Jharkhand High Court
M/S Moreish Food Limited vs Dasrath Mahto on 27 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
C.M.P. No. 663 of 2019
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M/s Moreish Food Limited, a Company Registered under the
Companies Act of 1956, having its office at 48/49 Kokar Industrial
Area, P.S. - Sadar, P.O. & District - Ranchi, through its Head (HR)
Indu Bhushan Lal, Son of Late P.D.N. Lal, resident of Ratu Road, P.S.
- Sukhdeonagar, P.O. & District - Ranchi.
... ... Petitioner
Versus
Dasrath Mahto, son of Sahdeo Mahto, resident of Village - Tilmi
Sereng, P.O. & P.S. - Rahe, District - Ranchi.
... ... Opp. Party
-----
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
------
For the Petitioner : Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate
Mr. Shubham Sinha, Advocate.
For the Opp. Party : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Advocate.
------
Order No.05/ Dated: 27.08.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. Instant civil miscellaneous petition has been filed for
restoration of L.P.A. No. 37 of 2015, which was dismissed for default
vide order dated 25.10.2018.
2. The instant petition is admittedly barred by limitation since
there is delay of 340 days in preferring the civil miscellaneous
petition, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 9118 of 2019 has
been filed for condoning such delay.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the
instant civil miscellaneous petition has been filed after inordinate
delay of 340 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay
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condonation application before going into the legality and propriety
of the impugned order on merit.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that delay in
preferring the civil miscellaneous petition may be condoned by
allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds
shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.
5. The ground for condoning the delay in preferring the civil
miscellaneous petition, as has been mentioned at paragraph-2 of the
interlocutory application is that the appeal of the petitioner was
listed on 25th October, 2018, but it was low down in the cause-list.
Moreover, the Advocate representing the appellant was not in good
health and was suffering from fever and so he left the Court
premises after lunch recess. However, the case was called out on that
day and was dismissed for non-prosecution.
6. Further, at paragraph - 3 of the interlocutory application it has
been mentioned that the appellant was unaware of any order passed
on that day as the case was not likely to be taken up in any case.
Moreover, the concerned workman also never approached the
management with a copy of the order for more than ten months. It is
only when an application was received recently on 17.08.2019 the
appellant become aware that its Letter Patent Appeal had been
dismissed. The petitioner contacted its Advocate and apprised him
that the case was dismissed. Thereafter, civil miscellaneous
application was prepared and filed on 04.09.2019.
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7. At paragraph-4, the ground has been taken that the respondent
workman virtually abandoned his claim and was not appearing even
before this Hon'ble Court when the letters patent appeal was
pending. However, he is now setting up a patently false plea only to
extort money from the appellant-Company.
8. At paragraph-5, the ground has been taken that the appellant
was all along unaware of these developments as it had not been
informed by its Advocate that the appeal had been dismissed on 25th
October, 2018 itself. The appellant otherwise, has a good case on
merits and would suffer irreparable injury in the event of delay in
preferring the restoration application is not condoned.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on delay
condonation application and before considering the same, this Court,
deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been
propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the
approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
10. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to
be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the
filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the
Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before
entering into the merit of the lis.
11. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is
for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
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limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather
the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs.
State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
12. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied
upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932,
wherein, it has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to
operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the
law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at
the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge
cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by
the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions
not recognized by law."
13. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the
Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565
days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory
explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at
paragraph-6 as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds."
14. While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649,
wherein, it has been held as under:
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"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to
be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of
liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be
curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
15. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act
with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and
laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal
expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are
the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while
considering the question of condonation of delay.
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal
Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given
case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At
paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to
the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.
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The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for
the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the
court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing
further has to be done; the application for condoning
delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If
sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire
whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of
the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but
the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary
power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may regard as
relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party
was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of bona
fides or due diligence are always material and relevant
when the court is dealing with applications made under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to consider the effect
of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14.
Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of
Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same
manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall
to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in
holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour
of the appellant because apart from the general criticism
made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the
period of limitation no other fact had been adduced
against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's
application for condonation of delay only on the ground
that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as
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possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our
opinion, is not a valid ground."
17. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider
the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of
the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry
of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other
side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of
the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its
part.
18. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of
'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause'
has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble
Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than
that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts
and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man.
In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
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However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide
or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See
Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan
[(1969) 2 SCC 770], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545]
and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993]
this Court explained the difference between a "good
cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every
"sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa.
However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser
degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a
liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is
done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram
Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The court has no power to extend the period of limitation
on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory
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provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
"the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such
a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its
aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress
fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have
not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of
time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
(2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008)
17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4
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SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would
fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC
225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent,
or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
19. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case
or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
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satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake
is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as
has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A.
Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3
SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of
Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
20. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation
to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @
Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC
195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient
cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order
22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision
should receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want
of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case
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whether explanation furnished would constitute
"sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of
each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay
caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the
courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding
fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a
slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule
and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the
matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by
not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable
right has accrued to the other party which should not be
lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like
manner. However, by taking a pedantic and
hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high
and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in
the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to
the party against whom the lis terminates, either by
default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a
party to have the decision on merit. While considering the
matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant
effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties
either way."
21. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to
condone the inordinate delay of 340 days, is proceeding to examine
as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient
explanation for condoning the delay.
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22. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove,
wherein, expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not
acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
23. This Court, in order to assess as to whether the ground as has
been referred in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the instant interlocutory
application can be considered to be sufficient cause for condoning
the delay of 340 days in filing the appeal, has scrutinized the record.
24. For ready reference Para- 2 to 5 of the said I.A. is being quoted
as under:-
2. That the appeal of the petitioner was listed on 25th October,
2018, but it was low down in the cause-list. Moreover, the
Advocate representing the appellant was not in good health and
was suffering from fever and so he left the Court premises after
lunch recess. However, the case was called out on that day and
was dismissed for non-prosecution.
3. That the appellant was unaware of any order passed on that day
as the case was not likely to be taken up in any case. Moreover,
the concerned workman also never approached the management
with a copy of the order for more than ten months. It is only
when an application was received recently on 17.08.2019 the
appellant become aware that its Letter Patent Appeal had been
dismissed. The petitioner contacted its Advocate and apprised
him that the case was dismissed. Thereafter, civil miscellaneous
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application was prepared and filed on 04.09.2019.
4. That the respondent workman virtually abandoned his claim
and was not appearing even before this Hon'ble Court when the
letters patent appeal was pending. However, he is now setting
up a patently false plea only to extort money from the
appellant-Company.
5. That the appellant was all along unaware of these developments
as it had not been informed by its Advocate that the appeal had
been dismissed on 25th October, 2018 itself. The appellant
otherwise, has a good case on merits and would suffer
irreparable injury in the event of delay in preferring the
restoration application is not condoned.
25. The reason has been shown that the appellant was unaware of
any order passed on 25.10.2018 as the case was not likely to be taken
up in any case. Moreover, the concerned workman also never
approached the management with a copy of the order for more than
ten months. It is only when an application was received recently on
17.08.2019 the appellant become aware that its Letter Patent Appeal
had been dismissed. The petitioner contacted its Advocate and
apprised him that the case was dismissed. Thereafter, civil
miscellaneous application was prepared and filed on 04.09.2019 and,
as such, delay of 340 days occurred in filing the instant C.M.P.
26. It appears from the explanation furnished, as quoted in the
preceding paragraph, that the laches and negligent approach is itself
clear since the moment the ground has been taken that the petitioner
came to know about the order when the workman made an
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application which was after more than the period of ten months.
27. The said explanation cannot be said to be sufficient since the
approach showing the vigil upon the outcome of the case is the
primary duty of the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be allowed
to take instance of knowing about the order only after the workman
has made an application, i.e., after more than ten months, rather the
petitioner is to show all care.
28. The ground which has been taken in the interlocutory
application does not seem to be a cogent explanation.
29. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the explanation which
has been furnished by the petitioner in the delay condonation
application, cannot be said to be a sufficient cause to condone the
inordinate delay.
30. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court has also
dismissed one Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on
28th April, 2023 filed by the State of Jharkhand which was filed
against the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021,
wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said
appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of the appeal.
31. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed S.L.P.(C)
Diary No. (S) No. 3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by the State of
Jharkhand against the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in
L.P.A. No. 401 of 2022, wherein the delay of 259 days was not
condoned.
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32. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove as also
the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application, is of
the view that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone
inordinate delay of 340 days in filing the civil miscellaneous petition.
33. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No.
9118 of 2019 is hereby dismissed.
34. In consequence thereof, the instant civil miscellaneous petition
also stands dismissed.
35. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand
dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Sunil-Amar/N.A.F.R.
