Jharkhand High Court
Their Workman Being Represented By Vice ... vs The Management Of M/S. Tata Iron And ... on 28 October, 2024
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(L) No. 2079 of 2018
Their workman being represented by Vice President, Ispat Mazdoor
Panchayat ... ... Petitioner
Versus
The Management of M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited,
Jamshedpur ... ... Respondent
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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, Advocate
: Mr. Pratyush, Advocate
: Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocate
: Mr. Shray Mishra, Advocate
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14/28.10.2024 Heard the learned counsels for the parties.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned award dated 26.07.2016 has a checkered history, but
ultimately it boils down to decision in connection with only 13
workmen. 13 workmen are being represented by the petitioner before
this court. Although the impugned order is in relation to 14 workmen
but only 13 are being represented before this court in this case.
3. The term of reference was:-
"Whether the retrenchment of the workmen on
TISCO Ltd. Jamshedpur mentioned in attached
Annexure - K by the management is justified? If
not, what relief they are entitled to?"
4. The learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal has given
a finding that the 13 workmen, whose case was considered, were not
having continuous 240 days' work in a year. He submits that the
continuous period of work is referrable to Section 25B of the
Industrial Disputes Act. As per Section 25B a person is deemed to be
in 'continuous service' for a period of one year if he works for 190
days as an underground employee in the mine or 240 days in any other
case. He submits that there is no requirement that the workman should
have worked for continuous period of 240 days. 240 days
employment is satisfied if 240 days of work is done within a span of
one year which is sufficient to bring home the case of the workman as
continuous period of service of one year. He has further submitted
that the approach of the learned Tribunal in looking for continuous
240 days service in a year is perverse.
5. The learned counsel has also submitted that the learned
Tribunal has also recorded that the case at hand was that there was no
termination of service but a case of casual temporary appointment for
a particular period which automatically ends on completion of the
period, as such, there is no question of retrenchment. He submits that
the period of such appointment for a particular period has also not
been recorded in impugned award.
6. The learned counsel has also submitted that the learned
Tribunal has held that the case of the concerned workmen did not
come under the purview of retrenchment, and reference was only to
decide the legality of retrenchment and that the Tribunal could not go
beyond the terms of reference.
7. He submits that the case of the workmen with regard to number
of days of work was referable to the job card of each person which
mention the period and the days of employment. Therefore, the
learned Tribunal was not correct in recording that the case of the
concerned workmen did not come under the purview of retrenchment.
He submits that once the workman is discontinued from service, he
stands retrenched. He has also referred to definition of retrenchment as
defined under the Industrial Dispute Act [section 2 (oo) (bb)]. The
learned counsel has further submitted that the impugned award cannot
be sustained in the eyes of law.
8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents,
while opposing the prayer, has submitted that even if the word
"continuous 240 days" in a year was mentioned in the impugned
award the same has no bearing as the award is required to be read as a
whole. Essentially, the Tribunal meant that there was no continuous
period of work for a year.
9. He has also submitted that the workmen did not give their
specific dates of their discontinuation and at best the date of
discontinuation could be taken as the date on which such a demand
was made to refer the dispute, which was 13.12.1997.
10. The learned counsel has submitted that if one year back from
13.12.1997 is taken into consideration, then none of the workmen had
worked for 240 days in 12 months preceding 13.12.1997 and
accordingly the workmen having not worked for 240 days, they are
not entitled to any relief. The learned counsel has further submitted
that the workmen have not even mentioned about specific dates of
termination; rather, their job cards indicate that they continued to work
from time to time even after 13.12.1997. Therefore, the learned
Tribunal has rightly recorded that the case of the concerned workmen
does not come under the purview of 'retrenchment'.
11. The learned counsel submits that once there is no retrenchment,
there is no question of any relief under Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. He submits that the records of the case reveal that the
petitioner was not entitled to any relief.
12. He has also submitted that upon going through the records of
this case, findings can still be recorded by this Court, and merely
because there is error in language used by the learned Tribunal while
coming to finding regarding 240 days' work, the same by itself may
not be a reason to interfere with the impugned award.
13. Arguments are concluded.
14. The learned counsel for the parties may file their short synopsis
of arguments and judgments on which they seek to rely upon, giving
specific reference to the concerned paragraphs. The synopsis should
be based on the arguments, which have been advanced. The needful be
done by 12.11.2024.
15. Post this case for judgment on 10.12.2024.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Saurav
