nil Ratan Kundu v Abhijit Kundu, 2008 (9)
SCC 413 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that in deciding a
difficult and complex question as to the custody of a minor,
a court of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and
the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be
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decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a human
problem and is required to be solved with human touch. A
court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by
statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by
precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the
paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-
being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is
exercising "parens patriae jurisdiction" and is expected, nay
bound, to give due weight to a child‟s ordinary comfort,
contentment, health, education, intellectual development
and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical
comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They
are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential
and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old enough
to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the court must
consider such preference as well, though the final decision
should rest with the court as to what is conducive to the
welfare of the minor.
34. In the case of Yashita Sahu v State of Rajasthan, (2020)
3 SCC 67, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has propounded that the
welfare of the child is paramount in matters relating to
custody. In this context, we may refer to Para 22 thereof,
which reads as follows:
22. A child, especially a child of tender years requires the
love, affection, company, protection of both parents. This is not
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only the requirement of the child but is his/her basic human
right. Just because the parents are at war with each other,
does not mean that the child should be denied the care,
affection, love or protection of any one of the two parents. A
child is not an inanimate object which can be tossed from one
parent to the other. Every separation, every reunion may have
a traumatic and psychosomatic impact on the child. Therefore,
it is to be ensured that the court weighs each and every
circumstance very carefully before deciding how and in what
matter the custody of the child should be shared between both
the parents. Even if the custody is given to one parent the
other parent must have sufficient visitation rights to ensure
that the child keeps in touch with the other parent and does
not lose social, physical and psychological contact with any
one of the two parents. It is only in extreme circumstances
that one parent should be denied contact with the child.
Reasons must be assigned if one parent is to be denied any
visitation rights or contact with the child. Courts dealing with
the custody matters must while deciding issues of custody
clearly define the nature, manner and specifics of the
visitation rights.'
35. In the case of Gaytri Bajaj v. Jiten Bhalla, (2012) 12 SCC
471, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed that it is the
welfare and interest of the child and not the rights of the
parents which is the determining factor for deciding the
question of custody and the question of welfare of the child
has to be considered in the context of the facts of each case
and decided cases on the issue may not be appropriate to be
considered as binding precedents. For ready reference the
relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted
as under:
14. From the above it follows that an order of custody of
minor children either under the provisions of the Guardians
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and Wards Act, 1890 or the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 is required to be made by the
court treating the interest and welfare of the minor to
be of paramount importance. It is not the better right of
either parent that would require adjudication while deciding
their entitlement to custody. The desire of the child coupled
with the availability of a conducive and appropriate
environment for proper upbringing together with the ability
and means of the parent concerned to take care of the child
are some of the relevant factors that have to be taken into
account by the court while deciding the issue of custody of a
minor. What must be emphasised is that while all other
factors are undoubtedly relevant, it is the desire, interest and
welfare of the minor which is the crucial and ultimate
consideration that must guide the determination required to be
made by the court.
36. It is settled position of law that there cannot be any
straitjacket formula in the matters of custody. „Welfare of the
child‟ is of paramount importance, reference in this regard
may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court in the case of Gautam Kumar Das v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2024) 10 SCC 588.
37. In the case of Shazia Aman Khan v. State of Orissa,
(2024) 7 SCC 564 the Hon‟ble Apex Court while referring
the ratio of Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9
SCC 413 has observed that welfare of the children is to be
seen and not the rights of the parties, the relevant
paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as
under:
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19. In Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu [Nil Ratan
Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413] , this Court laid
down the principles governing custody of minor children and
held that welfare of the children is to be seen and not the
rights of the parties by observing as under : (SCC pp. 428-
29, paras 52 & 55)
"Principles governing custody of minor children
52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is
fairly well-settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and
complex question as to the custody of minor, a court of law
should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing
therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by
interpreting legal provisions. It is a human problem and is
required to be solved with human touch. A court while
dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor
by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In
selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount
consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the
child. In selecting a guardian, the court is exercising parens
patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due
weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health,
education, intellectual development and favourable
surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral
and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we
may say, even more important, essential and indispensable
considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an
intelligent preference or judgment, the court must consider
such preference as well, though the final decision should
rest with the court as to what is conducive to the welfare of
the minor.
***
55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the courts
below. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that the
controlling consideration governing the custody of children is
the welfare of children and not the right of their parents."
(emphasis supplied)
21. This Court in Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma [Roxann
Sharma v. Arun Sharma, (2015) 8 SCC 318 : (2015) 4 SCC
(Civ) 87] , opined that the child is not a chattel or ball that it
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is bounced to and fro. Welfare of the child is the focal point.
Relevant lines from para 18 are reproduced hereunder : (SCC
p. 328)
"18. ... There can be no cavil that when a court is confronted
by conflicting claims of custody there are no rights of the
parents which have to be enforced; the child is not a chattel
or a ball that is bounced to and fro the parents. It is only the
child's welfare which is the focal point for consideration.
Parliament rightly thinks that the custody of a child less
than five years of age should ordinarily be with the mother
and this expectation can be deviated from only for strong
reasons."
20. This Court has consistently held that welfare of the child
is of paramount consideration and not personal law and
statute. In Ashish Ranjan v. Anupma Tandon [Ashish
Ranjan v. Anupma Tandon, (2010) 14 SCC 274 : (2011) 4
SCC (Civ) 948] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 282, para
19)
"19. The statutory provisions dealing with the custody of the
child under any personal law cannot and must not
supersede the paramount consideration as to what is
conducive to the welfare of the minor. In fact, no statute on
the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate the vital factor
of the welfare of the minor."
22. Another principle of law which is settled with reference
to custody of the child is the wish of the child, if she is
capable of. Reference can be made to Rohith Thammana
Gowda v. State of Karnataka [Rohith Thammana
Gowda v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 20 SCC 550 : 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 937] case. It was held as under : (SCC para 18)
"18. We have stated earlier that the question „what is the
wish/desire of the child‟ can be ascertained through
interaction, but then, the question as to „what would be the
best interest of the child‟ is a matter to be decided by the
court taking into account all the relevant circumstances. A
careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment would, however,
reveal that even after identifying the said question rightly the
High Court had swayed away from the said point and
entered into consideration of certain aspects not relevant for
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the said purpose. We will explain the raison d'etre for the
said remark."
38. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is evident
that the consideration governing the custody of children is
the welfare of the children" and not the rights of the parties."
Further, the welfare of child is determined neither by
economic affluence nor a deep mental or emotional concern
for the well-being of the child. The answer depends on the
balancing of all these factors and determining what is best
for child's total well-being.
39. In the backdrop of the provisions of law and judicial
pronouncements, in order to assess the welfare of the minor
child, we have gone through the oral evidence adduced by
the parties.
40. PW-1, Pooja Kumari is the mother of minor children, who
has stated in her deposition that the suit has been filed by
her for the custody of her son Aditya Rana aged 6 years and
daughter Aditi Kumari aged 3 years born out of her wedlock
with the respondent Ajeet Rana [appellant herein]. On
12.6.2023 she had to leave her children with her neighbour
and proceeded to Koderma Sadar Hospital to attend her
parents-in-law who reportedly had met with an accident. On
her way to the hospital she was overpowered by the said
Chandan Rana. This incident led to institution of Jainagar
PS 119/2023 u/s 366, 379, 498 IPC pursuant to which the
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police recovered and produced her before SDJM, Koderma.
Her husband and in-laws refused to take her back from the
Court. Thus her children since then have been residing with
her husband and in-laws but being infants they require their
mother.
41. She has further deposed that with the aid of her parents is
financially well-off and capable to take care of them. All her
attempts to get her children or even to meet them has been
thwarted by the respondent.
42. In her cross-examination she claimed to have left behind the
children with her neighbour Pramila Devi whom she claimed
would appear as a witness in her favour. However the said
Pramila Devi has not been examined as a witness on her
behalf. She has further deposed that before she was
recovered along with Chandan Rana, she was kept in Gaya
for 14 days by him where she was raped daily. She has
claimed to be earning Rs.14,000/- per month at Ranchi
where she lives with her mother.
43. P.W.-2 Munwa Devi has reiterated that Pooja Devi was
tortured for additional dowry by her in-laws while the
incident of Jainagar P.S. Case 119/2023 was unexpected
and despite no fault of her she was divorced by the
respondent [appellant herein] and her children were taken
away forcibly by him. Both the kids require their mother and
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she with the help of her parents is capable to take care of
them. This witness is the mother of the petitioner
[respondent herein] and has stated in her cross-examination
that the two kids were taken care of by their grand-parents
while the petitioner works as a computer operator in Telaiya
itself. She further contradicted herself by stating that the
petitioner was not earning presently and was maintained by
her father. She has not married the said Chandan Rana as
he was already married. This witness further denied that the
kids want to reside with their grandparents.
44. PW-3 Usha Devi in her examination-in-chief on affidavit has
stated verbatim the same as that of PW-2.
45. In her cross-examination she has claimed that the kids were
residing with their parental aunt i.e. their father's sister but
denied any lack of love by petitioner for her children or that
she was incapable to look after them.
46. PW-4 Tarkeshwar Rana has also deposed similar to other
witnesses and he is husband of petitioner's [respondent
herein] sister. It has been deposed that she was recovered
from Telaiya Railway Station along with Chandan Rana.
Prior to the incident no case against dowry demand was
instituted by the petitioner. Father of the petitioner is a
carpenter while she herself is a tutor in a coaching institute.
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47. RW-1 Devanti Devi is the mother of the respondent, Ajeet
Rana [appellant herein]. She has alleged illicit physical
relationship between Chandan Rana and petitioner, Pooja
Kumari [respondent herein]. She has deposed that on
12.6.2023 while she along with her husband had gone to
Asnabad to oversee the construction of their house, Pooja
Kumari eloped with Chandan Rana leaving behind both the
kids. The police on being informed by her husband had
registered Jainagar PS Case No-119 of 2023 upon which she
was recovered after 15 days. Thus Pooja Kumari has no love
for her kids and has tarnished their image in the village. The
divorce case being Original Suit No. 79 of 2023 has been
decreed in favour of her son and they have been taking care
of the kids adequately.
48. In her cross-examination, she has further stated that Pooja
Kumari was residing in her parental home since the
occurrence but she is well-educated while her father is a
carpenter at Bangalore. However she was not aware when it
was suggested that Pooja was employed in a school of
Ranchi earning Rs.15,000/- per month while her son is a
carpenter at Hazaribagh. She has further admitted that the
applicant [respondent herein] after the birth of her two
children under went tubal ligation for her sterilization to
prevent further pregnancy and affirmed that Ajeet would be
married again.
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49. RW-2, Ram Pravesh Rana is father of the respondent and
his deposition on affidavit is verbatim same as of his wife
RW-1 Devanti Devi.
50. In his cross-examination he has stated to be employed as a
printing operator in a company at Deoghar while his son is
employed in a private company at Hazaribagh. His wife
resides with him but stated later on that she does not
accompany him to Deoghar. The two children study in an
English medium school at village itself. He has not seen
Pooja to be visiting Chandan Rana any time after the
occurrence. He has however admitted that the children can
be looked after better by their mother and not step-mother.
51. RW-3, Ajeet Rana who is the respondent himself [appellant
herein] has made same statement in his examination-in-
chief on affidavit as the other two witnesses. It has come in
his cross-examination that he was employed in Orissa for
three years after marriage while presently he is employed as
a Poclain Driver in Hazaribagh earning Rs.23,000/- per
month. He is a weekly visitor to his village at Latbedhwa. His
father lives in Deoghar while his brother resides in Delhi and
his two sisters are married. His mother lives in Latbedhwa
taking care of his children.
52. From the pleadings available on record, it is evident that
admittedly the suit was filed by the respondent-Pooja
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Kumari for custody of the minor children one aged 6 years, a
boy, and the other aged 3 years, a girl at that time and who
were in custody of the father.
53. It is a settled law that in all matters of custody irrespective
of the law under which the same is sought, the welfare of the
child is of paramount-importance. The Court has not only to
look at the issue on legalistic basis but has to take into
consideration the human angles as well.
54. From the testimonies of the witnesses and pleadings
available on record, it is evident that the family of appellant-
Ajeet Rana comprises of his father, mother, two married
sisters and a brother besides himself. The two sisters are
married and reside at their respective matrimonial homes.
His brother lives in Delhi while his father is employed as a
printing operator in a plastic factory at Deoghar. The
appellant himself is employed in a company at Hazaribagh
as a poclain operator. The two children study in a school at
the village itself. The appellant does not commute daily from
his village to Hazaribagh and is a weekly visitor to his
village. Thus, the day-to-day care of the two children falls
entirely on the grand-mother as none of the other family
members is in any position to look after the daily affairs of
the children.
2025:JHHC:35989-DB
55. The respondent-mother, on the other hand, resides at
Ranchi with her mother and is engaged gainfully as a private
tutor. It has further come in evidence that she is employed
as a computer operator in Telaiya. She has not married to
said Chandan Rana as he himself was already married.
Further, as per finding recorded in the impugned order, as
per claim of the respondent-mother, she cannot have any
further baby as she has already undergone tubal ligation
which rules out further pregnancy.
56. The learned family court, considering the rival pleadings and
evidences from the perspective of child's age, parent's ability
to provide for child's needs as well as preference of the
children this Court, has opined that the respondent-mother
is better placed or suited to obtain the custody of her
children. The respondent-mother appears to be educated,
employed, and is in a position to nourish and provide for her
children on daily basis. The children can have the love,
affection and care of her mother every day compared to
weekly access to their father.
57. However, before conclusion of the hearing of the suit,
children were called in the Court and during interaction in
the Chamber, the learned Principal Judge has opined that
the boy appeared to be having very hardened feelings against
his mother. The learned Principal Judge, considering his
stance and disdain with which he looked down his mother,
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has made an opinion that it will not be in the best interest of
his well-being, more particularly psychological and mental
health to give his custody to his mother. The evidence
though suggests that though the father would not be
available to the children on daily basis, yet, it cannot be said
that he is unwilling or not fit to look after his son. Moreover
the family of the appellant-father is of carpenters and as
such the boy if he continues in his father's home would have
the exposure as carpenter and can very well learn the skills
of the profession while pursuing his studies. Accordingly, it
was held that the custody of minor son Aditya Rana shall
remain with his father.
58. So far custody of minor girl is concerned, finding has been
recorded that she is of very tender age. She was oblivious to
the nature of litigation or even of the dispute between her
parents. She appeared to be in requirement of her mother as
she appeared ragged, uncared, and neglected. Further
finding has been recorded on the basis of testimonies of the
witnesses and other material available on record that as the
children are under the care of their grand-mother as such
the welfare of the daughter would be best served by giving
her custody to her mother. The minor daughter has even not
started to go for her formal schooling as such change in her
place of residence will also have no adverse effect.
Accordingly, direction was passed upon the appellant-father
2025:JHHC:35989-DB
to hand over the custody of minor daughter Aditi Kumari to
the respondent-mother forthwith.
59. The law has been propounded by Hon‟ble Apex Court, as
taken note of above, that the welfare of the child is
paramount consideration while handing over the custody of
the minor and herein the fact is admitted that the minor
daughter is of tender age, and was found uncared and
neglected and further the mother is also earning and has not
contracted second marriage, as alleged, hence this Court is
of the view that that the learned family court while giving
custody of minor daughter to the mother has not committed
error.
60. This Court, after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect
along with the legal position and adverting to the
consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the
impugned judgment, has found therefrom that the issue of
giving custody of minors [son and daughter] has well been
considered along with the evidence as well as from the
pleadings made in the plaint and the written statement.
Accordingly, the learned Family Judge, on consideration of
the evidence, has come to the conclusion that the custody of
minor son Aditya Rana shall remain with his father, Ajeet
Rana while the custody of minor daughter Aditi Kumari shall
go to her mother, Pooja Kumari. The father was accordingly
directed to hand over the custody of minor daughter Aditi
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Kumari to the mothr forthwith. Accordingly, the suit filed by
the respondent-mother was partly allowed.
61. It needs to refer herein that avowedly, the mother is best
suited to care for her offspring, so aptly and
comprehensively conveyed in Hindi by the word "mamta".
Furthermore, recognising her maternity would obviate the
necessity of determining paternity. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
while drawing the importance of mother as guardian and
best suited person for custody of minor child has observed
in the case of Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh ((2017) 3 SCC
231) that it may also be underlying that the notion that a
child's primary need is for the care and love of its mother,
where she has been its primary care giving parent, is
supported by a vast body of psychological literature.
Empirical studies show that mother-infant "bonding" begins
at the child's birth and that infants as young as two months
old frequently show signs of distress when the mother is
replaced by a substitute caregiver. An infant typically
responds preferentially to the sound of its mother's voice by
four weeks, actively demands her presence and protests her
absence by eight months, and within the first year has
formed a profound and enduring attachment to her.
Psychological theory hypothesizes that the mother is the
centre of an infant's small world, his psychological
homebase, and that she "must continue to be so for some
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years to come". Developmental psychologists believe that the
quality and strength of this original bond largely determines
the child's later capacity to fulfil her individual potential and
to form attachments to other individuals and to the human
community.
62. Further, this Court, while appreciating the argument
advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity,
needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word
"perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex
Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous
consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public
Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately
discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt,
true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies
logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the
blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm
in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of
the said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number
of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501]
this Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that
the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by
the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or
suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
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25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse
finding" means a finding which is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994
SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can
be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no
evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58]
the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of
pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted
from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right,
proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English,
6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a
way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or
the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
2025:JHHC:35989-DB
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence."
63. This Court, on consideration of the finding arrived at by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court and based upon the
aforesaid discussion and judicial pronouncements, is of the
view that the judgment passed by the learned Family Judge
is not coming under the fold of the perversity, since, the
conscious consideration has been made of the evidences, as
would be evident from the impugned judgment.
64. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment dated
23.04.2025 passed in Original Suit No. 118 of 2023 by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Koderma needs no
interference.
65. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed.
66. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
2nd December, 2025
Alankar/ A.F.R.
Uploaded on 02.12.2025
