Lalan Ram Aged About 57 Years vs State Of Jharkhand
2024 Latest Caselaw 327 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Lalan Ram Aged About 57 Years vs State Of Jharkhand on 12 January, 2024

Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary

Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                  (Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction)

                              LPA No. 247 of 2023

Lalan Ram aged about 57 years, S/o Bansropan Ram, R/o Rahambigha, PO
Satbahini, PS Bishrampur, District Palamau, State Jharkhand
                                                            .... Appellant
                                        Versus
1.State of Jharkhand
2.The Director General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi having its registered
office at Jharkhand Police Headquarter, Dhurwa having its office at Dhurwa,
PO Dhurwa, PS Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi, State Jharkhand
3.The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Arms Forces, Dhurwa,
having its registered office at PO and PS Dhurwa, District Ranchi, State
Jharkhand
4.The Commandant, Jharkhand Arms Forces-10, Mahila Vahini, Hotwar,
having its registered office at PO and PS Lalpur, District Ranchi, State
Jharkhand                                                 ... Respondents
                              ---------------

CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

For the Appellant : Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, Advocate Mr. Krishna Prajapati, Advocate For the State : Mr. Anshuman Kumar, AC to SC (L&C)-II

---------------

12th January 2024

Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.

The appellant has filed this interlocutory application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 61 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal.

2. In view of the statements made in this interlocutory application, the delay of 61 days in filing this appeal is condoned.

3. I.A. No. 7241 of 2023 is, accordingly, allowed.

4. The appellant who suffered the punishment of dismissal from service passed on 24th May 2011 by the Commandant of the Jharkhand Armed Forces-10 approached the appellate and revisional authorities who also did not interfere with order of dismissal from service.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the writ Court in WP(S) No. 580 of 2013 which has been dismissed holding that the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own opinion to the findings recorded by the departmental authority. The writ Court referred to the judgment in "Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran" (2015) 2 SCC 610, "State of Bihar v. Phulpari Kumari" (2020) 2 SCC 130, "Pravin Kumar v. Union of India" (2020) 9 SCC 471, "SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava"

(2021) 2 SCC 612 and "UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj" (2022) 5 SCC 695 to fortify its opinion that the writ Court shall not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental proceedings except in a case of malafide or perversity.

6. In "UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, (2022) 5 SCC 695" the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"17. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India; H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya and recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us is a member) in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava wherein this Court has held as under : (Ajai Kumar Srivastava case, SCC pp. 626-27, paras 24-28) "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:

(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;

(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;

(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.

26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.

27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.

28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."

7. The appellant was appointed on the post of police constable in the year 1997. On 05th May 2010, he was issued a charge-memo on the allegation of unauthorized absence of 21 days from the duty. According to the respondents, an information was sent to the appellant on 27 th March 2010 and 8th April 2010 through registered post at his home address requiring him to report for duty. The appellant was put under suspension on 7th April 2010 and, as noticed above, a charge-memo was issued to him. The inquiring officer has recorded that on 22nd February 2011 the delinquent police constable was provided an opportunity to submit his defence and an information through special messenger regarding the date of inquiry on 24th March 2011 was sent to him. However, the delinquent police constable did not participate in the domestic inquiry. Nonetheless, he was afforded an opportunity through memo dated 28 th March 2011 to submit his final defence but he did not avail this opportunity.

8. The inquiring officer proceeded ex-parte against the appellant and submitted the inquiry report dated 11th April 2011 holding the charge of unauthorized absence proved against him.

9. Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that no inquiry as contemplated under Rule 824 of the Jharkhand Police Manual was conducted and in an ex-parte proceeding the

punishment of dismissal from service has been inflicted upon the appellant which is plainly in violation of the natural justice.

10. This is well-settled that it is lawful for the departmental authority to pass the punishment order on the basis of ex-parte inquiry provided the delinquent employee was afforded sufficient opportunity to appear and defend himself in the domestic inquiry. In the domestic inquiry, the department produced Khantar Paswan who gave a statement that the delinquent police constable did not report for duty after the period of sanctioned leave expired and, that too, without any permission or information. He further stated that through memos dated 13th December 2010 and 18th January 2011 information was sent to the delinquent police constable at his home address to report for duty but he did not respond to the notices issued to him.

11. The inquiring officer has recorded that sufficient opportunity was given to the appellant through notices dated 22nd March 2011 and 28th March 2011 but he did not participate in the domestic inquiry or submit his defence. As regards past misconduct of the appellant, Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the previous proceedings were also ex-parte proceedings and only in the departmental proceeding no. 49 of 2009 the appellant was awarded a major punishment. The submission made on behalf of the appellant is that the alleged misconduct were minor lapses on the part of the appellant and the punishment of dismissal from service was not justified. However, we are not inclined to accept this submission for the reason that the repeated misconduct of absence from duty would cumulatively assume the character of a major misconduct. The appellant was found absent from duty atleast on eleven occasions and he was awarded minor punishment atleast on three occasions and, therefore, considering unauthorized absence of the appellant in the past on eleven occasions, the decision of the departmental authority to dismiss the appellant from service could not have been interfered by the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

12. In "Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India" (1987) 4 SCC 611" the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the writ Court in exercise of the powers of judicial review shall not interfere with the punishment order unless it is

demonstrated that the order of punishment is so outrageous to the logic or disproportionate to the charge framed and found proved that shocks the conscience of the Court. The present case does not fall under the category of such cases. In "Maharashtra State Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. Hariprasad Drupadrao Jadhao" (2006) 3 SCC 690 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the question of punishment shall fall within the domain of the executive powers of the departmental authority.

13. Having regard to the limited powers of judicial review, the writ Court rightly declined to interfere with the punishment order. We also do not see any reason to defer with the writ Court's opinion and, accordingly, LPA No. 247 of 2023 is dismissed.

(Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J.)

(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Tanuj/-