Jharkhand High Court

Md. Mobin Alam vs Union Of India Through The Secretary on 29 April, 2025

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

                                                        2025:JHHC:12828-DB




       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                  Civil Review No.09 of 2025
                             ----
      Md. Mobin Alam, son of SK. Qurban Ali, aged about 53
      years, resident of Mohalla-Dhatkidih, P.O-Bistupur, P.S-
      Jamshedpur,     District-East   Singhbhum,         retired   as
      Personal Assistant, District Office, Giridih, Jharkhand.
                             ...   ...    Petitioner/Petitioner
                           Versus
     1.    Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of
     Labour and Employment, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi
     Marg, PO/PS New Delhi-110011.
     2.    The Central Board of Trustees, EPF through Central
     Provident Fund Commissioner, 14 Bhikaji Kama Place,
     PO/PS New Delhi-110066.
     3.    The Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner
     (HQ), 14 Bhikaji Kama Place, PO/PS New Delhi-110066.
     4.    The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ranchi,
     Bhagirathi Complex, Near Circuit House, Karamtoli, PO/PS
     Ranchi-834001, Jharkhand.
                     ...       ...   Respondents/Opposite Parties
     CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
                                ------
For the Petitioner   : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
                       Ms. Deepsikha Ranjan, Advocate
                       Ms. Priyanka Kumari, Advocate
For the UOI          : Mr. Anil Kumar, ASGI
                       Mr. Harsh Chandra, AC to ASGI
For Resp. Nos.2 to 4 : Mr. Parth S. A. Swaroop Pati, Adv.
                       --------

C.A.V. on 21.04.2025             Pronounced on 29.04.2025

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

Prayer

1. The instant review petition is under Article 226 of the

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Constitution of India, seeking review of the order dated

25.04.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No.2265 of 2023.

2. It needs to refer herein that the judgment passed by this

Court in W.P.(S) No.2265 of 2023 has been carried to the

Hon'ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal being

S.L.P. (C) Diary No.42077 of 2024. The same, however, was

permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to approach the High

Court seeking review. Accordingly, the said Special Leave to

Appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file review,

for ready reference, the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

needs to be referred, as under:-

"1) Learned senior counsel for the petitioner prays for withdrawal of this special leave petition with liberty to approach the High Court seeking review.

2) As prayed, the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty."

3. The present review therefore has been filed in pursuant to

the aforesaid liberty.

Facts

4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the

writ petition which also carried in the instant review petition,

needs to be referred which reads as under:-

5. It is the case of the review petitioner/writ petition that the

petitioner joined the Employees Provident Fund Organization

(EPFO) on 24/02/1992 as stenographer and was promoted as

Personal Assistant (PA) on 02/05/2008 retrospectively w.e.f.

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14/07/1997. The review petitioner was disciplined and

dedicated employee of the Organization, working with sincerity

and devotion to duty. The petitioner, while in service, was never

communicated about any adverse remarks recorded in the

Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR).

6. Thereafter, one Smt. Dashma Bobonga filed an FIR

No.0073 on 23/06/2017 with Sadar Police Station, Chaibasa

alleging false allegation that the petitioner, her sister's son

'Sanjat Alda' and one Ram Chandra Mukhi have fraudulently

withdrawn Rs.1,91,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Ninety One

Thousand Only) from her and her son and daughter's savings

bank account. In consonance to the aforesaid FIR, the

petitioner was arrested on 23/06/2017 and Rs.22,000/-

(Rupees Twenty Two Thousand Only) was seized from him. The

petitioner was released on bail on 04/09/2017. The petitioner

was placed under deemed suspension w.e.f. 23/06/2017 vide

order no. JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/08 dated 27/06/2017.

7. The Head Quarter of the petitioner during suspension was

changed to District Office, Giridih as per order no. 12 dated

08/08/2017. However, the suspension of the petitioner was

revoked vide order no.JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/61 dated

29/11/2017.

8. The Ld. Magistrate West Singhbhum at Chaibasa

acquitted the petitioner vide order dated 18.09.2017.

9. Upon acquittal by the Ld. Trial Court on 18/09/2017, the

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petitioner received the Charge Memorandum dated 20/12/2018

under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CC & A) Rules, 1971 for the

same allegations of which the Judicial Magistrate acquitted the

petitioner, issued by the Addl. Central Provident Fund

Commissioner (ACC), Bihar and Jharkhand for which

departmental proceeding against the petitioner is still

continuing.

10. The review petitioner under the Conduct Rules applied for

permission to purchase a flat in the name of his wife on

11/12/2018. The petitioner, while submitting the aforesaid

request, submitted that he shall finance the consideration

money from (i) Personal savings Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten

Lakhs (ii) Withdrawal); from SPF Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees

Twenty Five Lakhs Only) and (iii) Personal loan Rs. 15,00,000/-

(Rupees Fifteen Lakhs Only). Upon which, the Competent

Authority granted permission vide letter no.JH/RO/RNCAdm-I/

immovable property/2018/9731 dated 01/01/2019. In

consonance to aforesaid approval; the petitioner paid an

amount of Rs. 27,00,000/- (Twenty Seven Lakhs Only) to the

seller of the flat by withdrawing Rs.23,92,611/- (Rupees Twenty

Three Lakhs Ninety Two Thousand Six Hundred Eleven Only)

from his PF Account and the balance from his Personal

Savings. Subsequent to the transaction, the respondent no. 4

started putting queries through various letters regarding

personal savings of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Only)

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proposed to be saved in the next two years.

11. The DOPT issued Office Memorandum dated 11/03/2016

bearing no.25013/1/2016-Estt.-A-IV that "where autonomous

institutions have adopted the provisions of FR 56(J),

Administrative Ministry may ensure that they are strictly

followed in letter and spirit.

12. Thereafter, the Respondent no. 3 in pursuance of DOPT

OM dated 11/09/2015 issued circular

no.HR/AVS/NZ/193/56J/2015/589 dated 14/06/2017

relating to periodical review under Rule 56(J) of Fundamental

Rules and Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and in

pursuance thereto, respondent no.3 with the approval of

respondent no.2 constituted the Screening Committee and

Review Committee to consider the case of the officials of the

Organization under Fundamental Rule 56 (J) of and Rule 48 of

the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

13. The respondents issued another circular

no.HR/AVS/NZ/193/56-J/2015/3959 dated 05/08/2019

wherein the participation of the vigilance representative in the

Screening Committee was dispensed.

14. The Regional PF Commissioner, Ranchi forwarded

assessment sheet of the petitioner for consideration of the

Screening Committee as per letter no.JH/RO/RNC/Adm-I/FR

56J/2018/795/16748 dated 22/01/2020. The Assessment

Report do not depict the correct information. The RPFC has

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expressed the opinion on presumption that due to their inquiry

about savings of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) in

next two years, the petitioner cancelled the transaction. In fact,

totally ignored the factual aspect that seller/builder defrauded

and cheated the petitioner.

15. The Screening Committee comprising (i) Additional Central

PF Commissioner who is the Appointing Authority, (ii) RPFC-I of

the Region who sent assessment report for placing before the

Screening Committee and (iii) Assistant Director Vigilance who

was not to be member of the Committee was constituted of the

Screening Committee is per se illegal for two reasons viz; (i)

senior most member being the appointing authority and the (ii)

RPFC who sent adverse assessing report being member of the

committee and associating Assistant Director Vigilance as a

member in contravention of the circular dated 05/08/2019.

16. The Screening Committee considered the case of the

review petitioner in their meeting held on 23/12/2020. The

function assigned to the Screening Committee was to collate the

service records of the petitioner and place the same before the

Review Committee to consider the case of the petitioner under

Rule 56 (J) of the Fundamental Rules. But the Screening

Committee dehors the jurisdiction and the function assigned to

it as assumed the role of the Review Committee by

recommending in conclusion "Based on above facts, the

members of the Screening Committee are of unanimous opinion

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that Md. Mobin Alam, PA, is a fit case for compulsory

retirement under Fundamental Rule 56 (J). The official has

outlived his utility to the organization and has actually never

been useful to the organization even in the past." The findings

of the committee are totally contrary to the factual position on

record. The minutes of the Screening Committee is only copying

the Assessment Report sent by the RPFC.

17. The Review Committee in their meeting held on

09/03/2021 considered the recommendation of the Screening

Committee. The Review Committee considered the Annual

Performance Assessment Report (APAR) of the applicant.

18. The Review Committee is also influenced by the Charge

memorandum no.118/ZO (BR&JH)/ Vig./ Mobin Alam

(PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20/12/2018 which is issued for the same

charges of which the Trial Court acquitted the appellant.

Moreover, they failed to consider that the inquiry proceedings in

respect of the charge memorandum was continuing to ascertain

the truth of imputations and they cannot resort to action under

Rule 56 (J) as a short cut to the inquiry and proving of the

charges alleged against the applicant.

19. The Review Committee while recommending the petitioner

for pre-mature retirement is influenced by the recommendation

of Screening Committee and the remarks of the Screening

Committee that the general reputation and trustworthiness of

the petitioner has been so dismissal that despite holding the

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post of PA his services have rarely been used by any officer. The

finding of the Review Committee is contrary to the factual

position as the petitioner has been attached with different

officers. The Review Committee recommended the applicant for

pre-mature retirement under FR 56 (J) on the ground that the

petitioner has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful

which is contrary to the factual position as explained.

20. Being aggrieved by the acts, actions and inactions of

respondents against illegal and arbitrary orders, the petitioner

approached Ld. Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench

by filing Original Appeal No.050/00270/2021. The Ld.

Tribunal, while disposing off the aforesaid Original Appeal vide

order dated 07/05/2021 directed the respondents to consider

and pass order on the representation of the applicant ( review

petitioner herein) within time as per spirit of the DOPT OM on

the subject dated 28/08/2020.

21. It is the further case of the review petitioner that in

pursuance to the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted

representations dated 24/05/2021 & 24/06/2021 before the

respondent to decide the same in time and as per direction of

the Ld. Tribunal, but instead of deciding the representation

within the time as directed by the Ld. Tribunal, sought

extension of time by filing application before Ld. Tribunal.

Extension of time was granted by Ld. Tribunal subject to

payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten Thousand Only). Upon

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extension of time, the respondents rejected the representation

of the petitioner on the recommendation of the Representation

Committee vide order dated 23.12.2021.

22. It is evident from the factual aspect as referred

hereinabove based upon the pleading that the review petitioner

was appointed as Stenographer in the Employees Provident

Fund Organization (EPFO) on 24.02.1992 and promoted to the

post of Personal Assistant on 14.07.1997.

23. The Screening Committee of the EPFO was constituted as

per the circular dated 14.06.2017 for the purpose of

scrutinizing the service records of the applicant. The meeting of

the said Committee was conveyed on 23.12.2020 and found his

case fit for retirement under Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental

Rule. The decision so taken for compulsory retirement was

passed on 28.04.2021.

24. The review petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid

order dated 28.04.2021, had approached the tribunal by filing

original application which was disposed of on 07.05.2021 with

a direction upon the respondents to consider and pass order on

the representation of the applicant within the stipulated period.

25. The respondents had considered and rejected the said

representation vide order dated 23.12.2021, aggrieved thereof,

the original application being Original Appeal

No.051/00124/2022 has been filed.

26. The learned Tribunal, after calling upon the respondents,

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who had filed the written statement and on consideration of the

rival submissions made on behalf of both the parties, the

original application was dismissed declining to interfere with

the impugned order taking into consideration the discussion

made in the recommendation of the review committee, which

according to the tribunal, cannot be called arbitrary or without

any material, rather, the committee has considered the said

report which shows the consideration of the service records of

the applicant including the APARs, memorandums and

warnings issued in past for dereliction of punctuality, diligence

and absenteeism, applicant's general conduct reflected through

registration of FIR, his arrest and subsequent acquittal by the

trial court on the basis of compromise and his evasive conduct

about his savings.

27. The appointing authority, by applying the weeding out

principle has constituted Screening Committee, in exercise of

power conferred under the provision of Rule 56(J) of the

Fundamental Rules. The authority, after taking into

consideration the entire service book, has taken decision for

compulsory retirement of the petitioner and accordingly, he has

compulsory been retired.

28. The petitioner, being an employee of the Central

Government, had approached to the Central Administrative

Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 051/00124/2022. The learned

Tribunal has refused to interfere with the decision taken by the

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authority, against which, the writ petition has been filed.

Argument advanced on behalf of the Review Petitioner

29. This Court has declined to interfere with the view taken by

the learned Central Administrative Tribunal by dismissing the

writ petition. The writ petitioner, against the dismissal of the

writ petition, has approached to the Hon'ble Apex Court by

filing S.L.P. being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.42077

of 2024. However, the said S.L.P. was withdrawn with a liberty

to prefer review and accordingly, the present review petition has

been filed by taking the following grounds:-

(i) There is no consideration that APARs for the year 2016

has not been communicated to the petitioner but the same has

also been taken as a ground for compulsory retirement.

(ii) The petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case

and once, he has been acquitted, filing of FIR cannot be

construed to be a ground for compulsory retirement.

(iii) The disclosure not made which was to be made in

view of the provision of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965

cannot come for consideration of weeding out principle, since,

the property which was to be purchased finally, had not been

purchased.

(iv) The details of the communicated entries in service

which is 19 in number but out of the same, 18 has been closed

to be a stigma but even then, the same has been taken into

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consideration for weeding out principle.

30. Learned counsel for the review petitioner, based upon the

aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the same having not

been considered in right perspective and as such, it is a fit case

for exercising the power of review.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent

31. Per Contra, Mr. Parth S. A. Swaroop Pati, learned counsel

for the respondent nos.2 to 4 has submitted that all the

grounds which are being raised, have already been taken into

consideration by this Court and the petitioner by re-agitating

the same, is trying to make the said ground to be a ground for

review, which is not permissible.

32. Moreso, the petitioner has travelled to the Hon'ble Apex

Court by challenging the order passed by this Court but the

same has been withdrawn, however, the liberty was taken by

him to file review.

33. It has been contended that merely because the liberty has

been granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it does not mean that

any ground is allowed to be agitated by the review petitioner

making the same to be a ground for review, rather, the ground

is only to be entertained if acceptable within the scope to

exercise the power of review. All the four grounds have already

been taken into consideration by this Court and as such, the

said ground cannot be said to be a new one for the purpose of

coming to the conclusion that error apparent on the face of

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record or the fact could not be produced in spite of all due

diligence.

34. However, the submission has been made that all these

aspects of the matter, have already been considered and taken

note by this Court, which would be evident from the fact that

the consideration of non-communication of APARs is itself

evident from the details of communicated entries in service as

referred at para-4.3 of the vigilance profile, which has been

considered by this Court, available at page-23 of the judgment

sought to be reviewed.

35. The 2nd ground that in the judicial proceeding, the

petitioner has been acquitted, can also not be a ground, since,

the said judgment in the criminal proceeding was passed on the

basis of settlement, i.e., the entire amount, which the petitioner

has not paid in favour of the claimant, had been agreed to be

paid and accordingly paid by him in favour of the beneficiary

and on that count, the beneficiary does not intend to contest

the case and in that view of the matter, the criminal case was

resulted in acquittal, hence, the said judgment cannot be said

to be clean acquittal.

36. It is further evident that the moment, the petitioner has

made payment, it means that he has admitted the fact about

non-disbursement of claimed amount in favour of the

beneficiary which goes to the moral turpitude, integrity and

honesty of the petitioner which has been taken into

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consideration while applying the weeding out principle on the

basis of settled position of law that the entire service record is

to be seen.

37. So far as the argument of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 is

concerned, what has been argued on behalf of the petitioner is

not acceptable, reason being that, whatever material or articles

have been purchased, it is the statutory requirement in view of

the provision of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 to

communicate it to the appointing authority, so that the

appointing authority may be conscious with respect to such

purchase in order to come to the conclusion that whatever

articles have been purchased either movable or immovable

property, the same must be within the known source of income.

38. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has

submitted that all these grounds however cannot be taken as a

ground to review merely because the counsel who had

represented the writ petition now has been replaced by another.

Analysis

39. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and

gone through the rival submissions made on behalf of the

parties, pleadings and the order sought to be reviewed.

40. This Court, before coming to the power/scope to exercise

the scope of review seeking review of the said order, needs to

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refer the underlined principle on which the power of review, is

to be exercised.

41. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Moran Mar Basselios

Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius

and Ors., [AIR 1954 SC 526], particularly, at paragraph-32

has observed as under:

"32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason."

42. Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs.

Union of India, (1980) Supp. SCC 562, the Hon'ble Apex

Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done

unless the Court is satisfied that the material error which is

manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of

justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are

as under:

"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our

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earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed: 'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ..... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

43. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320

has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly

confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As

long as the point sought to be raised in the review application

has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not

entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an

alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review

jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under:

"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v.

Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:--

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(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."

44. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power

of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred on the

face of the order or the factual aspect could not have been

brought to the notice of this Court in spite of the due diligence

having been taken in the matter of making available the factual

aspect of the relevant documents.

45. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from

the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review

of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come

which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in

spite of the due diligence, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex

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Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most

Rev. Mar Poulose (supra).

46. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the power of

review can be exercised only the two folds ground, i.e., (i) if

there is any error apparent on the face of the order; or (ii) the

fact which could not have been brought to the notice of the

court in spite of the due diligence having been taken by the

concerned party.

47. Further, law is well settled that a review petition, has a

limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in

disguise", as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715, for

ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid

judgment is quoted as under:

"Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."

48. Similarly, in S. Murali Sundaram Versus Jothibai

Kannan and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 the Hon'ble

Apex Court observed as under:

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"15. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC are required to be referred to? In the case of Perry Kansagra (supra) this Court has observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order. It is observed that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is further observed that review is not appeal in disguise. It is observed that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view.

Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed that it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which the controversy has been finally decided. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under:

"(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1.

(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit."

49. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some

error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous

thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various

judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as

in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as

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permissible grounds of review.

50. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very

connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the

record of the case and does not require detailed examination,

scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position.

If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long

debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error

apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47

Rule 1 CPC.

51. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to

review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the

face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to

be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be

an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court

to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

52. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar

Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine

SC 1406, the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting the

provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has

been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at

paragraph 16.1 to 16.7, which reads as under:-

"16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. 16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

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16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review.

16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".

16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".

16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.--"

53. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussion it is evident that

while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to

review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be

exercised on well-recognized and established grounds on which

judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be

exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or

evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties

seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order

was made.

54. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very

connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the

record of the case and does not require detailed examination,

scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position.

If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long

debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error

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apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of invoking

the jurisdiction of review. Further an error which is not self-

evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can

hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record

justifying the Court to exercise its power of review.

55. It is evident from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex

Court that the parameters have been fixed in the recent

judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State

Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra), and in sum and substance, the

power of review can only be exercised if there is error apparent

on the face of order or the fact could not have been produced in

spite of due diligence.

56. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case by

taking into consideration the ground, as has been agitated on

behalf of the petitioner, we are now proceeding to examine as to

whether, the same can be said to be a ground to exercise the

power of review.

57. The 1st ground has been taken regarding acquittal in the

criminal case.

58. Although, the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal

case but as would be evident from the judgment of acquittal

which has been passed on the basis of settlement in a case

where the petitioner while working in Employees Provident

Fund Organization, has not disbursed the money in favour of

legitimate beneficiary and in consequence thereof, based upon

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the FIR, the judicial proceeding had commenced.

59. The charge-sheet was submitted and the trial was

proceeded by framing charge under Sections 467, 468, 471 &

120B of the IPC. The beneficiary, in course of trial, has agreed

for settlement, as offered by the petitioner by expressing wishes

of making payment of the legitimate amount in favour of the

petitioner and accordingly, the amount has been paid.

60. The competent court of criminal jurisdiction, based upon

the aforesaid settlement, has decided the judicial proceeding by

acquitting the petitioner.

61. It is, thus, evident that the criminal case has not been

decided on merit, rather, on the basis of settlement that too, on

the admission made on behalf of the petitioner in the judicial

proceeding by accepting to make payment in favour of the

beneficiary.

62. The aforesaid fact has been taken into consideration by

this Court, as would be evident from paragraph-57 of the

impugned order (writ petition), wherein, the issue of integrity

and moral turpitude has been taken note on account of the fact

that the amount which was to be given in favour of the

beneficiary under the EPF has not been given and

subsequently, on the basis of the compromise when the

criminal case was instituted, the said criminal case was ended

in settlement, for ready reference, paragraph-57 of the order

impugned (writ petition) is being quoted as under:-

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"57. It has also been considered about the issue of integrity and moral turpitude and not only that, the amount which was to be given in favour of the beneficiary under the EPF has not been given and subsequently, on the basis of the compromise when the criminal case was instituted, the said criminal case was ended."

63. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the ground which

is being taken regarding the issue of acquittal in the criminal

case, has already been taken into consideration by this Court

while deciding the writ petition and hence, it is not available for

the review petitioner to re-agitate the aforesaid issue by making

the same as a ground.

64. This Court, therefore, applying the principle upon which

the power of review is to be exercised, is of the view that the

ground of acquittal cannot be a ground for review, since, it has

already been taken into consideration by this Court.

65. The 2nd ground has been taken that the entry made of the

year, 2016 has not been communicated. The same has also

been taken into consideration by this Court, as would be

evident from paragraph-50, wherein, details of the

communicated entries in the service book have been referred by

taking note of paragraph-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the service record,

which has been taken into consideration by the Screening

Committee, for ready reference, paragraph-50 of the order

impugned (writ petition) is being quoted as under:-

"50. The details of the communicated entries in the service book has been taken into consideration along with the failure on the part of the writ petitioner for giving intimation of property transaction made by the

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officials, for ready reference, the details as referred in paragraph-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the consideration made by the Screening Committee are being referred as under:-

"4.2 Vigilance Profile-

4.2.1 A case No. G.R. Case No. 318/2017/TR No. 461/17 was filed against Sh. Mobin Alam, PA in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa for offences punishable under Section 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Sh. Mobin Alam PA was acquitted by the District and Session Judge-I Chaibasa vide order dated 18.07.2017 but the acquittal was on the basis of compromise between the accused and the complainant. The facts of the case are as follow:-

i. Shri Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridhi while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur cheated and withdrew Rs. 1,91,000/- from pension accounts of Smt. Dashma Bobonga W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa, East Singhbum and her two children in collusion with two other accomplices. A FIR was filed against them in Sadar Thana, Chaibasa and the Police authority taking immediate action arrested him along with cash amount Rs. 22,000/- ii. The trial court in its order dated 18.09.2017 pronounced the order as -"After going through the evidence of the prosecution witness, it is clear that during illegal transaction all accused persons have not prepared any forged document to withdraw the amount from the A/c of informant, her son and daughter. Hence, no case is made out for the offences u/s 467, 468, 471, 120(B) IPC rest section 420 IPC is compoundable in nature with permission of the court. The informant and her son and daughter have deposed that they have received all amount from the accused person and they do not want to proceed in this case. They agreed to settled their dispute happily. Informant, PW2 and PW3 have stated that on the po8int of compromise that accused was returned all amount and both parties have settled their dispute and not they do not want to proceed further in this case. On joint compromise petition dated 01.07.2017 both parties have signed which are duly identified by their respective lawyer. There is no public policy involved. The compromise petition is in order. Under such circumstances, compromise petition is hereby accepted. Hence, the accused persons namely 1. Mobin Alam 2. Ram Chandra Mukhi and 3. Sanjay Alda are hereby acquitted from all the charges of this case on compromise basis. They are also discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bond.

4.2.2 One Charge Memorandum No. 118/Zo(BR&JH)/Vig./Mobin Alam (PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20.12.2018 has been issued under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CCA) Rules, 1971 which is pending at the inquiry stage. The charges against the official in the said charge

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memorandum are-

(a) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur willfully committed grave misconduct by cheating and resoring to withdrawal of a sum of Rs.

1,91,000/- from the saving Bank Account of Smt. Dashma Bobonga, W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa. East Singbum and also from the Savings bank Accounts of her two children in collusion with other accomplices namesly Shri Ram Chandra Mukhi s/o Shri Bogeswar Mukhi Medical Basti Dhatkidih, Bistupur and Shri Sanjay Alda, S/o Shri Jam Rai Alda, vill- Harilatola, Basti Dhatkidih, Bistupur and Shri Sanjay Alda S/o Shri Jam Rai Alda, Vill Harilatola, Thana Mufsil Chaibasa in a fraudulent manner.

(b) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur was reportedly found at Punjab National Bank, Chaibasa on 23.06.2017 without getting headquarters leaving permission. He had taken Restricted Holiday Leave for 23.06.2017 but did noit apply for headquarters leaving permission. Without headquarters leave permission, he left the headquarter. The matter of not taking headquarters leave permission has been confirmed by Regional Office, Jamshedpur vide letter No. JH/RO/JSR/Adm/Pers/528/03/409 dated 02.11.2018. It is violation of Provision FR- 11 which provides that permission for leaving headquarter is essential for government servant before leaving the headquarter.

4.3 Details of communicated entries in Service Book-

i. Memorandum dated 22.01.2003 - for deserting his seat and leaving office during the office hour on regular basis without any permission.

ii. Memorandum dated 18.02.2003 - for deserting his seat and leaving the office without prior permission of or intimation to the competent authority.

iii. Memorandum dated 01.02.2005 - for failure to dispose the work assigned to him.

iv. Memorandum dated 06.07.2005 - from absence fro office without permission and to submit daily work report. v. Memorandum dated 05.08.2005 - to be punctual and disposal of work assigned to him.

vi. Memorandum dated 25.11.2005 - for not coming to office in time.

vii. Office noted dated 20.04.2006 - not allowing Shri Mobin Alam to mark his attendance on 20.04.2006 as he did not attend office in time and treating his absence as leave without pay till it is regularized by the competent authority.

viii. Memorandum dated 18.05.2012 - for absence from office on 18.05.2012 2.00 PM ix. Memorandum dated 28.08.2012 - for absence from office on 28.08.2012 at 3.00 PM x. Office Noted dated 25.09.2012 - for absence from

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office on 28.08.2012. Note given by APFC (Cash) on 27.09.2012 with reference to office note dated 25.09.2012 - stating that the submission of Shri Mobin Alam is absolutely false and baseless.

xi. Warning dated 20.11.2012 - for absence from office without intimation.

xii. Memorandum dated 06.02.2014- for not disposing a grievance case within due date.

xiii. Memorandum dated 27.03.2014 - for absence without any permission on 27.03.2014 at 12.45 P.M. xiv. Memorandum dated 05.12.2014 - from absconding from duty without any information/prior permission. xv. Memorandum dated 18.02.2015 - for late coming to office as well as non-appearance in the office as and when he calls upon.

xvi. Memorandum dated 13.05.2016 - absence from duty on 12.05.2016 without any information.

xvii. Recordable Warning dated 14.06.2016 - for unauthorized absence.

xviii. Memorandum dated 30.03.2017 - for absence from office on 30.03.2017 xix. Warning dated 13.04.2017 - for unauthorized absence from office."

4.4 Regarding intimation of property transactions made by the official-

On 11.12.2018, he had given an application in APPENDIX-V seeking prior intimation or previous sanction under rule 18(2) of CCS conduct rule, 1964 regarding purchase of flat worth Rs, 50,00,000 (Fifty lakhs) wherein source of funding was reported as Rs, 10,00,000/- from personal saving, Rs. 15,00,000/- from personal Loan and Rs. 25,00,00/- from SPF. In reply to further query, he replied that he intends to save the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- within a period of 2 years at the time of taking delivery of flat. When further query was raised about near impossibility of such high saving within two years, he changed his stance and stated that "I have made conversation with the members of family and friend circle who have promised to provide loan but they refused to give prior approval. He further made an excuse that "the sentence used by me for taking financial supports from my family and friends was under personal savings and not under personal loan." Subsequently, when he was asked to submit all the saving details, he informed the office that he has cancelled the transaction ostensibly citing that the builder has sold out the flat to other person after taking amount from him and thereafter he has moved the Civil Court, Jamshedpur against the builder."

66. It is further evident from paragraph-51, wherein, it has

been observed by this Court that the Screening Committee,

based upon the aforesaid grounds, has come to the conclusion

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that the services of the writ petitioner have rarely been utilized

by any Officers.

67. It has further been observed at paragraph-52 that it can

be summarized that the expression "dead wood" as referred by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court aptly describes this official as he

has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful and hence, the

Review Committee after going through the relevant documents

and applying its mind and other facts as available in the

records, has opined that it is a case for invocation of the

provisions under Fundamental Rule 56(J), for ready reference,

paragraph-52 is being referred as under:-

"52. Thus, from the conspectus of above, it can be summarized that the expression "dead wood"

as referred by the Hon'ble Supreme Court aptly describes this official as he has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful and hence, the Review Committee after going through the relevant documents and applying its mind and other facts as available in the records, has opined that it is a case for invocation of the provisions under Fundamental Rule 56(J)."

68. The argument which has been advanced by making the

ground for review that the entry made of the year, 2016 has not

been communicated, which cannot be said to be a ground for

acquittal in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das & Anr. Vrs. Chief

District Medical Officer, Baripada & Anr., reported in

(1992) 2 SCC 299, upon which, the learned counsel for the

petitioner has also relied upon, wherein, it is evident that the

consideration can be given if the order of compulsory retirement

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has been passed solely on the basis of one action, as has been

observed by the Hon'ble Apex at paragraph-32 of the said

judgment that "it is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number

of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the

primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed

present, may be indicative of malice in law."

69. But herein, it is not the fact like that, rather, the reason

for compulsory retirement is manifolds and not based upon one

ground. Therefore, the conclusion which has been arrived by

the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph-34 of the said judgment,

having been relied upon by this Court, wherein, it has been

held that the order of compulsory retirement is not a

punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of

misbehaviour. The order has to be passed by the government

on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a

government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the

subjective satisfaction of the government. Principles of natural

justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory

retirement. However, due care is to be given that they may

interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed mala fide

or it is based on no evidence or it is arbitrary.

70. The further consideration as has been referred at

paragraph-34(iv) is that the government shall have to consider

the entire record of service before taking a decision in the

matter. The record to be so considered would naturally include

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the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both

favourable and adverse. For ready reference, paragraph-32 to

34 of the said judgment are being referred as under:-

"32. We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the rules/orders in that behalf. Any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56(j) (or the rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation or representations, as the case may be. In some cases, it may happen that some adverse remarks of the recent years are not communicated or if communicated, the representation received in that behalf are pending consideration. On this account alone, the action under F.R. 56(j) need not be held back. There is no reason to presume that the Review Committee or the government, if it chooses to take into consideration such uncommunicated remarks, would not be conscious or cognizant of the fact that they are not communicated to the government servant and that he was not given an opportunity to explain or rebut the same. Similarly, if any representation made by the government servant is there, it shall also be taken into consideration. We may reiterate that not only the Review Committee is generally composed of high and responsible officers, the power is vested in government alone and not in a minor official. It is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed present, may be indicative of malice in law. We may mention in this connection that the remedy provided by Article 226 of the Constitution is no less an important safeguard. Even with its well known constraints, the remedy is

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an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action.

33. At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks -- not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. There may be any number of remarks, observations and comments, which do not constitute adverse remarks, but are yet relevant for the purpose of F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to it. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well stated in J.N. Sinha [(1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791] and other decisions referred supra.

34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:

(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.

(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.

(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary -- in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.

(iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter -- of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years.

The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post

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notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.

(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.

Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above."

71. The another ground has been taken regarding the

applicability of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The

same cannot also be said to be a new ground, rather, the same

has been taken into consideration by this Court, as would be

evident from paragraph-58 of the order impugned (writ

petition).

72. Further, the ground has been taken that the disclosure

had not been made, since, no property was purchased due to

certain dispute. But, this Court has considered the provision of

Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control