Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 7271 Jhar
Judgement Date : 1 December, 2025
2025:JHHC:35805
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.5079 of 2015
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Balwan Singh, son of Sri Ajit Singh, resident of village Sasroli, P.O., P.S. Sasroli, District Jhajjar (Haryana), Presently posted as Constable, Central Industrial Security Force, C.T.P.S., Chandrapura P.O., P.S. Chandrapura, District Bokaro ... Petitioner Versus
1. The Union of India through Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
2. The Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
3. The Director General of Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Boring Road, Patna, P.O., P.S. Shastri Nagar, Patna (Bihar).
4. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Eastern Zone, Headquarter, P.O., P.S. Patliputra, District Patna (Bihar).
5. The Commandant, Central Industrial Security Chandrapura, Force, P.O., C.T.P.S. P.S. Chandrapura, District Bokaro. .........Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Ms. Nirupama, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Prashant Pallav, ASGI : Mr. Abhijeet Kr. Singh, CGC.
: Mr. Bajranj Kumar, AC to ASGI
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CAV ON:06.11.2025 Pronounced On:-01/12/2025
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The instant writ application has been preferred
by the petitioner for quashing the order contained in
Memo No. V- 11014 / Pukh / Vivin / Revision-10/2014-
12556 dated 14.11.2014, passed by Director General of
Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Eastern
Division, Headquarter, Boring Road, Patna; whereby the
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revision petition dated 23.07.2014, preferred by the
petitioner has been dismissed affirming the Appellate
order dated 13/09/2013, contained in Memo No. V-
11014/E2/Ad II/Ap1-15/BS/2013-619, passed by
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Industrial
Security Force, Patliputra Headquarter, Patna; whereby
the appellate authority has modified the order dated
14/05/2013, passed by Commandant, Central
Industrial Security Force, C.T.P.S. Chandrapura, Bokaro
in the following manner "Reduction of pay to the
minimum stage in the pay band of Const/GD for a period
of three years with immediate effect with cumulative
effect to that of Reduction of pay by one stage from Rs.
7,830/- GP Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 7,540/- + GP Rs. 2,000/-
(in the pay band of PB-I Rs. 5,200-20,200/-+ GP Rs.
2,000/-) for a period of three years. It is further directed
that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of
reduction and on expiry of the period of reduction, it will
have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay."
Initially in a departmental proceeding the petitioner who
is a constable in Central Industrial Security Force,
CTPS, Chandrapura, Bokaro was imposed major penalty
vide order dated 14/05/2013, contained in Memo No. V-
15014/CTPS/Anu/Major-4/13- 1632, passed by
Commandant, Central Industrial C.T.P.S., Security
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Force, Bokaro, Chandrapura in the following manner
"Reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band
of Const/GD for a period of three years with immediate
effect. It is further directed that he will earn increment of
pay during the period not of reduction and on expiry of
the period of reduction, it will have the effect of
postponing his future increment of pay. The period from
18.02.2013 to 18.03.2013 is treated as suspension only
for all purposes".
II. Further prayed for direction upon the
respondent authorities to pay all the monetary benefits
for which the petitioner is legally entitled for.
3. Briefly stated, as per the pleadings in the writ
application is that on 21.02.2013, a Memo of charge
against the petitioner was served and a show cause was
issued to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his
reply to the show cause on 27/02/2013 within
stipulated time. Thereafter, Mr. B.N.Murmu was
appointed as enquiry Officer and he submitted his brief
note of Departmental Proceeding on 13/04/2013 and
the petitioner submitted his reply to the brief note on
22/04/2013. Thereafter, Inquiry Report was submitted
by the Enquiry Officer on 27.04.2013 under CISF Rules
2003, Rule 36 and the petitioner submitted his written
defense regarding the enquiry report on 10.05.2013. On
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14.05.2013, the Commandant, Central Industrial
Security Force, C.T.P.S., Chandrapura Bokaro, passed
the punishment order in following manner "Reduction of
pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of Const/GD
for a period of three years with immediate effect. It is
further directed that he will earn increment of pay during
the period not of reduction and on expiry of the period of
reduction, it will have the effect of postponing his future
increment of pay. The period from 18.02.2013 to
18.03.2013 is treated as suspension only for all
purposes".
Against the said order, the petitioner preferred
an Appeal before the Deputy Inspector General, CISF,
Eastern Zone HQ, Patliputra on 01.7.2013 and the same
was dismissed with modification vide order dated
13.09.2013 contained in Memo No. V-11014/E2/Ad
II/Ap1-15/BS/2013-619, passed by Deputy Inspector
General of Police, Central Industrial Security Force,
Patliputra Headquarter, Patna; whereby the appellate
authority has modified the order dated 14/05/2013,
passed by Commandant, Central Industrial Security
Force, C.T.P.S. Chandrapura, Bokaro in the following
manner "Reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the
pay band of Const/GD for a period of three years with
immediate effect with cumulative effect to that of
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Reduction of pay by one stage from Rs. 7,830/- GP Rs.
2,000/- to Rs. 7,540/- + GP Rs. 2,000/- (in the pay band
of PB-I Rs. 5,200-20,200/-+ GP Ras 2,000/-) for a period
of three years. It is further directed that he will not earn
increment of pay during the period of reduction and on
expiry of the period of reduction, it will have the effect of
postponing his future increment of pay."
Then the petitioner preferred a Revision before
the Director General of Police CISF, East Zone HQ,
Boaring Road, Patna against the order dated 13.09.2013
and the same was dismissed vide dated 14/11/2014.
Hence, this writ petition.
4. Ms. Nirupama, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner
had submitted that the revisional as well as appellate
authority had passed the impugned order without
scrutinizing the material available on record and they
have failed to take into account the reply to the show
cause submitted by the petitioner and also the
statement of witnesses where it has been categorically
stated that the alleged occurrence occurred in a spur of
moment and why only petitioner has been made a
scapegoat and others were left.
5. Per contra it has been contended by Mr.
Prashant Pallav, learned ASGI that there is no
procedural error and looking to the charge, the
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petitioner should have been satisfied by modification of
the original order of punishment because he works in a
disciplined force. Further, he relied upon the judgment
passed in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. N.
Gangaraj1, wherein it has been reiterated that the
scope of judicial review is confined only to the decision-
making process.
6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties
and after going through the documents annexed with
the respective affidavits it appears that the main
grievance of the petitioner is that only he has been made
a scapegoat and others were left.
However, after going through the documents,
the same ground has not been taken either in the reply
to the second show cause or in the memo of appeal.
Even otherwise, the appellate authority, after
considering each and every aspect of the matter, has
reduced the punishment from reduction of three annual
increment to one annual increment.
7. It further appears on perusal of the inquiry
report, that the same has been conducted after giving
full opportunity to the petitioner and after examining all
the witnesses. In other words, there is no procedural
error. The fact further reveals that a punishment order
(2020) 3 SCC 423
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has been passed after taking into consideration the reply
to the second show cause and the disciplinary authority
has imposed punishment upon the petitioner with
regard to reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the
pay band of const/GD for a period of three years with
immediate effect.
8. At this stage, it is also pertinent to mention
that the disciplinary authority has taken each and every
aspect of the matter including the contention of the
petitioner and thereafter imposed the punishment of
reduction of pay scale. Aggrieved petitioner filed an
appeal and the appellate authority, after going through
each and every aspect of the matter, reduced the
punishment from three stage to reduce the punishment
from reduction of pay for a period of three years to
"reduction of pay by one stage from Rs.7830/-+ GP
Rs.2000/- to Rs.7540/- +G.P. Rs.2000/- (in the pay band
of PB-I Rs.5200-20200/- +GP Rs.2000) for a period of 3
years with a further direction that he will not earn
increment of pay during the period of reduction and on
expiry of the period of reduction it will have the effect of
postponing his future increments of pay."
9. After perusing the appellate order, I find that
the same is well-reasoned order. Thereafter, petitioner
has also filed revision against the order of appellate
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authority but the same was also dismissed and the
order passed by the disciplinary authority, modified by
the appellate authority has been sustained.
10. At the cost of repetition, after going through
the impugned orders passed by the respondent
authorities, I don't find any error either with respect to
the merits of the case or any error in the procedure. In
other words, neither there is any perversity in the orders
impugned; nor there is any procedural irregularity. As
such, no relief can be granted to the petitioner.
11. Even otherwise, the law with regards to
judicial review is also well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of N. Gangaraj (supra), by a
judgment dated 14th February, 2020 has reiterated that
scope of judicial review is confined only to the decision-
making process. Power of judicial review conferred on
Constitutional Court or Tribunal is not that of an
appellate authority but is of a review of the manner in
which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that individual receives fair treatment
and not to ensure that that conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the
Court. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment read
as under -
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the
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decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13) "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
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suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
12. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the
instant application stands dismissed. However, there
shall be no order as to cost. Pending I.A., if any, is also
closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
December 01, 2025 Fahim/-
AFR/NAFR Uploaded on 1/12/2025
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