Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 9192 Jhar
Judgement Date : 12 September, 2024
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018
[Against the Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence dated
07/08.05.2018, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-XII,
Hazaribag, in Sessions Trial No.336 of 2013]
Mustak Mian @ Butan, aged about 42 years S/o Late Israil Mian
R/o Village Sariya, P.S. Churchu, P.O. Churchu, District Hazaribag.
.... .... Appellant
Versus
State of Jharkhand .... .... Opp. Party
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
......
For the Appellant : Md. Zaid Ahmed, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Vishwanath Roy, Spl. P.P.
......
C.A.V. on 02.09.2024 Pronounced on 12.09.2024
Per Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The above named sole appellant has preferred this appeal
challenging his conviction and sentence dated 07/08.05.2018
passed by Additional Sessions Judge-XII, Hazaribag in Sessions
Trial No.336 of 2013 (arising out of Churchu P.S. Case No.03 of
2013 corresponding to G.R Case No.947 of 2013) whereby and
whereunder the appellant has been held guilty for the offence
under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo R.I. for
life along with fine of Rs.1 Lakh with default stipulation.
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 1 | 23
3. The facts of the case as depicted in the F.I.R. instituted on the
basis of fardbayan of one Nuruddin Ansari (P.W.-2) stating inter
alia that his daughter Gulshan Ara Khatoon (since deceased) was
married with Mustak Mian @ Butan (appellant) in the year 2011.
It is further alleged that after solemnization of marriage
informant's daughter went to her matrimonial home and lived
there properly for six months, thereafter, informant came to know
that his son-in-law in some pretext or other used to assault his
daughter and frequently stop giving food to her. The informant's
daughter was any how surviving at her matrimonial home
receiving food from neighbourers. The informant several times
attempted to resolve the matrimonial discard of his daughter and
also assured his daughter that in the course of time everything will
be settled. It is further alleged that the conduct and behavior of
son-in-law with the daughter of the informant did not change
rather physical violence increased and became usual. Not only
this, the present appellant also started demanding Rs.50,000/-
from her father and pressurized to fulfill the aforesaid demand
through physical violence and non-supply of food and other
necessities. Ultimately on 13.03.2013, the informant received a
telephonic call from his daughter that her life is not secure unless
he gives some money to her husband. Upon this, the informant
consoled his daughter that he is managing some money. On
14.03.2013, nephew of informant namely Naushad informed
through telephonic message that Gulshan Ara Khatoon has been
murdered at her matrimonial home. The informant along with
other relatives reached to the matrimonial home of his daughter at
Village Sariya P.S. Churchu and found her dead body lying on the
bed in half naked condition and dupatta was gagged in her mouth.
There was bruise and red mark on her neck and beneath the bed, a
pouch of country made wine was also lying. From the scene of
occurrence, it appeared to informant that his son-in-law Mustak
Mian @ Butan after having sexual intercourse with the deceased
has inserted dupatta in her mouth due to which she has been died.
4. On the basis of above information, F.I.R. was registered for the
offence under Sections 302 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code
against the present appellant and after investigation charge-sheet
was submitted for the aforesaid offences.
5. The learned Trial Court after hearing prosecution and defence
found sufficient material to frame the charge under Section 302 of
the I.P.C. against the present appellant and accordingly charge was
framed on 17.08.2013 and was read over and explained to accused
to which he did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried.
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 3 | 23
6. In the course of trial, altogether nine witnesses were examined by
the prosecution and documentary evidence were also adduced.
7. After completion of prosecution evidence, statement of accused
was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which he has denied and claimed to be innocence and
falsely implicated. It is also pleaded that on the date and time of
the occurrence, he was not present at his house and later on came
to know about the murder of his wife. However, no oral or
documentary evidence has been adduced by the defence.
8. The learned Trial Court after apprising and appreciating the
prosecution evidence in the light of the defence of the accused
concluded that although F.I.R. was lodged for the offences under
Sections 302 and 376 of the I.P.C. only due to fact that the dead
body of deceased was found nude and dupatta was inserted in her
mouth. As against it, P.W.-9 Dr. R.S. Dangi, who conducted the
autopsy of the dead body of the deceased has clearly opined that
no sign of rape was found after examination of vaginal swab. The
cause of death was due to asphyxia caused by throttling. Sign of
multiple abrasions were found around the neck of the deceased. It
was also observed that the prosecution has succeeded to prove that
there was matrimonial dispute between husband and wife and
there was demand of dowry and non-fulfillment of which the
deceased was continuously tortured, harassed and her food was
also stopped. There were no any other persons in the house except
the present appellant and his wife. It is also proved that the death
of the deceased was caused due to throttling and it was not a
natural death as such mere defence of accused that he was not
present at his home and he is a driver, he was out of station being
bald plea cannot be accepted. The accused has failed to offer any
explanation as to under what circumstances, in his presence, in the
house, his wife died as an unnatural death. Therefore, principle of
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act may also be invoked in
this case against the accused and the accused has also failed to
prove his plea of alibi. Hence, prosecution has fully succeeded in
proving the charge levelled against the accused under Section 302
of the I.P.C. and convicted and sentenced him as stated above.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant assailing the impugned
judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant has
vehemently argued that the learned Trial Court has committed
serious illegality by not taking into consideration that for invoking
the principles under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the
foundational facts prima facie showing guilt of the accused must
be proved by the prosecution. The prosecution has miserably
failed to prove the exact date, day and year of the demand of any
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 5 | 23 illegal money and consequent torture meted with the deceased at
the hands of the appellant. None of the witnesses have been able
to prove that there was tense relationship between husband and
wife. Admittedly, the appellant is by profession a driver and
usually remains outside his house. The prosecution has miserably
failed to prove the presence of appellant at his house on the
relevant date and time of occurrence. The learned Trial Court has
passed the conviction and sentence of the petitioner only on
conjecture and surmises without any legal evidence. Hence, the
impugned judgment and order is fit to be set aside and appellant is
entitled for acquittal.
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon
reported judgment in the case of Balvir Singh v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2023) 12 SCR 815.
10. Per contra, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State controverting the
aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the appellant has
submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove the
foundational facts which could be proved by the prosecution.
There is no doubt that the prosecution case is based on
circumstantial evidence and there is no eye witness of the
occurrence. The circumstances proved by the prosecution clearly
shows that just within two years of marriage, the deceased was
killed in her matrimonial home while in custody of the appellant
by throttling. Her dead body was also found in the house of the
appellant. The appellant did not inform to his in-laws about the
unnatural death of his wife and he has also taken no recourse
before the police authority in lodging any case against unknown
miscreants or unnatural death of his wife. Prosecution has also
proved that the appellant was asking Rs.50,000/- as additional
dowry which could not be fulfilled by the informant and the
deceased was being mentally and physically tortured, assaulted
and put under starvation by the appellant. The accused has simply
denied his non-presence at the time of relevant occurrence. He has
neither proved his defence of alibi as mandated under Section 103
of the Indian Evidence Act nor he offered any explanation as to
under what circumstances his wife died unnatural death by
throttling. The learned Trial Court has very wisely and aptly taken
into consideration all the events and chain of circumstances in the
light of defence plea and arrived at right conclusion about the
guilt of the appellant. There is no illegality or infirmity in the
impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant
and no merits in this appeal which is fit to be dismissed.
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 7 | 23
11. For better appreciation of the case before us, a brief resume of
prosecution evidence appears to be beneficial to arrive at right
conclusion.
12. Out of nine witnesses examined by prosecution, P.W.-3 Kesiya
Devi, P.W.-4 Mosmat Shanti Devi, P.W.-5 Sita Devi, P.W.-6
Madina Khatoon, P.W.-7 Dulari Devi who happens to be local
villagers of the accused, have been turned hostile. These witnesses
have admitted about the murder of the deceased in the house of
present appellant in the night of 13/14.03.2013 but expressed their
no knowledge as to who has committed the murder of the
deceased, rather above witnesses have claimed to see the dead
body of the deceased in her matrimonial home.
P.W.-3 Kesiya Devi has specifically stated that the incident is
of two years ago and in the evening of the date of occurrence, she
had seen accused Mustak Mian @ Butan at his home, thereafter,
she did not see the accused. What happened in the night, she does
not know. On the next day morning after hearing hallah in the
village, she went to the house of the accused Mustak Mian @
Butan and found his wife lying dead in the house on the bed.
The appellant has taken plea of alibi that he was not present
in the house on the date of occurrence, is falsified by the aforesaid
witness although turned hostile and the appellant has not cross-
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 8 | 23 examined her to rebut above testimonies or other hostile witnesses
disputing or denying his presence at his home on the date of
occurrence.
13. The main witnesses of facts examined by prosecution are family
members of the deceased.
P.W.-1 Basir Ansari @ Ahmad is the uncle of deceased.
According to his evidence, the marriage of Gulshan Ara Khatoon
with the present appellant was solemnized in the year 2011. She
went to her sasural and lived quite well about six months.
Thereafter, she was being harassed and tortured on account of
non-fulfillment of additional demand of dowry by the present
appellant. He came to know from his brother Nuruddin Ansari
(informant) that the accused was asking money for purchasing
vehicle. About one or two days prior to occurrence, the accused
returned to his home thereafter, deceased informed through
telephonic call to her father that any untowards incident may
happen with her at the instance of her husband and just after two
days, Gulshan Ara Khatoon was murdered in her matrimonial
home. This witness has claimed to have seen the dead body of the
deceased at her matrimonial home which was lying on bed and
mouth was gagged with dupatta. There is nothing in his cross-
examination to rebut these aforesaid testimonies and no
suggestion has been extended by defence about his non-presence
at his home on the date of occurrence.
P.W.-2 Nuruddin Ansari is the informant and father of the
deceased. According to his evidence, just after six months of
marriage, his deceased daughter complained about ill-treatment
with her by her husband and he was demanding Rs.50,000/- He
came to know about murder of her daughter at her matrimonial
home and went there along with other family members and saw
the dead body of his daughter was lying on bed in half naked
condition. There was scratch marks on her neck and mouth was
gagged with dupatta.
In his cross-examination, he admits that the accused never
asked money from him nor assaulted the deceased in his presence
but above information was given by his daughter through
telephonic call. He has also admitted that Mustak Mian @ Butan
is a driver and used to come his home once in a week and on the
date of occurrence appellant was in his house. He also came to
know from the local villagers that in the evening, appellant was
present at his house. This witness has been simply suggested that
any other person has committed murder of the deceased and
accused is innocent but no cross-examination has been conducted
regarding presence of the accused at his house.
P.W.-9 Dr. R.S. Dangi has conducted autopsy of the dead
body of deceased on 14.03.2013 and found followings:
External Injury:-
Multiple bruises and scratch marks are present over the front and
sides of neck at the level of larynx and over it.
No Injury found inside the mouth.
Rigor mortis present both upper and lower limbs.
Internal Injury:-
Dissection of neck-Hemorrhage in the subcutaneous tissue and
muscle underlying the external injury.
Submucosal hemorrhage of the larynx and fracture laryngeal
cartilage found:
No injury found inside the mouth, tongue and inner aspect of lips.
Heart- Both chambers filled with blood and blood clots.
Both lungs are intact and congested, liver intact and congested,
spleen intact and congested, both kidneys intact and congested,
wall of stomach is normal and fill with approximately three ounce
of mucoid fluid, Urinary bladder is empty, no injury seen in
private part, hymen old torn, vaginal swab taken and send for
examination of spermatozoa.
As per laboratory report, no sperm was seen in the smear
provided.
Opinion about rape:-
Since hymen old torn no any injury seen over the private part and
no sperm material was found in the vaginal smear, definite
opinion about rape cannot be given.
Opinion about death:-
Death is due to asphyxia caused by throttling.
Time elapsed since death - 6 to 36 hrs.
The postmortem report is marked as Ext-7.
No material of any significance has been elicited in the cross-
examination of this case.
P.W.-8 S.I. Anand Kishore Prasad is the I.O. of this case.
According to his evidence, the fardbayan (Ext-2) of informant
Nuruddin Ansari on his dictation was recorded by him at Village
Sariya and accordingly formal F.I.R. (Ext-4) was registered. He
got prepared inquest report (Ext-5) of the deceased in presence of
witnesses. This witness has noticed, on the dead body some
scratches and reddish mark over the neck, mouth was gagged with
dupatta and lower part of the body was naked. Some wet
substance was found near the vagina; prima facie it appeared that
she was also ravished and dead body was found on bed in a room
in the house. One cup and country made liquor pouch was also
lying near. Above materials were seized and seizure list (Ext-6)
was prepared. He has further deposed that the place of occurrence
of this case is the pakka house of accused Mustak Mian @ Butan
situated in Village Sariya. There is 10 ft. X 10 ft. courtyard and
adjacent to the courtyard towards south, there are two rooms
constructed under Indira Awas and in the western side of room the
dead body was found lying on bed. During course of
investigation, he recorded the statement of witnesses, Majid Alam,
P.W.-3 Kesiya Devi, P.W.-1 Basir Ansari, Karamat Ansari, P.W.-4
Mosmat Shanti Devi, P.W.-6 Madina Khatoon, P.W.-5 Sita Devi,
P.W.-7 Dulari Devi etc. who have supported the prosecution case.
He also arrested the accused Mustak Mian @ Butan who
confessed his guilt finding sufficient evidence. He submitted
charge-sheet against the accused.
In his cross-examination, he has reiterated none of the
witnesses are eye witness of the occurrence. Prior to this
occurrence, no complaint was made by parents of deceased about
ill-treatment or torture meted with her.
14. From the facts proved by the prosecution following undisputed
facts may be deducted:-
(i) The appellant and deceased were married in the year 2011, it
was second marriage of the deceased.
(ii) Just after six months of the marriage, the appellant started
torturing for demand of Rs.50,000/- from his wife and
stopped her food and clothing and started assaulting and
torturing followed with frequent quarrel.
(iii) Just prior two days of the occurrence, the deceased gave a
distress call to her parent that any untowards incident may
happen with her at the instance of her husband who is
present with her.
(iv) Just within two days i.e. on 14.03.2013, the nephew of the
informant informed through telephonic message about
murder of deceased in her matrimonial home. The informant
P.W.-2 and other relatives went to matrimonial home of the
deceased found her dead body lying on bed. Lower part of
body was naked and some liquid was noticed near vagina,
there was scratches and nail marks over the neck. Mouth
was gagged with dupatta. There was also small pouch of
country made liquor and a cup indicating that the deceased
was murdered due to throttling or gagging her mouth and
she might have been raped.
(v) The postmortem report (Ext-7) of the deceased also shows
mark of injuries around the neck and cause of death due to
throttling within 6 to 36 hours.
(vi) The accused fled away from his house and on the arrival of
relatives of the deceased, he was not present in his house.
Rather he was arrested on 15.03.2013 at about 17:30 hours
in his Village Sariya.
15. In his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the accused has
simply denied the aforesaid circumstances and there is a specific
defence that on the date of occurrence, he was not present in his
house rather he was elsewhere.
16. There is very stout argument on behalf of appellant that the
burden of proof of the guilt of accused lies on the shoulder of
prosecution, which never shifts upon the accused. The prosecution
cannot take advantage of the silence of accused or non-offering
any defence. In the instant case, the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove the foundational facts regarding inference of the
guilt of the appellant, hence, he cannot be convicted with the aid
of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.
17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments has discussed
what constitutes a prima facie case (foundational facts) in the
context of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Referring to
the dictionary meaning of the latin term, the Supreme Court noted
that "prima facie" means 'at first sight' or 'based on first
impression'. The provision of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence
Act would apply to cases where the prosecution has successfully
proved facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
regarding the guilt of the accused.
18. In the case of Anees v. State Government of NCT, 2024 SC
Online SC 757. The Hon'ble Apex Court has elaborately
discussed the principles of law governing applicability of Section
106 of the Indian Evidence Act as under:-
"35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.-
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustration
(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him."
36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience".
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 16 | 23
37. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under:
"11. ... The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.
It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. [1936] 3 All ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."
38. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein this Court observed as under:
"22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."
(Emphasis supplied)
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 17 | 23
39. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under:
"23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516] : (SCC p. 393, para 38) "38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer [AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus:
'11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 18 | 23 or inconvenience.
The word "especially" stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.'""
(Emphasis supplied)
40. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681, this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal death in the confines of the house. The following observations made therein are considered relevant in the facts of the present case:
"14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [[1944] A.C. 315 : [1944] 2 All ER 13 (HL)] - quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [(2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135].) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads:"
19. In the instant case as discussed herein above, the foundational
facts proved by the prosecution as could be within its capacity
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 19 | 23 reveals that there was tense relationship between appellant and his
wife due to demand of some money or otherwise matrimonial
discard or dispute which was communicated by deceased to her
parents but due to their inability no effective steps were taken.
Just prior to the date of occurrence, the deceased informed
through telephonic message that any untowards incident might
happen with her at the hands of her husband and just next day, the
information about murder of deceased was communicated through
niece of the informant. The presence of the appellant at his house
on the fateful day is stated by the local villager (P.W.-3 in her
evidence) and other villagers have also seen the dead body of
deceased wife in the house of the present appellant. The death was
caused due to throttling. Just from the morning, when people and
local villagers assembled at the house of the appellant, he was
absconding from his house, which also shows his conduct
influenced by fact in issue. The dead body after conducting
inquest report was sent for post-mortem examination, thereafter,
present appellant arrived to his house and was arrested by police.
In the course of investigation, the statement of present petitioner
was recorded wherein he has also not denied his presence on the
fateful date of occurrence in his house and has failed to express
any enmity with any other person, who might have caused death
of the deceased in his house. The above clinching circumstances
are sufficient to reasonably infer that the appellant is the author of
the murder of his wife. In the rebuttal, the appellant has simply
denied his presence at his house but failed to offer any explanation
as to where he was on the fateful day when his wife died
unnatural death. He has also not informed the incident to police or
any other local villager as to under what circumstances his wife
died inside the four walls of the room of his house. In the
aforementioned circumstances, if the strict principle of
circumstantial evidence is insisted upon by the courts, it would be
extremely be difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused. Here, it is also pertinent to
observe that if the appellant was outside in connection with his
duty, he must come with fair submissions as to where he had gone
and what duty he was discharging on the fateful date of
occurrence. How he came to know about murder of his wife and
returned to home. He has also not expressed any suspicion against
any person who might have caused the murder of the deceased.
The plea of alibi is also required to be proved by the accused
through evidence as mandated by Section 103 of the Indian
Evidence Act which reads as follows:-
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 21 | 23 "103. Burden of proof as to particular fact. - The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
Illustrations [(a)] ....
(b) B wishes the Court to believe that, at the time in question, he was elsewhere. He must prove it."
The Court has to presume absence of circumstances favouring the
accused unless it is proved.
20. In the instant case, we have given anxious consideration to overall
aspects of the case and the foundational facts proved by the
prosecution leading to inference of guilt of the appellant. No more
facts may be insisted upon to be proved by the prosecution for
drawing such inference. If such insistence is strictly adhered to,
the same will lead to failure of justice. The non-fulfillment of any
reasonable explanation to the foundational facts and the specific
plea of defence by the accused adds an additional link in the chain
of circumstantial evidence against the accused to fortify his guilt.
In view of aforesaid discussions and reasons, we find no illegality
or infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence
passed by the learned Trial Court against the appellant and no
legal substance in the points of argument raised on behalf of the
appellant. This appeal appears to be devoid of merits, hence,
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 799 of 2018 P a g e 22 | 23 stands dismissed and the conviction and sentence of the appellant
passed by learned trial court is hereby upheld and confirmed.
21. Let a copy of this judgment along with Trial Court records be sent
back to the concerned Trial Court for information and needful.
22. Pending I.A., if any, is closed.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated: 12/09/2024
Sachin / AFR
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