Jharkhand High Court
52 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand on 29 January, 2024
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.448 of 2023
With
I.A. No.7710 of 2023
------
Syed Zakir Hussain, son of late Syed Md. Anwar Pandit, aged about
52 years, resident of Chas, P.O. & P.S. Chas, District Bokaro
.... .... Appellant
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Department Administrative Reform and Rajbhasa,
Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.
Dhurwa, District Ranchi
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, P.O. & P.S. Bokaro, District
Bokaro .... .... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
------
For the Appellant : Mrs. Rinku Bhakat, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Mohammad Asghar, AC to Sr. SC-II
------
05/Dated: 29.01.2024
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the
Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated
13.12.2022 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in
W.P. (S) No. 4918 of 2017 by which the writ petition has been
dismissed.
2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation
since there is delay of 219 days in preferring the appeal,
therefore, an application being I.A. No. 7710 of 2023 has been
filed for condoning such delay.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that
the instant intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate
delay of 219 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the
delay condonation application before going into the legality
and propriety of the impugned order on merit.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that
delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing
the instant Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds
shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.
5. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the
appeal, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory
application is that the appellant-writ petitioner was having no
knowledge about the disposal of the case and when he has
tried to ascertain the position of the case, it has come to his
knowledge that his case has already been dismissed on
13.12.2022.
6. Thereafter, immediately on 27.07.2023, the appellant
has applied for certified copy of the order dated 13.12.2022
and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner in W.P.(S)
No.4918 of 2017 has not informed the petitioner about the
dismissal of the case due to which delay of 219 days has
occurred in fling the instant appeal.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on
delay condonation application and before considering the
same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal
proposition as has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex
Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning
the inordinate delay.
8. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is
not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but
certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay,
then the duty of the Court to consider the application to
condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
9. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as
has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
10. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim,
(1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in
Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to
operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case,
but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be
enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular
party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds,
enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its
operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by
law."
11. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as
under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
when the statute so prescribes and the courts have
no power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."
12. While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013)
12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal
approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay
as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner
requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters."
13. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not
act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for
filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross
inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be
taken into consideration while considering the question of
condonation of delay.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762,
has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
even after sufficient cause has been shown a party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed
on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect
of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that
diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for
consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while
exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to
such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It
cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was
sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of
bona fides or due diligence are always material and
relevant when the court is dealing with applications
made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the court is called
upon to consider the effect of the combined
provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our
opinion, considerations which have been expressly
made material and relevant by the provisions of
Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the
same manner be invoked in dealing with
applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the
present case there is no difficulty in holding that the
discretion should be exercised in favour of the
appellant because apart from the general criticism
made against the appellant's lack of diligence
during the period of limitation no other fact had
been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already
pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner
rejected the appellant's application for condonation
of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's
duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the
period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a
valid ground.
15. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to
consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also
the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not
as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is
accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is
necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and
at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
16. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning
of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of
'sufficient cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs.
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein,
it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to
15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that
the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable
the court concerned to exercise discretion for the
reason that whenever the court exercises discretion,
it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant
must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
"sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra
Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC
(Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012)
5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC
1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964
SC 993] this Court explained the difference between
a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and
observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good
cause and vice versa. However, if any difference
exists it can only be that the requirement of good
cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided
on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR
2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is
hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of
time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitations
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense
of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a
party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff
Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa
Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts
to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay.
No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there
was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
17. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala
Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal
Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
18. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that
the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath
Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &
Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression
"sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other
similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona
fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case
whether explanation furnished would constitute
"sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon
facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket
formula for accepting or rejecting explanation
furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But
one thing is clear that the courts should not
proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the
cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod
order in over-jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the
rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be
imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand,
while considering the matter the courts should not
lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within
the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to
the other party which should not be lightly defeated
by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical
view of the matter the explanation furnished should
not be rejected when stakes are high and/or
arguable points of facts and law are involved in the
case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury
to the party against whom the lis terminates, either
by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merit. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a
balance between resultant effect of the order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way."
19. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove,
wherein, expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with
which means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part
in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or
"remained inactive".
20. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition
and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application to condone the inordinate delay of 219 days, is
proceeding to examine as to whether the explanation
furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for
condoning the delay.
21. As would appear from the explanation furnished,
wherein, it has been stated that appellant-writ petitioner was
having no knowledge about the disposal of the case and when
he has tried to ascertain the status of the case, it has come to
his knowledge that his case has already been dismissed on
13.12.2022.
22. Thereafter, immediately on 27.07.2023, the appellant
has applied for certified copy of the order dated 13.12.2022.
Since the learned counsel for the writ petitioner in W.P.(S)
No.4918 of 2017 has not informed the petitioner about the
dismissal of the case and as such, the delay of 219 days has
occurred in fling the instant appeal.
23. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the explanation
which has been furnished by the appellant in the delay
condonation application, cannot be said to be a sufficient
cause to condone the inordinate delay reason being that the
impugned judgment was passed on 13.12.2022 and the
requisition for certified copy of the impugned judgment had
been made on 27.07.2023. But there is no explanation to that
effect in the said interlocutory application rather only
explanation has been given that writ petitioner was having no
knowledge about the disposal of the case and when he has
tried to ascertain the status of the case, it has come to his
knowledge that his case has already been dismissed on
13.12.2022, as such, the same shows the callous approach of
the appellant towards his lis which cannot be said to be
sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 219 days.
24. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order
in L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay
condonation application since the appeal was filed after delay
of about 687 days without any sufficient cause to condone the
delay.
25. The reference of another case is required to be made
herein of an order passed by the coordinate Bench of this
Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of
condoning the delay of 568 days was under consideration.
26. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the
reason furnished by the State appellants therein to be
sufficient cause on the ground of movement of file from one
table to another by putting reliance upon the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex as referred hereinabove.
27. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon'ble Apex
Court by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has
challenged the order passed in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the
said SLP No.7755 of 2022 has been dismissed as would
appear from the order dated 13.05.2022.
28. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed one
Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th
April, 2023 filed by the State of Jharkhand which was filed
against the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.99 of
2021, wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed
the said appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of
the appeal.
29. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred
hereinabove as also the explanation furnished in the delay
condonation application, is of the view that no sufficient
cause has been shown to condone the inordinate delay of 219
days in filing the appeal.
30. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being
I.A. No.7710 of 2023 is hereby dismissed.
31. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands
dismissed.
32. In consequence of dismissal of appeal, pending
interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
