Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 9862 Jhar
Judgement Date : 4 October, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.6339 of 2023
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Pratap Ranjan, S/o Yugeshwar Marar Deen, aged about 35 years, R/o P.R. Kunj, Near Devi Mandap Raod, Hehal, P.O. Ratu, P.S. Mandar, District Ranchi, present posted and residing at Kuju Area, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh, District Ramgarh, Jharkhand. ... Petitioner Versus
1. Chairman Cum Managing Director & Disciplinary Authoriy, Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), Darbhanga House, Kutchery Road, P.O.- GPO, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
2. Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), through its Chairman, Central Coalfields Limited (CCL) Darbhanga House, Kutchery Road, P.O. -GPO, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
.......Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Shresth Gautam, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Kr. Das, Adv.
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CAV ON:20.08.2024 Pronounced On:-04/10/2024
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The instant writ application has been preferred
by the petitioner praying therein for quashing the
departmental proceeding which has been initiated
against this petitioner vide memorandum dated
27.05.2023 (Annexure-3), issued by the respondent
no.1; whereby the respondent company proposes to hold
an enquiry against this petitioner under Rule 30.0 of the
Coal India Executives Conduct, Discipline and Appeal
Rules 2021.
3. Brief facts of the case as it appears from the
averments made in this writ application is that
petitioner joined CCL in the year 2013. On 30.09.2019,
CBI registered an FIR bearing case no. RC 5(A)/2019- R
based on the complaint of the Chief Vigilance Officer,
CMPFO (Coal Mines Provident Fund Organization),
Dhanbad alleging fraudulent withdrawal of provident
fund of 38 ex-employees during the period 2015-18
amounting to Rs.1.70 Crores (approximately).
Thereafter, on 18.09.2020 the disciplinary authority
issued a memorandum bearing no. Ref No.
CCL/VIG/RDA-06/20/2021/903 for initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner herein
and the Petitioner was found guilty vide Ref No.
CCL/VIG/RDA-06/20/2021/1631 and was awarded the
punishment of "Reduction to one stage lower in time
scale for a period of six months without cumulative
effect."
On 27.05.2023, once again the Respondent
No. 1 issued a memorandum on identical facts which
was duly replied by the Petitioner and the respondent
No.1 issued an order dated 06.09.2023 rejecting the
reply of the Petitioner and decided to proceed and
enquire into the charges against the petitioner. Hence,
the present petition has been filed.
4. Mr. Shrestha Gautam, learned counsel for the
petitioner has assailed the initiation of the departmental
proceeding on two grounds.
(i) For the same cause of action, the department has already initiated a full-fledged
proceeding and thereafter a punishment has been
imposed upon this petitioner vide order of punishment
dated 3.12.2021 (Annexure-2) whereby penalty of
deduction to one stage lower in time scale for a period of
Six months without cumulative effect was passed. The
petitioner did not challenge the aforesaid order of
punishment and it has attained finality. Accordingly, the
fresh initiation of departmental proceeding for the same
cause of action is barred by law. In this regard he
referred the judgment passed in the case of Lt.
Governor, Delhi v. H.C. Narinder Singh reported in
(2004) 13 SCC 342. For brevity para-4 of the said order
is quoted herein below:-
"4. Reading of the show-cause notice suggests as if it is in continuation of the departmental proceedings. Lack of devotion to duty is mentioned as the reason for the proposed action which was the subject-matter of the earlier proceedings as well. The second proposed action based on the same cause of action proposing to deny promotion or reversion is contemplated under the impugned show-cause notice. Second penalty based on the same cause of action would amount to double jeopardy. The Tribunal was,
therefore, right in law in annulling such an action. We are not expressing any opinion on the ambit or scope of any rule."
(ii) The next limb of argument is that if the court
does not propose to quash the departmental proceeding,
then at least since the cause of action and the charges in
the departmental proceeding and that in the criminal
proceedings are same and similar; the departmental
proceeding may be stayed because it will be adversely
affected the criminal proceeding. In this regard learned
counsel relied upon the judgment passed in the case of
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry,
reported in (2005) 10 SCC 471 wherein at para-8 it has
been stated as under:-
"8. The purposes of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. Criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So, crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances."
Relying upon the aforesaid judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court and also by drawing attention
to the charges in both the proceeding, learned counsel
submits that if the proceeding is not quashed then at
least the same should be stayed till conclusion of
criminal trial.
5. Mr. A. K. Das, learned counsel for the respondent
submits that the charges in both the proceedings are not
at all same and similar. He draws attention of this Court
towards the charge in the earlier proceeding and also the
charge made in the instant proceeding and submits that
earlier proceeding was with respect to procedural lapses
in dealing with old cases of settlement of coal mines
provident fund to the dependent of retired/deceased
employee of CCL, wherein disciplinary action was taken
against the officials including the petitioner who were
found responsible for such procedural lapses.
However, the charges against the petitioner in
the Memorandum of charge dated 27.05.23 is for
accepting illegal gratification of Rs.22000/- for
processing bogus CMPF claim under a conspiracy which
mainly attracts misconduct under Rule 5.0 i.e. taking or
giving bribe of any illegal gratification which was not the
charge in the earlier proceeding. Accordingly, it is not a
case of double jeopardy as being claimed by the
petitioner and since in the preliminary enquiry the
petitioner failed to satisfy the respondents, it was
decided to initiate departmental proceeding.
6. Mr. Das further submits that there cannot be
any stay of the departmental proceeding for indefinite
time. It is true that if the criminal case and departmental
proceeding are of same and similar nature and the
criminal proceeding is on the verge of conclusion; then
certainly departmental proceeding could be stayed
awaiting the final result of criminal case but in the
instant case there is no likelihood of early conclusion of
trial. As such in the interest of justice, the petitioner may
be directed to participate in the departmental
proceeding.
6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties
and after going through the documents available on
record and the averments made in the respective
affidavits, it appears from bare perusal of the charges
against this petitioner in both the memorandum, it is
crystal clear that they are distinguished and on different
set of facts.
The charges against the petitioner in
memorandum of charge dated 18.09.2020 was with
respect to procedural lapses i.e. irregularity in
certification and processing of CMPF final refund claim
and not exercising due diligence in verifying the
genuiness of the claimants and the documents
submitted by them which mainly attracted misconduct
under Rule 5.0(i), 5.0(v), 5.0(9) of Coal India Executives'
Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 2021; whereas the
charges against the petitioner in Memorandum of charge
dated 27.5.2023 is for accepting illegal gratification of
Rs.22000/- for processing bogus CMPF settlement claim
under a conspiracy which mainly attracts misconduct
under Rule 5.0(2) i.e. taking or giving bribe or any illegal
gratification; thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be
said that the current memorandum dated 27.05.2023 is
same and similar with that of the earlier charge dated
18.09.2020. The current memorandum which has been
issued to the petitioner is for a very serious and grave
misconduct of the acceptance bribe for which
prosecution sanction has also been issued. Thus in no
case it can be said to be a case of double jeopardy and
hence the said limb of arguments of the petitioner is not
acceptable to this Court.
7. So far as second limb of arguments with
regard to stay of departmental proceeding till the
conclusion of the criminal proceeding is concerned; it is
now a settled principle that a departmental proceeding is
not barred during pendency of criminal trial. As a matter
of fact, there is no legal bar to conduct the disciplinary
proceeding and criminal trial simultaneously; however in
no straight jacket formula it can be said and it has been
laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the Court has
to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in
such matter on a case to case basis.
One of the formulae for staying the disciplinary
proceeding is that if the defence of the employee in
criminal case will be prejudice. In this regard reference
may be made to the case of SBI v. Neelam Nag reported
in (2016) 9 SCC 491 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
has held in para-13, 14, 15, and 18 which are quoted
herein below:-
"13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The only question that arises for consideration is no more res integra. It is well settled that there is no legal bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and criminal trial simultaneously. However, no straitjacket formula can be spelt out and the Court has to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in such matters on case-to-case basis. The contour of the approach to be adopted by the Court has been delineated in a series of decisions.
14. This Court in Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao [Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 171] has summed up the same in the following words: (SCC pp. 449-50, paras 16-17)
(i) There is no legal bar for both the proceedings to go on simultaneously.
(ii) The only valid ground for claiming that the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would be to ensure that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. But even such grounds would be available only in cases involving complex questions of facts or law.
(iii) Such defence ought not to be permitted to unnecessarily delay the departmental proceedings. The interest of the delinquent officer as well as the employer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings.
(iv) Departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where both the proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. (emphasis supplied)
15. The recent decision relied on by the appellant in Stanzen [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 641] , has adverted to the relevant decisions [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry, (2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605; Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810; A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 548 and State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455] including M.G. Vittal Rao [Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 171] . After adverting to those decisions, in para 16, this Court opined as under: (Stanzen case [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 641] , SCC p. 643) "16. Suffice it to say that while there is no legal bar to the holding of the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal trial simultaneously, stay of disciplinary proceedings may be an advisable course in cases where the criminal charge against the employee is grave and continuance of the disciplinary proceedings is likely to prejudice their defence before the criminal court. Gravity of the charge is, however, not by itself enough to determine the question unless the charge involves complicated question of law and fact. The court examining the question must also keep in mind that criminal trials get prolonged indefinitely especially where the number of accused arraigned for trial is large as is the case at hand and so are the number of witnesses cited by the prosecution. The court, therefore, has to draw a balance between the need for a fair trial to the accused on the one hand and the
competing demand for an expeditious conclusion of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings on the other. An early conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings has itself been seen by this Court to be in the interest of the employees."
(emphasis supplied) 18 [Ed.: Paras 17 and 18 corrected vide Order dated 9-11- 2016.] . In the peculiar facts of the present case, therefore, we accede to the contention of the appellants that the pendency of the criminal case against the respondent cannot be the sole basis to suspend the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Respondent 1 for an indefinite period; and in larger public interest, the order as passed in Stanzen case [Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 641] be followed even in the fact situation of the present case, to balance the equities.
8. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that
how the criminal trial will be prejudiced by continuance
of departmental proceeding. It is true that the basis of
proceeding is the FIR registered by the CBI being RC
case No. 5(A) 2019 R which was based on complaint of
the Chief (Vigilance) Officer CMPFO Dhanbad, but the
criminal trial is against 38 ex-employees during the
period from 2015-18 for defalcation of Rs.1.70 crores in
which one of the accused is this petitioner. There is
nothing on record to suggest that who are the
prosecution witnesses in the criminal trial and as to
whether the witnesses in both these proceeding are same
and similar.
Moreover, it is a settled proposition of law that
if the petitioner is acquitted from the criminal trial and
before its conclusion the petitioner is punished in the
departmental proceeding; then certainly he can approach
the concerned respondent and his acquittal in the
criminal case will certainly change the final verdict of the
departmental proceeding.
As stated herein above, the petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that how the continuance of
departmental proceeding will hamper the criminal trial
adversely.
9. Accordingly, looking to the overall facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to
stay the departmental proceeding and the respondents
are directed to proceed in the departmental proceeding in
accordance with law and the petitioner is hereby directed
to co-operate in the departmental proceeding.
10. As a result, the instant writ application stands
dismissed. Pending I.As, if any, is also closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Fahim/-
Jharkhand High Court, Ranch.
Dated:04/10/2024 AFR/
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