Debashis Ghoshal vs State Of Jharkhand
2024 Latest Caselaw 1591 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Debashis Ghoshal vs State Of Jharkhand on 17 February, 2024

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

                                         1                        Cr.M.P. No. 8 of 2016


          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                    Cr.M.P. No. 8 of 2016
       Debashis Ghoshal, son of Late Debabrata Ghoshal, resident of
       Godabari Apartment, P.O. & P.S. Gopalpur, District- Asansol, West
       Bengal                                   ... Petitioner

                                -Versus-
1.     State of Jharkhand
2.     Shyam Dutt Sharma, S/o Late Jeevan Sharma, resident of Lohar Tola,
       P.O., P.S. & District- Ramgarh, at present working for M/s MA Chinna
       Mastika Group of Companies as Manager of M/s Bhaskar Steel Pvt.
       Ltd., Binjhar, Ranchi Road, opposite Ashok Cinema, P.O. & P.S. Giddi,
       District- Hazaribag, Jharkhand               ... Opposite Parties

                                 -----

PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

-----

For the Petitioner             : Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, Advocate
For the State                  : Mr. Achinto Sen, A.P.P.
For O.P. No.2                  : Mr. Sidhartha Roy, Advocate
                                 -----

C.A.V. on 08.02.2024                             Pronounced on 17.02.2024

Heard Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, learned counsel for the petitioner,

Mr. Achinto Sen, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Sidhartha Roy,

learned counsel for opposite party no.2.

2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the order dated

08.04.2015 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Hazaribag, whereby, an

application filed under Section 239 Cr.P.C. for discharge of the petitioner has

been dismissed in connection with Giddi P.S. Case No.81/2011,

corresponding to G.R. No.3426/2011 registered under Section 406/420 of

the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The prayer is also made for quashing of the order dated 14.10.2015 passed

by the learned Sessions Judge, Hazaribag in Criminal Revision No.76/2015,

whereby, the revision application preferred against the order dated

08.04.2015 has been dismissed, pending in the Court of the learned

S.D.J.M., Hazaribag.

3. The FIR was registered on the written report of Sham Dutt Sharma,

who is the Manager of new established company, namely, Bhaskar Steel Pvt.

Ltd. of Maa Chhinnamastika Group of Company alleging therein that the

petitioner-Debashish Ghoshal, Managing Director of Asansol Infotech and

Industrial Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. whose registered office is at G.T. Road,

Godavari Apartment, Gopalpur, Asansol came to the informant's office on

10.08.2011 and gave some materials, brochures and C.D. to the informant

and said that he has brought some new technology from China and asked

the informant to build a new factory, it would give lots of benefit. It was

further alleged that the petitioner taking the informant into confidence took

a cheque of Rs.51,00,000/- Lakh and remained absconded for three

months. When the informant made enquiry then he came to know that

there is no such technology from China and when the informant put the

cheque for encashment then the cheque was bounced for insufficient fund

and stop payment.

4. Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that

the investigation was not made in accordance with law. He submitted that

the Investigating Officer has submitted final form in absence of any cogent

material against the petitioner and the petitioner has been put to trial. He

further submitted that no case under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian

Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is made out.

He also submitted that the entire case of prosecution is devoid of criminal

mens rea and the instant prosecution is merely a misuse of the process of

law. By way of referring the contents of the FIR, he submitted that if any

case is made out i.e. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

and no case under the Indian Penal Code is made out. He further submitted

that merely dishonour of the cheque in view of the stop payment

endorsement made by the petitioner to the bank, if any is made out,

however, wrongly the case has been registered under Sections 406 and 420

of the Indian Penal Code and charge-sheet has been submitted. He also

submitted that since within mandatory provision, notice with regard to

payment of cheque was not made and that is why, false FIR was registered.

He further submitted that the cheque in question being chief material

exhibit, was not produced by the informant in course of the investigation

and the said cheque is not part of the documents submitted by the

Investigating Officer under Section 173(3) Cr.P.C. along with final form. He

submitted that the informant has concealed the fact that there is existence

of an agreement between the Director of M/s Ma Chinnamastika Sponge

Iron Private Limited, namely, Pradip Bhardwaj and the employer of the

informant and the terms and conditions of the said agreement discuss entire

gamut of business proposition and its transactions between the parties to

the agreement, which also contained the arbitration clause. He further

submitted that the said cheque was taken by the Director of M/s Ma

Chinnamastika Sponge Iron Private Limited, namely, Pradip Bhardwaj from

the petitioner at the gun point by putting him in tremendous fear of life. He

submitted that the entire case of prosecution is lacking in view of the

evidentiary materials on the record. He further submitted that the petitioner

filed the discharge petition under Section 239 Cr.P.C., which was rejected by

the learned Trial Court vide order dated 08.04.2015, against that, the

petitioner preferred Criminal Revision No.76/2015, which was also dismissed

vide order dated 14.10.2015. He further submitted that the allegation with

regard to coming to the premises and convinced with regard to issue the

cheque of Rs.51 Lakhs is false. He submitted that the petitioner was taking

several works of the said company since 2007 and one of such work was

undertaken by the parent company i.e. M/s Ma Chinnamastika Sponge Iron

Private Limited, which has issued a work completion certificate vide letter

dated 09.02.2010, contained in Annexure-4. By way of referring

Annexure-6, he submitted that by letter dated 21.10.2011, the petitioner

has stated about manufacturing status of plant and equipment for 500 TPD

iron ore sinter and 100 TPD briquetting/pellesting plant as on date and also

for clearing the dues of Rs.7,57,774/- by giving details of work done. He

submitted that another letter dated 01.11.2011 was sent and request was

made for payment of rest of the amount of Rs.43,61,840/-. He also

submitted that the said cheque was obtained from the petitioner at the gun

point by putting him in tremendous fear of life and, thereafter, the

complainant/informant filed P.C. Case No.101/2011. He further submitted

that M/s Asansol Infotech and Industrial Consultancy Services Limited

(AIICSL) has issued legal notice dated 14.11.2011 through Advocate

addressed to the informant demanding to return of cheque and

balance payment of Rs.44,00,000/- within 7 days. On these facts, he

submitted that no case of cheating under Sections 406 and 420 of

the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act is made out. He relied upon the

judgment passed by Patna High Court in the case of Praveen Kumar v.

The State of Bihar in Criminal Miscellaneous No.25231 of 2011 and

submitted that in identical situation, Patna High Court has been pleased to

set aside the order taking cognizance so far as Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned. He further submitted that mere

breach of contract and cheating would depend upon the intention of the

accused at the time of alleged inducement and if that is lacking, the

proceeding under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not

warranted. To buttress this argument, he relied upon the judgment passed

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of International Advanced

Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI)

and others v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Limited and others ,

reported in (2016) 1 SCC 348. Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the said

judgment read as under:

"14. In the light of the well-settled principles, it is to be seen whether the allegations made in the complaint filed against ARCI and its officers for the alleged failure to develop extruded ceramic honeycomb as per specifications disclose offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420 IPC. It is to be seen that whether the averments in the complaint make out a case to constitute an offence of cheating.

15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant.

16. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If it is established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very time when he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all that is established is that a representation made by the accused has subsequently not

been kept, criminal liability cannot be foisted on the accused and the only right which the complainant acquires is the remedy for breach of contract in a civil court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] , this Court held as under: (SCC p. 250, para 21) "21. ... In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating."

The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] was referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC 553 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 751]"

Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sarkhel, learned counsel for the

petitioner submitted that the petitioner may kindly be discharged.

5. On the principle of discharge, he relied upon the judgment passed by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Prafulla

Kumar Samal and another, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4. Paragraph 10

of the said judgment reads as under:

"10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a

senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sarkhel, learned counsel for the

petitioner submitted that the Court is not required to merely act as a post

office or mouthpiece of the prosecution and considering the above

judgment, the petitioner is fit to be discharged.

6. On the point of discharge, Mr. Sarkhel, learned counsel for the

petitioner further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. Central Bureau of

Investigation, Bengaluru, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768. Paragraph 17

of the said judgment reads as under:

"17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] and discern the following principles:

17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, "cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial".

17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This,

however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. 17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused."

Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sarkhel submitted that if some

materials of strong suspicion are there, then only the discharge petition can

be dismissed, which is lacking in the case in hand.

7. On the point of discharge, Mr. Sarkhel further relied upon the

judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Vijayan

v. State of Kerala and another, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398.

Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the said judgment are as under:

"10. Before considering the merits of the claim of both the parties, it is useful to refer to Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as under:

"227.Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."

If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge

against him.

12. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39 :

1977 SCC (Cri) 533] , wherein this Court observed as follows:

(SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. ... Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial."

This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the trial Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused.

13. In a subsequent decision i.e. in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , this Court after adverting to the conditions enumerated in Section 227 of the Code and other decisions of this Court, enunciated the following principles: (SCC p. 9, para 10) "(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has

to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.""

Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sarkhel submitted that strong

suspicion is lacking in the case in hand and in view of that, the petitioner is

fit to be discharged.

8. The said arguments of Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel has been resisted by

Mr. Siddhartha Roy, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 on the ground

that the petitioner has induced opposite party no.2 to part with Rs.51 Lakhs

and even after the same, no work was done as there was no technology

from China and everything was a blatant lie. He further submitted that so

far as the documents at Annexure-4 onwards are concerned, on which, the

petitioner is relying, those are forged documents and for the first time, the

same have been produced before this Court, which were not subject matter

before the learned Trial Court or the Revisional Court and in view of that,

those documents are not fit to be considered by this Court. He submitted

that so far Annexure-4 is concerned, the same is not connected with the

present case. By way of referring Annexure-5, he submitted that it is a

forged document as admittedly all the pages are not signed by the

Managing Director of the company and only the last page is signed by the

Managing Director and the said signature is forged as overlapping of stamps

is pertinent in the last page. He further submitted that Annexure-5 is the

document of 16.12.2010 and admittedly the date of occurrence in FIR is

10.08.2011 and different figures are shown in Annexures-6, 7, 9 and 10

annexed with the petition. By way of referring Annexure-12, he submitted

that the said document was issued after 1 ½ years from the date of

institution of the FIR. He also submitted that so far as Annexure-8 is

concerned, it is the case registered by the petitioner and the same was

investigated by the police and final form was submitted in favour of the

Managing Director of the company and against that, no protest petition was

filed by the petitioner. He further submitted that even if the case under

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well as Sections 406 and

420 of the Indian Penal Code is registered, both provisions can go

simultaneously. To buttress this argument, he relied upon the judgment

passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sangeetaben

Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another , reported in

2012 (7) SCC 621.

9. On the point of not entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

after dismissal of the revision petition, Mr. Roy, learned counsel for opposite

party no.2 relied upon the judgment passed by Gauhati High Court in the

case of Deba Prasad Dutta v. Madhumita Sharma , reported in 2023

SCC OnLine Gau 842.

10. On the point of entertaining the Revisional Court's order, he relied

upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , reported in 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 1294.

11. Mr. Roy, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 further submitted

that if the case of the petitioner is being considered on the discharge

petition, the same is required to be considered in light of the judgment

passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh @ Sachin

Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra , reported in (2008) 10 SCC

394 and the same was further considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Sandeep Sunil Kumar Loharia v. Sumeet Ganpatrao

Bachewar and another in Criminal Appeal No.1051 of 2018 [Arising

out of SLP (Crl.) No.2313 of 2017] and tagged matters .

12. Mr. Roy, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 further submitted

that if the amount is taken on assurance to complete the project and the

amount was paid on inducement and the work was not completed, the case

of cheating is made out. He relied upon the judgment passed by this Court

in the case of Anuj Kumahar @ Anuj Kumar and others v. The State

of Jharkhand and another in Cr.M.P. No.1057 of 2014.

13. It is an admitted position that the petitioner and the informant have

entered into transaction for installing a plant on Chinese technology. It

appears that after taking cheque of Rs.51 Lakhs, the petitioner was

traceless for about 3 months and thereafter he was traced and he has

issued a cheque of Rs.51 Lakhs in favour of opposite party no.2, which was

instructed as stop payment by the petitioner. In spite of issuance of cheque,

it was not encashed, opposite party no.2 was required to take remedy

under the Negotiable Instruments Act. It appears that statutory notice etc.

was not issued and the present FIR was registered, which clearly suggests

that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not made out.

14. With regard to installing new plant on Chinese technology, there are

allegations of taking the amount on the pretext of Chinese technology,

however, there was no such technology in China. Further, the document

relied by the petitioner with regard to the certificate dated 09.02.2010,

contained in Annexure-4 was said to be forged and the agreement was said

to be signed by the Managing Director only on the last page that too on the

stamp, which is further disputed by opposite party no.2. In this background,

it appears that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case, so

far as Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned.

15. There is no doubt that the document of unimpeachable character can

be considered, however, if such dispute is there, that cannot be appreciated

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A reference may be made to the judgment passed

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills

Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited and others , reported in (2008)

13 SCC 678. Paragraph 22 of the said judgment reads as under:

"22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious of the fact that although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant immediately. The courts on the one hand should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be maintainable."

16. In the judgment relied by Mr. Sarkhel, learned counsel for the

petitioner in the case of Praveen Kumar (supra) in identical situation, the

case under Sections 406 and 420 was maintained, however, the case under

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was set aside and finding of

not making out the case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act in the present case has already been taken note of by this Court in

paragraph 13 of this judgment.

17. There is no doubt that mere breach of contract and cheating would

depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged

inducement, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Mettalurgy and New

Materials (supra) as relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner,

however, in the case in hand, it has been alleged that the said technology

was never introduced by China and on the said ground, the amount was

taken. Thus, that dispute is distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of

the present case.

18. The judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well

as opposite party no.2 on the point of discharge, are not in dispute. The

principle laid down therein are there. It is well settled that the Courts are

not post office and prima facie case is required to be examined at the time

of framing of the charge. In the case in hand, what has been discussed

hereinabove, so far as Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code is

concerned, it appears that prima facie case is made out and in view of that,

those judgments are distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the

present case.

19. Further it is well settled that if injustice is not done, in the garb of

Section 482 Cr.P.C., second revision is not maintainable after dismissal of the

revision petition. In the case in hand, the Court finds that so far as the case

under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, that is

not made out and, as such, the petitioner is discharged from liability of

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court further finds that

the case under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code is

maintained.

20. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the learned Court

will proceed under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, in

accordance with law.

21. Accordingly, this petition is allowed in part in above terms and

disposed of.

22. Interim order, if any granted by this Court, is vacated.

                                                       (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated: the 17th day of February, 2024
Ajay/         N.A.F.R.