Jharkhand High Court
Rahul Kumar vs Central Coalfields Limited ... on 9 September, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.393 of 2023
With
I.A. No. 5264 of 2024
------
Rahul Kumar, aged about 31 years, son of Late Madhu,
Resident of Subhashnagar, Ranchi Dhoura, P.O. Amlo,
P.S. Bermo, District Bokaro.
.... .... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. Central Coalfields Limited represented through its
Chairman cum Managing Director, Office at
Darbhanga House, P.O., G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District
Ranchi.
2. The General Manager (Personnel & Industrial
Relations), Central Coalfields Limited, Office at
Darbhanga House, P.O., G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District
Ranchi.
3. The General Manager, Bokaro & Kargali Area, Central
Coalfields Limited, P.O. Kargali, P.S. Bermo, District
Bokaro.
4. Project Officer, Karo I-OCP/Kargali, Central Coalfields
Limited, P.O. Kargali, P.S. Bermo, District Bokaro.
5. Personnel Manager, Karo I-OCP/Kargali, Central
Coalfields Limited, P.O. Kargali, P.S. Bermo, District
Bokaro.
6. Commissioner, CMPF, Region-I, RAIDA Building, 4th
Floor, Lowadih, Namkum Industrial Area, P.O. & P.S.
Namkum, District Ranchi.
.... .... Respondents/Respondents
-----
CORAM : HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
------
For the Appellant : Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate
For the Resp.-CCL : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
For the Resp.-CMPF : Mr. Prashant Vidyarthy, Advocate
Mr. Romit Kumar, Advocate
------
Order No.06/Dated 09 September, 2024
th
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.:
The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of
the Letters Patent, is directed against the
order/judgment dated 04.05.2022 passed by learned
Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 1896 of 2020
by which the writ petition has been dismissed.
I.A. No. 5264 of 2024:
2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by
limitation since there is delay of 415 days in preferring
the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 5264
of 2024 has been filed for condoning such delay.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the
fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been filed
after inordinate delay of 415 days, deems it fit and
proper, to first consider the delay condonation
application before going into the legality and propriety
of the impugned order on merit.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted
that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by
allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of
grounds shown therein treating the same to be
sufficient.
5. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring
the appeal, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory
application is that the counsel of the appellant-writ
petitioner tried to contact the appellant-writ petitioner
to inform him about the outcome of the writ petition but
the same could not have been done due to change of
mobile number of the appellant-writ petitioner.
It has also been stated that after one year, an
acquittance of petitioner/appellant met with his counsel
and then the counsel intimated him about the outcome
of the writ petition and thereafter, came to meet his
counsel in July, 2023 and thereafter, the appeal was
drafted and filed on 26.07.2023, as such, delay of 415
days has occurred in preferring the appeal.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the
appellant on delay condonation application and before
considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper
to refer certain legal proposition as has been
propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to
the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate
delay.
7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally
the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of
limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from
inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider
the application to condone the delay before entering into
the merit of the lis.
8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of
limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare
that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors.,
(2014) 11 SCC 351.
The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and
Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul
Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings
of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it
has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may
appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a
particular case, but if the law provides for a
limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk
of hardship to a particular party as the Judge
cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time
allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or
introduce exceptions not recognized by law."
In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala,
(1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a
case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no
explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory
explanation for condonation of delay had been given,
held at paragraph-6 as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes and
the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds."
While considering the similar issue, this Court in
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been
held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant
and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has
to encapsulate the conception of
reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of
a party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and
the said principle cannot be given a total go-by
in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."
9. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant
does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time,
due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of
limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona
fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital
factors which should be taken into consideration while
considering the question of condonation of delay.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR
762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has
been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no
right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At
paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise
that even after sufficient cause has been shown
a party is not entitled to the condonation of
delay in question as a matter of right. The proof
of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for
the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient
cause is not proved nothing further has to be
done; the application for condoning delay has
to be dismissed on that ground alone. If
sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay. This aspect of the matter
naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that
diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall
for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after
sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may
regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry
as to why the party was sitting idle during all
the time available to it. In this connection we
may point out that considerations of bona fides
or due diligence are always material and
relevant when the court is dealing with
applications made under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions
of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
considerations which have been expressly
made material and relevant by the provisions
of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in
the same manner be invoked in dealing with
applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In
the present case there is no difficulty in holding
that the discretion should be exercised in
favour of the appellant because apart from the
general criticism made against the appellant's
lack of diligence during the period of limitation
no other fact had been adduced against it.
Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the
appellant's application for condonation of delay
only on the ground that it was appellant's duty
to file the appeal as soon as possible within the
period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is
not a valid ground.
Thus, it is evident that while considering the
delay condonation application, the Court of Law is
required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation
of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to
whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of
the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of
the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into
the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time,
due to inaction and laches on its part.
It also requires to refer herein that what is the
meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of
meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in
Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held
by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15
hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude,
which when the act done suffices to accomplish
the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it
cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted
diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the
facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the court exercises discretion, it
has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant
must satisfy the court that he was prevented
by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court
has to examine whether the mistake is bona
fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building
Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964
SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2
SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2
SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ)
24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR
1964 SC 993] this Court explained the
difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every
"sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than
that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1
SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation." The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party
but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law
is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in
the community, to suppress fraud and perjury,
to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression.
It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have
not been agitated unexplainably and have from
lapse of time become stale. According
to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that
persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a
sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and
therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in
equity and justice by long enjoyment or what
may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510]
, Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC
705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC
448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held
that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly
in the face of law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means
that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in
view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the Court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.
The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished,
the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether
the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover
the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra
Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath
Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin
Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs.
Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
It has further been held in the aforesaid
judgments that the expression 'sufficient cause' should
be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on
the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula
is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram
Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan
Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-
12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression
"sufficient cause" within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the
Code or any other similar provision should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation
furnished would constitute "sufficient cause"
or not will be dependent upon facts of each
case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for
the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing
is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause
shown and reject the petition by a slipshod
order in over-jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be
the rule and refusal, an exception, more so
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona
fides can be imputed to the defaulting party.
On the other hand, while considering the
matter the courts should not lose sight of the
fact that by not taking steps within the time
prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly
defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like
manner. However, by taking a pedantic and
hypertechnical view of the matter the
explanation furnished should not be rejected
when stakes are high and/or arguable points
of facts and law are involved in the case,
causing enormous loss and irreparable injury
to the party against whom the lis terminates,
either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the
decision on merit. While considering the
matter, courts have to strike a balance between
resultant effect of the order it is going to pass
upon the parties either way."
10. It is evident from the judgments referred
hereinabove, wherein, expression 'sufficient cause' has
been dealt with which means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
11. This Court, after considering the aforesaid
proposition and the explanation furnished in the delay
condonation application to condone the inordinate delay
of 415 days, is proceeding to examine as to whether the
explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient
explanation for condoning the delay.
12. As would appear from the explanation furnished,
wherein, it has been stated that the counsel of the
appellant-writ petitioner tried to contact the appellant-
writ petitioner to inform him about the outcome of the
writ petition but the same could not have been done due
to change of mobile number of the appellant-writ
petitioner.
It has also been stated that after one year, an
acquittance of petitioner/appellant met with his counsel
and then the counsel intimated him about the outcome
of the writ petition and thereafter, came to meet his
counsel in July, 2023 and thereafter, the appeal was
drafted and filed on 26.07.2023, as such, delay of 415
days has occurred in preferring the appeal.
13. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the
explanation which has been furnished by the appellant
in the delay condonation application, cannot be said to
be a sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay
reason being that the impugned judgment was passed
on 04.05.2022 and the appeal has been filed on
26.07.2023, but there is no sufficient explanation to
that effect in the said interlocutory application and only
explanation has been furnished that the number of the
appellant-writ petitioner was changed, therefore, there
was no contact with the appellant-writ petitioner, as
such, the same shows the callous and negligent
approach of the appellant towards his lis as the
appellant-writ petitioner has also not taken steps to
know the outcome of his writ petition which cannot be
said to be sufficient cause to condone the inordinate
delay of 415 days.
14. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an
order in L.P.A. No.430 of 2022 on 11.09.2023 rejecting
the delay condonation application since the appeal was
filed after delay of about 128 days without any sufficient
cause to condone the delay.
15. The reference of another case is also required to
be made herein of an order passed by the coordinate
Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.116 of 2020 on
18.07.2023 rejecting the delay condonation application
since the appeal was filed after delay of about 156 days
without any sufficient cause to condone the delay.
16. Further, the coordinate Bench of this Court in
L.P.A. No.835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of condoning
the delay of 568 days was under consideration.
The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found
the reason furnished by the State appellants therein to
be sufficient cause on the ground of movement of file
from one table to another by putting reliance upon the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex as referred
hereinabove.
17. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon'ble
Apex Court by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022
and has challenged the order passed in L.P.A. No.835 of
2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of 2022 has been
dismissed as would appear from the order dated
13.05.2022.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed one
Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on
28th April, 2023 filed by the State of Jharkhand which
was filed against the order passed by this Court in L.P.A.
No.99 of 2021, wherein the coordinate Bench of this
Court dismissed the said appeal on the basis of delay of
534 days in filing of the appeal.
18. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an
order in L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting
the delay condonation application since the appeal was
filed after delay of about 687 days without any sufficient
cause to condone the delay.
19. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also
dismissed S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on
02.02.2024 filed by the State of Jharkhand against the
order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in L.P.A.
No.401 of 2022, wherein, the delay of 259 days was not
condoned.
20. This Court, after taking into consideration the
ratio laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments
referred hereinabove as also the explanation furnished
in the delay condonation application, is of the view that
no sufficient cause has been shown to condone
inordinate delay of 415 days in filing the appeal.
21. Accordingly, the delay condonation application
being I.A. No. 5264 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.
22. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also
stands dismissed.
23. In consequence of dismissal of appeal, pending
interlocutory applications also stand dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Saurabh/A.F.R.
