Mr. Manoj Kumar Aged About 50 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand
2024 Latest Caselaw 4970 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Mr. Manoj Kumar Aged About 50 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand on 7 May, 2024

Author: Navneet Kumar

Bench: Navneet Kumar

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                    L.P.A. No. 78 of 2024
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Mr. Manoj Kumar aged about 50 years, son of Late Pachu Lohar, resident of Village-Gudu, P.O.-Gudu, P.S.-Ratu, District-Ranchi, Presently resident of Kathitand, Tender Bagicha, P.O.-Kamre, P.S.-Ratu, District-Ranchi .... ... Petitioner/ Appellant Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand

2. The Secretary, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi

3. The Joint Secretary, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi

4. The Deputy Secretary, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi

5. The Department Inquiry Officer, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department, having its office at City Administrative Building, Golchakkar, Dhurwa, P.O-Dhurwa, P.S.- Jaggarnathpur, District-Ranchi ... ... Respondents

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CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR

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For the Appellant                 : Mr. Rajan Raj, Advocate
                                  : Mr. Rohit, Advocate
For the Respondents               : Mr. Aditya Kumar,
                                    A.C. to Sr. S.C.-I
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                            th
Order No. 05 / Dated: 07 May, 2024

This interlocutory application has been preferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 57 days.

2. Considering that sufficient cause has been shown in the interlocutory application and having no objection on the part of the Respondent-State, the delay of 57 days in preferring this appeal is hereby condoned.

3. I.A. No. 4743 of 2024 stands allowed.

4. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal primarily on the ground that the punishment order was passed in breach of natural justice and without any proof of second marriage with Moumita Das.

5. In order dated 9th November 2016 passed in W.P.(S) No.3980 of 2016 the writ Court held as under:-

"7. Having heard the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the writ petition for the simple ground that the charge of bigamy has been proved against the petitioner. The petitioner was given ample opportunity of hearing. After following the procedure laid down, the petitioner was punished with the impugned punishment and the same was also affirmed by the appellate authority. Law is well settled that no person can be left scot free, particularly a Government servant, who is expected to follow the rules and maintain discipline. Rule 54 of the Service Code is very clear regarding bigamy and the petitioner has violated the rules. As such, he has rightly been slapped with the impugned punishment of reduction in rank for three years taking a lenient view. The punishment of reduction of rank has been awarded by order dated 24.4.2014 and now the punishment has lost its effect.

8. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. No interference is warranted.

9. The writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the aforesaid interlocutory application also stands disposed of."

6. Mr. Rajan Raj, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the departmental proceeding the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the documents produced in the domestic enquiry do not establish that the appellant had contracted second marriage with Moumita Das and her representation was considered by the appellate Authority without any opportunity to the appellant to controvert.

7. On the basis of charge memo dated 16th September 2012 in Prapatra-"Ka" a departmental proceeding was initiated on the charge that the delinquent appellant had solemnized second marriage with Moumita Das. There is a reference of wedding cards, photographs, UID and joint bank account in State Bank of India, Ratu Branch, at Ranchi which were produced in the domestic enquiry to support the charge of second marriage. Therefore, the submission that the department could not establish that the

appellant solemnized second marriage with Moumita Das is bereft of merits. There is a fundamental distinction between a departmental enquiry and criminal trial. While strict proof shall be the test in a criminal Court, it is the preponderance of probability which is the yardstick to decide whether or not the charge against the delinquent employee has been proved. In this context, this is also necessary to keep in mind that the expression preponderance of probability refers to a positive element of possibility. The bank account and UID are the documents which could not have been prepared by the complainant.

8. This is also a settled law that the strict rules of evidence are not applied in a departmental proceeding and a decision can be taken even on the basis of hearsay evidence. (refer: "Major U.R. Bhatt v. Union of India" AIR 1962 SC 1344). However, the appellate authority upon consideration of the reply of Moumita Das dated 25th April 2016 and other evidences on record held that the charge levelled against the delinquent employee was found to be proved.

9. The powers of the writ Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded in a departmental proceeding is very limited but all orders are not immune from judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In appropriate cases, where a finding of fact recorded by the departmental authority is not based on any legal evidence a certiorari shall lie. It is now a well settled proposition in law that sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is not an issue that can be raised in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10. In "B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India" (1995) 6 SCC 749 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion.

But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

11. In our opinion, the punishment of reduction in time pay-scale for next lower scale for three years is on the lower side. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal bereft of merits is dismissed.

                                            (Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.)



D.S.                                               (Navneet Kumar, J.)