Akahtar Khan Aged About 54 Years vs Union Of India
2024 Latest Caselaw 4884 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Akahtar Khan Aged About 54 Years vs Union Of India on 6 May, 2024

Author: Navneet Kumar

Bench: Navneet Kumar

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                (Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction)
                     L.P.A. No. 90 of 2024

Akahtar Khan aged about 54 years, Secretary Rashtriya Mazdoor, P.O.
Bhowra, P.S. Jorapokhar, District Dhanbad.                ... Appellant
                                          Versus
1. Union of India
2. Secretary Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India,
Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, P.O. G.P.O. New Delhi, P.S. Sansad Marg,
New Delhi
3. Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Shram Bhawan, P.O.
Jagjivan Nagar, P.S. Sariadhela, District Dhanbad
4. Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Shram Bhawan, P.O. Jagjivan
Nagar, P.S. Sariadhela, District Dhanbad
5. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. through The General Manager Hurriladih
Colliery, Under P.B. Area, B.C.C.L, P.O. Hurriladih, P.S. Jharia, District
Dhanbad                                                 ... Respondents
                                ---------------

CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR

For the Appellant : Mr. Avishek Chandra, Advocate For the UOI : Ms. Chandana Kumari, Advocate

---------------

6th May 2024

Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.

The writ Court's decision not to interfere with the office order dated 21st October 2020 by which the Deputy Director in the Ministry of Labour which is the appropriate Government declined to refer the dispute for adjudication is under challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal.

2. The writ Court observed as under:

"5. Mr. Jai Shanker Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that reference was made under Section 10(1) of the M.V. Act and it was not open for the respondents to reject the claim on the ground of limitation as from perusal of Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it appears that said function of the appropriate government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function which is the established law and as such on this ground alone the impugned order of declining the reference is not tenable in the eyes of law on the ground of limitation. The Law of Limitation is not applicable to proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondents authorities, without adhering to the Act, dehors the rule, has rejected claim of the petitioner. Learned counsel places heavy reliance upon the Judgment passed in the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Another Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (1989) 3 SCC 271.

6. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents - BCCL argues that there is no quarrel of the fact and settled principles of law that Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not talk of any limitation. Learned counsel further argues that the issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1. The Court after considering plethora of Judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, has clearly observed in para 44 and 45, which reads as under:

"44. To sumarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under this Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "as any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of Industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employer's financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry.

45. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the High Court correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute."

7. Learned counsel submits that in the instant case, delay was of 19 years. The delay has not been explained as to why the reference was made after delay of 19 years.

8. In view of facts and circumstances of the case and in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the instant case and as such the same stands dismissed."

3. The ground to lay a challenge to the order passed in W.P.(S) No. 5312 of 2021 is that the power under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is administrative in nature and the appropriate Government does not exercise any adjudicatory power at that stage. In support of his submission, Mr. Avishek Chandra, the learned counsel for the appellant refers to "Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Another v. State of Bihar and Ors." (1989) 3 SCC 271.

4. In the writ petition, the appellant pleaded that Suni Lal Bauri who was working as Minor Loader at Hurriladih Colliery under the Bharat Coking Coal Limited was terminated from service on 9 th November 1998,

without any valid reason or providing an opportunity of hearing to him. There is no detail provided by the appellant as regards the stand taken before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the failure of conciliation and report thereon and other necessary foundational facts. The writ petition did not refer to any fact relating to raising the dispute on behalf of Suni Lal Bauri with the Management so as to demonstrate that there was a continuous effort by the appellant-Mazdoor Union. The order dated 21st October 2020 passed by the Deputy Director refers to a delay of 21 years in raising the dispute. In the said order, there is a mention about "Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty" (2000) 2 SCC 455 that a dispute should be raised within a reasonable time.

5. But then, only on such a technical plea the writ Court cannot be moved. It is well remembered that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary. This is also too well-settled that the rules of natural justice are not made applicable in every situation and the writ Court can decline relief to the aggrieved person if remand to the authority would not bear any fruit.

6. Even so, there is no law of universal application that every order passed in breach of natural justice must be interfered by the Court. The requirement in law that every order that ensues civil consequence must be passed following the rules of natural justice shall vary from case to case and no strait-jacket formula can be prescribed. Lord Wilberforce observed that:

"a breach of procedure cannot give (rise to) a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain" [see, "Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation"

(1971) 2 ALL ER 1278 (HL)]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered a decision in "Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commr., Kumaon Division" (2004) 4 SCC 281 on the same lines and held that the rules of natural justice shall not apply in cases where it would be of no use if an opportunity of hearing shall be a mere ritual and without the possibility of any change in the decision on merits.

7. Having regard to the aforementioned aspect of the case, we decline to interfere with the writ Court's decision and, accordingly, L.P.A. No. 90 of 2024 is dismissed.

(Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.)

(Navneet Kumar, J.) R.K./Nishant