Chandrika Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand & Others
2024 Latest Caselaw 5634 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Chandrika Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand & Others on 12 June, 2024

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
             L.P.A. No.121 of 2023
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Chandrika Singh                        ...   ...   Appellant
                              Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Others ...          ...   Respondents
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CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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For the Appellant : Mr. Rajendra Krishna, Advocate : Mr. Pratyush Shounikya, Advocate For the Respondents : Ms. Piyushita Meha Tudu, AC to AAG-IV

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th Order No. 08/Dated 12 June, 2024

I.A. No.2959 of 2023

1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed

for condoning the delay of 155 days in preferring the

appeal.

2. The ground has been taken in explaining the delay

in filing the appeal that the appellant is a retired person

and was not getting any amount due to non-fixation of

pension, as such, the appellant since was facing financial

crunch, which was the main reason for filing the appeal

after a delay of 155 days.

3. The issue of delay condonation was heard by this

Court on 30.04.2024. The State took time to file objection

to the limitation petition.

4. The objection has been filed by way of an affidavit.

5. The ground has been taken therein that it is

incorrect on the part of the appellant to take a ground that

Page 1 he was facing financial crunch since some amount was

paid to him in 2020.

6. The learned State counsel, in view of the aforesaid

stand, has submitted that the very explanation furnished

for the purpose of condoning the delay, therefore, cannot be

said to be sufficient cause to condone the said delay.

7. In response to the said submission, Mr. Rajendra

Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has

submitted that the amount which has been said to be paid

is not in dispute but the fact requires consideration even

accepting the stand taken by the respondent in the

objection affidavit that some amount has been paid in the

year 2020, but, the appellant, being a retired person, is

having so many liabilities, as such, it cannot be said to be

correct objection on behalf of the State.

8. It has further been submitted that some amount

was paid in 2020 and by the time the instant appeal has

been filed three years have elapsed and the ground for

condoning the delay cannot be rebutted merely on account

of the fact that some amount was paid in the year 2020.

9. It has further been contended by referring to the

order passed by the learned Single Judge that admitted

retiral dues have been directed to be paid but even then the

same have not been paid.

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10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on

the issue of condonation of delay.

11. This Court is conscious with the fact that the period

of delay is not having any bearing to dismiss the delay

condonation application but if the said delay is being

sufficiently explained then irrespective of the period of

delay, the delay is to be condoned.

12. While considering the delay condonation

application, the Court of Law is required to consider the

sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the

approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not

as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is

accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is

necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant

and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its

part.

13. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause'

has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land

Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has

been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15

hereunder:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate"

or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which

Page 3 provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"

from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it

Page 4 has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by

Page 5 the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225] .

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

14. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means

that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner

or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the

facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged

that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained

inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each

case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court

concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that

whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be

exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court

that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from

Page 6 prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation

is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for

condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether

the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the

ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and

Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee &

Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A.

Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @

Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah

Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5

SCC 157.

15. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments

that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a

liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is

done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of

bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,

whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be

decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket

formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to

the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram

Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan

Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it

has been held as hereunder:-

"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other

Page 7 similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."

16. After going through the explanation furnished on

behalf of the appellant in the delay condonation

application, we have found that the appellant has retired

from service sometimes in the year 2018.

17. It is evident from the order passed by the learned

Single Judge wherein while disposing of the writ petition, it

Page 8 has been directed to look into the grievance of the petitioner

with regards to the claim of arrears of salary/ pension/

subsistence allowance, etc. upon a representation to be

filed by the petitioner along with a copy of this order as well

as the writ records within a period of two months from

today.

18. Therefore, this Court is of the view that on the one

hand the State has not fully complied with the order as has

been passed by the learned Single Judge, while on the

other hand, the objection is being made in condoning the

delay.

19. The law is well settled that a wrong doer cannot be

allowed to take advantage of its own wrong, reference in

this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of

Kusheshwar Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar and Ors.,

(2007) 11 SCC 447, wherein at paragraphs-14, 15 and 16,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:-

"14. In this connection, our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to a decision of this Court in Mrutunjay Pani v. Narmada Bala Sasmal [AIR 1961 SC 1353] wherein it was held by this Court that where an obligation is cast on a party and he commits a breach of such obligation, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of such situation. This is based on the Latin maxim commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no party can take undue advantage of his own wrong).

Page 9

15. ... This Court (at SCC p. 142, para 28) referred to Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 191 wherein it was stated:

"It is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure."

16. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, "a wrongdoer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong"."

20. Further, in Advanta India Limited vs. B. N.

Shivanna and Anr., (2018) 14 SCC 666, the Hon'ble Apex

Court has been pleased to observe at para-20 which reads

as under:-

"20. After going through the record, we find that the BCI has shown undue indulgence to the respondent by allowing him to take advantage of his own wrong, in the guise of exercising its review power. It is a case of nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria meaning thereby that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong. This maxim is explained in Eureka Forbes Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank in the following manner: (SCC p. 217, para 66) "66. The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria has a clear mandate of law that, a person who by manipulation of a process frustrates the legal

Page 10 rights of others, should not be permitted to take advantage of his wrong or manipulations."

21. The State has taken the ground that some of the

amount has been paid in the year 2020, as per the

objection affidavit, but admitted pensionery benefit has not

been paid, in such circumstances, the ground has been

taken of financial crunch by the appellant in filing the

appeal cannot be said not to be a sufficient cause to

condone the delay.

22. This Court, considering the aforesaid explanation

and basing upon the discussion made hereinabove, is of

the view that the explanation which has been furnished on

behalf of the appellant in condoning the delay of 155 days

cannot be said to be not sufficient reason.

23. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the instant

interlocutory application needs to be allowed.

24. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2959 of 2023 is allowed.

25. The delay of 155 days in filing the instant appeal is

hereby condoned.

26. Mr. Rajendra Krishna, learned counsel appearing

for the appellant, has submitted by referring to the enquiry

report that the order of punishment has been passed

wherein the first punishment is to recover unadjusted

amount with statutory interest, second is withholding of

Page 11 two annual increments with cumulative effect and third

punishment is that during the period of suspension, the

appellant will get only the subsistence allowance.

27. The ground has been taken, which according to the

learned counsel for the appellant, has not been appreciated

by the learned Single Judge is the propriety of the enquiry

report.

28. The Enquiry Officer although has reflected in the

enquiry report that the defence reply has not been found to

be satisfactory and by giving such finding the Enquiry

Officer has come to the conclusive finding of embezzlement

of public money. But simultaneously, he has directed the

Presenting Officer to come with the relevant documents.

Series of communication have been made but it would

appear from the enquiry report that the Presenting Officer

neither has presented himself in the enquiry proceeding nor

any document has been produced.

29. The question, therefore, has been raised that if the

Enquiry Officer was already satisfied that it is a case of

embezzlement, then why direction has been passed upon

the Presenting Officer to come with the document which

itself shows that the Enquiry Officer, in order to satisfy, has

called upon the Presenting Officer along with the

documents to be filed but even then the documents have

not been filed but charge has been found to be proved.

Page 12

30. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid

submission, is of the view that the original record needs to

be perused.

31. The learned State counsel, therefore, is directed to

produce the original record pertaining to instant

departmental proceeding on the next date of hearing.

32. List this matter on 03.07.2024.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Birendra/

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